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ABSTRACT
CONFRONTING THE WAR MACHINE:
DRAFT RESISTANCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
by
Michael S. Foley
University of New Hampshire, May 1999

This dissertation recovers the history o f the draft resistance movement in Boston
during the Vietnam War. It is a blend o f social, political, and cultural history that seeks
not merely to assert the importance o f draft resistance to our understanding o f the antiwar
movement and the Vietnam War era, but also to capture the experience o f draft resisters
and their supporters.
It is an actor-oriented history. The sources used include the personal private
manuscript collections of participants, court records, underground newspapers, a 1997
survey administered to 310 former resisters and draft resistance activists (185 responded),
and interviews with more than 60 movement participants. The resulting analysis,
consequently, captures the backgrounds, motivations and justifications o f resisters and
their friends, how their draft resistance work affected their lives at home, at school and at
work, and, more broadly, how it affected the rest o f their lives.
Ultimately, this history, told largely in narrative form, recounts the story o f those
who violated draft laws as a way o f confronting the war machine rather than dodging it.
By openly defying Selective Service laws and inviting the government to prosecute them,

xv
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draft resisters and their allies raised the stakes for everyone opposed to the war. Draft
resistance, unlike other forms o f protest at the time, mobilized the local antiwar
community to take positive action against the administration and against the war in ways
that marches and teach-ins could not. Moreover, by returning draft cards to the Justice
Department, draft resisters forced the Johnson administration to take the antiwar
movement seriously for the first time.
Draft resistance activists possessed a certain moral clarity that created in them an
impatient sense of citizenship. It was the most striking characteristic o f the movement.
In the earliest days, it caused resisters and supporters to advocate a strategy of protest that
resulted in personal risks ranging from beatings at the hands of a mob to government
prosecution and incarceration. They chose to disrupt their lives and those o f their loved
ones to protest the war in the strongest way possible. Eventually, that impatience also led
to the movement’s dissolution.

xvi
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INTRODUCTION

DRAFT RESISTERS AND DRAFT DODGERS:
MUHAMMAD ALI. BILL CLINTON, AND CONSCRIPTION DURING THE
VIETNAM WAR

Nothing can bring you peace but yourself. Nothing can bring you
peace but the triumph o f principles.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Self-Reliance, 1841
On April 28, 1967, the best known Vietnam War-era draft resister refused
induction into the United States Army. Amid unprecedented media scrutiny and public
attention, Muhammad Ali. the heavyweight boxing champion of the world, entered the
United States Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station in Houston, Texas. For
months, Americans had listened to Ali say that he would not answer his country’s call to
serve, and now the day of reckoning arrived. Following the customary physical
examinations and the completion o f endless paperwork, Ali and 25 other draftees stepped
into the induction ceremony room. The officer in charge of the induction, Lieutenant
Steven Dunkley, stood at the podium and explained to the recruits that each man should
step forward after hearing his name called; that single step, he said, would mark one’s
official entry into the Army. He started to read the list alphabetically and soon came to
Ali’s name. When he called out "Muhammad Ali,” however, the champ did not move.
He called “Cassius Clay,” Ali’s birth name, and again the boxer stood still. As Lt.
Dunkley continued with the ceremony, two other officers led Ali out of the room and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2
explained the penalties for induction refusal. When Ali indicated that he would not
change his mind, the officers asked him to draw up an explanatory statement. “I refuse
to be inducted into the armed forces o f the United States because I claim to be exempt as
a minister o f the religion of Islam,” Ali wrote. Then they let him go. As the United
States Army’s newest recruits boarded a bus to Fort Polk, Louisiana, Muhammad Ali
emerged from the induction center a hero to some and a traitor to others.1
For this individual act o f draft resistance, the boxing establishment and the federal
government did what none o f Muhammad Ali’s opponents in the ring could do: they
punished him and took away his title. Within an hour o f his induction refusal, the New
York State Athletic Commission, unwilling to wait for the outcome o f Ali’s inevitable
trial, announced that they no longer recognized him as the World Boxing Association
heavyweight champion and revoked his license to fight. Ten days later, a Houston grand
jury indicted Ali, and on June 20,1967, a jury o f six men and six women (all white)
heard Ali’s case; at the end o f the day. after twenty minutes of deliberation, they returned
with a verdict o f guilty. The judge sentenced Ali to five years in prison and a $ 10,000
fine, both the maximum allowed.2
Although he stood at the threshold o f his best years as an athlete, the heavyweight
champion gave up the promise o f millions o f dollars o f income to make a point.

1 Steven Dunkley interview in Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, Voices o f
Freedom: An Oral History o f the Civil Rights Movementfrom the 1950s through the
1980s (New York: Bantam, 1990), pp. 331-333.
2 Thomas Hauser, Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times (New York: Touchstone,
1991), pp. 172, 179.
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Officially, the statement Ali scribbled at the induction center argued that he should be
awarded a ministerial deferment from the draft because o f his membership in the Nation
o f Islam (all male members are considered ministers o f the faith), but his public
statements exposed deeper roots to his disobedience. “Why should they ask me, another
so-called Negro,” he said, “to put on a uniform and go 10,000 miles from home and drop
bombs and bullets on brown people in Vietnam while so-called Negro people in
Louisville [his hometown] are treated like dogs and denied simple human rights?”3
While he did not at first perpetrate this act o f defiance as a protest against the war per se,
his resistance to the machinery o f the draft and the war was an act o f principle, and it set
an important precedent for a budding movement o f men prepared to resist the draft - not
dodge it - as a form of mass civil disobedience aimed at undermining the nation’s
conscription efforts and ending the war.
The American public, the media, and the government regarded Muhammad Ali’s
draft resistance as an isolated case, unlikely to gamer widespread support from his fellow
citizens; nevertheless, the broader significance of his act did not escape some
commentators. In the wake o f Ali's induction refusal, for example, New York Times
columnist Tom Wicker speculated on the impact of thousands of Muhammad Alis
refusing to comply with the draft. Referring to Ali as a “strange pathetic Negro boxer,
superbly gifted in body, painfully warped in spirit,” Wicker argued that Ali’s act of
defiance exposed the “ultimate danger to a government that outrages a powerful and
passionate m inority.” What could the government do, Wicker asked, if 100,000 draft age

3 “Clay Says He Will Not Step Forward,” New York Times, 21 April 1967, p. 29.
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men “flatly refused to serve” in the military? “A hundred thousand Muhammad
Alis...could be jailed. But if the Johnson administration had to prosecute 100,000
Americans in order to maintain its authority, its real power to purse the Vietnamese war
or any other policy would be crippled if not destroyed.”4 Here Wicker anticipated the
logic that draft resistance leaders would adopt in inaugurating a nationwide draft
resistance movement in the fall o f 1967. In fact, resisters later used excerpts from
Wicker’s editorial - the figure o f 100,000 draft resisters, in particular, became a
movement target - to promote their massive campaign to disable the draft and stop the
war.
To date, draft resistance has been virtually forgotten or, at best, understated by
historians o f this period. And thanks to several high profile draft “dodger” cases, the
public’s distinction between draft evaders and draft resisters is imperceptible; anyone
who violated a draft law, it seems, was and is a draft dodger. This dissertation charts the
history o f the draft resistance movement in Boston, where its impact was greatest. It
argues that at the height o f American prosecution of the war in Vietnam, draft resistance
raised the stakes for the antiwar movement (and the administration) by emphasizing
personal risk for the war’s opponents and by pushing it toward more radical tactics of
civil disobedience and direct confrontation with the government. As a result, the Johnson
administration found itself taking the antiwar movement seriously for the first time.

4 Tom Wicker, “In the Nation: Muhammad Ali and Dissent,” New York Times, 2
May 1967, p. 46.
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5
Context: The Historian’s View
Since the end o f the Vietnam War, historians have written a number of very solid
accounts o f the antiwar movement. All o f these have attempted to provide a national
view of what was, essentially, a very decentralized movement made up o f hundreds, if not
thousands of organizations, many of which acted as their own movements within a
movement.5 The production of national narratives like these is fairly typical in the early
stages of historical analysis on any subject, but in an attempt to provide a cohesive picture
o f a national movement, they inevitably direct most of their attention toward the famous
names and largest organizations; the local context in which most social movements thrive
gets lost. For example, with the exception of Tom Wells’s The War Within, each of these
histories of opposition to the war interweaves brief discussions of draft resistance with
discussions of the rest o f the antiwar movement, thus minimizing its import. This has
occurred, no doubt, because of the localized emphasis of the draft resistance movement;
though the Resistance existed in name as a national organization, in reality it was made
up of dozens of largely independent, local draft resistance organizations who, at most.

5 Thomas Powers, Vietnam: The War at Home (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1984);
Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War
in Vietnam, 1963-1975 (Garden City. NY: Doubleday, 1984); Melvin Small, Johnson,
Nixon, and the Doves (New Brunswick. NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988); Charles
DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement o f the Vietnam Era
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Tom Wells, The War Within: America’s
Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). For a broader
trajectory of the peace movement since the 1930s, see Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels
Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933-1983 (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1984). And for a national overview written by an active leader in the
antiwar movement, see Fred Halstead, Out Now! A Participant's Account o f the
American Movement Against the Vietnam War, 2nd ed. (New York: Pathfinder, 1991).
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stayed in touch with one another and, on occasion, coordinated protests for the same day.
Weils gives the most attention to draft resistance, but even he understates its impact.
Although he credits draft resistance with affecting the rest o f the antiwar movement and
American policy in Vietnam, he provides comparatively few details about the lives and
motivations o f rank and file draft resisters and, instead, relies on a few interviews with
former Resistance leaders.6
Now that a preliminary understanding of the national organizations and their
leaders has been achieved, it makes sense to turn our attention toward the antiwar
movement in smaller geographic areas or toward individual strains o f protest within the
broader antiwar movement.7 Kenneth Heineman’s study of the antiwar movement on
several state college campuses, Amy Swerdlow’s history of Women Strike for Peace, and
Richard Moser’s analysis of GI and veteran protest against the war are excellent examples
o f the new directions antiwar scholarship has taken. This study will add a history o f the
draft resistance movement to that list.8

6 Wells, The War Within, pp. 191-195, 268-270. Even Wells’s chronology o f the
entire antiwar movement in 1967 and 1968 (the period, he argues, o f the antiwar
movement’s most effective influence on government policy) shows that draft resistance
dominated antiwar activity at that time, pp. 584-585.
7 See Christian Appy, “Give Peace Activism a Chance,” Reviews in American
History 23 (March 1995), p. 142.
8 Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State
Universities in the Vietnam Era (New York: NYU Press, 1993); Amy Swerdlow, Women
Strike fo r Peace: Traditional M otherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1993); Richard Moser, The New Winter Soldiers: G la n d
Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1996). See also, James Tracy, Direct Action: Radical Pacifism From the Union Eight to
the Chicago Seven (University o f Chicago Press, 1996), which, although it deals with a
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What is most surprising about the scant level o f attention paid to draft resistance
in the history of the Vietnam War era is that historians have had several significant
studies on the subject, produced in the years immediately following the movement’s
demise, available to them as an indication o f its importance. First among these is The
Resistance, written by historian Staughton Lynd with Michael Ferber, a founder of the
New England Resistance, in 1971. Like the larger antiwar movement histories that
followed it, that book presented a national view o f draft resistance that likewise
emphasized the experience o f leading organizers and strategists but which, at least,
demonstrated its significance to the movement.9 In addition, two significant sociological
studies analyzed the draft resistance movement o f the Vietnam era as well.10 And two
collections o f resister accounts appeared in 1968 and 1970: Alice Lynd’s We Won't Go
and Dr. Willard Gaylin’s study o f war resisters in prison, In the Service o f Their Country.
Both books made it into paperback and found a wide audience among the general

broader period, deserves to be put in this category o f new antiwar scholarship as well.
9 Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971).
10 Barrie Thome, '‘Resisting the Draft: An Ethnography o f the Draft Resistance
Movement,” Ph.D. diss., Brandeis Univ., 1971; Michael Useem, Conscription, Protest,
and Social Conflict: The Life and Death o f a Draft Resistance Movement (New York:
Wiley, 1973). Unlike the present study, both o f these projects, rooted in solid
sociological analysis, examined draft resistance organizations especially regarding
strategies, tactics, and backgrounds of the activists. They have both been important to my
conceptualization of this project. In addition, I have benefitted from the use o f an
unpublished manuscript about the Boston Draft Resistance Group, written in the early
1970s by sociologist Charles S. Fisher.
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public.11 Except for a 1967 book on teach-ins and a 1975 study of GI protest against the
war, no other subgroup within the antiwar movement became the focus o f such extensive
scholarly and public interest as draft resistance did in the years during and immediately
after the war.12
In spite o f the availability of such sources, draft resistance has only barely made it
into our histories of the 1960s and, as a result, has not begun to make inroads into the
college textbooks that American students read in their surveys of American history. Todd
Gitlin’s influential history/memoir called The Sixties, for example, describes draft
resistance as just one of the “varieties o f antiwar experience.” Likewise, Terry
Anderson’s popular book, The Movement and the Sixties, devotes approximately two of
its 423 pages to draft resistance.13 Even the books on the events of 1968 contain few

11 Alice Lynd, We Won't Go: Personal Accounts o f War Objectors (Boston:
Beacon, 1968); Willard Gaylin, M.D., In the Service o f Their Country: War Resisters in
Prison (New York: Viking, 1970).
12 Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh, ed., Teach-ins USA: Reports, Opinions,
Documents (New York: Praeger, 1967); David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The
American M ilitary Today (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1975).
13 Todd Gitiin, The Sixties: Years o f Hope, Days o f Rage (New York: Bantam,
1988), see pp. 291-292; Terry Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in
America From Greensboro to Wounded Knee (New York: Oxford, 1995); David Burner,
M aking Peace With the 60s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) treats draft
resistance in one paragraph; James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron
to the Siege o f Chicago (New York: Touchstone, 1987) focuses primarily on Students for
a Democratic Society and draft resistance is all but ignored; Allen Matusow, The
Unraveling ofAmerica: the History o f Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper &
Row, 1984), like Anderson, gives draft resistance a couple o f pages; John Morton Blum,
Years o f Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 (New York: Norton, 1991),
p. 278, places draft resistance earlier than it actually occurred and makes it seem more
like an SDS effort than it was; David Farber, The Age o f Great Dreams: American in the
1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), gives a brief, incorrect representation of draft
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references to draft resistance, which is most puzzling given the amount o f space it
occupied in big city newspapers acrosis the country that year, especially from January to
July.14 Furthermore, critics of the sixties generation or of the antiwar movement
emphasize the most militant factions of the New Left and Civil Rights Movement and,
consequently, suspend attention to draft resistance.15
By the time the history of draft resistance filters down from studies on the antiwar
movement to surveys about the 1960s and then textbooks, the portrayal is often absent or
incorrect. To the extent that some textbooks or syntheses on the 1960s discuss the draft
and protest against it, the emphasis inevitably centers on draft card burning or draft
evasion - which were not at all synonymous with draft resistance. Although early draft
resistance events sometimes included a small proportion of resisters burning their draft
cards, the movement quickly realized that card burning was easily misinterpreted by the
public (see chapter 4) and abandoned it. Likewise, although some in the draft resistance
movement certainly extended their definition of resistance to men who avoided service,

resistance: “A group called the Resistance urged young men to bum their draft cards in
public. Thousands did.”; Terry Anderson, The Sixties (New York: Longman, 1999)
ignores draft resistance altogether.
14 David Caute, The Year o f the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 127-135, Caute provides a breezy summary of draft
resistance in 1968 and directs almost all of his attention to the Spock Trial rather than to
the tactic o f resistance; Ronald Fraser, ed. 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt (New
York: Pantheon, 1988); Jules Witcover, The Year the Dream Died: Revisiting 1968 in
America (New York: Warner Books, 1997).
15 See, for example, Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation:
Second Thoughts About the 60s (New York: Summit, 1990) and Adam Garfinkle, Telltale
Hearts: The Origins and Impact o f the Antiwar Movement (New York: St. Martin’s,
1995).
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the majority o f resisters made a sharp distinction between the two and resented sweeping
generalizations that characterized resisters and dodgers in similar terms. Even so, it is the
burners and dodgers who appear most prominently in textbooks and other general studies
o f the 1960s.'6

16 An unscientific sampling o f 14 of current college textbooks reveals the
emphasis on the more controversial burning of draft cards and draft dodging. Only James
Henretta. et al, America: A Concise History (Boston: Bedford Books, 1999) actually
name the Resistance and its Omega symbol. Even so, they emphasize draft card burnings
and make it seem as though the Resistance supported draft dodgers: “Several thousand
young men ignored their induction notices risking prosecution for draft evasion. Others
left the country, most for Canada or Sweden. The Resistance, started at Berkeley and
Stanford and widely recognized by its omega symbol, supported these draft resisters.”
For other textbooks which either ignore or barely mention draft resistance, see the
following: George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, America: A Narrative History, 4th ed.
(New York: Norton, 1996), Vol. II, p. 1441, mention draft resistance but lump it together
in a paragraph mostly about draft dodging; James West Davidson, et al, Nation o f
Nations: A Narrative History o f the American Public, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill,
1998), Vol. II, p. 1105, emphasizes burnings, no mention o f resistance; John A. Garraty.
The American Nation (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), Vol II., p. 833, discusses the
draft only, not draft resistance; Carol Berkin, et al, M aking America-. A History o f the
United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1999), Vol. II, pp. 957-958. addresses draft
evasion, not resistance; Mary Beth Norton, et al, A People and a Nation: A History o f the
United States, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), Vol. II, p. 941, discusses draft
dodging and protests at draft boards, but not draft resistance; Gary Nash, et al, The
American People: Creating a Nation and a Society, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1998),
Vol. II, p. 981, mentions Muhammad Ali and a “campaign” against the draft without
being more specific; Paul Boyer, et al, The Enduring Vision (Lexington, D.C.Heath,
1996), Vol. II, pp. 986, 983, briefly mentions draft resistance (though they incorrectly
state that hundreds of protesters at the Spring Mobe in New York on April 15, 1967 threw
their cards into a bonfire. In reality, fewer than one hundred lit their cards with cigarette
lighters and dropped them in a coffee can that people passed around); Alan Brinkley,
American History: A Survey, 10th ed., (New York: McGraw Hill, 1999), p. 1070, and
Alan Brinkley and Ellen Fitzpatrick, America in Modern Times: Since 1890 (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1997), p. 513, although they make the distinction between resistance and
draft dodging, they emphasize draft dodging; American Social History Project, Who Built
America?: Working People and the Nation's Economy, Politics, Culture & Society (New
York: Pantheon, 1992), Vol. II, p. 569, does not discuss draft resistance but, consistent
with its emphasis on the experience o f working people, emphasizes the inequitable draft
deferment system; David Burner, et al, Firsthand America, 4th ed., (St. James, NY:
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More recently, several new collections of oral histories have been published
which focus on conscientious objectors and draft dodgers. All are sympathetic portrayals
and two o f them, Sherry Sherson Gottlieb’s Hell No, We W on’t Go!: Resisting the Draft
During the Vietnam War and Alan Haig-Brown’s Hell No, We Won’t Go: Vietnam Draft
Resisters in Canada, use the term draft resister in their titles to describe men who, by
draft resistance standards, dodged the draft - either by fleeing the country or by carrying
out some ploy that got them rejected by the Selective Service. The blurring of this
distinction is profoundly annoying to former draft resisters who today find themselves
stressing the difference whenever they talk about it. Part of the reason they chose to resist
the draft, after all, derived from a sense o f unfairness in the Selective Service System, the
machinery of which provided “safety valves” that channeled potential troublemakers or
recalcitrants out o f the system while others took their places on the battlefield; to accept
one of the deferments that marked a man ineligible for service or even to leave the
country was tantamount to letting the system win. The confusion of draft resister and
draft dodger labels has become so frustrating that one draft resistance leader has said on
several occasions (only partially in jest) that when he dies, his epitaph should read, “I
Didn’t Dodge, I Resisted.” 17

Brandywine, 1996), Vol II, p. 958, emphasizes draft card burning and the Berrigan
brothers; John M. Murrin, Liberty, Equality, Power, 2nd ed., (Orlando: Harcourt Brace,
1999), Vol. II, p. 1006, focuses on draft card burnings; Thomas Bailey, et al, The
American Pageant, 11th ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), p. 953, mentions draft
card burnings only.
17 James Tollefson, The Strength N ot to Fight: An Oral History o f Conscientious
Objectors o f the Vietnam War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Sherry Sherson Gottlieb,
Hell No, We W on’t Go!: Resisting the D raft During the Vietnam War (New York: Viking,
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The primary aim o f this dissertation is to recover a history that is at risk of being
lost altogether. More than that, the type of history that is recovered is o f even greater
importance than its resurrection. This dissertation is a blend of social, political, and
cultural history that seeks not merely to assert the importance of draft resistance to our
understanding o f the antiwar movement and the Vietnam War era. but also to capture the
experience of draft resisters and their supporters. It is an actor-oriented history. The
sources used range from the written materials of draft resistance organizations to United
States District Court records, from underground newspapers to a 1997 survey
administered to 310 former resisters and other draft resistance activists (185 responded).

1991); Alan Haig-Brown, Hell No, We Won 7 Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada
(Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 1996). Epitaph quote from Michael Ferber.
Note: More encouraging is that draft resistance sources are slowly making their
way into the document readers that history professors so frequently use in upper-level
courses on the Vietnam War and the 1960s. For examples of document readers that
include draft resistance, see Marvin Gettleman, et al, Vietnam and America: A
Documented History, 2nd ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1995) and Alexander Bloom and
Wini Breines, Takin ’It To the Streets: A Sixties Reader (New York: Oxford, 1995). Even
so, the same cannot be said for the standard syntheses on the war, which generally include
one chapter out of ten or more on the antiwar movement. Just as draft resistance is
marginalized in college textbooks, it receives less attention than draft card burnings and
draft evasion in these surveys of the war. For syntheses o f the Vietnam War, see Marilyn
Young, The Vietnam Wars (New York: Harper, 1991); George Herring, Am erica’s
Longest War, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996); Gabriel Kolko, The Anatomy o f a
War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience (New York:
Pantheon, 1985); George Donelson Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal, 2nd ed., (New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1994); Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking,
1983); Gloria Emerson, Winners and Losers (New York: Penguin, 1976). In addition, no
entry on draft resistance appears in either Paul Buhle, et al, Encyclopedia o f the American
Left (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1992), or Stanley Kutler, Encyclopedia o f the
Vietnam War (New York: Macmillan, 1996). Likewise, entries on the Antiwar
Movement, Conscientious Objectors, and Selective Service in Kutler barely mention draft
resistance (see pp. 30-46, 148, and 493-494), though it receives one paragraph in the entry
on the Supreme Court.
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and from personal papers to interviews with more than 60 participants in the movement.
A considerable portion of the resulting analysis is, consequently, directed at capturing the
backgrounds, motivations and justifications o f resisters and their friends, how their draft
resistance work affected their lives at home, at school and at work, and, more broadly,
how it affected the rest o f their lives. That said, the dissertation does not neglect the
organizational structure of draft resistance groups, the strategies conceived and tactics
employed, as well as the contests for power within those organizations. These topics
raise important issues, too.
In addition, much of the dissertation is concerned with the response to draft
resistance by the public, the press, and most important, the federal government. It is
especially attentive to the manner in which both the Selective Service System and the
Department o f Justice reacted to the open defiance o f draft laws by resisters and their
supporters, and how many of their cases - famous and not-so-famous - played out in the
courts.
To begin to understand the varieties o f historical experience generated by the draft
resistance movement in the late 1960s, one must first grasp the context in which they
were created. To do that, a brief history o f the war and the draft are in order.
Context: The Vietnam War and the Selective Service System. 1950 to 1965
American intervention in Vietnam dated to the years immediately following the
Second World War. Under President Harry Truman, the United States supported French
efforts to reestablish colonial hegemony in Southeast Asia and, by the early 1950s,
provided eighty percent of the funds spent by France in fighting the Viet Minh, the
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nationalist, communist, guerrilla movement led by Ho Chi Minh. When, in 1954, the
French suffered their final defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the United States witnessed the
signing o f the Geneva Accords, an agreement which called for the temporary separation

o f Vietnam into two regions, north and south, at the 17th parallel. In 1956, the Accords
stipulated, a national election would be held to reunite the country as one independent
nation.
Almost immediately, the Eisenhower administration intervened in Vietnam to
prevent its reunification. Recognizing that Ho Chi Minh might win as much as 80
percent o f the vote, and fearing that a communist Vietnam might lead neighboring
countries to fall to communism, too, Eisenhower approved the CIA-directed build-up of a
separate, permanent government in South Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem. Although he
received little support from the majority of citizens living in southern Vietnam. Diem
disavowed the planned elections for 1956 and declared South Vietnam's independence.
This turn of events effectively planted the seeds for a second Indochina war. By 1960,
more than 600 American military advisers lived in South Vietnam, training the new Army
o f the Republic o f Vietnam (ARVN) for a war with the North. That figure climbed to
nearly 17,000 by the time both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy were murdered in
November 1963.
The United States Congress gave President Lyndon Johnson permission - though
without a declaration o f war - to escalate the war in Vietnam following an alleged attack
by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the USS Maddox in the Gulf o f Tonkin in early
August 1964. Johnson began a sustained bombing campaign on the North and, following
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Vietcong attacks on American advisers in early 1965, made the decision to send ground
troops to South Vietnam. By December 1965, Johnson increased the American presence
in South Vietnam to almost 185,000 American combat troops. That kind o f rapid
escalation required greater mobilization o f manpower, and it could come from only two
places: the reserves or a draft.
The president and his advisers believed that activating the reserve armed forces
would be more disruptive to the homeffont than increasing draft calls, so the Selective
Service quickly swung into action. Prior to 1965, Americans had grown used to the
peacetime draft system in place since 1948. For more than ten years, monthly draft calls
were kept to fewer than 9,000 men (as compared to almost 40,000 men a month in 1967
and 1968), and a complex system of draft deferments made it easy for many draft-age
men (especially middle class draft-age men) to stay out o f the service altogether. The
drafting o f more than 170.000 men between September 1965 and January 1966 and more
than 300,000 men every year for the next three years snapped Americans back to reality
and the nation’s system of conscription soon came under scrutiny for the first time in a
long time. Many Americans did not like what they found.
Muhammad Ali's encounters with the draft illuminated much of what was unfair
and unjust with America’s system o f conscription. In April 1960, when he turned 18, Ali
(still known as Cassius Clay) registered for the draft just like every other draft-age man in
Louisville, Kentucky through Selective Service Local Board 47. Draft registrants did not
detect a war on the horizon, and the steady, familiar operation of a peacetime draft that
called proportionately few men to the service minimized anxiety. Two years later, in
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March 1962, Local Board 47 classified Ali I-A, eligible to be drafted. Almost another
two years passed before he heard from the Selective Service again, however, and this time
they ordered him to take the standard pre-induction physical and mental examinations just
weeks before he won the heavyweight title from Sonny Liston. The gifted athlete passed
the physical exam with no difficulty, but he scored very poorly on the 50 minute mental
ex amination. The Army rated his IQ at 78, which put him in the 16th percentile, far below

the 30th percentile score required to pass. A second mental test proved that Ali did not
fake the first exam, and in March, 1964, he received a new classification of l-Y, not
qualified for service. The publicity that followed his deferments humiliated Ali. “I said I
was the greatest,” he told reporters, “not the smartest.”18
Given his test scores, however, Ali believed he could now proceed with his
boxing career without fear o f the draft. He was wrong. Early in 1966, as the demand for
troops increased with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the United States Army
lowered its standards on the mental examination to make anyone with a score in the 15th
percentile or better eligible for the draft. In February, his local board reclassified Ali 1-A.
To the champ, it seemed arbitrary.
As a puzzled Ali struggled to deal with this turn of events, reporters descended on
him from all over the country. They asked him questions about Vietnam, the war, the
president, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but the champion boxer known as much for
his mouth as his punch found himself speechless. Finally, frustrated, Ali spoke the quote

18 Thomas Hauser, Muhammad A li, pp. 142-143; David Remnick, King o f the
World: Muhammad A li and the Rise o f an American Hero (New York: Random House,
1998), p. 285.
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heard around the world: “Man* I ain’t got no quarrel with them Vietcong.” The media
and the public recoiled; by the time he refused induction over a year later, he had become
so controversial that some state boxing commissions moved to bar closed-circuit
broadcasts o f his fights. Although Ali appealed the reclassification, arguing for
conscientious objector status, few seemed to take it seriously. Many viewed his
membership in the Nation of Islam as insincere, a ruse to help him dodge the draft. But
Ali had joined the Nation in 1961, long before the draft issue came up, and if the public
did not believe his claims, the retired judge who ruled on his appeal did. The judge
recommended that the Appeals Board classify Ali as a conscientious objector. By late fall
1966, Ali’s case had become politicized, however, and the Appeals Board denied his
request for CO status. Several months later, Ali refused induction. He did not fight again
until 1971.19
The apparent inconsistency in the Selective Service System’s handling o f Ali’s
classification was not unique to his case. As draft calls increased, it grew increasingly
obvious that the men being called to serve in this war came primarily from minority and
working class homes and often were undereducated or close to illiterate. Where, for
instance, were the white professional athletes? Unlike World War II system, this draft
called few national celebrities. Elvis Presley answered the call o f the armed forces in the
late 1950s during a period of relative peace. In 1966, George Hamilton, the handsome
Hollywood actor who was then dating one of President Johnson’s daughters, escaped

19 Hauser, Muhammad Ali, pp. 144-145,154-155; Remnick, King o f the World,
pp. 286-287; “TV o f Clay Fight Banned in 3 Cities,” New York Times, 19 Mar. 1966, p.
22 .
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conscription by c laim ing his mother needed him to care for her. But famous, wealthy,
white men were not the only siafe ones; more glaring were the millions o f college and
graduate students who held deferments while those who could not go to college faced the
draft
Bill Clinton, a young Arkansan studying at Georgetown University, benefitted
from just such a deferment. As an undergraduate, the future president dodged the draft
the same way millions o f other college men did: legally. As part o f its program of
“manpower channeling,” the Selective Service maintained its peacetime system of
deferments for vocations deemed to be in the “national interest.” Students in college,
they assumed, were being educated for the future benefit of the nation whereas stock boys
in a supermarket or gas station attendants were not. Even if a gas station attendant was
every bit as bright as thousands of college students his age, but could not afford to go to
school, he would be much more likely to be drafted. The system seemed to be saying that
some men were better than others and therefore warranted protection from the
indiscriminate violence o f war. Others could be sacrificed.
Those with deferments became very skilled at keeping them or securing others.
Students, especially, had access to information about the myriad ways to beat the draft,
and the leisure time to conceive and carry out plans that would keep them out of the
Army. Bill Clinton is a perfect example. Like thousands o f other men who graduated
from college in the middle o f the war (1966), Clinton “pyramided” a graduate deferment
on top of his undergraduate one. Before graduate deferments were eliminated in 1968,
registrants could conceivably use this tactic until they reached the age of 26 and were
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much less likely to be drafted. Clinton might have adopted a sim ila r strategy but he came
along too late; in the middle oFhis Rhodes scholarship at Oxford University, Congress
eliminated graduate deferments. Despite the example of the draft resistance movement
and his Rhodes scholar roommate who chose to accept prison over induction, Clinton
manipulated the system as well as he could to avoid being drafted. After receiving an
induction notice in May 1969, he sought and gained acceptance into an advanced Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at the University of Arkansas Law School. This
move successfully pushed him out of the 1-A pool into the 1-D classification for reserves
and kept him from being inducted. Despite some pangs o f guilt, Clinton held that
deferment until late October when he reneged on his ROTC commitment and asked to be
reclassified as 1-A. By that time, President Nixon had changed draft regulations to allow
graduate students to finish the entire school year if called (which meant Clinton would be
safe until July 1970) and was strongly hinting that a random selection process would soon
be instituted. When the Selective Service held its first draft lottery on December 1,
1969, Clinton’s number was so high (311) he knew he would never be called.20
During the 1992 presidential campaign, a copy of Clinton’s 1969 letter to the
ROTC director at Arkansas provided evidence that Clinton knew he had avoided the draft
even though he admired his Oxford friend who had chosen to resist the draft as “one of
the bravest, best men I know.” To see him regarded as a criminal, Clinton wrote, was “an
obscenity.” And even though he viewed the draft system as “illegitimate,” he

20 David Maraniss, First In His Class: A Biography o f Bill Clinton (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 150-151, 165, 167-168, 173-175, 179-180, 190-193, 198199.
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acknowledged that he could not take the same course and expect to maintain his “political
viability within the system.” Future political campaigns were more important than
principled protest against the war and the draft21
Bill Clinton’s Selective Service saga is important not simply because he is now
seen (along with Dan Quayle and Phil Gramm, among others) as one o f the nation’s best
known draft dodgers, but because it illustrates how the draft, which so efficiently
marched some off to war, could be so easily subverted and ignored by others. In New
York City and Cleveland, Ohio, 38 fathers and sons were arrested for paying up to $5,000
for false papers used to get deferments. One New York draft board official was convicted
o f selling deferments and exemptions for as much as $30,000.~ The parallels with the
Civil War era practice o f buying substitutes to fight on one’s behalf are obvious. As
unscrupulous parents bought bogus medical records to keep their sons out of Vietnam,
working class men vanished from their neighborhoods only to land in Southeast Asia.
The same could be said o f the thirty to forty thousand draft-age men who emigrated to
Canada and an additional ten thousand who went to Sweden, Mexico, and other
countries. Asylum in these places cost money and resulted in someone else bearing the
burden o f fighting in Vietnam. Most important, students who wrote annual checks to
their university’s bursar’s office not only paid their tuition but ensured that other draft age
men - in effect, substitutes - took their places in the Army.
At its heart, draft resistance turned on this question: What could a man do when

21 Maraniss, First In His Class, p. 199.
22 Myra McPherson, Long Time Passing, pp. 381-382.
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his country expected him to participate in a system o f conscription that sent some o f his
fellow citizens to fight in a war he regarded as immoral and illegal, and yet protected
him?

It is a complicated issue o f conscience versus obligation. Those who, like Bill

Clinton, opposed the war but manipulated the system to evade service in Vietnam, served
neither their conscience nor their sense o f obligation. James Fallows is another case in
point A few years after the war ended, Fallows, a Harvard graduate and today a highprofile editor for a national news magazine, wrote about the sense o f guilt he felt for
evading the draft. On the day o f his pre-induction physical, Fallows and all o f the other
registrants from Harvard and Cambridge arrived at Boston Army Base with letters from
doctors and psychiatrists that would keep them from being drafted. In the weeks leading
up to the physical. Fallows dropped his weight to 120 pounds, making him virtually
useless to the Army. Meanwhile, as the Harvard men were being processed, a busload of
strapping working-class kids from Chelsea arrived and Fallows quickly realized that they
knew nothing about draft loopholes. On that day, the middle-class kids escaped the draft
as the Chelsea boys went off to serve in the Army.23
During wartime, political scientist Michael Schaefer has argued, the obligation of
citizenship is not merely to serve. “It is.” he writes, “an obligation to active involvement
whether in pursuit o f policy or protest against it.” Those who opposed the war but
accepted the Selective Service System and their privileged places within it, Schaefer
charges, did not fulfill their responsibilities as citizens. Two other men were drafted into

23 James Fallows, “What Did You Do in the Class War, Daddy?” originally
published in The Washington Monthly, October 1975. It is reprinted in Walter Capps,
ed., The Vietnam Reader (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 213-221.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
the Armed Forces instead o f Bill Clinton and James Fallows. They may have served in
Vietnam. They may have died there. Draft resisters cannot claim to have prevented other
men from being drafted in their stead, but they can take some comfort in knowing that
their actions fully exemplified their opposition to the war. In the end, the Selective
Service moved to a more equitable lottery system (though some deferments remained)
and in time, an All Volunteer Force replaced conscription altogether. Even so, if as many
draft age men resisted the draft as opposed the war, the war effort might have crumbled
before 1968.24
Confronting the Draft and the War in Boston
Small numbers of dissenters began to protest against the war and the draft
immediately following the Johnson administration's escalation of American aggression in
Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. For the most part, however, the antiwar movement evolved
in restrained fashion until 1967. With the exception o f a few radical pacifists, the war’s
opponents avoided confrontation; most limited their protest to marches and teach-ins.
The draft resistance movement that emerged in 1967 and 1968 changed all that. "From
Protest to Resistance” became the slogan that gained popularity throughout the antiwar
movement in 1967, but it might have been more accurately phrased ’‘From Protest to
Confrontation,” for the strategy conceived by draft resisters constituted an open challenge
to the administration to prosecute them for violation o f draft laws in hopes that the system
would break down under the weight of so many court cases.

24 D. Michael Schaefer, “The Vietnam-Era Draft: Who Went, Who Didn’t, and
Why it Matters,” in D. Michael Schaefer, ed., The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the
American Imagination (Boston: Beacon, 1990), pp. 57-76.
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This dissertation slows down the usual narrative pace o f the period from late 1967
to early 1968. It picks up the story ofthe antiwar movement at a time when it began to
develop a sense of its growing strength and credits the civil disobedience of draft resisters
as the driving force behind this shift. Although the marches in Washington and the large
organizations such as the National Mobilization to End the War received most of the
national press, on the local level draft resistance formed the leading edge of the antiwar
movement.
By openly defying Selective Service laws and inviting the government to
prosecute them, draft resisters and their allies raised the stakes for everyone opposed to
the war. Going to teach-ins, picketing Dow Chemical and ROTC. and getting on buses
bound for marches in Washington or New York undoubtedly helped antiwar activists to
educate their fellow citizens about the war, but those events occurred only periodically
and could not sustain an ongoing grass-roots effort to oppose the war. Draft resistance,
on the other hand, mobilized the local antiwar community to take positive action against
the administration and against the war in ways that marches and teach-ins could not. At
least one historian reminds us, for instance, that most antiwar students did not belong to
any organization, but joined marches, demonstrations, and teach-ins.25 Draft resistance
activists recognized this but guessed that some proportion of those people would be
willing to take greater risks if they thought it could hasten the end o f the war. They were
right. Hundreds of men and women in Boston and thousands o f people across the country
moved from protesting against the war to more direct confrontation with their

25 Heineman, Campus Wars, p. 270.
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government over its policies in Vietnam.
On one level, then, the history o f the draft resistance movement during the
Vietnam War raises questions about the place of individuals in a civil society and one’s
freedom and right to disagree with a government that theoretically represents the views of
the majority. Eric Foner, the Columbia University historian who has recently authored a
landmark study o f freedom in America, charts a history of contested meanings o f that
most American o f words. In the nineteenth century, Foner argues, freedom meant every
American having the “opportunity to develop to the fullest his or her innate talents,”26 and
in many ways, that definition held sway through the civil rights movement of the 1950s
and 1960s. The “rights revolution” that followed the civil rights movement, however,
changed that idea. Within the last thirty years or so, Americans have invoked the concept
o f freedom more often in their defense of more narrowly defined rights that they hold
sacred.27
Even so, the example of draft resistance highlights Foner’s warning that freedom
is a protean idea that “overspills the scholar’s carefully constructed boundaries.” First,
although the Vietnam-era draft resistance movement emerged at the dawn o f the “rights
revolution,” it viewed the government and the draft system as impediments to attaining
the older sense o f freedom that Foner describes as developing every citizen’s potential.
The Selective Service, through its policy of manpower channeling, seemed to have more

26 Eric Foner, The Story o f American Freedom (New York: Norton, 1998), p.
xviii.
27 Foner, The Story o f American Freedom, pp. 299-305.
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say about a draft registrant’s future than he did himself. Draft resisters, therefore,
targeted the draft not only because they saw it as an instrument o f the war machine, but
because they sought to reassert the freedom o f every citizen to chart his future for
himself. Second, although Foner writes that many Americans viewed the “generational
rebellion” o f the 1960s as a “massive redefinition o f freedom as a rejection of all
authority,” draft resisters made it clear that their rebellion targeted only illegitimate
authority; that is, authority that ceased to be legitimate when it deviated from
Constitutionally mandated provisions for declaring and fighting a war, and engaged in
military policies that a reasonable person would regard as immoral or criminal.28
Finally, in a more general way, draft resistance represented a continuation o f the
idea, more prominent in the nation’s early history, that freedom means an “active
engagement in public life.”29 There are many ways to engage in public life, of course, and
the experience o f draft resisters and their allies raised additional questions about
American definitions o f citizenship. Resisters and their supporters acted on the
assumption that when the nation’s government sets illegal or immoral policy, citizens are
obligated to disagree with those policies, to disobey them if necessary, and accept the
legally prescribed punishment. But while they emphasized dissent and (civil)
disobedience to one’s government as a necessary duty of citizenship, critics of the
movement charged it with being unpatriotic; they likened refusal to answer the
government’s call to service as an act o f disloyalty. True patriots, they asserted, are not

28 Foner, The Story o f American Freedom, pp. 292-293.
29 Foner, The Story o f American Freedom, p. xvii.
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disloyal to the government. Perhaps in no other part o f the antiwar movement did the
battle over citizenship and patriotism become so pitched. In this debate, however, the
draft resistance movement took a page from the civil rights movement which had, after
all, produced citizens who, despite repeated jailings. were counted among America’s
finest in the 1960s. But even most civil rights activists had not refused their country’s
call to service.
Just like their counterparts in the civil rights movement, however, draft resistance
activists possessed a certain moral clarity that informed their sense o f citizenship. If other
antiwar activists were ambivalent about the administration and the war, draft resisters and
their supporters were not. By late 1967, when thousands of men and women, young and
old, gravitated to draft resistance, their minds were made up: the war in Vietnam was not
only illegal and immoral, but "obscene.*’ They had studied Vietnamese history and
culture and believed the United States had upset an indigenous drive for independence led
by Ho Chi Minh and established a puppet government in South Vietnam. In creating and
perpetuating the conflict in Vietnam, draft resistance activists reasoned, American forces
killed thousands o f noncombatants and did incalculable damage to the rural countryside.
In short, the war offended them in every possible way.
That sense o f outrage fueled a movement that attracted activists who were both
politically and religiously motivated. It combined tactics of moral witness (e.g., turning
in draft cards in a church) which galvanized religious opponents of the war. with the
political goals of confronting the war “machine” and undermining it, which attracted
secular, political protesters. For some of the religious protesters, draft resistance and the
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mass civil disobedience it required created an opportunity to build community, an
“ecclesia” dedicated to the-“struggle for the renewal of man.” Today, with the possible
exception of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Americans are more accustomed to hearing the
rhetoric of morality and values come from conservative political activists on the right, but
in the late 1960s, draft resistance represented one of the last times where religious and
political activists on the left invoked those themes. In later years, former draft resisters
lamented the failure of foe left to continue to tackle moral issues as they had with foe
Vietnam War and foe draft. One draft resister commented: “I think that open and
aggressive efforts to take moral stands, [that] articulate what real values (family and
otherwise) are...would - or could - bring about significant social change and spiritual
renewal” in America.30
Although draft resisters were, at foe time, considered foe radical wing o f foe
antiwar movement, their ideas and tactics derived in many ways from well-worn
American traditions of dissent. In particular, foe emphasis on obedience to one’s
conscience over allegiance to one’s government had roots that reached as far back as foe
abolitionist movement and more directly to foe writings of Henry David Thoreau. The
movement made frequent reference to Twentieth Century peace heroes such as Gandhi.
Albert Camus, and Martin Luther King, Jr., but draft resistance organizers quoted no one
as often as they did Thoreau.
It is not surprising, then, that critics of foe New Left and foe antiwar movement

30 Christian Resistance letter to Michael Ferber, 1 Mar 1968, Papers o f Michael
Ferber; 1997 Survey o f Boston draft resisters, respondent #64.
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have ignored the draft resistance movement in their characterizations of the sixties
generation as “destructive.” Draft resisters and their supporters do not, for instance, fit
David Horowitz’s and Peter Collier’s claim that sixties activists “assaulted and mauled”
the American system, destroying “that collection o f values that provide guidelines for
societies as well as individuals.*’ Neither do they match historian Stephen Ambrose’s
portrayal of the antiwar movement as choosing “to print a license to riot, to scandalize, to
do drugs and group sex, to talk and dress dirty, to call for revolution and bum flags, to
condemn parents and indeed anyone over 30 years o f age, in an excess of free will and
childish misjudgement seldom matched and never exceeded.” Although draft resistance
activists sought to confront the government, they tried as much as possible to avoid
alienating the public and, in both their rhetoric and appearance, they cut a sharper, cleaner
image than anyone who might have fit Ambrose’s generalization.31
The community that was formed around draft resistance, religious and otherwise,
included many more people than the resisters themselves. Dozens o f people, many of
them women, contributed to the cause. The demographics of draft resistance supporters
debunks the commonly held myth that student radicals in the 1960s did not trust anyone
over thirty years of age. Although most draft resistance supporters were in their twenties,
many professionals, academics, and ministers in their thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties,
participated in the movement, too. Many turned out at demonstrations and draft card
tum-ins, some raised money, some did draft counseling, monitored trials, cooked food, or

31 Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation, p. 15; Stephen
Ambrose, “Foreword,” Adam Garfinkle, Telltale Hearts, p. v.
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wrote editorials or letters to newspapers. Like the resisters themselves, they were
outraged by the war and possessed a moral certainty that fueled their commitment to the
more radical approach o f draft resistance.
The moral clarity that characterized draft resisters and their allies created an
impatient style o f citizenship - again with antecedents in the civil rights movement - that
became the most striking characteristic o f their movement. A sense of urgency
permeated the draft resistance movement over the course o f its relatively short life. In the
earliest days, it caused resisters and supporters to advocate a strategy of protest that
resulted in personal risks ranging from beatings at the hands of a mob to government
prosecution and incarceration. They chose to disrupt their lives and the lives of their
loved ones to protest the war in the strongest way they knew. Other antiwar activists
continued to be satisfied with occasional marches and demonstrations, or began to do
outreach to working-class and minority neighborhoods. For draft resisters, however, the
issues were always more clear and more urgent, and, thus, demanded more radical action.
That moral clarity and the impatience it fostered also account for the sudden
fragmentation and dissolution of the draft resistance movement. After an initial period
of sensing that their defiance of draft laws attracted the attention and concern o f the
Johnson administration, they concluded in the spring of 1968 that, despite Johnson’s
decision to forgo another term as president, their strategy o f confronting the government
did not seem to be working. Even though returning a draft card constituted a crime, the
Justice Department refused to indict men for it; they waited instead until registrants
refused induction. It would take a long time for thousands o f registrants just to be called
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for induction and, meanwhile, the war in Vietnam continued unabated. American troop
strength was at its peak and thousands of Americans and Vietnamese continued to die.
The resulting frustration within the movement began to undermine its effectiveness. As
the rest o f the world seemed to be spinning out of control in the wake o f assassinations
and student-led rebellions, draft resistance activists began turning to other methods of
protest, especially outreach to enlisted men and high school students.
Without any more draft card tum-ins or other acts of civil disobedience to plan,
the rank-and-file base of draft resisters quickly eroded. By the end of the summer only a
core group o f organizers made up the draft resistance “movement” in Boston. The Justice
Department prosecuted very few of the draft resisters who had turned in their draft cards
months before; this happened in part because local draft boards had violated Selective
Service regulations themselves - making such cases unwinnable - and in part because the
case load grew so large at the U.S. Attorney’s office that many “fell through the cracks.”
In addition, however, some draft resisters found their perceptions of the war and the draft
changing. The moral clarity and impatient sense of citizenship that once informed their
actions receded as a new sense of exasperation and confusion about what to do next took
over. Some accepted new deferments from their draft boards (which were only too happy
to oblige). Many continued to oppose the war and worked with antiwar organizations to
that end, but their more personal confrontations with their government were over.
In 1978, Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss, two analysts of the Vietnam Warera draft, asserted that “the most severe punishment suffered by draft resisters...has been
the condemnation and misunderstanding o f their fellow citizens.” True forgiveness, they
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wrote, could not come from any government program, but “only from understanding.”
Today, a lack o f understanding regarding draft resisters persists (see Appendix C); one
goal o f this dissertation is to provide a basis for that understanding by exploring the
contested notions o f morality, citizenship and freedom that fueled the draft resistance
movement during its brief but influential history.
Although draft resistance grew into a national movement, this dissertation focuses
primarily on the movement in Boston. An analysis o f grassroots organizing and rankand-file resisters on a national scale would be almost impossible, whereas an in-depth
study of one particular region uncovers the often dramatic experiences o f draft resisters in
sharp detail.
In many ways, of course, Boston is unique. First, there is the long heritage o f
disobeying authority that dates to before the Revolution and which resurfaced especially
during the antebellum period, when Boston led the nation’s movement to abolish slavery.
One draft resistance activist later remarked that the importance of Boston’s history should
not be overlooked in understanding draft resistance. “You could just feel it,” he said.
“There was something in the bricks.” In addition, the religious tradition in Boston made
it atypical among other draft resistance communities. Across most of the country, the
location for draft card tum-ins and other public events mattered little, but in Boston they
often took place in churches, where the actions of draft resisters appeared to be more
solemn. Finally, the concentration o f colleges and universities in Boston also meant that
more than 100,000 students lived within a very small area, thus providing a ready-made
base for protest.
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In spite o f these uncommon characteristics, Boston makes sense as the focus of
this analysis for several reasons. First, although the Resistance grew to over 75 chapters
across the country, the New England Resistance, centered primarily in Boston, quickly
became the largest single chapter. The Boston branch published the national newsletter
and later a national newspaper called The Resistance. Indeed, a March 1968 issue of The
Resistance characterized the New England Resistance as the country’s “coordinating
center for the movement.”32 In addition, several United States Supreme Court decisions
evolved out o f Boston draft cases, and the widely followed trial of Dr. Benjamin Spock,
the famed pediatrician, and his four co-defendants for conspiracy to aid and abet draft
resistance took place in Boston in 1968. By 1969, the city had become so clearly
identified with draft resistance that when the Rolling Stones performed at the Boston
Garden, Mick Jagger strutted out onto the stage in a tight long sleeve T-shirt emblazoned
with a hand-painted Omega symbol, the mark of the Resistance, on his chest.JJ Although
Resistance groups in Philadelphia. New York, Chicago, Madison, the Bay area, and
elsewhere also thrived and, in some cases, outlasted their New England counterpart,
Boston led the way through the movement’s most effective period.
The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first three chapters trace the
history of draft resistance from small groups of individual pacifists in early 1966 to a fullscale grassroots movement by late 1967. The next three chapters examine the range of
responses to draft resistance by the press, the public, the government, and resisters’

32 “Resist!” The Resistance, 1-15 Mar 1968, p. 9
33 Old Mole #28, 5 Dec 1969, pp. 1, 9.
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families and Mends during the fall o f 1967. The final portion o f the dissertation picks up
the chronological narrative and follows the movement through its peak period in the
spring o f 1968 through its subsequent decline in late 1968 and early 1969. An epilogue
catches up with draft resisters and their supporters thirty years later.
When Muham m ad Ali told the press that he did not have a quarrel with the Viet
Cong, he shocked a nation whose citizenry in 1966 overwhelmingly supported the war.
Ali’s pronouncement came just weeks before the first “little band of bold pioneers” in
Boston confronted the draft by publicly burning their draft cards. This act, too, horrified
many o f the residents of greater Boston and the nation, and they were tried and convicted
very quickly. Chapter One recounts the story of these few early resisters and argues that
the expeditious fashion with which the Justice Department handled their cases, set a
precedent of firmness and efficiency that led later draft resistance organizers to believe
their mass protest would be punished with equal dispatch. And that was exactly what
they wanted.
As the first Boston resisters went off to prison, protest against the draft subsided.
But as Chapter Two shows, attention to the draft was growing. With draft calls swelling,
many Americans grew concerned with its obvious unfairness. The president appointed a
blue-ribbon commission to review the Selective Service System and make
recommendations to improve it. As the nation’s interest turned toward conscription
(thanks in part to Ali’s case), draft counseling organizations formed in the spring of 1967
and began dissem inating inform ation to men who wanted to avoid the draft. In part their
strategy aimed to impair the draft through overcooperation, that is, by filing every piece
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o f available paperwork with one’s draft board as a way o f wasting its time and resources.
In addition, draft counseling organizations like the Boston Draft Resistance Group moved
the antiwar movement toward direct confrontation by staging raucous demonstrations
inside the Boston Army Base.
For some in the antiwar movement, however, draft counseling and these other
types of protests were not enough. They were better than marches and teach-ins, but draft
calls and the war continued to escalate throughout 1967 and antiwar protest did not
appear to have any material effect on the administration. Chapter Three introduces those
in the movement who were growing impatient with these tactics as they plotted more
radical, confrontational protest strategies centered around large scale draft resistance. By
returning their draft cards to the government (alone a violation of the draft law), those
who chose to become draft resisters raised the stakes for themselves as opponents o f the
war and upped the ante for the administration by inviting it to prosecute them. They
would not dodge or take a deferment o f any kind. On October 16, 1967, the nearly 1.000
men who returned their draft cards nationwide set a new standard for protesters by risking
imprisonment and backed up their opposition to the war with direct action.
In response to the October 16 draft card tum-in at the Arlington Street Church, the
Boston newspapers emphasized the small number of cards burned (rather than those
turned in) at the ceremony and readers quickly characterized them as “unpatriotic,”
“misguided,” and “hippies.” Chapter Four describes the press and the public’s reaction to
draft resistance in the fall o f 1967 and the image they held o f draft resisters. The chapter
also provides profiles of draft resisters based on a 1997 questionnaire that shows, among
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other things, that resisters did not fit the image that the public and media seemed to
believe. Most were white, middle class college students who held deferments at the time
o f their resistance. Most had activist experience in civil rights and other peace protests
and decided to resist the draft only after they believed they had exhausted all other legal
means of lodging their protests. When nothing else worked, after careful consideration,
they pushed harder. Most important, they did not see their acts as disloyal.
Most draft resisters were reminded of the serious nature of their offense when the
FBI got involved. Within a week after the draft cards arrived at the Justice Department,
FBI agents descended on Boston’s college campuses, interviewing resisters and their
friends. But as Chapter Five demonstrates, government interest in draft resistance
extended far beyond the local FBI office to Washington, where the Selective Service,
Justice Department, and President Johnson himself wrestled to find an appropriate
response. In the end, a feud developed between the Selective Service and the Justice
Department over punitive reclassification of draft resisters to 1-A and drafting them to
serve in Vietnam. It soon became obvious to those involved with draft resistance that the
right people were hearing their message.
The parents of most draft resisters were very concerned about their child’s safety
and his future; few openly supported their sons’ actions. As a result, when draft resisters
recognized that the people to whom they thought they could turn for support were not
stepping up to provide it, they found encouragement and assistance elsewhere. Chapter 6
describes the wide range o f people who joined draft resistance and other organizations as
a way o f providing moral and financial support to resisters while also doing something to
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end the war. Like many o f the resisters, supporters were mostly white and middle class.
Often they were older than the resisters and included professionals and academics among
their ranks. In the end, they proved to be o f critical importance to the long-term health of
the draft resistance movement.
The draft resistance movement that blossomed in the late 1967 demanded a
response from the federal government. They expected to be arrested for their defiance o f
draft laws and brought to trial but it did not work out that way. Instead, on January 5,
1968, a Boston grand jury indicted five men (including nationally known critics o f the
war, Dr. Benjamin Spock and the Reverend William Sloane Coffin) for conspiracy to
counsel, aid, and abet men to resist the draft. The indictments seemed designed to crush
draft resistance and undermine opposition to the war, but rather than stifle the movement,
it invigorated it. Between January and April, as the “Boston Five” prepared for their trial,
and as those who returned their draft cards in October began to refuse induction, draft
resistance intensified. Chapter 7 charts that period of the movement and examines the
effect draft resistance had on policy makers considering even further escalation in
Vietnam. In the end, several administration officials argued that fulfilling a request for
another 206,000 troops would lead to even greater levels o f draft resistance. The request
was denied.
Just as draft resistance seemed to be peaking, however, external events beyond the
control of the movement changed the context in which draft resistance took place. The
assassination o f Martin Luther King, Jr., the strike at Columbia University, and student
riots around the world created an almost apocalyptic atmosphere in which draft resisters’
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impatience with the war began to extend to a broader indictment o f American society for
injustices and inequities at home and abroad. Chapter 8 describes the early fragmentation
o f the draft resistance movement in Boston as the urgency that had always characterized
the movement began to extend to other causes. Meanwhile, the trial of the Boston Five,
the one event with the potential to hold the movement together, became mired in
legalistic arguments over free speech and other issues while largely losing sight o f the
war and the draft. The movement had reached its twilight.
By the summer o f 1968, the New England Resistance shrank to a much smaller
number o f activists as the organization moved away from draft card turn-ins toward
grassroots organizing among high school students and GIs. Chapter Nine follows this
final stretch in the history o f the movement and also rejoins rank-and-file resisters as they
wrestled with the prospect o f continuing their confrontation with the government by
refusing induction. Some went to prison, some reconsidered their resistance and accepted
new deferments, while others did nothing and never heard from a prosecutor. Ultimately,
by the end of 1968, draft resistance began to fade from view in Boston. Many activists
faded from view, too, but the epilogue reports that draft resisters and their allies have, for
the most part, maintained activist lives, especially in their communities, since the war
ended.
Thirty years have passed since the heyday of Vietnam-era draft resistance and
until now it has gone almost forgotten. This dissertation argues that the Resistance is
worth remembering. Although their numbers never amounted to a significant portion of
the American population, draft resistance activists dominated the antiwar movement at a
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time when Johnson administration policy in Vietnam approached a crisis state. Like so
many nonviolent American dissenters before them, their clear-eyed interpretation o f the
problem (in this case, the war) fueled an intense urgency to act. Draft resisters and their
allies, like the abolitionists and the young civil rights activists, pushed their movement
toward confronting their own government and demanding an end to the violence o f war.
Draft resisters were, as their opponents charged, radicals, but they were home-grown
radicals who, despite their faults, represented the best American traditions of dissent.
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TOWARD A DRAFT RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
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CHAPTER I

IN THE BEGINNING: A “LITTLE BAND OF BOLD PIONEERS”

Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means o f their
respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of
injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that
you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powdermonkeys and all, m arching in admirable order over hill and dale to the
wars, against their wills, aye, against their common sense and consciences,
which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of
the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they
are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined Now, what are they? Men
at all? or small moveable forts and magazines at the service of some
unscrupulous man in power?...
The mass o f men serve the State thus, not as men mainly, but as
machines, with their bodies...A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs,
reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the State with their
consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are
commonly treated by it as enemies.
Henry David Thoreau,
“On the Duty o f Civil Disobedience” (1848)
In times o f war, pacifists rarely escape unscathed. On March 31, 1966, a handful
o f Bostonians learned this lesson the hard way. Despite the raw, early spring weather,
hundreds o f people gathered in the early morning shadow o f the South Boston District
Courthouse all because they had heard something offensive on the radio. Or maybe
someone else had heard it. Certainly, the man in a dark suit holding a motion picture
camera at the front o f the throng had heard it. And so, too, the few other men who,
similarly dressed, were trying to blend in with the crowd. They were not altogether
successful in this, but the larger group didn't seem to care. Most in the crowd were high
school students; nearly all were residents of Southie and probably could spot a
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government man as well as anyone. In any case, the multitude anxiously waited for the
“cowards” and “'commies” to make their appearance on the steps o f the grand old
building - a “natural stage” for the first act in what would become a three year long
morality play.
A few minutes before the appointed hour o f 9:00 AM, eleven young men and
women arrived, filed by the edge o f the crowd, and silently climbed the steps of the
courthouse. Their physical appearance no doubt surprised some in the crowd. The men
in the group had short haircuts and wore suits and ties. The women wore neat-looking
dresses and, like some of the men, also were clad in overcoats to beat the chill. These
were not the bearded beatniks that some in the Southie crowd expected.
Four of the men - David O’Brien, John Phillips, David Reed, and David Benson stood in the middle o f the group and, as they had promised in their press release,
produced their draft cards. The other members o f their group looked on from behind
them as the crowd, now numbering more than 250, drew nearer and grew louder, shouting
“cowards!” and calling the four “yellow!” The smaller group’s clean-cut appearance, if it
had affected the crowd earlier, no longer mattered.
One of the four pulled out a small portable gas burner and ignited it. Each of the
men then held his Selective Service document to the fire, comer first, and watched as the
orange flame grew larger and brighter. Amid the sudden, unmistakable expressions o f
hostility from the mob - some were now yelling “Shoot them!” and “Kill them!” - John
Phillips began to speak: “I am a pacifist,” he said. “I do what I believe as an individual. I
believe in the law but when the law violates my conscience...” He did not finish. Just
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then a gang o f about 75 high school boys broke from the rest o f the crowd and rushed up
the steps.
The eleven pacifists had little opportunity to brace themselves for the attack and
seven o f them went down quickly. As the mob punched and kicked them, most tried to
cover their faces; others, consistent with their training in nonviolence, went limp and fell
to the steps as the youths stomped on their backs. Someone repeatedly slapped 18 yearold Suzanne Williams in the face. David Benson clung to the cold steel rail that bisected
the steps while at least four young men pounded him at once. Phillips later remembered:
“I saw one person going down in front o f me so I grabbed him and...pulled him around so
he could be pushed into the courthouse.” Three government agents who had infiltrated
the crowd to witness the card burning (two from the FBI and one from the Army’s
Criminal Investigation Division) were knocked down as they attempted to guide the
pacifists up the stairs away from the mob and into the building. Their actions may have
saved someone’s life. As some o f the high-schoolers ran into the courthouse chasing two
o f their quarry, FBI agent Thomas Mclnemey shoved David O’Brien through the door
and ran with him through the lobby to the janitor’s room some 75 feet away from the
front entrance. Inside the room, O’Brien nervously lit a cigarette while Mclnemey stood
watch outside the door, waiting for the mob to be dispersed. John Phillips was not as
lucky. Before anyone could prevent it, a fist - augmented by a class ring - slammed into
the side of his nose, breaking it. As he finally stumbled into the courthouse, blood spilled
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from his face.1
The police at last arrived as the melee wound down, but they arrested no one.
They sealed the entrance to the building, scattered the crowd, and took Phillips to the
hospital; Williams accompanied him. Inside the courthouse, a young woman, holding
the hand of her toddler, approached one o f the mob’s victims and apologized on behalf of
the community of South Boston, saying the assailants were not representative o f the
people who lived there.2 Outside the building, however, a police officer told one
reporter, “Anyone foolish enough to commit such an unpatriotic gesture in South Boston
can only expect what these people got.”3 Nearby, State Representative James F. Condon
commented that “this wouldn’t have happened if these were South Boston boys; our boys
are patriotic.”4 Activists in the incipient draft resistance movement came to expect this
kind o f reception in 1966.
In the huge public outcry that followed in the wake of the beatings, opinions were

1The description of the South Boston incident is pieced together from several
sources: “7 War Protesters Beaten in Boston,” New York Times, 1 Apr. 1966, p. 5;
“Pacifist Group, Card Burners, Struck, Kicked,” Manchester Union-Leader, 1 Apr. 1966,
p. 1; “Boston Draft Card Burnings, Beatings Jar Mayor, Police,” Boston Globe, 8 Apr.
1966, p. 1; “Draft Protester Thanks FBI Agent,” Boston Globe, 1 Jun. 1966, p. 1; “The
Wrong Place,” Time, 8 Apr. 1966, p. 28; John Phillips, telephone interview with author,
29 Aug. 1997; Xenia (nee Suzanne) Williams, interview with author, Barre, Vt., 28 Aug.
1997; Transcript o f United States v. O 'Brien, Cr-66-9l-S, 1966, National Archives,
Waltham, Mass.
2 “Boston Draft Card Burnings, Beatings Jar Mayor, Police,” Boston Globe, 8 Apr.
1966, p. 8; Editorial, Boston Globe, 8 Apr. 1966, p. 14.
3 “The Wrong Place,” Time, 8 Apr. 1966, p. 28.
4 “7 War Protesters Beaten in Boston,” New York Times, 1 Apr. 1966, p. 1.
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sharply divided. For the next month. Boston’s public officials, newspaper editors, and
residents debated and discussed the meaning o f draft card burning as a method o f protest
and appropriate responses to it. Because the timing o f the event coincided with a month
long strike that had shut down Boston’s three daily newspapers, many o f the city’s
residents awoke two days later to read a front page editorial on the subject in the
Manchester, New Hampshire, paper, which was trying to make inroads in the Boston
market during the strike. William Loeb, the publisher of the Union-Leader, one o f the
most vehemently conservative and anticommunist papers in the country, called the card
burners “Anti-American ‘kooks’” who had not only “thumbed their nose deliberately and
spat in the face of American patriotism” but also insulted “our soldiers fighting in Viet
Nam.” Their assailants, according to Loeb, responded with “the type o f natural patriotic
reaction that they SHOULD have had.” In fact, he said, “there were probably millions of
Americans all over the United States who said to themselves: ‘Give them another one for
me. 1T»S
Few of those who sympathized with the attackers would go as far as Loeb in their
characterizations o f those involved, yet they did see the issue in terms o f loyalty and
disloyalty, patriotism and traitorous behavior. In a letter to the Boston Globe (which
began printing again on 8 A pril), one woman complained about the paper’s criticism o f
the South Boston mob: “There is something drastically wrong,” she wrote, “when our
country’s defenders are condemned and vilified” for beating up draft card burners who

5 Editorial, Manchester Union-Leader, 2 Apr. 1966, p .i.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45
“most likely provoked the attack in the first place.”6 Another young woman argued that
the South Boston students “could not have reacted in any other way in order to preserve
the American image of red-blooded patriotism.” The demonstrators, she said, “were
asking for trouble,” and those who assaulted them “showed their love for America by not
standing by apathetically while their government’s dignity and authority was being

desecrated” by a “defiant, selfish minority.” “They are heroes,” she finished.7 The Globe
also printed a letter from an Army private stationed in Vietnam: “...it’s difficult to
suppress the feeling I have for Boston and this patriotic display,” he said. “It is indeed
gratifying to know that the draft card burners who aren’t men enough to face the
responsibilities and hazards o f defending their country...now face a hazard they didn’t
bargain for - outraged, patriotic citizens.”*
In contrast, those who criticized the South Boston mob did not view the event as a
question o f patriotism or loyalty, but o f freedom, morality, and especially legality. For
instance, although the editors o f the Boston Globe referred to the card burners as
“misguided” and suggested that “few will support or justify” their actions, they
condemned even more harshly “those who took the law into their own hands” as “more
criminal” because “it could have amounted to murder.” Such lawlessness, they said, and
the subsequent blaming of the pacifists for “inciting riot” (as one city councilor charged)

6 Letter, Boston Globe, 12 Apr. 1966, p. 36.
7 Letter, Boston Globe, 24 Apr. 1966, p. A4.
* Letter, Boston Globe, 25 Apr. 1966, p. 12.
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came “straight from the handbook o f the Southern segregationist.”9 Others agreed but
were more generous to the pacifists. One letter writer believed that those “who had their
heads cracked recently probably know far more about the concept o f freedom and care far
more about what America is and is becoming than all the punks who attacked them.” 10
Still others suggested that the “bullies” were deluding themselves because they could not
“face the possibility that the war in Viet Nam might be both immoral and futile, and the
consequent thought that those who have given their lives there may have done so in
vain.” More than that, another argued, the private who wrote so glowingly of the beating
proved that even GIs knew that rather than fighting for “freedom and democracy,” they
were “defending the right to beat to the ground, with no fear o f arrest, anyone with whose
opinions they disagreed.” 11
Although Boston’s newspaper editors printed such opinions in relatively equal
numbers for each side o f the debate, other indications made obvious the ongoing hostility
that early draft resisters faced. One week after the incident at the courthouse, a group of
ministers calling themselves the Clergy Group for the Right to Dissent sponsored a march
to protest the treatment o f the draft card burners and the complete lack o f police
protection. Estimates vary, but somewhere between 175 and 300 people marched to the
Boston Common from two different starting points: the South Boston District Courthouse

9 Editorial, Boston Globe, 8 Apr. 1966, p. 14. Editorial, Boston Globe, 23 Apr.
1966, p. 12.
10 Letter, Boston Globe, 29 Apr. 1966, p. 12.
11 Letter, Boston Globe, 26 Apr. 1966, p. 16; Letter, Boston Globe, 28 Apr. 1966,
p. 16.
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and the Arlington Street Church in the Back Bay. Although the police department, stung
by criticism of its absence a week earlier, provided 150 officers (some on horseback and
motorcycles) to escort the two groups, it could not keep some counter-demonstrators from
expressing their views, sometimes in dramatic fashion. From apartment windows in
South Boston, several residents pelted the marchers with eggs, occasionally missing and
hitting a police officer. People on the sidewalks threw things, too, and yelled “coward”
and ‘"maggot” as the demonstrators walked by. One heckler walked up to the group with
a live chicken and broke its neck in a less-than-subtle warning; he then followed the
group with the dead anim al dangling from the end of a stick. The marchers made it to the
Common safely and, thanks to the police presence, held a small rally without incident.
Later, Mayor John Collins told the press that he would continue to take measures to
ensure greater police presence at such events, noting that “precisely because any protest
against U.S. foreign policy in Viet Nam is unpopular among some of the citizens of
Metropolitan Boston, it is even more urgent to protect this right.”12
The events o f March and April 1966 came as something o f a shock to the city of
Boston. The protest in Southie, along with a few others the week before, constituted
some o f the earliest demonstrations against the war in Vietnam - and certainly the first
public challenge to the draft - that the city had seen. The mob response also took counterdemonstrating to a new, more frightening level, thus mirroring the reaction that so many

12“Marchers Pelted in Boston Protest,” New York Times, 7 Apr. 1966, p. 5;
“Boston Pacifist Parade Pelted,” Manchester Union-Leader, 7 Apr. 1966, p. 1; “Boston
Draft Card Burnings, Beatings Jar Mayor, Police,” Boston Globe, 8 Apr. 1966, p. 8;
Jerome Grossman speech, ACLU annual meeting, 2 O ct 199^
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social movements experience in their formative stages. More important, however, the
public’s perception o f these events as articulated in letters to the editor and comments
made on the street quickly established the terms o f debate that people not only in Boston,
but across the country, would settle upon in evaluating draft resisters. Despite the great
lengths to which the resisters would go to appeal to the public’s sense o f morality, its
sense of justice, and its sense o f tradition (as exemplified by figures such as Thoreau) in
the coming years, resisters constantly found themselves accused o f disloyalty and o f being
unpatriotic. Even in early 1968, when draft resistance became a national movement unto
itself, and draft card burnings were being discouraged in favor o f draft card tum-ins held
in churches, the words “draft resister” conjured up images o f flaming cards that, like the
Stars and Stripes afire, caused many Americans to cringe.
This chapter demonstrates that the nascent draft resistance o f 1966 and reaction to
it also established other important trends that would extend into the subsequently much
wider resistance movement, or at times set precedents that would prove to be instrumental
in the way organizers shaped the later movement. For Gandhian pacifists, the act o f civil
disobedience - burning one’s draft card - served both as an act o f moral witness and as a
vehicle for confronting the government. Unlike draft “dodgers” who sought ways to
protect themselves from the draft by fleeing or making themselves ineligible through
some act o f subterfuge, resisters openly defied the law and awaited the state’s
punishment. They were impatient, unsatisfied with marching and attending teach-ins.
Likewise, they possessed a certain moral clarity that made evading the draft
unconscionable and, at the same time, drove them to fight the administration and the
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Selective Service System. In their challenge to the draft and to the policy makers
responsible for America’s presence in Vietnam, these protesters raised the. question o f the
individual’s place in a civil society in a way that few others in the antiwar movement
could. For them, individual dissent was not inconsistent with good citizenship.
That said, moral witness had its shortcomings, too. Particularly because it seemed
to be carried out primarily by children o f privilege - white, middle and upper class college
students - the act o f resistance took on an air o f condescension for some working class
observers. Although draft resisters successfully sought to expose the inequities o f the
Selective Service System, the same system that sent a disproportionate number of
working class and minority men to fight in Vietnam for much of the war, the draft
resistance movement never attracted significant numbers o f men from those groups to
join in severing their ties with the draft.
Finally, this chapter shows how the Department o f Justice, through its efficient
handling of early draft violators’ cases, actually encouraged the formation o f a broader
movement against the draft. Although the early resisters, so few in number anyway,
never attempted wide ranging recruitment efforts aimed at bogging down the courts‘Snd
filling jails with enough potential draftees to hamper the operations o f the draft, the
speedy work of prosecutors and the federal courts in dispatching the first burners and
returners to prison made that notion seem possible. The later draft resistance movement
o f 1967 and 1968 fully expected mass arrests and imprisonment thanks to the example set
by the first draft resisters and the Department o f Justice in 1966.
Indeed, the government seemed well-prepared to penalize those who resisted
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fulfilling roles that men their, age had ostensibljrperformed in earlier wars. And they
were supported by the majority of the population who, in April 1966, continued to
-to

approve of Lyndon Johnson-’s m anagem entofthe war in Vietnam.13 Those old enough to
remember the Second World War and Korea had grown used to a peacetime draft and at
the outset, it seemed, viewed Vietnam as the younger generation’s turn to go and do what
those before them had done. As Joseph, tfie main character in Saul Bellow’s first novel.
Dangling Man, might have said, it was an “era o f hardboiled-dom.” The first Vietnam
era draft resisters, beaten and bloodied in the city that liked to call itself the “the cradle of
Liberty,” could understand Joseph's assertion that “most serious matters are closed to the
hard-boiled. They are unpracticed in introspection, and therefore badly equipped to deal
with opponents whom they cannot shoot like big game or outdo in daring.”14
Sons o f Liberty?
Since the revolutionary era. o f course, Boston has fostered a reputation as a
hotbed of protest and resistance to unjustifiable authority. Long before and long after the
Sons of Liberty dumped tea into the harbor, however, the legacy has, in fact, been fairly
mixed. In 1707, for instance, more than a thousand soldiers and sailors, many o f whom
had been “pressed” into (not-so-selective) service during Queen Anne’s War, returned to
Boston from two failed attacks on Port Royaf, Jamaica that had ended in chaos, mutiny,

13 In a Gallup poll, 54% approved o f Johnson’s handling of the war, 31%
disapproved, and 15% had no opinion. “LBJ Viet Policy Still Endorsed,” Boston Globe,
20 Apr. 1966, p. 25.
—
14 Saul Bellow, Dangling Man (New York: Vanguard, 1944; New York: Penguin,
1996), p. 9.
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and what one historian described as “craven retreat.” Their performance s a angered their
fellow citizens that, not unlike the egg-throwing tenement dwellers o f South Boston in
1966, many emptied the contents o f their chamber pots onto the troops as the marched by.
“Is your piss-pot charged, neighbour?” yelled one woman. “So-ho, souse the cowards.”15
By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, Bostonians turned toward
radical resistance to authority. Impressment o f local sailors for the King’s navy became
such a threat to the city that, despite the encouragement o f several ministers to take up
arms against the Catholic French to the north, Bostonians were more likely to arm
themselves against ship captains suspected o f pressing men into service. In 1741, a mob
o f 300 men wielding “axes, clubs and cutlasses” terrorized the commander o f the man-ofwar Astrea when they suspected that he planned to sweep the city’s docks for men. Four
years later, another crowd assaulted the commander o f H.M.S. Shirley and “beat him and
the Suffolk County deputy sheriff senseless in Milk Street in retaliation for pressing.” In
November 1747, in response to a massive press sweep, crowds quickly abducted several
ship’s officers and surrounded the governor’s mansion where some others had taken
refuge. When the governor called out the militia and issued a proclamation to disperse
the crowd, the mob answered by smashing all of the windows in the government house
and dragging a royal barge from the harbor to the governor’s house where, in his
courtyard, they torched it.16 In the middle o f the eighteenth century, few Bostonians

15 Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness,
and the Origins o f the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1979), p. 59.
16Nash, The Urban Crucible, pp. 171,221-222.
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would countenance being conscripted, especially by force, into military service for the
crown.
Twenty years later, mob rule became common place as the tensions between
colonists and British authorities - those that would lead to revolution - took root and
grew. In a clear message of their resistance to the passage o f the Stamp Act in 1765, a
mob o f 40 to 5<J tradesmen demolished a brick building believed to be the future office of
the stamp distributor in a half-hour. That night, the crowd moved to the stamp
distributor’s house and spent four hours destroying everything in his house. Twelve days
later, while Chief Justice (and future provincial governor) Thomas Hutchinson and his
family were eating dinner, the crowd took axes to his front door, chased the family out o f
the house and. as historian Gary Nash recounts it,
then systematically reduced the furniture to splinters, stripped the walls
bare, chopped through inner partitions until the house was a hollow shell,
destroyed the formal gardens in the rear o f the mansion, drank the wine
cellar dry, stole E.900 sterling in coin, and carried off every moveable
object o f value except some of Hutchinson’s books and papers, which
were left to scatter in the wind.
When they were through, they razed the building.17 Surely, by 1773, the nighttime
dumping o f 342 casks of tea into Boston harbor should not have surprised anyone.
In the nineteenth century, Bostonians took pride in their revolutionary heritage
and invoked it in other campaigns to right injustice. In nearby Concord, Henry David
Thoreau went to jail rather than pay taxes that he knew were subsidizing the Mexican
War. In an essay that influenced few o f his contemporaries but profoundly inspired later

17Nash, The Urban Crucible, p. 294.
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twentieth century proponents o f civil disobedience from Mohandas K. Gandhi to Martin
Luther King, Jr., Thoreau wrote: “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly
[e.g., fugitive slaves, Mexican prisoners], the true place for a just man is also a prison,”
he wrote. One hundred twenty years later, draft resisters would be inspired by such
rhetoric:
A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority...but it is
irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep
all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not
hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills
this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to
pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent
blood.18
Thoreau was the nagging conscience of his fellow citizens and set the example that
obedience to one’s moral principles took precedence over allegiance to one’s government.
Soon after the end o f the Mexican War, following passage of the Fugitive Slave
Act o f 1850, abolitionists in Boston took their protests to a new level as they actively
planned to prevent fugitive slaves from being recaptured in their city and, failing this,
preventing their transport back to the South. In February 1851, a mob rushed through the
doors of the courthouse in Court Square seeking a captured fugitive slave named
Shadrach. When they emerged with him on their shoulders and quickly spirited him out
o f harm’s way to Canada, Theodore Parker, one o f several abolitionist ministers on the
Boston Committee o f Vigilance, described the mob’s action as “the noblest deed done in
Boston since the destruction o f the tea in 1773.” A few months later, when authorities

18 Henry David Thoreau, “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience,” in Walden and
Civil Disobedience (New York: Signet, 1980) pp. 230-231.
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captured another fugitive slave and housed him in the courthouse, they surrounded the
building with chains to prevent another raid. James Brewer Stewart tells us that
resistance to authority was in the air: “Antislavery politicians o f all shadings were openly
opposing federal authority, debating the limits of peaceful dissent, and exploring the
imperatives o f forcible resistance.” Indeed, in May 1854, a mob assembled at Faneuil
Hall after hearing of the imprisonment o f another fugitive slave, Anthony Bums, at the
courthouse. When one minister counseled the crowd to wait until morning to free Bums,
the crowd responded “No! No! Tonight! Tonight!” They immediately marched from
Faneuil Hall to the court building and battered down the front door only to hear shots ring
out as the first few men crossed the threshold. A guard was shot, but the crowd was
forced to leave without Bums. On the day that authorities escorted Bums to a ship that
would take him south, many of the city’s buildings were shrouded in black and all the
armed forces available lined the route to prevent any attempt to free him. Parker,
disgusted by the whole ordeal, said: “We are the vassals of Virginia. It reaches its arms
over the graves o f our mothers, it kidnaps men in the city o f Puritans, over the graves o f
Samuel Adams and John Hancock.”19
In the twentieth century, however, Boston’s history o f resisting authority mostly
seemed a distant memory. The city’s campaigns to root out all manner o f vice led to

19 Marion Gleason McDougall, Fugitive Slaves (first published Boston, 1891;
New York: Bergman, 1967), pp. 44-48; Alice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment: Phases o f
American Social History from the Colonial Period to the Outbreak o fthe Civil War,
(1944; reprint, New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 538-540; James Brewer Stewart, H oly
Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976),
154-159.
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book bannings that made famous the phrase “Banned in Boston.” During the red raids
that followed the Great War, Department o f Justice agents and local police arrested six
hundred alleged com m unists (“in most instances,” one judge later said, “perfectly quiet
and harmless working people”), handcuffed them in pairs and paraded them through
Boston’s streets where the masses of citizens who witnessed it jeered and taunted them.20
After World War n, Boston’s place as home to numerous colleges and universities and its
stature as a liberal, free-thinking town did not insulate it from the same kind of Cold War
conformist attitudes that affected the rest o f the country. The city sent John F. Kennedy, a
committed cold warrior, to the White House and soon after helped elect his like-minded
youngest brother, Ted, to fill his vacant Senate seat. Like most Americans. Bostonians
were fervently anticommunist and supported Kennedy’s policies in Laos and South
Vietnam as essential to holding back the spread o f the Red menace. In 1965, when
Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, took steps to escalate American involvement in
Vietnam, few protested. Even in July, when Johnson made the decision to use the draft
rather than the reserves to increase military manpower, few balked. Nationally, 63% o f
Americans continued to favor the draft against only 13% who opposed it. There is no
indication that the people o f Boston felt any differently, even though the doubling of draft
calls soon began to affect more and more families.21
In fact, when early opponents to the war first attempted a march and rally on the

20 Howard Zinn, A People's History o f the United States, Rev. and updated ed.
(New York: Harper, 1995), p. 366.
21 George Q. Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service (Chapel Hill:
University o f North Carolina Press, 1985), p. 234.
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Boston Common (as part o f the International Days o f Protest) on October 16,1965, they
received very little serious consideration from the media and saw counter-demonstrators
easily dash their meeting. The day before the march, the Boston Globe ran an article by
Gordon Hall, an apparent expert “observer and reporter o f extremist movements” which
suggested that the scheduled march and demonstration would be dominated by
communists. He noted that o f the 14 sponsoring organizations, all but ten were “tightly
knit permanent organizations o f left-wing persuasion,” and that even when apparently
benign organizations such as the Cambridge Committee to End the War in Vietnam (the
primary sponsor) “are not the actual creations and front groups of the extreme Left, they
are custom tailored for infiltration and control by extremists.” Hall argued that “their
paper-mache structure and general informality are no match for the militancy, and
superior organization of the extremist.” He offered no evidence that militants were, in
fact, taking over the CCEWV, but quoted Young Socialist Alliance memos that urged
members to become active in the antiwar movement. Readers of the Globe, then, most
likely viewed the march not as a legitimate expression o f opposition to the escalating war
made by concerned citizens, but instead a communist front.22
Things only got worse for the demonstrators on the day of the march. A total of
3000 people had assembled at three separate locations - the Cambridge Common, the
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology administration building on Massachusetts Avenue
(“Mass. Ave.,” to locals), and Boston University’s Marsh Plaza on Commonwealth

22 Gordon Hall, “Viet Protest Influenced by Left,” Boston Globe, 15 Oct. 1965,
p.5.
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Avenue (“Comm. Ave.” to locals) - before inarching to Boston Common where they met
at the Parkman Bandstand. At the Mass. Ave. Bridge, where the three groups joined for
the final leg o f the march, six Harvard freshman held a banner that read, “We Support
LBJ in Viet Nam.” The six followed the marchers to the common where they joined
another group, numbering 300, the core of which were members o f William F. Buckley’s
Young Americans for Freedom; there they waited until the marchers settled in in front o f
the bandstand and until the speakers took their seats before making their move. This
smaller crowd, made up largely o f students who came from Boston University, Harvard,
MIT, Northeastern University, Boston College, and Emerson College, then pushed their
way through the demonstrators until they positioned themselves directly in front o f the
platform. To the relief of the speakers, 50 police patrolmen had already posted
themselves at the bandstand, with six men guarding the steps. The counter-protesters
carried signs that said “Stay in Viet Nam,” “Draft the Pinkos,” “Drop the Bombs,” and
“Send the Draft Dodgers to Viet Nam.” Seeing this, the antiwar marchers, began to chant
“We want peace in Vietnam. We want peace,” only to have the counter-demonstrators
respond with “We want victory in Vietnam. We want victory.” Finally, Russell Johnson
o f the American Friends Service Committee attempted to speak, but he could outshout
the insurgents only briefly. State Representative Irving Fishman from Newton and Noam
Chomsky, the MIT linguistics professor, couldn’t even match Johnson’s performance and
police ended the rally before it turned violent. Chomsky later remembered that he
“wasn’t unhappy that there was a large contingent of police, who didn’t like what we
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were saying...but didn’t want to see people murdered on the Common.”23
The placard urg in g that draft “dodgers” be sent to Vietnam must have seemed
incongruous to many in attendance because, at that point, very few people had dared to
challenge the draft as a method o f protesting the war. Indeed, after the publication o f a
Life magazine photograph o f Catholic Worker Chris Kearns burning his draft card on July
29, 1965, Congress quickly passed a law making draft card destruction punishable by up
to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Since then, antiwar activism had been largely
limited to marches and rallies. But on the same day that the counter-protesters broke up
the Boston Common rally, David Miller, another Catholic Worker from Syracuse, stood
on a platform in Manhattan and said, “I believe the napalming o f villages is an immoral
a c t” As he held his draft card aloft, he declared, “I hope this will be a significant
political act, so here goes,” and set his card on fire.24 Miller was the first to challenge the
new law against card burning and his picture ran on front pages across the country. In
reaction, the senior senator from Massachusetts, Republican Leverett Saltonstall, urged
support for the men serving in Vietnam “who are exposed to danger,” and not for “those
who are trying to avoid their duty to their country.” He had clearly missed Miller’s point.
As evidenced by his easy submission to arrest, trial, and imprisonment, Miller did not try
to “avoid” anything; rather, he intended to set an example for others who viewed the war

23 “Cheers, Jeers, Eggs, Paint Greet Marching Thousands,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct.
1965, p. 1; “Some Students Demonstrate FOR LBJ’s Policy,” Boston Globe, 3 Nov.
1965, p. 26; Noam Chomsky, letter to author, 6 December 1996.
24 Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance (Boston: Beacon, 1971), p.
23.
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as immoral and who believed it was their duty as citizens to disobey any laws that
perpetuated that immorality. Saltonstall could only say, “We want freedom o f speech, but
we want patriotism,” too.25
If the tremendous increase in parcels sent to the Pentagon for forwarding to GIs
in Vietnam is any indication, the International Days o f Protest did little to persuade most
Americans that they should protest the war. Thousands o f packages and letters arrived at
the Pentagon in the weeks following the demonstrations, creating a logistical problem for
the military. Newspapers that featured a “Women’s Page” ran helpful hints on what to
send to soldiers (“send anything that can be mixed with water because the water there has
a foul taste and the boys can’t drink it”).26
In Boston, public officials dismissed the protesters and reaffirmed their support
for U.S. policy. “Those who question the U.S. policy,” said Ted Kennedy, “ought to be
just as quick to condemn the terrorist activities o f the Viet Cong, such as assassination
and kidnaping.” Governor Volpe said “Let those misguided individuals who protest our
actions in South Vietnam know that the frontiers o f freedom do not stop at the territorial
limits o f the United States o f America. They extend around the world, to all people o f all
races, customs and beliefs.” State Representative Patrick W. Nee stood in Park Square a
few days after the protests and distributed 2000 bumper stickers with the message, “We

25 “Draft Card Burning is Shocking - Saltonstall,” Boston Globe, 19 Oct. 1965, p.
4.
26 “Viet Gifts Clog Pentagon,” Boston Globe, 7 Nov. 1965, p. 50; “Draft Protest
Backfires As G.I. Mail Swells,” Boston Globe, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 1; “Helpful Hints: What
To Send G.I. in Viet Nam,” Boston Globe, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 11.
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Support Our Boys in Viet Nam.” “The way they were snapped up by motorists,” he said,
“shows how the real Americans feel.” Truly, it was a time o f hardboiled-dom.27
Interestingly, college students seemed to be the most outspoken critics of the
antiwar protesters. In an early example o f deriding the appearance of those with whom
one disagrees, one o f the Harvard freshman who held the “We Support LBJ in Viet Nam”
banner remarked that the idea to do so came about because they “wanted people to know
that all students aren’t unwashed beatniks.” Meanwhile, at Boston University, members
o f the Young Republicans and the Young Democrats collected 6,000 student signatures
for a petition pledging support to Johnson’s Vietnam policy and presented them to
Assistant Secretary o f State William P. Bundy. (At the time, BU had only 8,000 day
students and a total enrollment of 15,000).28
The protesters had their defenders, too, but they were few and found themselves
most often defending the marchers from charges o f being communists (as they had been
called by several congressmen and senators). Howard Zinn, an Associate Professor o f
Government at Boston University decried the name calling, saying that the student
“radicals” were a “new breed,” one without “commitment to any other country” or “fixed
loyalties to any dogma.” In a Globe opinion piece, he wrote that although students
realized that “the Communists will use any means to gain their ends,” they also

27 “Ted Back, Predicts Long, Tough W ar,” Boston Globe, 11 Nov. 1965, p. 10;
“Veteran’s Day Voices Rise Against Pacifists’ Protests,” Boston Globe, 11 Nov. 1965, p.
19; “Answering the Anti-Warriors,” Boston Globe, 21 Oct. 1965, p. 2.
28 “Some Students Demonstrate FOR LBJ’s Policy,” Boston Globe, 3 Nov. 1965,
p. 26; “B.U. Viet Support Signed by 6,000,” Boston Globe, 19 Nov. 1965, p. 6.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
concluded, after seeing “American planes bombing Vietnamese villages, and Marines
throwing grenades down tunnels in which crouch helpless women and children,” that the
United States would do the same. “Force and deception,” he said, “are found on all
sides” and then quoted Randolph Bourne who, at the outbreak o f the Great War, offered
this critique o f American patriotism:
The moment war is declared...the mass o f the people, through some
spiritual alchemy, become convinced that they have willed and executed
the deed themselves. They then with the exception o f a few malcontents,
proceed to allow themselves to be regimented, coerced, changed in all
environments o f their lives, and turned into a solid manufactory of
destruction toward whatever other people may have, in the appointed
scheme o f things, come within the range o f the government’s
disapprobation.29
Like Zinn, most supporters o f the protesters tried to focus attention on what they
perceived to be the immoral nature of the war by invoking examples from an earlier
generation. In a letter to the Globe, one person wrote: “We really should humbly
remember that Hitler’s and Tojo’s obedient, patriotic, brave soldiers were considered
murderers by us because o f their government’s stand...Those who demonstrate for peace
want a firm, defensible basis for this war. Please give them your patience, tolerance, and
consideration.” Another person, a potential draft resister, wrote: “The Nuremburg Trials
established that it was the responsibility of each individual to refuse to participate in any
activity which violated moral standards.” For that reason, he said, he would have to
refuse induction if called. Echoing Thoreau, he said: “I hold allegiance to one thing

29 Howard Zinn, “Don’t Call Students Communists When They Protest Against
Viet Nam War,” Boston Globe, 24 Oct. 1965, p. A4.
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higher than the government o f the United States, and that is my own conscience.”30
In the fail o f 1965, such appeals to conscience persuaded few. In another Gallup
poll, 58% of Americans described the degree o f communist involvement in Vietnam
protests as “a lot” and another 20% said “some,” while only 4% answered “not at all.” It
was a lonely time to oppose the war. In Boston, over 300,000 people turned out on the
streets of the Back Bay to see the longest parade the city had held in 27 years - it lasted 2
Vi hours - on Veteran’s Day. Mayor John Collins and 11 servicemen wounded in
Vietnam led the parade o f 17,000 marchers. According to one reporter, “pro-Viet Nam
fervor infused” the day.31
Within the budding antiwar movement disagreement over tactics further limited
effectiveness. Mainstream New Left groups planned more marches and teach-ins but
shied away from non-compliance with the draft as a tactic, fearing such direct
confrontation with the federal government. At the national convention of Students for a
Democratic Society held in June in Kewadin, Michigan, SDS decided that attacks on the
draft were too radical and instead chose to focus on “stopping the seventh war from
now.” Activists in the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
thought draft resistance would undermine other antiwar work and allow the
administration “to convince everybody that our main objective is to be a bunch o f
professional draft-dodgers.” A small groups of individuals disagreed. Emboldened by

30 Letter, Boston Globe, 24 Oct. 1965, p. A4; Letter, Boston Globe, 1 Nov. 1965,
p. 4.
31 “Link Reds to Protests,” Boston Globe, 20 Nov. 1965, p. 7; “Pro-Viet Nam
Fervor Infuses Longest Parade Here in 27 Years,” Boston Globe, 12 Nov. 1965, p. 6.
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David Miller’s public defiance, a crowd of 1500 sympathizers including Dorothy Day and
A. J. Muste turned out in New York’s Union Square in November to watch five pacifists
bum their cards. Although someone with a fire extinguisher “bolted from the crowd and
doused the pacifists and their cards,” they managed to bum them anyway.32 More and
more, radical pacifists began to see the draft as the ideal point o f entry for protesting the
war.
Pacifists’ Progress
A newly fotmed branch o f the Committee for Non Violent Action (CNV A) can be
credited for initiating what became the draft resistance movement in Boston. In 1957,
members o f several pacifist organizations came together to form the original CNV A as a
way “to go beyond words” in protesting the escalating nuclear arms race. On August 6,
the twelfth anniversary o f the bombing of Hiroshima, eleven members were arrested for
trespassing at a nuclear test site at Camp Mercury, Nevada, seventy miles west of Las
Vegas. After a quick trial resulting in convictions and suspended sentences, they went
back to the entrance o f the test site to pray. There they saw the giant mushroom cloud o f
the blast and it convinced them that they “could never rest while such forces o f evil were
loose in God’s world.” The following year, several CNV A members led by Albert
Bigelow, a former World War II naval officer, attempted to sail a thirty foot ketch named
“The Golden Rule” into an American hydrogen bomb test site at the Eniwetok atoll in the

32 Thomas Powers, Vietnam: The War a t Home (New York: Grossman, 1973;
Boston, G.K. Hall and Company, 1984), p. 186. Charles DeBenedetti, An American
Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement o f the Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1990), pp. 129-130.
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M arshall Islands. They were twice intercepted by the Coast Guard and, after the second

attempt, spent sixty days in jail in Honolulu. The events garnered national headlines and
led the Boston Herald to characterize the mission as “Thoreau-esque.”33
In 1960, Bradford Lyttle, the son of a Unitarian minister and a paciflst-Socialist
mother, established the New England CNV A in Groton, Connecticut, at a time when he
was moving the organization toward a more confrontational “obstructionist” approach to
protest. As historian James Tracy describes it, this move showed “that radical pacifists
privileged individual cathartic action over pragmatic efficacy,” a practice that would later
prove significant in Boston. In Groton, CNV A activists focused their attention on
protesting the manufacture o f the Navy’s most powerful weapon: the Polaris nuclear
submarine. Each time the shipbuilders launched a new Polaris, CNV A activists would
row their boats and paddle their canoes out into the Thames River in a symbolic attempt
to block the sub. One person actually managed to swim out to a sub and climb aboard the
hull as if to demonstrate his willingness to sacrifice his own body for peace. On land,
occasional violence broke out: In the first week o f operation someone shattered all of the
windows in the CNV A office. Later, an angry shipyard worker knocked out Lyttle as he
distributed leaflets.34
By 1965, New England CNVA had moved to Voluntown, Connecticut, where
members continued to plan its submarine protests, demonstrations at the Sikorski

33 James Tracy, D irect Action: Radical Pacifism From the Union Eight to the
Chicago Seven (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 99-104; DeBenedetti,
An American Ordeal, pp. 31, 35; Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, p. 9.
34 Tracy, Direct Action, pp. 107, 113-114.
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helicopter plant in Stratford, and peace marches, including one from Quebec to
Guantanamo in 1963. Their activities were well known within pacifist circles; in fact,
membership tended to overlap among groups such as CNV A, the War Resisters League,
the Workshop in Non Violence (later WIN magazine), the Fellowship o f Reconciliation,
and the American Friends Service Committee. In time, the CNVA’s work gained the
attention o f two Boston University students, John Phillips and David O’Brien. Both were
members o f the War Resisters League and had been active at BU, but were looking for an
opportunity to make a more powerful personal commitment to ending the war in
Vietnam. They spent much o f their free time participating in CNV A-sponsored
demonstrations and at the farm in Voluntown where they received permission to form a
Boston branch o f the organization in January 1966.35
For Phillips and O’Brien, much o f the attraction to CNV A lay in the “spiritual
underpinnings” o f Lyttle’s Gandhi an pacifism and the sense that CNVA had a utopian

vision o f operating as an alternative society within a society. According to Phillips,
compared to the “reactive” nature o f many antiwar groups, the CNVA focused on
building a new society. He felt “the presence of God” all through that time. “You
couldn’t help it...there were all these Unitarian Ministers, Friend Service Committee
[members]...I felt a strong spiritual identity throughout the experience.”36
Unlike New England CNVA, the fifteen or so hardcore members o f Boston

35 Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997; John J. Phillips letter to CNVA-West, 24 Feb
1966, Boston CNVA folder, New England CNVA papers, Swarthmore College Peace
Collection (hereafter cited as SCPC).
36 Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997.
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CNVA directed their attention exclusively toward the Vietnam war. Although they were
pacifists and were deeply concerned about the proliferation o f nuclear weapons, the
worsening situation in Vietnam, they felt, deserved all o f their attention. They set up their
first office in Roxbury but because o f inadequate plumbing and wiring, later moved to an
old bam in Brookline, complete with “milk-crate-modem furniture” and mimeograph
machines for producing leaflets. They were extremely well-informed regarding the
Geneva Accords and could, in conversation or leaflet form, detail the history o f American
involvement in Vietnam since the 1940s. One o f their regular activities involved going to
the movie theater where Doctor Zhivago played and passing out leaflets that stressed the
peace theme in the film and applied it to Vietnam. They also planned their own peace
marches in which they inevitably ran into the usual intolerant bystanders. On a Boston to
Provincetown march, they were regularly jeered and occasionally beaten up. Phillips: “I
remember going through Plymouth... very naive...walking through the center o f town and
finding the whole center o f town mobbed with people ready to do all kinds of things to

mess us up...one lady in particular squirting us with a water pistol full of mustard because we were yellow.”37
On March 25, 1966, the group turned its attention to the Boston Army Base as its
contribution to the Second International Days of Protest. The strategy involved leafleting
and sitting in the road to block buses o f draftees and anyone else from entering or exiting.
In general they hoped to be able to “gum up the works.” It did not last long. At the army

37 Williams interview, 28 Aug. 1997; Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997; “Dear
Fellow American,” and “We Support Our President,” leaflets, Boston CNVA folder,
NECNVA papers, SCPC.
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base, which is located in South Boston near the waterfront, hundreds o f longshoremen
and other onlookers spat on the demonstrators, yelled obscenities, and called them all
“cowards.” One burly longshoremen approached the group and offered them a gallon o f
gasoline, “so you can bum yourself,” as Norman Morrison, a Quaker, had done outside
the Pentagon several months before. This prompted David Benson to take out his draft
card and bum i t As he attempted to light i t a. longshoreman knocked the matches from
his hands. The police quickly stepped in and arrested the demonstrators - eleven o f them
- and hauled them off to the police wagon. As two officers dragged Benson away from
the gates o f the Army base, he ripped up the card and tossed the pieces to the ground.
Several hecklers yelled sarcastically to the police: “Be careful. Don’t hurt them.” As
Suzanne Williams remembers it, they were arraigned for “sauntering and loitering in such
a way as to engender a breach of the peace and likely to endanger passersby.” They were
released on their own recognizance and ordered to appear for trial at the South Boston
Courthouse on March 31, thus setting in motion the events that would lead to their
beating.38
Benson did not destroy his draft card lightly. The Boston CNV A had quickly
recognized the draft as a potentially ideal target for the kind o f confrontational direct
action about which they had been learning in Voluntown. It required more than the usual
commitment to standard civil disobedience; one had to be prepared to face the penalties

38 New York Times, 26 Mar. 1966, p. 2; “Pacifists Stage Boston March,”
Manchester Union-Leader, 26 Mar. 1966, p. 1; “Punchers at Court,” Boston Globe, 10
Apr. 1966; Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997; Williams interview, 28 Aug. 1997; Boston
CNVA newsletter, c. early April 1966, Boston CNVA folder, NECNVA papers, SCPC.
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o f the draft card destruction law and, for those who had deferments, face the inevitable
change o f draft status to 1-A (draftable) by one’s local board. One also had to face the
hostility o f those whose sons and brothers were being conscripted.
The Boston resisters’ emphasis on the draft coincided with a sharp increase in the
number o f men being called for induction. By the end o f 1965, between 35,000 and
45,000 men were being drafted every month nationwide; in contrast, monthly calls in
1962 and 1963 had averaged between 6,300 and 9,400 men. Americans had grown
comfortable with the peacetime draft but the sudden intrusion o f the Selective Service
System on their lives brought the war home and made the draft a subject o f heightened
scrutiny.39
America and Conscription
Not until after World War II did the American people tolerate a peacetime draft.
During the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American
War, the armed forces of the United States relied on volunteers - as they do today. The
behavior of British troops stationed in the thirteen American colonies in the 1760s and
early 1770s convinced most Americans o f that era. and for generations after, that standing
peacetime armies encroached on the liberties of the citizenry and, at their worst, could be
used as forces o f repression. Moreover, to Americans who embraced classical republican
notions of service to one’s community, conscription seemed unduly coercive. Instead,
throughout most o f the nineteenth century, Americans expected that all free citizens

39 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey,

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69
would spring to the defense o f the nation during periods of crisis.40
The earliest uses o f conscription in America were, therefore, carried out with
caution. President Lincoln introduced the first draft in 1863 - and saw bloody riots as a
result - but terminated it soon after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Woodrow Wilson,
too, initiated conscription in 1917, upon American entry into the war in Europe, but
ended it once victory was achieved. The draft that Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed into
law in 1940 (long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) created the first of its kind
in peacetime, but hardly seemed necessary after 7 December 1941 when millions enlisted
to fight. In what was by then the custom, that draft, which resulted in ten million
inductions, ended on March 31, 1947. This did not stop policy makers from openly
contemplating renewal o f the draft law even without an attendant national emergency.
Soon after the expiration o f the old law, the loss of 15,000 men from the armed services
each month amid growing tensions with the Soviet Union (exacerbated by the Communist
coup in Czechoslovakia), led to revived calls for a peacetime draft. On June 24, 1948
Congress passed the Selective Service Act.41
The establishment o f a draft in peacetime did not occur without criticism. In
1947, the War Resisters League sponsored the first public draft card burning and turn-in

40 Richard Gillam, “The Peacetime Draft: Voluntarism to Coercion,” in Martin
Anderson, ed., The M ilitary Draft, p. 101.
41 John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise An Army: The Draft Comes to Modem
America (New York: Free Press, 1987), pp. 254-260; Lawrence M. Baskir and William
A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War and the Vietnam Generation
(New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 19; William H. McNeill, “The Draft in the Light of
History,” in Martin Anderson, ed., The M ilitary Draft: Selected Readings on
Conscription (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 59-65.
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in New York City. More than 400 people participated, including social critic and essayist
Dwight MacDonald, who spoke against conscription under any circumstances:
When the State...tells me that I must ‘defend’ it against foreign
enemies - that is, must be prepared to kill people who have done me no
injury in defense o f a social system which has done me considerable injury
- then I say that I cannot go along. In such a serious matter as going to
war, each individual must decide for himself; and this means civil
disobedience to the State power that presumes to decide for one.42
In addition, ongoing segregation within the military led A. Philip Randolph, the black
labor leader and civil rights activist, to tell the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1947
that he would “personally pledge...to openly counsel, aid and abet youth...in an organized
refusal to register and be drafted” should a peacetime draft be enacted. A month after
passage o f the new draft law, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which
ended segregation in the military.43
The adm inistration o f the Selective Service remained essentially the same as it
was during the war, but Congress did make some key changes in writing the new law.
First, they reduced the draftee’s term to 21 months (in World War II, draftees served for
the duration of the war) and placed a two year limit on the life of the draft; after that,
Congress would have to reevaluate the need to continue it. (Eventually, the draft came up
for review every four years through the fifties and sixties and Congress extended it every
time.) As Congress reviewed a possible extension o f the Act in 1950, North Korean
armies streamed across the 38th parallel into South Korea, leading the United States,

42 Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, p. 9; Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance,
pp. 4.
43 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 5; Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 170.
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under the auspices o f the United Nations, to take action against North Korea. Congress
quickly extended the draft law and the Selective Service sprang into action, drafting
220,000 men by the end o f 1950. Such events seemed to confirm the need for - and the
practical advantage o f - an ongoing Selective Service Act.44
As the Korean conflict wound down and manpower needs declined, some in
Congress worried about the structure o f the draft. They feared that the armed forces
qualification test resulted in the rejection o f too many draftees and that, consequently, the
nation was sending too many o f its brightest and healthiest off to fight while its weakest
and least intelligent stayed home to procreate. L. Mendel Rivers, a Congressman from
South Carolina, suggested lowering the standards o f the qualification exam because, he
said, “Korea has taught us one thing if it has taught us anything. You don’t need a Ph.D.
degree to fight those Chinks.” At approximately the same time, Selective Service
inaugurated the implementation o f a system to distribute draft deferments to America’s
best and brightest. Starting in 1951, draft boards began granting deferments to college
students who placed in the top half o f their class or who scored well on a national
aptitude test. Soon, more than 75% o f the nation’s college students were effectively put
out o f harm’s way.45 During the rest o f the decade and well into the 1960s, very few
Americans were drafted and no draftees were killed; thus, Americans seemed willing to
tolerate not only a peacetime draft but the concomitant inequities assured by a complex

44 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 176-177.
45 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 21; Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey,
pp. 182,201.
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system o f deferments.46
Attitudes toward the draft did not change substantially until the American
escalation in Vietnam. Up to that point, the Selective Service enjoyed considerable
approval among policy makers. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy praised the state
directors o f the Selective Service, saying that, “the pressures upon them are tremendous,
yet I cannot think o f any branch of our government in the last two decades where there
have been so few complaints about inequity.” Furthermore, in 1963 the Pentagon
acknowledged the importance o f the draft in noting that one third of all enlisted men and
41% o f its officers would not have entered the service if not for the draft as a motivator.47
Much o f the popularity o f the agency could be traced to its director, General
Lewis B. Hershey, who after supervising the draft during World War H, served as director
o f Selective Service from 1948 to 1970. Hershey personified his agency in a way
unequaled by anyone, save J. Edgar Hoover. Politicians loved him for the folksy Will
Rogers style he brought to his testimony before Congressional committees. In 1966,
syndicated columnist Mary McGrory described him as “everybody’s grandfather” and
noted that “if the system is inhuman, its director at least is not.”48
Hershey liked to promote the agency’s flexibility and the fact that rather than
being run as a massive government bureaucracy out o f Washington, the Selective Service

46 Chambers, To Raise An Army, p. 256.
47 Flynn, Lerwis B. Hershey, pp. 218,221.
48 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 181; Mary McGrory, “Everybody’s Grandfather,”
Boston Globe, 18 Apr. 1966, p. 14.
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was decentralized, administered by over 4,000 local boards made up o f “little groups of
neighbors.” Naturally, this made it into a much larger bureaucracy and the neighbors on
local boards were hardly representative o f mainstream America. As Lawrence Baskir and
William Strauss pointed out after the Vietnam War, Hershey shaped the agency in his
own image, “converting what was originally a civilian agency into a paramilitary
organization, 90 percent of whose top-ranking officials and state directors were officers in
the armed forces. In turn, they appointed local board members with perspectives like
their own.” Indeed, a 1966 study o f over 16,000 draft board members across the country
found that more than 70 percent were middle and upper class professionals (managers,
proprietors, public officials, white collar workers) over 50 years old while only 25 percent
held blue-collar or agricultural jobs.49
From the end o f the Korean War until 1965, these draft boards oversaw - under
the direction o f Hershey - the implementation of a deferment system based on a theory
that they called “manpower channeling,” in which the Selective Service extended its
mission beyond merely delivering men to the armed forces but also, through the use of
attractive deferments and the threat o f induction, “channeled” men into fields o f study
and occupations deemed to be in the nation’s interest. Thus, in the mid-1960s if one had
the grades and planned to study physics (scientists were important in the arms and space
races), one could expect a deferment for four years o f undergraduate work, additional
deferments for graduate study, and a final occupational deferment if successful in

49 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 16; James W. Davis, Jr. and
Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little Groups o f Neighbors: The Selective Service System
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), p. 58.
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securing a the right kind o f job. Such a system could easily ensure the safety of a man
from age 18 to 26 and beyond: O f coarse, it was completely unfair, and its discovery by
the antiwar movement early in 1967 proved very useful [see Chapter 2], but Hershey
argued that the protection o f “ vital activities and scarce skills” were keys to national
security. Those who were ineligible for such deferments, because they were poor or not
as smart or worked in their fathers’ businesses, more likely saw things as Bellow’s
character Joseph when he said “personal choice does not count for much these days.”50
Despite the inequities, by July 1965 the deferment system had long been accepted
by the public as an integral part o f the draft. More than that, Hershey’s biographer notes,
after twelve years o f relative dormancy, “deferments had been translated into exemptions
in the minds o f many. To now revive the draft in order to fight a limited war in Southeast
Asia might prove troublesome.” It did. Early protests against the war included the
occasional draft card burning which resulted in the August 1965 passage o f legislation
(sponsored in the House by Mendel Rivers and in the Senate by Strom Thurmond)
prohibiting the destruction o f draft cards. In addition, General Hershey began using
reclassification as punishment for antiwar protesters. After more than 30 people, many of
them students at the University o f Michigan, staged a sit-in at a Local Board 85 in Ann
Arbor in October, Hershey revoked the deferments of 13 male students and made them
eligible for the draft This invited considerable criticism from editorial boards across the
country, but Hershey argued that “reclassification is quicker at stopping sit-ins than some

50 Davis and Dolbeare, Little Groups o f Neighbors, p. 154; Bellow, Dangling
Man, p. 125.
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indictment that takes effect six months later.” When a reporter from the Michigan
campus paper interviewed him about this decision, he responded, “I’m one o f those oldfashioned fathers who never let pity interfere with a spanking.” Some months later,
Mendel Rivers told Hershey, “God bless you, you did right.”51
Suddenly, in a matter o f months, public interest in the draft had heightened
considerably. Between September 1965 and January 1966, 170,000 men had been drafted
and another 180,000 enlisted after being classified 1-A. Men seeking deferments quickly
became fathers or enrolled in college. By January, two million men had college
deferments, effectively becoming the first draft dodgers. That spring, the eighth edition
o f The Handbookfo r Conscientious Objectors, published by the Central Committee for
Conscientious Objectors and “designed to serve the committed objector, not to challenge
the draft system,” sold 11,000 copies in less than five months and went into a second
printing. At the same time, Hershey, in an attempt to tap into the student population,
resurrected the long unused Selective Service Qualification Test in order to target the
poorest students. In 1963, when the test was offered last, only 2,145 men sat for it. In
1966, however, 767,935 men - all anxious to secure deferments - took the exam.52
“I Fought the Law, and the Law Won”
Into this atmosphere o f increased attention to the draft stepped the Boston

51 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 234-236, 243; Powers, The War A t Home, p. 86;
Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, p. 54; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and
Circumstance, p. 25.
52 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 234,241; DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, p.
166.
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Committee for Non-Violent Action. As they quickly discovered, however, few others
shared their commitment to challenging the war and its system o f conscription. On
March 26, 1966, the day after their arrest at the Boston Army Base for “sauntering and
loitering,” many of them participated in a march from the Cambridge Common to the
Arlington Street Church. Organizers decided to hold the rally in the church in hopes that
they would be able to avoid the kind o f hostility that had caused the October
demonstration on the Common to end. It made no difference. Marchers were jeered and
pelted with eggs for much of the march. A group of counter-protesters marched ahead of
them chanting derogatory epithets and calling the parade the “long yellow line.” When
they arrived at the church, a group of 1,500 unsympathetic onlookers awaited them. As
the marchers entered the building, dozens o f eggs and several beer cans rained down on
them. Many of the eggs splattered on the doors of the church staining them a slimy
yellow. On the steps o f the church Noam Chomsky asked a police officer “Don’t you
think you ought to stop this?” The officer just smiled until an egg connected with his
uniform, rapidly changing his demeanor. “Then they cleared everybody away in about
three seconds,” Chomsky recalled.53
For two straight days, the members o f Boston CNVA had faced considerable
enmity as they protested against the war. Still, several of them decided that on the day o f
their “trial” for the sit-in at the Army base, they would use the courthouse steps as a
“natural stage” for a draft card burning. Part o f their training in civil disobedience taught

53 “Eggs Hurled At Hub Marchers in War Protest,” Manchester Union-Leader, 27
Mar. 1966, p. 1 New York Times, 27 Mar. 1966, p. 32; Chomsky interview, 20 May
1997.
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them to seek to make every event into an opportunity for protest, to get the message out.
Therefore, they wrote press releases and distributed them to as many newspapers, and
radio and television stations as they could, never realizing that it could result in the
beating that they received. Years later, John Phillips said, “For some reason, I think we
were oblivious to the possibilities there. This was something we never expected to
happen.”54
After the attack, the victims went inside to be sentenced each to a $20 fine for
their roles in the sit-in. Standard nonviolent tactics included refusal to pay fines and the
eleven convicted loiterers did as much. They believed that rather than giving money to
the system that they were fighting, it would be better to have that system incur some
expenses to support them for 20 days in jail. The judge told John Phillips that, given his
broken nose and two black eyes, he had already paid a sufficient penalty, but Phillips
insisted on going to jail, too. There the group quickly learned, however, that the
Massachusetts correctional system did not spend much money to house and feed them.
Their cells at the Charles Street Jail were overrun with cockroaches and they were served
disgusting meals. Suzanne Williams recalled that,
There were these phenomenaL.women’s fist sized, meatballs that were
served there which were 100% inedible....I have no idea what they were
made of... We were given only, in the security trappings of a jail, large
spoons to eat with. And it was not possible to penetrate those objects with
that spoon. It was some kind of double boiled gristle or something....we
all referred to them as hand grenades....Some o f the other things they
served there, too, were quite questionable in origin.
On the day that they were released from jail (an uncle had paid bail to get Phillips out the

54 Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997.
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first night but the others stayed), a crowd o f reporters, about ten police officers, and five
FBI agents waited outside. To their satisfaction, Gary Graham Hicks, one of the eleven
from CNVA, and one o f the few black men in the m ovem ent burned his draft card. As
he did so, two FBI agents stood directly behind him, peering over his shoulder, one
relayed information that he read off the card to the other who wrote it down in a
notebook. After Hicks dropped the burning remains to the ground, the first agent snuffed
out the flame and collected the pieces. Even though Hicks, like his four friends before
him, had openly broken the law - and said so to the media as they did it - the FBI agents
diligently collected evidence at the scene as if it were a clandestine deed, evidence that
would put Gary Hicks in prison within a year.55
The government wasted no time in taking legal and possibly illegal action against
the Boston CNVA men who had burned their draft cards. On April 15, 1966, two weeks
after the draft card burnings on the South Boston Courthouse steps, a grand jury in U.S.
District Court in Boston indicted David O’Brien, John Phillips, David Benson, and David
Reed each for violating the Federal law prohibiting the destruction of one’s draft card
(Hicks’s indictment came down later). At almost the same time, each man heard from his
draft board. By April 22, two o f the men - Phillips and O’Brien - had been reclassified to
1-A. By mid-May, two o f them - Phillips and Reed - had been called for their pre
induction physicals (which they ignored) and by mid-June both had been called for

55 “Pacifist Group, Card Burners, Struck, Kicked,” M anchester Union-Leader, 1
Apr. 1966, p. 10; Phillips interview, 29 Aug. 1997; Williams interview, 28 Aug. 1997;
Transcript of United States v. Hicks, Cr-66-l03-J (1967), National Archives, Waltham,
Mass.
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induction (which they also ignored). On August 18, Phillips and Reed were indicted for
failure to comply with the Selective Service laws directing them to appear for their
physicals and to submit to induction. These were the early days o f draft resistance, and a
determined Federal government brought its full force to bear on those that challenged its
authority.
When each o f the CNVA cases came to trial, the defendants and the government
argued their cases from two completely different perspectives. The prosecution, led by
Assistant U.S. Attorney John Wall, a former paratrooper who served in Korea, stuck to
proving that the defendants did “knowingly and willfully” bum their draft cards or refuse
induction. These facts were easily proven as the defendants had generally perpetrated the
acts in public or announced their intentions in letters to their draft boards. In contrast, the
defendants, all o f whom served as their own counsel, used some o f the evidence
introduced by the prosecution against them - their letters to their local boards - not to
dispute the government’s presentation of the facts, but to make an argument to the jury
based on the moral value o f their acts as compared to the immorality of the “war
machine” and, sometimes specifically, American efforts in Vietnam.
David O’Brien faced the government first. In his trial o f June 1, 1966, he did not
object to any o f the evidence presented by Wall and, after hearing the testimony o f FBI
agent Thomas Mclnemey, thanked the man for saving his life. In his cross-examination
o f the state’s assistant director of Selective Service, Col. Paul Feeney, O’Brien read aloud
the letter that he had sent to his Local Board 18 in March. He told them that he was
severing his ties to the Selective Service because, he wrote,
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...I feel that it is the only moral course I can follow. I could never
serve in the armed forces in any capacity for I consider the existence o f the
war machine the furthest step taken toward the demise o f mankind, not
only physically but morally.
I cannot accept a position of civilian alternative service in place of
the military requirement you want me to perform. This would amount to
my being placed in a special category, and I am not special. This would be
saying that there is a right to draft others in the killing machine....to draft
those who don’t have special religious training and belief. I feel this right
does not exist; it is a wrong.
During his one-day trial, O’Brien’s arguments rested more on his pacifist beliefs
than on his particular dislike for the Vietnam War. He acknowledged that he could have
applied for conscientious objector (CO) status - which would have kept him from being
drafted into a combat role but probably would have resulted in having to fulfill non
combat responsibilities for two years - but such exemptions were generally given only to
those who were Quakers or could demonstrate a religious basis for their pacifism.
O ’Brien could not. Moreover, he felt that even to accept CO status would be tantamount
to acceptance o f and participation in an institution designed to kill others. "I could not
go along with the system,” he said in his final statement to the jury. “I had to refuse to
cooperate with what I considered to be evil.”56
John Phillips agreed. But in a letter that he wrote to President Johnson (a copy of
which he sent to his draft board, thus making its way into the trial as evidence), he went
beyond O’Brien’s expressions o f pacifism to address more Thoreau-like questions o f the
place o f the individual in a civil society. He started by stating that he, too, objected
conscientiously to all wars. “To participate in the war effort,” Phillips wrote, “whether in

56 Transcript of United States v. O ’Brien, Cr-66-91-S (1966), National Archives,
Waltham, Mass.
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combat or as a noncombatant, would be a betrayal o f my moral beliefs.” As a result, he
did not seek CO status through his draft board. “I am really a conscientious affirmer.” he
said, “for I wholeheartedly affirm the values o f life and conscientiously pursue the good
o f all men.” But, equally important, Phillips said, he found the Selective Service System
intolerable because it sought “to coerce a man to do the bidding o f his state, under threat
o f punishment should he refuse.” In a truly free society, he argued, “individuals will act
from a genuine desire to attain a better life for their fellows, not from an acceptance o f
standards imposed by the government.” Without room for individual conscience, men,
as Thoreau said, “serve the State...not as men mainly, but as machines.” Phillips and the
others would not accept that. He concluded by pledging to continue his efforts to
convince his fellow citizens that “war is senseless and immoral,” and that in Vietnam, “as
in all wars men are being made their brothers’ murderers for the selfish interests of
political leaders.” He said he knew the president would “recognize the urgent need for
such a task,” and would encourage him in his “mission for peace.”57
In the letters that they wrote to their draft boards and in statements made at their
trials, David Reed and Gary Hicks - as if to prove Thoreau’s point that by means of men’s
respect for the law, “even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice” expanded on the critiques of O’Brien and Phillips to directly question the morality o f
American policies with respect to Vietnam. In early 1966, Reed wrote to his local board
and reminded them that he faithfully registered for the draft in 1964, but that since then,

57 John J. Phillips letter to Lyndon B. Johnson, 8 Feb. 1966, introduced as
evidence in United States v. JohnJ. Phillips (1966), National Archives, Waltham, Mass.
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he had “seen the government o f the United States rain bombs upon the people o f
Vietnam” and “American soldiers bum the homes o f Vietnamese peasants with cigarette
lighters, with flame-throwers, and with napalm bombs.” He also referred to the American
invasion o f the Dominican Republic and government threats to “wage total war - nuclear
war - against the people o f the Soviet Union and China.” All o f these actions. Reed
charged, “are crimes under the Constitution of the United States; they are crimes under
the Charter o f the United Nations, and under international law; and, most importantly,
they are crimes against humanity...” As a result, he wrote, “I refuse to participate in
these crimes, and I declare my intention to do all that I can, as one citizen, to stop my
government from behaving in this manner.” Reed told the local board that he would
henceforth refuse to participate with the Selective Service System. “I think it is the duty
o f every American to say ‘NO’ to the government,” he wrote, “and face jail rather than
fight in a brutal war o f aggression against the people o f Vietnam.” When his board called
him for induction in May, Reed responded: “I refuse to serve in the armed forces
because... my loyalty to humanity lies above my loyalty to any government.”58
Hicks, too, used his trial to highlight the apparent hypocrisy of the government in
expecting its citizens to obey the law while the American government “openly violate[d]
“international law, the Geneva convention and the Nuremberg decisions and the Charter
o f the United Nations” in prosecuting its war in Vietnam. Furthermore, in a way that the
other card burners did not, he emphasized his perspective as an African American in

58 Exhibits A and C, United States v. David Reed, Cr-66-168-C (1966), National
Archives, Waltham, Mass.
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outlining his charges. Hicks said to the judge during sentencing:
I have openly violated the law. This country has openly violated
the law. But there is a qualitative difference, your Honor. I have not done
any public harm by breaking the law. This country has committed and is
committing genocide in Viet Nam by breaking the law.
I would like to say that I live in a very unique country...This is the
only country in the world that can maintain an army to protect what is
known as a free world. This same country can’t send Federal Marshals to
protect people who try to vote in Alabama. Instead they send their Federal
Marshals to shuttle me back and forth to Charles Street Jail for burning a
draft card.
This is the only country in the world that has the courage - and I
use the word courage very loosely, your Honor - to talk endlessly about
freedom and democracy and justice and human rights and then does
everything to stand in the way of attaining these conditions. This is the
only country in the world that says that I should deal nonviolently with the
Ku Klux Klan. This same country will actually pay me to go out and
commit genocide against someone whom I don’t even know.
Hicks concluded by telling the court that “carrying a draft card in this country is equal to
a black man carrying a draft card in South Africa or of a Jew being forced to wear a Star
o f David on an armband in Nazi Germany.” The law prohibiting the burning o f draft
cards, he said, was made to “suppress legitimate political expressions o f legitimate
American dissenters to foreign policy.” When Americans start enacting and tolerating
such laws, he finished, “then we no longer live in a democracy and we may as well stop
pretending that we do.”59
In the fall o f 1966 and early 1967, when Reed and Hicks were tried, such charges
were gaining currency at home (albeit among a limited number o f people) and especially
abroad. During much o f 1966, Bertrand Russell, the aging British philosopher and

59 Transcripts, United States v. Gary G. Hicks, Cr-66-103-J (1967), National
Archives, Waltham, Mass.
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mathematician, almost single handedly organized an International War Crimes Tribunal
to hear evidence o f possible American war crimes in Vietnam. After refusals from Prime
Minister Harold Wilson and President Charles DeGaulle to hold sessions of the tribunal
in either Britain or France, the tribunal finally got down to business in Stockholm in May
1967. There, consistent with the charges levied by Americans like David Reed and Gary
Hicks, international researchers presented evidence that American planes had bombed
civilian targets in both North and South Vietnam including, for example, 13 separate
bombing runs on a leprosarium in Quinh Lap over nine days in June 1965. Such acts led
the tribunal to find the United States guilty of war crimes and caused a growing number
o f draft resisters to invoke the Nuremberg principles as support for their decisions to defy
orders to commit immoral acts.40
The American media and the Johnson administration, despite being invited to
defend itself before the tribunal, largely ignored the proceedings. Secretary o f State Dean
Rusk, referring to Russell, told reporters that he had no intention of “playing games with
a 94-year-old Briton.” Jean Paul-Sartre, executive president o f the tribunal, had trouble
understanding this comment, coming as it did from “a mediocre American official.” The
American press seemed even less interested, calling it an “anti-American propaganda
ploy,” and claiming that the tribunals members were “not interested in peace.” At this
early date, one historian has noted, the American media could be depended upon to view

60 John Duffet, ed., Against the Crime o f Silence: Proceedings o f the International
War Crimes Tribunal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968; Clarion, 1970), see
especially pp. 180-185.
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the tribunal as “a political circus orchestrated by left-wing nuts.”61 The evidence
presented to the tribunal would be confirmed by Vietnam veterans at the Winter Soldier
hearings in 1971, but in 1967, such stories had no effect on American war policy.
Similarly, the early appeals to morality by draft card burners had no impact on the
way their cases were handled by the judicial system. By early 1967, all five o f the Boston
CNVA draft resisters were serving prison sentences o f anywhere from two to five years,
except for David O ’Brien who, after two months in prison, secured bail while his case
went through the appeals process. The judges who heard the cases allowed the
defendants to make their cases in closing statements but would not tolerate trying to put
American war policy on trial. Consequently, all such cases were easily processed. At the
end of 1966, the government had secured 450 draft related convictions, a substantial
increase over the 262 convictions o f 1965 and 227 o f 1964.62
Charles DeBenedetti, perhaps the most insightful scholar of the Vietnam era
antiwar movement, has noted that “the draft issue provided the link between political
action and personal commitment and life-style for which radical pacifists had been
seeking.”63 CNVA members sought to challenge the nation’s war policies on the issue of
morality as one way of calling attention to the growing callousness and attraction to
violence that they saw in American culture. David O ’Brien got to the heart o f the matter

61 Tom Wells, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1994), p. 142.
62 “450 Convicted in ‘66 as Draft Violators,” New York Times, 6 Jan. 1967, p. 2.
63 DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, p. 167.
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in his statement at sentencing:
I feel that the draft card burning symbolizes my choice to work for
the betterment o f our society in a very radical way, radical in that all our
motivations, all our actions, all our beliefs must be reexamined and those
that are incompatible with the well-being o f the individual and those that
deny love must be changed.
The horrors o f a war are so great that I am mystified that so many
people, even those who have fought in wars, seem unable to feel any
compassion for those who are affected. The cry we have heard in the past
to bomb Hanoi with its thousands o f innocents has been acted upon, and
now the same people cheer over the cries and screams o f their victims. I
cannot understand how the warriors fail to see in this the rape o f their own
sensitivity. There is no more true saying than that war makes us all
victims. But must we all be executioners as well?64
Such pleas did little to affect policy makers in Washington, Selective Service officials,
the courts, or the public at large. Soon the Boston CNVA ceased to exist, as the men who
comprised much o f its core found themselves in federal prison.65
In spite o f their organization's demise, the Boston CNVA draft resisters set
important precedents for future resisters to follow. In addition to raising questions about
individuality and freewill in a republic at war, they framed their dissent as an issue of
citizenship, an impatient brand of citizenship that justified confronting one’s government
when circumstances warranted it. Furthermore, the rapid, effective response of the
federal government to the draft resistance threat set an example o f prosecutorial zeal that
led later draft resistance leaders to believe that they could rely on the Department of

64 Transcripts, United States v. O 'Brien.
65 The life o f the Boston CNVA always was tenuous. Even before the trials o f the
draft card burners, a June newsletter desperately appealed for funds and complained o f
“the lack of support by those whom we thought were our supporters.” Newsletter, 7 Jun.
1966, Boston CNVA folder, NECNVA papers, SCPC.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87
Justice to attempt to prosecute thousands o f draft resisters at once, thus clogging the
courts and straining the Selective Service System.
On October 16, 1967, John Phillips, then over twelve months into his sentence,
watched the nightly news in the prisoners’ lounge at the federal pen in Petersburg,
Virginia and, to his amazement, saw hundreds of men tuming-in (and some burning) their
draft cards in an elaborate ceremony at the Arlington Street Church in Boston. “I
remembered,” he later recalled, “our little band o f bold pioneers,” and the beatings they
received for doing essentially the same thing as these men who now were backed by
thousands o f supporters. Much had changed in eighteen months, but in that intervening
period, many opponents of the war must have remembered the experience o f the Boston
CNVA, for public draft resistance disappeared between April 1966 and October 1967 in
Boston. Although some resurrected the idea in other parts o f the country in the spring of
1967, Boston’s leading protesters turned to other means o f undermining the Selective
Service System and the war effort before October 16.
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CHAPTER H

THE DRAFT AS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND MOVEMENT TARGET

Sarge, Tin only 18,1 got a ruptured spleen, and I always carry a
purse / 1 got eyes like a bat, my feet are flat, and my asthma's getting worse
/ Yes, think of my career, my sweetheart dear, my poor old invalid aunt /
besides, I ain't no fool, I'm going to school, and I'm working in a defense
plant.
Phil Ochs
“Draft Dodger Rag,” 1965
For more than a year after the beatings of the CNVA draft card burners, protests
targeting the draft faded from public view. The impatience exhibited by the early draft
resisters receded as the courts consistently ruled against the burners and sent them off to
prison quickly and quietly. Protest against the war continued, but sporadically and still on
a small scale. On the morning of April 15, 1967, however, draft resistance resurfaced in
dramatic fashion. As 100,000 to 400,000 people (estimates varied) gathered in New York
for a march that organizers called the Spring Mobilization To End the War in Vietnam
(more than 60,000 also marched in San Francisco), about 170 men, most from Cornell
University, plus several women, and one former Green Beret, burned their draft cards
together in Central Park’s Sheep’s Meadow. Newspapers across the country splashed
their images across their front pages. The following day, Martin Luther King, Jr., the
main speaker at the New York march, told panelists on television’s “Face the Nation”
news program, that although he didn’t condone the draft card burning in the Park, he did
support resistance. “In the true spirit o f non-violence,” he said, “I have only advocated
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doing what we do to resist it openly, cheerfully, and with a desire to reconcile rather than
to estrange and really appeal to the conscience o f the nation on what I consider a very
unjust and immoral involvement” in Vietnam.1
On the same day o f the marches in New York and San Francisco, a full page “We
Won’t Go” statement appeared in the Harvard Crimson:
We, the undersigned, as American m en o f draft age, may be asked
by our government to participate in the war in Vietnam. We have
examined the history and the nature of this war, and have reached the
conclusion that our participation in it would be contrary to the dictates o f
our consciences.
We therefore declare our determination to refuse military service
while the United States is fighting in Vietnam. Our intention in signing
this statement is to unite with other draft-age men who share our
convictions, in order to turn our personal moral rejection of this war into
effective political opposition to it.
That eighty-six men signed this statement on a day when one hundred seventy others
burned their cards in New York made it significant. Noncompliance with the draft
reemerged as one o f the primary strategies o f antiwar protest, but this time on a larger

1Face the Nation, transcripts, April 16, 1967; David J. Garrow, Bearing the
Cross: M artin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New
York: Vintage, 1986), p. 557. Note: Garrow writes that during King’s appearance on
Face the Nation, he “pointed out that he advocated draft resistance, not draft evasion.” In
fact, King did not state this outright, though it can be inferred. The discussion went like
this: King: “....I do not at this point advocate civil disobedience. I think we have to do a
lot o f groundwork in massive education before that. I have only urged young men to
study their possible status as conscientious objectors. And there is nothing evasive or
illegal about this. It is actually guided by and endorsed by the Selective Service Act,
which is a perfect constitutional right.” M artin A gronsky (CBS News): “Dr. King, am I
to understand, then, that you do not advocate resistance o f the draft by any American?”
King: “Well, it depends on what you mean by resistance.” Agronsky: “Refusing to
serve.” King: “Well, I have certainly advocated this, because I myself would be a
conscientious objector if I had to face it...”
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scale. Gone were the days o f fighting the draft individually or even in small groups. This
new brand of defiance recognized the power o f numbers.
Nevertheless, even with its emphasis on converting moral outrage into “political
opposition,” the Harvard We Won’t Go statement did not commit the signers to action or
even a clearly defined strategy o f resistance. “Our policy is open,” admitted one
spokesman for the group (tentatively calling themselves the Harvard Draft Resistance
Group). “Draft resistance could include applying for draft deferments as conscientious
objectors, emigrating to Canada or accepting prison sentences rather than undergoing
induction.” He estimated that between 500 and 700 men had signed similar statements
nationwide and - as if to demonstrate the absence of risk - mentioned that he knew o f no
resulting prosecutions.2 In a strategy that was altogether different than the CNVA
practice o f open confrontation with the government, the We Won’t Go signers
deliberately chose to be vague because, as one of them later noted, they were still
debating their plans; they discussed numerous strategies, but did not want to commit to
anything beyond the statement.3
The example o f the Boston CNVA exposed the inherent risks o f open draft law
defiance and, perhaps more important, appeared to be ineffective. One key figure in the
draft resistance movement that developed a year later recalled that the actions o f Phillips,
O’Brien, Reed, Benson, and Hicks, seemed “politically very dumb.” Although one had to

2 “We Won’t Go Statement,” Harvard Crimson, 15 Apr 1967, p. 8; “Harvard
Group Pledges Not to Enter Military,” Harvard Crimson, 17 Apr 1967, p. 1.
3 Bill Hunt, telephone interview with author, 31 Oct 1997.
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respect their pacifist, nonviolent stand, he said, the “stupidly provocative” incident in
South Boston did not win many converts among the larger citizenry.4 Consequently, the
We Won’t Go statement promised no such violations of the law nor did the mere signing
o f it constitute a crime.
This more cautious - perhaps ambivalent - approach of courting confrontation
without actually confronting the government did, however, represent the beginning of a
shift back toward more radical defiance o f the government’s will regarding conscription.
This chapter shows that despite the absence o f draft resistance through most o f 1966 and
the winter o f 1967, the impulse to challenge the draft never completely died. Indeed, the
draft remained a constant concern for the American people and, consequently, continued
to loom as an obvious target for the growing antiwar movement. As Selective Service
escalated draft calls, more and more Americans began to question the fairness o f a
conscription system that appeared to play favorites; local draft boards, it seemed, valued
some draft-age citizens more than others. Increasingly, as the military inducted
disproportionate numbers of working-class, poor, and minority men (while upper and
middle-class men hid behind deferments), more and more antiwar activists saw an
opportunity to expose the nation’s system o f conscription as both unfair and unAmerican. Making the draft the focus of their protest, it followed, could form the
foundation for a massive grassroots movement against the war.
The Harvard We Won’t Go statement and dozens of others like it derived from
this rationale. And if the We Won’t Go statements did not outline a clear program of

4 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
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protest, the organizations they spawned did. This chapter, therefore, also addresses the
formation o f the Boston Draft Resistance Group which relied on the grassroots
community-organizing model practiced by Students for a Democratic Society, rather than
on the tactics o f moral witness pursued by religious activists and radical pacifists. Instead
o f aiming for dramatic confrontations that were sure to gamer media (and government)
attention, these individuals adopted a more low-key approach that focused on building
grass-roots support through campus and community organizing.
The Draft as a Political Issue
In the autumn o f 1966, as John Phillips and David Benson tried to adjust to their
prison cells and as David Reed and Gary Hicks prepared for similar arrangements, an
article in the Harvard Crimson reported that the war in Vietnam had “had virtually no
effect on the graduate plans of Harvard seniors.” The university’s Office of Graduate and
Career Plans, the article noted, had determined that 74% o f graduating seniors from the
Class of 1966 had gone on to graduate school while only 7% went into the military.
These figures virtually matched those of the Class of '65. At the same time, however, the
editors predicted that the 1966-67 school year would be the “Year o f the Draft.” Events
would prove them right.5
In fact, for some conscription-age men, 1966 had already become the “year of the
draft” as Selective Service calls climbed to 40,000 a month. But students at universities
such as Harvard did not have to worry, for they were protected by deferments issued by

5 “Impact o f the War and the Draft,” Harvard Crimson, Registration issue, 1966,
p.7; the Class o f 1965 sent 71% going to graduate school and 8% into the military. “The
Year of the Draft,” Harvard Crimson, 30 Sep 1966, p.4.
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their local draft boards. As long as they scored well on the Selective Service mental
aptitude test or attained rankings in the upper half o f their classes, deferments were
practically guaranteed. Such deferments raised serious questions about the fairness of the
draft; working class men who lacked the financial resources to attend college full-time,
for example, were more likely to be drafted than middle class, full-time students.
Meanwhile, a host o f deferments continued to protect some while others were left
exposed [see Table 1]. The draft had operated this way since the late forties, but with an
escalating ground war taking place in Southeast Asia, more and more Americans began to
examine the draft more critically.
At Harvard in the fall of 1966, however, few students questioned the legitimacy of
the 2-S (student) deferment. When the Harvard Undergraduate Council sponsored a
referendum to gauge student opinion on the draft and, in particular, on the requirement
that the university provide class rankings to the Selective Service, only 43% turned out to
vote. Those who did cast ballots overwhelmingly opposed the computing o f students’
rank for the Selective Service. More telling is that 65% indicated that they believed they
deserved draft deferments “solely because they were students,” while 70% expressed their
aversion to proposals for a more equitable lottery system to replace the existing process.
Insofar as they were willing to see changes made, 84% favored some kind of alternative
service system in which one could fulfill one’s duty to the country by accepting a non
military appointment in lieu of being sent to boot camp and possibly Vietnam. Clearly,
these results reflected a strong instinct on the part o f the students to keep themselves from
being drafted; any concern for those who went in their place - those who were not as
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privileged - was not immediately discernible.6
Table 1: Selective Service Classifications
Class

Definition

I-A

Registrant available for military service.

I-A-O

Conscientious objector registrant available for noncombatant military service only.

I-C

Member o f the Armed Forces o f the United States, the Coast and Geodetic Survey.

I-D

Qualified member o f reserve component, or student taking military training.

1-0

Conscientious Objector available for civilian work contributing to the maintenance

I-S

Student deferred by law until graduation from high school or attainment o f age 20.

I-W

Conscientious objector performing civilian work contributing to the maintenance

l-Y

Registrant qualified for military service only in time o f war or national emergency.

II-A

Occupational deferment (other than agricultural and student).

II-C

Agricultural deferment

II-S

Student deferment.

1II-A

Extreme hardship deferment, or registrant with a child or children.

[V-A

Registrant with sufficient prior active service or who is a sole surviving son.

IV-B

Official deferred by law.

IV-C

Alien not currently liable for military service.

IV-D

Minister o f religion or divinity student.

IV-F

Registrant not qualified for any military service.

Registrant over the age o f liability for military service.
V-A
Source: In Pursuit o f Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? Report o f the National Advisory Commission on
Selective Service (1967)

This is not to say that Harvard students were apathetic regarding the Vietnam
War. Since 1965 the campus had seen a fairly steady stream o f speakers, leafleters, and

6 "Students Vote NO on Class Ranks in HUC Poll on Selective Service," Harvard
Crimson, 13 Oct 1966, p. 1. The article noted: “Most o f the students who repudiated the
policy o f ranking students in compliance with Selective Service requests indicated that
they objected for reasons of'educational policy* rather than any opposition to student
deferments in general."
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other activists (many from the May 2nd Movement and Students for a Democratic Society)
coordinating teach-ins and campaigning against the war. These events occurred
sporadically, though, and the numbers o f students involved remained relatively low.
There were some exceptions. In early November 1966, several hundred antiwar
students, largely led by SDS, managed to comer Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamara
on the hood o f a car. McNamara had come to campus to lunch with a group of
undergraduates as part of the Kennedy Institute’s Honorary Associates program. In
anticipation o f his appearance, SDS had tried to arrange a debate on the war between the
Secretary and Robert Scheer, managing editor o f Ramparts magazine. McNamara
refused and, as a result, roused SDS to action. Using walkie-talkies to communicate, they
monitored the exits o f Quincy House waiting for McNamara’s departure. A decoy car
failed to fool the students and they quickly surrounded McNamara's vehicle as it tried to
leave Mill Street. They began rocking it. As demonstrators sat down in front of and
behind the car, the driver slammed the car into gear and started driving forward into the
students. Thinking better of it, he stopped before anyone got hurt. Finally, an obviously
annoyed McNamara edged out of the car. Hal Benenson, a junior and co-chair o f SDS,
persuaded the Secretary to stand on the hood of a convertible parked at the curb.
McNamara, impeccably dressed, hair neatly greased back in his trademark style,
scrambled onto the front o f the car and shouted into the SDS microphone: “I spent four of
the happiest years at Berkeley’s campus doing some of the same things you’re doing here.
But there was an important difference. I was tougher and more courteous.” This brought
catcalls of “fascist!” and “murderer!” to which McNamara responded, “And I was
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tougher then and I’m tougher now '”
He then asked Benenson to organize a non-violent meeting that he promised to
attend but hastened to add that he had another meeting in five minutes on the other side of
the Charles River. The crowd was in no mood for a later meeting. Finally, he relented:
“0.k. fellas, I’ll answer one or two o f your questions.” Michael Ansara, the chair of SDS,
called for two questions from the crowd. Someone immediately asked why the
Administration kept insisting that the war resulted from aggression by North Vietnam in
1957. “The war didn't begin in '57,” McNamara answered, “it started in ’54-55 when a
million North Vietnamese flooded into South Vietnam.” Another student then yelled,
“Yeah, and they were all Catholics.”7 “A report from the International Control
Commission states that it was aggression,” the Secretary replied. “I didn't write it. All
you have to do is read it. You haven't read it and if you have, you obviously didn't
understand it.” “We've seen it,” someone shouted. Now McNamara was irritated: “Why
don't you guys get up here since you already seem to have all the answers?” It soon
turned into a shouting match. Someone asked ”How many South Vietnamese civilians
have we killed and why doesn't the State Department disclose the figures?” When

7 The student who made this remark was well-informed. One million North
Vietnamese d id stream into South Vietnam following the establishment o f Ngo Dinh
Diem’s government in South Vietnam. Just as Diem’s rise to power was orchestrated by
the American Central Intelligence Agency, so too was this exodus o f Catholics, who fled
North Vietnam at the urging o f - and with assistance from - American operatives there.
American agents used propaganda to portray the Viet Minh (in the North) as hostile to
Vietnamese Catholics, while portraying Diem, himself a Catholic, up as a kind of savior.
See CIA operative Edward Lansdale’s report excerpted from the Pentagon Papers in
Marvin E. Gettleman, et al, eds. Vietnam and America, 2nd ed., (New York: Grove Press,
1995), pp. 81-96.
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McNamara responded with a weak “We don’t know,” another in the crowd yelled, “Why
don't you know? Don't you care?” The jeering reached such a level that McNamara
could not have been heard even if he had answered. To his relief, ten Harvard and
Cambridge police pushed their way toward him. helped him from the car and ushered him
into McKiniock Hall where he escaped the throng through an underground tunnel.8
Harvard officials and others in positions o f authority condemned the students for their
behavior, but the event electrified the campus - if only briefly.
Within a couple o f weeks, life returned to normal at Harvard. Even the dramatic
confrontation with one o f the architects o f the American war effort did not galvanize
more students to sustained protest. Indeed, this was symptomatic o f all antiwar efforts in
the Boston area up to that point. Certain groups and individuals held demonstrations,
organized occasional marches, teach-ins. and rallies, but taken together these events
constituted little more than spasms that were easily ignored by those running the war.
They failed to create a cumulative effect that even approached comparison with the civil
rights movement or other precedent-setting political activism. Antiwar activists
continued to seek ways to unify their efforts and attract greater numbers of citizens to
their cause.

8 “McNamara Mobbed, Jeered by 800; Monro and Watson Are Appalled,”
Harvard Crimson, 8 Nov 1966, p. 1; Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and
Lessons o f Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 254-256. In his recollection,
McNamara claims that he kept his driver from pushing forward, saying “Stop! You’ll kill
someone!” He also suggests that after taking the two questions, “the danger was only
increasing” so he simply “concluded his remarks, jumped off the car, [and] rushed
through a Quincy House door...” In fact, it seems clear that he concluded his remarks
only when his reenforcements arrived to provide safe passage.
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The decision to make the draft the target o f antiwar dissent grew organically out
o f a national political atmosphere in which the operations o f the Selective Service System
(SSS) were coming under increased scrutiny. By the end o f 1966, the number of draftees
being called for induction numbered more than four times that o f 1964 levels. As a
result, the draft (and the war) touched the homes of a far greater number o f families than
it had since the end o f the Korean war. But as the Harvard Crimson made clear, it did
not affect everyone equally. That fact alone led many to believe that the complex system
o f deferments that had evolved over a decade of relative peace warranted closer
examination.
Rumblings about the Selective Service had started as early as 1964 when Barry
Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president, had called for the end o f the draft. In
response, President Johnson announced that he would launch a comprehensive study of
Selective Service. Historian George Q. Flynn notes that Johnson recognized that the
“draft issue was politically sensitive because o f the class bias o f the deferment system.”
One labor official wrote to the president in 1964, that “when Walter Reuther realizes his
people are doing the dying while the auto executives sons keep getting school deferments,
there could be hell to pay.” Johnson won in a landslide in 1964 but the results of the
study were not released. Only in April 1965 did Robert McNamara receive the
Department of Defense report ordered by Johnson. McNamara concluded that the draft
must continue and that, since the study showed that 40% of all enlistees joined because of
fear o f the draft, any notion o f an All Volunteer Force (as some were suggesting) should
be dismissed. McNamara made his recommendations to Johnson, but the DOD report
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remained unpublished until July 1966 when increased criticism of the draft in the wake of
sharply increased calls for manpower forced its release. McNamara himself grew uneasy
with the inequities o f the existing system of conscription and in one speech even floated
the idea of two years of “national service” as a solution.
One o f the most obvious cases o f Selective Service unfairness involved George
Hamilton, the handsome Hollywood actor. Hamilton lived a fairly public social life most notably as a frequent date o f President Johnson’s older daughter, Lynda Bird - and
news o f his deferred status caused controversy. On 23 June 1966, Congressman Alvin
O’Konski, a Republican from Wisconsin and a member o f the House Armed Services
Committee, told his fellow committee members that although all o f the 100 men drafted
from his Congressional District over the previous six months came from families with
annual incomes under $5,000, George Hamilton, “a young Hollywood actor with a
$200,000 home, a $30,000 Rolls Royce. and a $100,000 income,” continued to receive a

hardship deferment to support his mother, a woman, the congressman noted, who had
been married four times. “The system is undemocratic and un-American,” O’Konski
concluded. “It nauseates me. How can I defend it to my people?” Although O’Konski
carefully avoided accusing the White House of arranging preferential treatment for the
first daughter’s boyfriend, Hamilton’s deferment made the president look bad.
Muhammad Ali’s lawyer, Hayden Covington, told the champ, “George Hamilton gets out
[of the draft] because he’s going with the president’s daughter, but you’re different. They
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want to make an example out o f you.”9
To placate critics o f the draft, Johnson issued Executive Order 11289, creating the
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service under the chairmanship o f Burke
Marshall, the former head o f the Justice Department’s civil rights division. Johnson
instructed the commission to review draft “fairness” (especially student deferments),
classification methods, the appeals system, and the impact of the draft on society, among
other things, and to submit their report to him early in 1967, so that he and the Congress
might be fully informed when they took up the renewal o f the Selective Service Act in the
spring.10
More than any o f America’s previous armed conflicts, the Vietnam War relied
mostly on the working class to fight it. Christian Appy, an historian at MIT, estimates
that enlisted ranks in Vietnam were “comprised of about 25% poor, 55% working class,
and 20% middle class, with a statistically negligible number o f wealthy.”11 In fact, he
shows that the inequities o f the SSS were not limited to its structure o f deferments. Appy
explains that in the early 1960s, half o f the men called by local boards failed one or both
o f their physical or mental exams; most failed the intelligence exam called the Armed
Forces Qualification Test. O f those who failed this test, almost half came from families

9 “O’Konski Asserts Draft Takes Poor,” New York Times, 24 Jun 1966, pp. 1-2;
David Remnick, “King of the World: Muhammad Ali and the Rise o f an American
Hero,” (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 289.
10George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f
Kansas, 1993), pp. 189-191.
11 Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1993), p. 27.
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with six or more kids and an annual income o f less than $4,000. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, then the Assistant Secretary o f Labor for Policy Planning, viewed this as “de
facto job discrimination” against "‘the least mobile, least educated young men.” Intent on
putting such men to work in careers that would teach them skills that could be useful
outside the service, he called for reform that would facilitate such training through
military service. Then, as draft calls increased dramatically in 1965, Appy tells us, the
military, “with no intention o f engaging in any social uplift...simply accepted more and
more men with terribly low scores on the mental examination.”12
Shortly thereafter, in 1966. Robert McNamara created Project 100,000, a program
which would address Moynihan’s concerns by admitting 100,000 men who failed the
exam into the military every year. “The poor o f America,” McNamara said, “have not
had the opportunity to earn their fair share of this nation's abundance, but they can be
given an opportunity to serve in their country’s defense and they can be given an
opportunity to return to a civilian life with skills and aptitudes which for them and their
families will reverse the downward spiral of decay.” Appy tells us that officials in the
Johnson administration fashioned this program as part o f the War on Poverty and Great
Society initiatives more than as one strand o f manpower mobilization. O f course, to reap
the promised rewards one might have to first survive the fighting in Vietnam. Ultimately,
“the promised training was never carried out,” and half o f the 400,000 men who joined
the military through Project 100,000 went to Vietnam. Worse, they had a death rate twice
as high as American forces as a whole, and 40% of them were black - compared to 10%

12 Appy, Working Class War, p. 31.
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for the military overall.13
The Marshall Commission went to work in the summer and fall of 1966, then, just
as Project 100,000 unfolded, sending even greater numbers o f poor and poorly educated
men off to fight in place o f better educated, middle and upper class men. The inequities at least those resulting from deferments - and the public’s view o f them were apparent to
Commission members from the start as they received over 500 unsolicited letters from
the public, the majority of which urged the abolition o f all deferments. As a result,
George Flynn notes, by their second or third meeting, Marshall and others had
successfully shifted the focus from a critique o f the existing system toward a new plan for
national service.14

13 Appy, Working-Class War, pp. 31-33.
14 Flynn, The Draft, p. 191. It is curious that Flynn, probably the leading historian
on the draft, disputes the notion that the draft was unfair. In fact, he argues that “the
draft worked against social inequalities.” He cites evidence that the proportions o f
college students and non-college students who served were relatively the same. For
example, in 1964, 70% o f high school dropouts served; 74% o f high school graduates
(who apparently didn't go on to college) served: 68% o f college drop outs served; and
60% of college graduates served. Likewise, in 1967, 60% o f high school graduates
served; 50% o f non-high school graduates served; and 40% o f college graduates served.
Flynn, The Draft, pp. 194-195.
Unfortunately, such statistics are misleading. We cannot judge their validity
without knowing the total population for each category, though it is obvious that the
number o f men who were college graduates or even college dropouts is probably much
smaller than the number o f men who had graduated only from high school. For example,
if in a pool o f 1500 men, 1000 had graduated from high school and the other 500 had
graduated from college (a reasonable proportion, I think), by the 1964 percentages that
Flynn provides, the number of privileged men (college graduates) to serve is less than
half the number o f underprivileged who would serve:
300 college graduates to 740 high school graduates.
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'“We Won't Go”
Although the strategy o f confronting the Selective Service directly had lost some
of its appeal among the war’s opponents, the heightened level o f attention focused on the
draft served to hold it aloft as an ever-present, tempting target. By late 1966, a certain
momentum developed that brought even the recalcitrant SDS to move toward draft
resistance. Following two small meetings in New Haven, a national discussion of
noncompliance took place in late August at the AFSC building in Des Moines, Iowa.
There, about 50 participants from various student organizations discussed plans for
com m unity antidraft unions which would counsel and organize men around the issue of

the draft. In addition, they resurrected the idea of a “We Won’t Go” pledge - first used by
the May 2nd Movement in the spring of 1964 - and made plans for a national We Won’t
Go conference in the fall.15
Before the We Won’t Go conference could take place, another national meeting
produced a statement o f noncooperation. Over two hundred people, mostly with roots in
pacifist organizations, met in New York in late October and issued a signed pledge called
“Saying 140' to Military Conscription, for Draft-Agers Who Have Shunned, or Broken
Their Ties to, the System.” David Reed, just weeks away from his trial and inevitable
imprisonment, authored the earliest drafts of the statement and the end result seemed to
reflect a mature understanding that, as he told a reporter from the Harvard Crimson,
“Non-violent non-cooperation is most successful when large numbers o f people are

15 Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance (Boston: Beacon, 1971),
pp. 55-56.
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involved.” He knew better than most that the consequences o f individual noncooperation
could be severe.16 The statement said:
We, the undersigned men o f draft age (18-35), believe that all war is
immoral and ultimately self-defeating. We believe that military
conscription is evil and unjust. Therefore, we will not cooperate in any
way with the Selective Service System.
We will not register for the draft.
If we have registered, we will sever all relations with the Selective
Service System.
We will carry no draft cards or other Selective Service certificates.
We will not accept any deferment, such as 2-S.
We will not accept any exemption, such as 1-0 or 4-D.
We will refuse induction into the armed forces.
We urge and advocate that other young men join us in
noncooperating with the Selective Service System.
We are in full knowledge that these actions are violations of the
Selective Service laws and are punishable by up to 5 years
imprisonment and/or a fine of $10,000.” 17
The statement had obvious roots in pacifism (non-pacifists in the New Left would not
necessarily have agreed with the argument that “all war is immoral,” for example, often
stating that they would have fought in World War II) and it attempted to extend the spirit
o f individual acts o f moral witness such as those carried out by the CNVA to a larger
community.
Suddenly, draft resistance as a tactic began picking up steam. A few weeks later,
on December 4, the national We Won't Go conference took place in Chicago, and as

16 “Former Harvard Student Faces Trial Tuesday for Failure to Accept Draft,”
Harvard Crimson, 27 Oct 1966, p. 1.
17 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, pp. 49-50; Note: this statement later appeared
in the 15 July 1967 issue of The Peacemaker. Significantly some of the signers included
members o f the CNVA (Reed, Chuck Matthei. Lou Waronker), future draft resisters (Don
Baty, Rick Boardman, George Jalbert, Marty Jezer), and future members o f the New
England Resistance (Alex Jack, Ray Mungo, Robert Talmonson).
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Ferber and Lynd described it, it "brought together representatives o f every significant
strain o f antidraft activity- at a moment when that activity was on the verge of assuming
mass proportions.” Over 500 representatives from across the country left the meetings
planning to start dozens o f local We Won’t Go projects.18
Most significant, the Students for a Democratic Society were poised to join the
battle at last SDS originated at a conference o f sixty two college students in Port Huron.
Michigan in 1962. That conference produced a manifesto, the Port Huron Statement that
became the most enduring intellectual contribution of the New Left. Authored primarily
by Tom Hayden, a 22 year-old former editor o f the University o f Michigan’s student
newspaper, the statement chastised American society for failing to live up to its potential.
In particular, it expressed the students’ horror at the treatment o f African-Americans in
the segregated South, and their anxiety over the threat of a nuclear holocaust (their fears
were almost realized several months later when the United States and the Soviet Union
nearly went to war over missiles in Cuba). Most important, the manifesto indicted
modem conceptions o f man as "a thing to be manipulated... inherently incapable of
directing his own affairs.” It called for the establishment o f “a democracy of individual
participation” in which “the individual share in those social decisions determining the
quality and direction o f his life.” This notion o f “participatory democracy” would allow
individuals to escape the alienation and conformity of modem society, and instead
encourage independence and creative fulfillment of all citizens. For thousands of college

18 Ferber & Lynd, The Resistance, p. 59.
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students in the 1960s, these ideas struck a chord.19
Still, in spite o f the Selective Service’s power over the direction of so many young
American lives, SDS had a long history of ambivalence regarding draft resistance.
Kirkpatrick Sale writes that, by fall 1966, when some in SDS were thinking o f coming
out against the 2-S deferment or refusing induction, “even many o f those willing to take
such personal risks - and there were a number in SDS - tended to acknowledge that this
was more an expression o f middle-class guilt, or a 'politics o f masochism,' than an
effective way to build up a mass antidraft organization.” When the National Council met
in Berkeley in December, however, “everyone wanted to talk about the draft.” In part,
this shift in attitudes could be attributed to the participation o f some of its prominent
members in both the Des Moines meeting and the We Won’t Go conference, but also to a
growing sense that the timing made sense given the government’s need to review and
probably renew the Selective Service Act within six months. Just before the National
Council met, John Spritzler o f Dartmouth SDS, sensing the mood, wrote an essay in New
Left Notes, SDS’s national newspaper, proposing a mass draft card burning by 10,000
men.20
Thus, after more than a year of doubt regarding the political efficacy o f protesting
the draft, and after 19 hours o f debate over two days, the National Council o f SDS
adopted a militant antidraft resolution:

19 The Port Huron Statement has been reprinted in dozens o f anthologies. See, for
example, Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, Takin' It to the Streets: A Sixties Reader
(New York: Oxford, 1995), pp. 61-74.
20 Kirkpatrick Sale, SD S (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 313.
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SDS reaffirm s its opposition to the United States Government's
immoral, illegal and genocidal war against the Vietnamese people in their
struggle for self-determination.
SDS reaffirms its opposition to conscription in any form. We
maintain that ail conscription is coercive and anti-democratic, and that it is
used by the United States Government to oppress people in the United
States and around the world.
SDS recognizes that the draft is intimately connected with the
requirements of the economic system and the foreign policy o f the United
States.
SDS opposes and will organize against any attempt to legitimize
the Selective Service System by reforms [a clear reference to the Marshall
Commission]. The proposals for a lottery or for compulsory national
service would not change the essential purpose o f the draft - to abduct
young men to fight in aggressive wars...
Since individual protest [like CNVA-style burnings] cannot
develop the movement needed to end the draft and the war, SDS adopts
the following program:
SDS members will organize unions of draft resisters. The
members of these unions will be united by the common principle that
under no circumstances will they allow themselves to be drafted. The
local unions will reach out to all young men of draft age by organizing in
the high schools, universities, and communities. Courses o f action will
include (a) direct action during pre-induction physicals and at the time of
induction, (b) anti-draft and anti-war education among potential inductees
and their families, (c) demonstrations centering on draft boards and
recruiting stations, (d) encouraging young men already in the military to
oppose the war. and (e) circulating petitions stating that the signer will
refuse to serve in Vietnam or submit to conscription in any form. National
SDS will coordinate the local unions on a regional and national level,
providing staff (including travelers), supplies, and financial resources.21
With this statement. SDS took a bold step, moving, as one of its leaders said, "‘from
protest to resistance." In protesting against the war. SDS would no longer be content with
the spasmodic occurrence o f marches and sit-ins; they had now made a commitment to
action. Soon, members began wearing buttons expressing one word: “Resist.” The
Berkeley statement effectively set the course for antidraft activity across the country for

21 Ferber & Lynd, The Resistance, p. 60; Sale, SDS, pp. 312-315.
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the next six to eight months.
Certainly, its impact became obvious in Boston and especially at Harvard.
Although many students seemed to take what one future draft resistance leader called the
“morally opaque” view of the draft as an inconvenience early in the 1966-67 school year,
by the end o f the fall semester, discussions took a more sober turn.22 The influence of
some members o f the faculty proved significant in this regard. On December 6, just two
days after the national We Won’t Go conference opened in Chicago, sixteen members of
the Departments o f Government and Philosophy offered a resolution for consideration to
the entire faculty. The resolution characterized the 2-S (student) deferment as “unjust”
and stated that “it strikes us as implausible to suppose that it is in the national interests
that students, regardless of their fields, should be deferred while the disadvantaged are
compelled to enter military service.” Philosophy professor John Rawls proposed working
as a group to get a “proper law through Congress in the spring.” But before the issue
could even be debated, Oscar Handlin o f the history department introduced a motion to
table the resolution. Handlin felt that “on a matter of principle,” the faculty should not
vote on issues o f “either educational, social or political policy,” and favored faculty
members expressing their views individually rather than as one corporate body. This
argument proved sufficiently persuasive as the faculty table the resolution by a 141-88
margin.23

22 The future draft resistance leader who described some students’ view o f the
draft as an inconvenience as “morally opaque” is Bill Hunt; Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
23 “Faculty Debate on 2-S Opens at Meeting Today,” Harvard Crimson, 6 Dec
1966, p .l; “Faculty Avoids Deferment Debate. Tables Resolution Attacking 2-S,”
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If the majority of the faculty seemed unwilling to tackle the draft the students
soon began to dedicate more attention to the issue. After another failed attempt by some
professors to bring their resolution to a vote early in the spring semester, the editors o f the
H arvard Crimson, though notoriously timid on such issues, published an editorial in
support o f a lottery system. It anticipated the release o f the Marshall Commission report
and laid out the arguments for and against the 2-S deferment: “The best defense o f the
student deferment is that it is economical,”’ the editors wrote. They challenged the
proposition that without the student deferment, the United States would suffer the
“decimation of a generation o f college students’*as Great Britain did during the First
World War. “America,” they wrote, “has simply too great a wealth o f human resources to
justify a procedure based on the premise that a loss of some portion o f its students would
be catastrophic.” The paper acknowledged that there are times when a nation “must
ignore moral principles” and put self-preservation first. “Now is not such a time,” they
concluded. “Because of it’s clear social inequity, the 2-S deferment should be
discarded.”24 It turned out that the Marshall Commission agreed.
Draft Reform?
Within a week of the Crimson editorial, two competing commission reviews put
the draft on the front pages again. The first report resulted from a Congressionallyordered review of the SSS led by retired Army general Mark Clark. Essentially, it argued
that the existing Selective Service Act and its attendant policies and procedures were

Harvard Crimson, 7 Dec 1966, p.l.
24 “The Draft: The Equity of a Lottery,” Harvard Crimson, 25 Feb 1967, p.2.
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basically fair and, therefore, that the law should be renewed. Like General Lewis
Hershey, the Director o f Selective Service, the Clark commission advocated continued
use o f local draft boards, keeping the undergraduate deferment, and opposed any kind of
lottery. The only significant change recommended by Clark was the calling o f the
youngest men - rather than the oldest - in the pool first. In addition, it urged that draft
card burners and other draft violators be “severely and expeditiously punished,” and
pushed for the application o f tighter standards on conscientious objectors.25 Under these
proposals, the system would change little.
The Marshall Commission report, released the next day, advocated more
sweeping reforms, including the elimination o f the 2-S. They named it, In Pursuit o f
Equity: Who Serves When N ot All Serve? and reported that they had “sought to find the
means o f securing the manpower needed for our national security in a manner as
consistent as possible with human dignity, individual liberty, fairness to all citizens, and
the other principles and traditions of a democratic and free society.” Its major
recommendations included inducting men at age 19, selecting them “through a system of
impartial random selection among those equally vulnerable,” and the elimination of
occupational and student deferments. On this last point, they noted that “student
deferments have become the occasion of serious inequity...Even though educational
opportunity is increasingly widespread, the opportunity to go to college still reflects a
degree of social and economic advantage not yet shared by all.” Therefore, the majority

25 Flynn, The Draft, p. 198; “Draft Panel Calls for a Crackdown,” NYT, 4 Mar
1967, p. 7.
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of the Commission voted to recommend eliminating student deferments.26
Equally interesting, the Commission recommended the elimination of local draft
boards, and centralization of power in regional offices that would use a computerized
system; in this way the capricious nature o f local board decision-making could be
replaced by a more uniform process. They bolstered their recommendation with a telling
analysis o f draft board composition: most local board members were middle-aged and
elderly (71% were 50 or older; 22% were 70 or older), had military backgrounds (66.3%),
and were overwhelmingly white (96.8%). These “little groups o f neighbors” were not
representative o f the people most Americans counted as their neighbors.27
Two days later, on March 6. 1967, Lyndon Johnson went to the Congress and
asked for a renewal o f the Selective Service Act. In his address, he pushed many of the
Marshall Commission’s proposals. He acknowledged the inequity o f the deferment
system: “Deferred for undergraduate work, deferred further to pursue graduate study, and
then deferred even beyond that for fatherhood or occupational reasons,” he said, “some
young men have managed to pile deferment on deferment until they passed the normal
cut-off point for induction.” Therefore, he urged the elimination o f graduate deferments
except in the fields o f medicine, dentistry, and the ministry. On the termination of
undergraduate deferments, however, the president balked. He cited the split vote of the
Commission and asked for Congressional and public debate on the subject. In addition,

26 "In Pursuit o f Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?, ” The Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service,” (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. IE, 38-42.
27 "In Pursuit o f Equity, ” pp. 73-75.
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Johnson’s message called for the induction o f 19-year-olds first, urged centralization of
the SSS administration into regional boards, and the implementation o f a “Fair and
Impartial Random (FAIR) lottery system to be in place by I January 1969.28 Between
March and June, then, the fate o f the draft lay with Congress and the American people.
The Boston Draft Resistance Group
The contrasting perspectives of Congress and the incipient draft resistance
movement regarding the new proposals could not have been more opposed. By March
and April, Ferber and Lynd note, “We Won't Go statements and antidraft unions
mushroomed from coast to coast, some of them instigated by SDS, some arising
independently.”29 Promises o f draft reform meant little to the protesters. In fact, the
growing number o f students supporting draft resistance had grown so suspicious o f the
administration and the Selective Service that nothing short o f the abolition o f the draft
and American withdrawal from Vietnam would have satisfied them.
Much of this cynicism was well-founded. Shortly after SDS made its
commitment to draft resistance, Peter Henig discovered a Selective Service document that
stunned even the most hard-line opponents of the draft and the war. Dubbed the
“channeling memo” and published in the January 1967 issue o f New Left Notes, the piece
became one of the draft resistance movement’s best recruiting tools. Selective Service

28 "Text of President Johnson's Message to Congress on the Selective Service
System," NYT, 7 Mar 1967, p. 32; "Johnson Plans Draft By Lottery" NYT, 7 Mar 1967,
p .l; Flynn, The Draft,
pp. 202-203.
29 Ferber & Lynd, p. 62-63.
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included the memo in training kits, and activists assumed that it came from the desk o f
General Hershey; as they read it most imagined the wizened, half-blind, old man writing
it - a sinister Gepetto o f sorts - sitting at his desk typing out the ominously matter-of-fact
phrases:
Delivery o f manpower for induction, the process o f providing a
few thousand men with transportation to a reception center, is not much o f
an adm inistrative or financial challenge. It is in dealing with the other
millions o f registrants that the System is heavily occupied, developing
more effective human beings in the national interest...
Throughout his career as a student, the pressure - the threat o f loss
o f deferment - continues. It continues with equal intensity after
graduation. His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he is
up to. He is impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark upon some
less important enterprise and is encouraged to apply his skill in an
essential activity in the national interest. The loss of deferred status is the
consequence for the individual who acquired the skill and either does not
use it or uses it in a non-essential activity.
The psychology of granting wide choice under pressure to take
action is the American or indirect way o f achieving what is done by
direction in foreign countries where choice is not permitted.
To the surprise o f even the most jaded, this document offered evidence that the Selective
Service System’s primary purpose was not inducting men into the military, but the kind
o f social engineering practiced by America’s totalitarian enemies (“foreign countries
where choice is not permitted”). The channeling memo implied that those who could not
afford to go to college but worked as. say, an electrician’s apprentice or a gas station
attendant were much more likely to be drafted. Likewise, those who did manage to go to
college but graduated only to pursue careers in music or the arts, for example, could
expect their local boards to regard their career choices as something short of being “in the
national interest.” These were stunning revelations. Certainly, the channeling memo
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highlighted the kind o f manipulation of lives that SDS criticized in the Port Huron
Statement Any innocence retained by the nascent draft resistance movement surely now
was lost “At last 'the American way* laid bare,” wrote Kirkpatrick Sale.30
In the face o f such deceit draft resistance attracted more and more men who were
willing to organize against the SSS and to do so in bold fashion. Despite the initially
unclear mission o f the Harvard We Won’t Go group, a sense o f solidarity quickly
developed. Within ten days, at a meeting on April 25, a number of the We Won’t Go
signers organized themselves into the Boston Draft Resistance Group (BDRG) and
brought their objectives into focus a little more sharply. Using the statement as their
primary recruiting tool, the men (no women yet worked with the Group) “set out to
mobilize the Harvard campus” by going door-to-door and inviting other students to
meetings where they could discuss the draft and the war. A few days later, 60 people
turned out for the first meeting.31
The tactic o f canvassing the campus for more men made sense at the time. Just
days before, Martin Luther King, Jr. and famed pediatrician Benjamin Spock had come to
Cambridge to launch Vietnam Summer where they visited a few homes to talk to families
about the war as television cameras captured it all on film. The organizers of Vietnam
Summer aimed to fuse politically inactive middle class Americans into a powerful

30 Sale, SDS, 319-320; Mike Ferber and David Harris, “On the Resistance,” leaflet
distributed by the U.S. National Student Association,’Papers o f Michael K. Ferber
(hereafter, MKFP).
31 “Signers o f ’We Won’t Go* Petition Organize Draft Resistance League,”
Harvard Crimson, 26 Apr 1967, p.l; “Anti-Draft Group Seeks to Mobilize Harvard
Around Resistance Issue,” Harvard Crimson, 5 May 1967, p. 1.
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antiwar lobby by sending thousands o f volunteers into thousands o f communities across
the country to talk about Vietnam. The idea had been conceived by Gar Alperovitz, a
fellow at the Kennedy School’s Institute o f Politics at Harvard. He modeled it on
Freedom Summer, the 1964 civil rights project which injected over 1,000 college students
and civil rights activists into Mississippi to run Freedom Schools and to register blacks to
vote. Organizers chose Cambridge as the national headquarters for Vietnam Summer,
and staffed it with 11 people and 100 recruiters. Eventually, over 4,000 volunteers took
to the streets o f 770 of their own communities as part o f the nationwide project. It is
virtually impossible to gauge the impact of Vietnam Summer, though most scholars have
concluded that it did not prove as successful as its Movement forebear. According to
Charles DeBenedetti, the far-flung engagement of the project made it difficult to manage:
"People [volunteers] worked sporadically. Staff members were not consistent.
Ideological animosities were all too predictable” in a project more or less supported by
the American Friends Service Committee, the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, and some factions of SDS.32
Even with its shortcomings, the national office o f Vietnam Summer exerted a
heavy influence on the Boston Draft Resistance Group. A booklet called “'Vietnam

32 “King Calls for Vietnam Summer Volunteers,” Harvard Crimson, 24 Apr 1967,
p .l; John Herfort, “Vietnam Summer,” Harvard Crimson, Pre-Registration issue, 1967.
p. 8; DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, pp. 182-183; Kenneth Keniston, Young
Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968). Note: When
King and Spock canvassed two homes in Cambridge, they were heckled by a group of
young men with signs and a tape player blaring a recording o f “God Bless America.”
Meanwhile one carried a sign that said, “King Get the Hell Out o f Chicago and Harvard.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
Summer: Project Profiles,” described antiwar projects allied with Vietnam Summer,
including BDRG. The still small draft resistance organization’s own depiction o f itself
demonstrated the impact o f Vietnam Summer: “The Boston Group's program is built on
the view that constructing a radical constituency through draft resistance is the tactic most
likely to mobilize opposition to the war where it will be felt Draft-age men and their
parents, especially parents in the middle class, meet the war most closely through the
draft system; draft resistance hits them at their present concerns.” The emphasis on
constructing a movement from the middle-class while reaching out to the working-class
directly echoed the Vietnam Summer approach, but BDRG soon found its own identity.
In just a matter o f months, the Boston Draft Resistance Group transformed itself
into one of the most important antiwar organizations in the city, largely due to the efforts
o f three organizers: Bill Hunt, Tim Wright, and Harold Hector. All three were older than
typical draft protesters. Hunt and Wright both were Ph.D. candidates in the Harvard
history department and were both married. Wright was an Army veteran and Hunt had
children. Hector, 26 and African-American, came from Roxbury, and so brought a much
needed working-class background to the organization. Hunt essentially recruited the
other two. As Wright later noted. Hunt was a "spellbinding storyteller and charismafilled visionary in style” who “seduced” Wright into taking a leading role in BDRG.
Hector agreed. Once he talked with Hunt, he became committed to fighting the draft and
the warmakers.33
But the commitment o f the three ran deep for other reasons. Bill Hunt, for

33 Tim Wright, interview with author, 25 Aug 1997.
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instance, possessed a fairly long record o f social activism before he took up draft
resistance. He had participated in the civil rights movement, marching with Martin
Luther King, Jr. and SNCC in Selma, Alabama in 1965 and had been concerned about
Vietnam since before John F. Kennedy’s assassination. When he arrived at Harvard, he
joined the May 2nd Movement because it was the only group doing anything to protest the
war; they had issued the first We Won’t Go statement in 1964 and at Harvard regularly
manned tables distributing leaflets about the war (Eventually Hunt would tire of M2M’s
Maoist/Leninist rhetoric, and join SDS as it grew more radical). Draft resistance for
Hunt, then, became a logical extension of his other activist interests.34
Tim Wright, on the other hand, had not been much o f a social activist before he
went to Harvard. Instead he looked to his time in the Army as “the most politically
educational experience” o f his life “because it was a situation in which [the Army] put
people o f radically different social class and ethnic background into an identical
environment.” This resulted in what he called a “kind o f barracks socialism” in which
class origins were not important. Before going into the service, he had been a very
“provincial suburban kid,” but the “latently radicalizing experience” o f serving in the
Army changed all that. He figured that by the time Vietnam heated up, he would have
been “urging most middle-class people I knew to go into the Army to learn about their
own provinciality.” Under the circumstances, however, the escalating war in Vietnam
made it inappropriate to urge anyone into the Army, he thought, and so he found himself

34 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
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working with BDRG to keep men out.35
Harold Hector, one o f the few blacks to participate in the draft resistance
movement in Boston, did not have either the activist or military background of Hunt and
Wright, but was ripe for protest in 1967. Hector had grown up in Roxbury and sought to
join the Navy in 1959 but was rejected because he was overweight He watched civil
rights workers on television as they were beaten, attacked by dogs, and sometimes
murdered. He and his friends knew that they could not be non-violent if they went south.
“We go south, we [will] kick ass,” they thought. But they never did. Instead, Hector met
Bill Hunt and Tim Wright whose convictions regarding the war easily dovetailed with his
own views of America as an oppressive society. Soon, he joined the other two as one of
the leaders of the Group.36
At first, the Boston Draft Resistance Group - made up o f about 30 signers of the
We Won’t Go statement - operated out o f a room in Harvard’s Memorial Hall, but over
the summer of 1967, with $1,000 in seed money from Vietnam Summer, the BDRG
opened an office on River Street in Cambridge that they staffed at first for 3 hours every
day. In the early days, the Group’s work focused primarily on legal research regarding
the draft and on organising through canvassing. They targeted other Boston area college
campuses, and soon had over 400 signatures on the We Won’t Go pledge. That summer,
one worker noted, BDRG was a “talking machine.” They talked to draft age men

35 Wright interview, 25 Aug 1997.
36 Harold Hector, interview with author, 9 Apr 1997.
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wherever they could find them, distributed leaflets, and visited army bases.37
For the most part, the talking aimed to engage and provoke others to do something
- anything - to protest the war. An early leaflet challenged draft age men to make
choices:
WE W O N ’T GO - > W ILL YOU?
Right Now
Americans are killing in Vietnam - and are being killed
What will you do about it?
Will you kill?
WiU you be killed?
What can you do about it?
- silence is inexcusable
Are you going to fight, kill, and die for an unjust war?
Can you let others die?
We Won't
We Won't Go
We refuse to be silent
We, the Boston Draft Resistance Group, have signed a statement declaring
our rejection o f the war, and a refusal to serve in the armed forces while
the Vietnam War continues. So strong a stand is necessary now. A faculty
supporting statement is now in circulation. We hope to turn our individual
rejection o f the war into effective group opposition to it. What is your
stand? Are current means o f dissent effective for you in your position as a
draft age man? Come discuss your views: We invite you to discuss the
issues that led us to sign this statement.
Those who read the leaflet were encouraged to stop by the BDRG office to speak with
one o f the organizers or to come to one of the regularly planned meetings designed to
provide information on the war and the draft.38

37 Ferber & L ynd, The Resistance, p. 169-170; "Peace Movement Strives To
Reach Working Class" Harvard Summer News. 11 lul 1967, p. 5 ; Charles S. Fisher,
Midwives to History: The Boston Draft Resistance Group, unpublished manuscript, p. II16.
38 Leaflet announcing 4 May 1967 meeting. Papers of Charles S. Fisher (to be
deposited at Swarthmore Peace Collection).
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In May and June 1967, students at Harvard paid attention to appeals made by
groups like BDRG, especially as debates over the future o f the draft took place in
Washington. When Congress finally voted to extend the draft in late June, they did little
to change the existing system. In spite o f the President’s message to them and the
recommendations of the Marshall Commission. Congress rejected a lottery system and
dictated that the President could not institute such a change without Congressional
approval. They did include language stating that graduate deferments (except for medical
and dental school students) would be eliminated sometime in 1968, but set no timetable.
Meanwhile, undergraduate deferments remained in tact.j9 The most significant change
involved the ending o f marriage and fatherhood deferments for men married after 1965.
Still, all o f the fundamental inequalities about which there had been so much concern
when Johnson appointed the Marshall Commission remained. Yet his aides urged him to
sign the bill. “Congress went a long way towards meeting the recommendations in your
message,” Joseph Califano told the President. He calculated that by limiting graduate
deferments and eliminating marriage deferments, “some 200,000 additional men will be
made eligible for the draft in 1968.1,40
Although the system remained basically the same, the possibility o f change
continued to cause anxiety among many men. That one might not be able to expect
continued safety when entering graduate school caused many men to seek out BDRG.

39 Flynn, The Draft, p. 204-205.
40 Memo to LBJ from Joseph Califano, 29 Jun 1967, Office papers o f Joseph
Califano, Box 55, LBJL.
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The Group often received mixed responses, however, from those who might join. As one
BDRGer wrote, “almost immediately we realized the need to make a clear distinction
between draft evasion and draft resistance.” Doing so was necessary, he said, to avoid
“misrepresentation as affluent draft dodgers whose political dissent was a function of
class privilege.”41 They decided, therefore, to issue a statement opposing all conscription
while the war continued; but this did not clarify matters. They still lacked a plan. They
still had not developed any ideas that emphasized action.
By mid-summer, BDRG started to address these shortcomings. First, the
organization decided to “minimize" the act o f signing the We Won't Go statement “as an
end in itself,” and instead sought to make signing one’s name “a symbol of commitment
to work actively against the war through other activities o f the Group.” This decision
reflected a desire on the part of organizers to treat draft resistance “as a unique issue
around which to organize people who opposed the war for widely divergent reasons.” As
one wrote, they were concerned, "to reach those who were anti-war out of self-interest as
well as those who had firm moral and political conviction.” There would be no
application o f any kind o f moral litmus test because, ultimately, they aimed “to help
ordinary young guys move from fear and alienation to active radical commitment.” The
draft, then, because it touched every young man in some way, offered the perfect
opportunity to organize protest against the war and “the social and political structure
which makes such wars possible.” In addition, part of that goal involved trying to reach

41 Typescript o f an article that appeared in New Left Notes, 12 May 1967, Fisher
papers.
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working class Bostonians, again with the idea that once galvanized, they would learn how
to “flex their own political muscle.”42'
As the organization experimented with strategy and new tactics, eventually there
evolved a strategy of meddling with the draft. “We are unabashedly using every means
possible to inhibit, retard, and be dishonest with the Selective Service System,” said Ray
Mungo, the outgoing editor of the BU News, signer o f the We Won’t Go pledge, and early
BDRG activist “Our position has been philosophically anarchistic. That is, we make no
moral judgements about why a kid wants out. If he wants out, we get him out the best
way we can.” He made it clear that the Group did not specialize in helping men obtain
conscientious objector status (those who wanted it were referred to the American Friends
Service Committee), and that instead “loopholes” were BDRG’s specialty. “It is perfectly
legal,” he explained “to refuse to sign the security oath at the pre-induction physical, and
you don’t even have to give a reason for refusing. The army generally doesn’t want
anything to do with non-signers and classifies them l-Y.”43 Mungo could speak with
some authority on this last point for, by then, the BDRG knew the Army well - and the
Army was getting to know BDRG.
The Early Morning Show and the Horror Show
Two o f the most ingenious programs developed by the Boston Draft Resistance

42 “Vietnam Summer: Project Profiles,” Papers of Alex Jack; BDRG Newsletter, 1
Feb 1968, Ferber papers: Fisher, p. 11-16; Bill Hunt, “Boston Draft Resistance Group,”
New England SDS Conference Newsletter, c. Aug 1967, Fisher papers; “Peace Movement
Strives To Reach Working Class,” Harvard Summer News, 11 Jul 1967, p. 5.
43 “Peace Movement Strives To Reach Working Class,” Harvard Summer News,
11 Jul 1967, p. 5.
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Group came to be known as the Early Morning Show and the Horror Show. Almost
every day in the suburban Boston area, a draft board would send a group o f men to the
Boston Army Base either for induction or for pre-induction physicals (usually done a few
weeks before the call for induction). The Early Morning Show got its name from the
practice o f BDRG staff and volunteers who rose very early in the morning to drive out to
draft boards and meet and speak with potential draftees before the bus arrived for the trip
downtown. The name for the Horror Shows came from a related program in which
BDRG members would pose as potential draftees and, upon entry into the induction or
physical examination proceedings, create a disruption by making political speeches,
questioning Army officials about the war in Vietnam, or something similar (often Horror
Shows took place when a BDRGer had himself been called for a physical).
Early Morning Shows began when members o f BDRG recognized that potential
draftees felt most vulnerable and anxious during the time period between the preinduction physical and the induction itself.

'This gives us a crucial opportunity to reach

them before it is too late,” they wrote. "Therefore BDRG has set up a program to hit each
local board when they send in their quota.” Dozens o f local boards operated in the
greater Boston area, making an Early Morning Show possible on almost any weekday.
Consequently, through some “forever secret” ploy, the BDRG would obtain a schedule
noting when each draft board planned to send its men. Five or six staff and volunteers
would arrive before the board opened, careful to park far away (after the first few
episodes, the police in some towns began taking down license plate numbers). Generally,
some pre-inductees would be waiting there already. A few o f the BDRGers would
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approach the young men, while the others stayed behind. They learned not to appear at a
local board all at once for several reasons. First, they did not want to overwhelm the men
they hoped to counsel. Equally important, however, they wanted to avoid making the
impression that they were an organized group; as long as the draft board clerks and bus
drivers thought that the BDRGers were simply friends of the pre-inductees, the prospect
o f ejection from the premises remained remote.
Once there, the BDRG men and women tried to engage the potential draftees in
conversations about the war and’specifically about the draft. Sometimes, if space and
time allowed, one o f them would make a speech. Either way, one BDRG newsletter
reported, “many o f these guys want to talk; a good percentage o f them are already
consciously against the war, and a lot more are badly confused. We tell them about
deferments, exemptions, and their right to refuse the Security Questionnaire. We also
hand out Draft Fact Cards with our address and phone and even make appointments for
them to come in for counseling.” Generally, the conversations with these men involved
informing them that they had certain rights under the draft law and that they might qualify
for certain deferments. If that seemed likely, the young man would be invited to stop by
the BDRG office for counseling on how to make his case to his draft board. By the fall, a
full complement o f draft counselors staffed the BDRG office and they were supported in
their work by researchers who continuously looked for “loopholes” in the Selective
Service regulations. They also maintained lists o f sympathetic doctors and psychiatrists
who would be willing to see clients who could be candidates for physical or mental
deferments.
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After conversing at the draft board, the counselors would try to board the bus for
the ride into Boston. When successful, this gave them more time to talk to the pre
inductees. Getting on the bus could be difficult. Sometimes, the bus driver worked for a
charter company and held no particular loyalty to the Selective Service; getting on these
buses required little ingenuity. But frequently it required some kind o f clever maneuver
like those listed in a special memorandum for Early Morning Show participants:
1. Board the bus when the driver is not nearby. Often if you get on,
several o f the pre-inductees will follow.
2. If clerk instructs everyone to show a bus token for return trip to bus
driver, show a token
3. If checking names at the bus door, get to the end of the line and try to
see the list to see whose name has not been checked, and say, while
pointing: 'that's my name.'
4. Sometimes you can get on using your own old papers. Tell the clerk
that you’re going for induction and want to ride down to induction
center on the bus (because you just moved there).
Upon arrival at the Army base, BDRGers would inconspicuously leave the base and catch
a regular city bus back to town. Later that afternoon, if they had collected the names of
any of the pre-inductees, they would call them to see how things went and to again offer
them assistance.44
Early Morning Shows became an essential element in BDRG operations and in
the Group’s identity. By early February 1968, an available pool of more than 100
volunteers helped to pull o ff the EMS at more than 20 draft boards each month.45 The

44 Boston Draft Resistance Group Newsletter, I Feb 1968, Ferber papers; “Anti
Draft Organizing at Pre-Induction Physicals,” undated memo, Fisher papers.
45 BDRG Newsletter, March 1968, Thome papers; Fisher, “Midwives to History,”
H-21.
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program continued for over two years, until the breakup o f the organization in the
summer o f 1969. In reality, however, the proportion o f men approached under such
circumstances who then came to BDRG for counseling was quite small. As Tim Wright
later reflected, “Mostly we were not successful. Probably half of the kids who showed up
[for the bus] were openly hostile. Another third were kind o f passive and maybe two or
three or four in each group were openly sympathetic...those were the people we would try
to work with. We would give them support numbers, o f doctors and stuff and we would
encourage them to come to the office afterward...” But mainly, as one BDRG staffer
wrote, “the basic rationale for the ’early morning show1is to broaden the anti-war
movement. Unless you get a man's name and phone number we can't see if he knows
other men who need counseling or whether he or his friends will help us with anti-draft
and anti-war work in his area.” Thus, even the activists who participated in the Early
Morning Shows had limited expectations for actually helping the men they met there to
escape the draft; instead, the education and politicization of young men mattered most.46
The BDRG sought to educate and politicize in the Horror Shows, too, but they
also aimed to have a little fun at the Army's expense. Whenever the Selective Service
called a male BDRG member for his own pre-induction physical and whenever BDRGers
could pose as potential draftees, they did everything possible to “demystify the nature of
power as it affects the guys who are being forced to fight.” They did this by talking to the
other draftees about the war and the draft during the proceedings, and by constantly

46 Tim Wright, interview with author, 25 Aug 1997; “Anti Draft Organizing at
Pre-Induction Physicals,” undated memo, Fisher papers.
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challenging the authority o f the Army officials running the physicals. These men gained
access to the base easily. Tim Wright; the veteran, in an early newsletter:
As the military-industrial complex goes, the Boston Army base is a pretty
bush-league operation, considering its crucial role in the lives and deaths
o f the young men o f Boston. Jutting out into the grim waters o f Boston
Bay, it's a conglomeration of warehouses, offices, recruiting and induction
chambers. At ten minute intervals, a public bus leaves South Station,
carrying army personnel, civilian workers, inductees, pre-inductees, and
the Boston Draft Resistance Group to their appointed tasks. There is thus
public access to the interior o f the Base —a fact o f considerable legal
significance, as we have lately learned. The security (!?) guards are
civilian, with what seems to be a median age o f 86, who can often be
bullied and/or cajoled. So far we have allowed ourselves to be sluggishly
evicted, although not without making a vivid impact on incoming draftees
and passers-by. Our purpose is, in the classical formula, to instruct, to
inspire, and to delight.
This kind o f witty description conveyed an accurate sense o f the spirit that BDRG
members brought to their work. Early descriptions of Horror Shows include frequent use
of adjectives like “entertaining,” and “provocative.” Tales of BDRG exploits made
antiwar work seem fun and bred confidence in activists who might otherwise hesitate to
take part in such bold confrontations.47
Horror Shows did not occur with the same frequency as Early Morning Shows.
They were much more difficult to organize and to sustain. Usually, it required a few men
because once one began a political speech during the physical, he would be hauled off;
others were needed to carry on after the first one or two were taken out o f the room. Most
o f the time leaflets had been distributed to all of the men in advance. As one BDRGer
noted,

47 BDRG Newsletter #1,29 Jun 1967, Fisher papers.
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Our leaflets and conversations convey a few very simple ideas. 1) If you're
worried about going to fight in the Vietnam war, you’re not alone. More
and more guys are coming to feel this war isn’t worth one American life,
and the draft resistance movement can stop it. 2) You have legal
alternatives to the draft. (Most working-class pre-inductees are absolutely
ignorant about their rights under the draft — many could legitimately
qualify for physical, mental or occupational deferments, not to speak of
C.O. Most workers barely know that CO status exists.) The BDRG will
provide free counseling and legal aid in resisting the draft, and stick with
you down the line. 3) We support the boys in Vietnam. We need them to
build a decent society right here.
The Army confiscated such documents at first. But the BDRG soon learned that the
Army could not legally take the leaflets and began each subsequent leaflet with the
declaration, “This is yours to keep! The Army may not take it away from you!”
Those who participated in Horror Shows, then, did attempt to engage pre
inductees in serious discussions about the war and the draft - but only on a limited basis.
For the most part, they tried to disrupt the Army’s proceedings and to do on-the-spot
education by making speeches and arguing with Army officials. By one account, the
BDRG nearly took over a physical one day. "adroitly turning a menacing harangue by an
army officer into a debate on the war. and calling for a straw vote on it.” Forty eight out
of fifty voted against the war.”48 Occasionally, a scuffle would break out. One time, in
1968, Sergeant Brown, the man in charge o f inductions and pre-induction physicals. lost
his tie to a BDRG man in such an altercation. Later the tie graced the wall of a coffee
house started in Cambridge by BDRG; they named the establishment “Sgt. Brown’s
Memorial Necktie.”
As a political tactic, Horror Shows never attained even the minimal level o f

48 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 172.
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effectiveness as the Early Morning Shows, though they became legendary throughout the
movement and were copied in other parts of the country. Quite often, a kind o f
moratorium on Horror Shows would have to be instituted because the Army grew better
prepared for them. After a couple o f months o f successful Early Morning Shows and
several Horror Shows in the summe r o f 1967. the raids on the induction center were
suspended because “the Army got very hip very quickly, and our last two or three visits
ended in almost instantaneous eviction.” Curiously, they were never arrested for such
stunts (some speculated that the Army did not want to make martyrs out o f them in a
court case).49
As the fall of 1967 approached, the BDRG began its first real self-evaluation. At
the 8 August Steering Committee meeting, members discussed group ideology and asked
the “burning” question: “does the BDRG gain more effectiveness by (a) encouraging the
idea that it is committed to a hard-core, direct-action, somewhat alienated brand of
radicalism, or by (b) underplaying the alienation and seeking a surface alliance with more
'acceptable' anti-war groups, such as Vietnam Summer, the AFSC, etc.?” Their answer, it
turned out, fell somewhere in between. BDRG continued to conduct its “direct action”
programs (the Early Morning Shows and the Horror Shows), but also decided to become
much more involved in community oriented draft counseling.50
Draft Counseling
While the Boston Draft Resistance Group had always been influenced in part by

49 BDRG Newsletter, undated, c. August 1967, Ferber papers.
50 BDRG newsletter, undated, c. August 1967, Ferber papers.
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the work o f the Students for a Democratic Society, it became more so in the fall of 1967.
At that time Nick Egleson, Vernon Grizzard, and John Maher joined BDRG and turned it
more toward counseling and the Early Morning Shows. Egleson and Grizzard both were
national SDS officers and Maher had been heavily involved with Vietnam Summer.51
Their training in these organizations had stressed community organizing and they brought
this perspective to the young and still malleable BDRG. It also resulted in continued
emphasis on the politicization and radicalization o f everyone with whom they came in
contact. Implicitly, they offered each “client” a deal: in exchange for draft counseling the
BDRG expected a personal commitment against the war.
BDRG recognized an opportunity in draft counseling because the primary
provider o f draft counseling in the area, the American Friends Service Committee,
focused on preparing conscientious objection appeals. “The AFSC counseling course is
no longer adequate for our purposes” wrote one BDRGer, “because it is non-political, not
aimed specifically at the War in Vietnam and. in consequence, somewhat out of date.”
Consequently, BDRG quickly established its own counselor training course with the help
of a couple of AFSC counselors and using all of the research that the first small group o f
BDRG counselors had gathered over the summer.52 Soon the new office on Columbia
Avenue in Cambridge was open six days a week, staffed with dozens o f volunteer
counselors tending to the long lines of men seeking information on the draft.
Unlike the AFSC or the individual resisters from the Committee for Non-Violent

51 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 170.
52 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, pp. 172-173.
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Action, BDRG counselors advised men to take advantage o f the system any way they
could. If a counselee felt that he could not in good conscience participate with the
Selective Service System at all, outright resistance became an option; but this occurred
very infrequently. Instead, counselors sought to find something in the young man's life
that made him eligible for a deferment. Even though popular artists like Phil Ochs had
described nearly every available escape from conscription in songs like “Draft Dodger
Rag,” many men remained unaware o f their options. Counselors, then, would lay them
out as Ochs had, looking for men who were still too young (“Sarge, I’m only 18"); had
physical ailments (“I got a ruptured spleen...l got eyes like a bat, my feet are flat, and my
asthma’s getting worse”); were homosexual (“I always carry a purse”); could get a
hardship deferment (“think of my...sweetheart dear, my poor old invalid aunt”); were
enrolled in college or graduate school full-time (“I’m going to school”); or were qualified
for work in the national interest (“and I’m working in a defense plant”). Therefore, rather
than refusing to cooperate with the draft, men who came to BDRG for help were told to
overcooperate by applying for a deferment allowed by the system. In addition, local
board decisions could be appealed, sometimes repeatedly, in hopes that eventually a
bureaucratic error would occur; if that happened, the process could be dragged out for
years and chances o f such individuals being inducted became very small.
BDRG was not satisfied with simply helping individuals stay out of the service,
however. From the start, BDRG counselors maintained a broader agenda. One directive
issued in September 1967 cautioned counselors to “be always conscious of the total
situation —every deferment that you get for someone else, for yourself, just means that
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another ghetto cat who can't get deferments, gets drafted.” It then reinforced the aim of
moving as many counselees toward more radical action as possible:
Don't respect the law. Use it. Try to awaken the guy you are
counseling to how the SS System works, etc. Touch, expand his
consciousness.
Stay aware o f the draft’s relationship to the war, and that just
getting people who come in for help a deferment is not doing anything to
halt the war and the ever increasing militarism in the country. We must hit
these guys so they don't just take their deferments and forget about the
draft We must look for ways to politicize them, to get them indignant
about the draft.53
As part o f this counseling philosophy, counselors took great care in providing
information about the draft. “You don't tell a guy what to do, you don’t make decisions
for him,” remarked one counselor. “Lay out the decisions open to him, but he should
make the decisions. Force him to think about what he’s going to do and what his choice
means....the only way you'll get him to work against the war is if he's convinced it’s the
right thing to do.” Ultimately, counselors hoped that they would not only provide useful
information that would help his or her client to escape the draft but also convince them of
the importance o f continued action against the war and move them "toward a more
radical perspective.” Although it didn't happen as often as BDRG would have liked,
some counselees went on to organize in their own neighborhoods, become counselors
themselves, or even volunteer for Early Morning Shows.54
Counselees were not always receptive to the political ‘rap’ that they received

53 Thome, “Resisting the Draft.”p. 311.
54 Fisher, “Midwives to History,”p. IU-9; Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” p. 88;
Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 173
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when they came for draft information, however. Most just wanted service without
expectation o f any further commitment on their part. Some counselors had little patience
for such individuals.55 The records that the BDRG kept for each man it counseled no
longer survive, but in 1973, Charles Fisher, a sociologist at Brandeis University and
himse lf a former BDRG counselor, used more than 5,000 counselee forms to make some
conclusions about these individuals. According to Fisher, despite the efforts o f BDRG to
reach into the working-class community, 60% of the men that they counseled were
college students and, therefore, mostly middle-class. Overall, however, 50% were
classified 1-A (draftable) and 35% were 2-S (student deferment). Another sociologist and
former BDRG counselor. Barrie Thome, estimated that most of BDRG’s clientele were
“middle-class students who came for technical advice on how to avoid the draft.”
Moreover, she wrote, “at least two thirds and perhaps even 80 or 90 percent were white,
middle class college students.”56
Thome noted that draft counselors preferred to work with working-class and
minority clients because of the obvious imbalance in who was drafted. These counselees
were few in number, however. As a result, the most favored clients were “registrants
who were similar to the counselors —white, middle-class, college-educated, and
concerned about the war and the draft as political issues.” Conversely, Thome reported,
The clients whom counselors most disliked were typified by an upperclass, pampered, college senior, politically apathetic and trying to evade

55 Thome, “Resisting the Draft,”p. 91.
56 Fisher, “Midwives to History,” p. 111-21; Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” pp. 85,
112.
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the draft for reasons o f self-interest....they were already in a privileged
relationship with the draft so the BDRG was not furthering distributive
justice by helping them to continue to evade conscription. If these clients
weren’t radicalized through the draft counseling process, BDRG
counselors were hard-pressed to offer a political justification for giving
them service.57
Harold Hector, a BDRG founder and a master counselor, hated it “when a Harvard guy
would come in and want to get out, wanting to get out to spend more time at Harvard.
[That] used to piss me off. Td say, ‘hey man. there are a lot of guys who don't have that
student deferment, you know, who are really in trouble with going [to Vietnam], who
need this counseling.’”58
Counselors never imposed a plan o f action on their clients. Rather, they limited
themselves to providing as much information as possible about the Selective Service
System and all o f the legal ways to avoid being drafted. If it seemed impossible for a
client to take advantage o f one of the legal loopholes, then they were left with three
choices: accept induction, refuse induction and go to prison, or leave the country. In
exam ining thousands o f client records, Charles Fisher found that 40% of the men

counseled by BDRG tried to fail their physicals; 30% applied for conscientious objector
status; only 3 to 4% considered induction refusal or leaving the country. (These figures
do not add up to 100%; the choices made by the remaining men are unclear. Many, no
doubt, attempted to fail the mental examinations, acted crazy, or claimed to be

57Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” pp. 299-300.
58 Harold Hector, interview with author, 9 Apr 1997.
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homosexual - all of which could get one disqualified).59 Ultimately, however, as one
BDRG counselor noted, the course o f action taken by an individual client on his own
draft case did not matter as much as his outlook, “as whether or not he was strongly
opposed to the Vietnam War and could be mobilized for radical political activity.”60
Measuring the success o f moving young men to such levels o f activism proved
difficult. No one knew what most counselees did after they left the BDRG office.
Certainly, few started their own neighborhood anti-draft programs and most were not
heard from again. As a result, there began to develop among some BDRGers a sense that
the counseling and Early Morning Shows were too tame. On the one hand, organizers
could claim that, even in that first summer of operation, they had “been able to expose the
draft as merely the more conspicuous symptom of a broader pattern o f corporate
manipulation. In doing so, we help to transform alienation and fear into conscious
political radicalism.” On the other hand, to a large extent BDRG continued to play by
rules set by the Selective Service and did so in an almost unnoticed fashion. Very few of
their actions received significant press coverage (as the draft card burnings o f 1966 had)
and any sense that they were making progress was difficult to gauge. Furthermore, the
moral and ethical challenges pushed by the CNVA the year before seemed to get lost in
BDRG’s willingness to work the system to its advantage. As the war raged on, some men
began to resurrect the idea o f total non-compliance as another complementary response.
Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd noted that “a means had yet to be found that would

59 Fisher, “Midwives to History,” p. IH-22.
60 Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” p. 88
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tie together in one political process the hundreds o f signers o f We Won't Go statements
and the bold tactics of the draft card burners.” A new strategy was needed, one that
would openly confront the government on a massive scale. As summer slipped into fall,
momentum quickly gathered for what would become the driving force of Boston’s
antiwar movement61

61 New England SDS Conference newsletter, Fisher papers; Ferber and Lynd, p.
65.
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CHAPTER ID

OCTOBER 16!: “A RESOLUTE SHOW OF MORAL FORCE”

If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his
cross, and follow me. For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and
whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it. For what shall a
man be profited, if he shallgain the whole world, and forfeit his soul? Or
what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?
Matthew 16: 24-26
As the Boston Draft Resistance Group refined their draft counseling and draft
meddling tactics, plans for an ambitious national confrontation with the Selective Service
originated in California and began to move east. On April 15, 1967, the same day that the
We Won’t Go advertisement ran in the Harvard Crimson, former Stanford University
student body president David Harris announced the formation of an organization called
The Resistance to a capacity crowd assembled for the National Mobilization in San
Francisco’s Kezar Stadium. From the stage, Harris, who had returned his draft card to his
local board the previous August and pledged total noncompliance with the Selective
Service, told the crowd that the war in Vietnam was “a logical extension of the way
America has chosen to live.” He called on the draft age men in the crowd to join him on
October 16 when men in cities across the country would sever their ties to the Selective
Service by returning their draft cards to the government:
As young people facing that war, as people who are confronted
with the choice o f being in that war or not, we have an obligation to speak
to this country, and that statement has to be made this way: that this war
will not be made in our names, that this war will not be made with our
hands, that we will not carry the rifles to butcher the Vietnamese people,
and that the prisons o f the United States will be full of young people who
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will not honor the orders o f murder.1
As he spoke, Harris himself expected to receive his own induction notice at any time. He
had already appeared at the induction center in his hometown of Fresno for his preinduction physical. But, as he told the crowd, he planned to refuse induction and accept a
prison sentence instead.
David Harris and several friends with whom he lived in a sort of commune in Palo
Alto arrived at their personal decisions to resist the draft after many months o f discussion
in 1966. One o f these men, Dennis Sweeney, an experienced activist who had worked
with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Mississippi, remembered their
discussions about noncompliance beginning in the spring of 1966 when Robert
McNamara commented on the army as one of the best tools for educating the poor and
minorities. “It became obvious/’ Sweeney noted, “that it was pointless to say you ’won’t
go’ if you weren’t being asked to.”2 But he also knew it would be pointless to refuse
induction if only a few people did it. “I was sure I was going to do it but I was sure I
wasn’t going to do it by myself,” he said, “because I believed that to have an impact, to
have some kind of political effect, it had to be a number o f people doing it together.”

1David Harris, Dreams Die Hard: Three M en's Journey Through the Sixties
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), p. 181.
2 Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance (Boston: Beacon, 1971) p.
81. Ferber and Lynd quote Sweeney as citing McNamara’s comments on the poor and
minorities in a speech in Montreal (May 1966), though the text of that speech did not
include any such reference. Such a comments, however, would be consistent with
McNamara’s views on Project 100,000 (see Chapter 2). See “The Text o f Address by
McNamara to American Society o f Newspaper Editors,” New York Times, 19 May 1966,
p. 11.
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Although the timing did not seem right in 1966, David Harris went ahead and returned his
card anyway.
Early in March 1967, Harris and Sweeney met Lennie Heller and Steve Hamilton
from Berkeley. Heller and Hamilton had independently arrived at the same idea for a
draft resistance movement as Harris and the others in Palo Alto. In fact, they carried
leaflets that they had produced which bore the name of their budding organization: The
Resistance. The name had important historical antecedents. First, it most obviously
referred to resistance to Nazi occupation in Europe during the Second World War. The
reference to fascism was deliberate: Heller and Hamilton feared that the Vietnam War
might lead to the dawn o f an American style o f fascism designed in part to crush dissent.
Bettina Aptheker, another activist at Berkeley, later recalled that “when you said the word
resistance [in 1967], it was with a capital R, and you meant the resistance to fascism in
Europe...People had a sense o f very great repression in this country...like fascism was
creeping in on us from a lot o f different directions.” General Hershey’s channeling memo
and the obvious inequities in the draft only fueled this perception. Second, in the early
sixties, French students used the term “Young Resistance” to describe their protest o f
their country’s colonial war in Algeria. This group included several thousand men who
refused induction into the French army. The American resisters saw clearly the parallels
between the French students’ outrage over the Algerian war and their own anger over
Vietnam.3

3 Harris, Dreams Die Hard, pp. 175-176; Ferber & Lynd, pp.2-3, 88-90; Tom
Wells, The War Within: Am erica's Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1994), p. 125.
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In California, the Resistance distributed its first leaflet in early April, prior to the
Mobilization, and in it they articulated the basis for recruiting more members:
We will renounce all deferments and refuse to cooperate with the
draft in any manner, at any leveL.The war in Vietnam is criminal and we
must act together, at great individual risk, to stop it. Those involved must
lead the American people, by their example, to understand the enormity of
what their government is doing...To cooperate with conscription is to
perpetuate its existence, without which the government could not wage
war. We have chosen to openly defy the draft and confront the
government and its war directly.
This is no small decision in a person’s life. Each one realizes that
refusing to cooperate with Selective Service may mean prison...To do
anything but this is to effectively abet the war...We prefer to resist4
With such rhetoric, the Resistance raised the standards for antiwar protest. To keep a
student deferment while protesting the war, to flee to Canada, to seek conscientious
objector status, to intentionally try to fail a physical, or even to counsel a potential draftee
to do any of these things was “to effectively abet the war.” As another early leaflet
argued, “the American military system depends upon students, those opposed to war, and
those with anti-Vietnam war politics wrangling for the respective deferments. Those
opposed to the war are dealt with quietly, individually and on the government’s terms.”5
The draft, they suggested, used deferments as built-in safety valves to disarm
dissenters. A genuinely universal draft, as writer Michael Walzer noted, “would almost
certainly be a major restraint upon peacetime warmaking, if only because it would mean
that the sons of politically articulate and effective classes would die in greater numbers,
though for no more significant purposes.” Or, as Staughton Lynd pointed out in April

4 Harris, Dreams Die Hard, p. 176.
5 Ferber & Lynd, p. 90.
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1967, if there were not student deferments, “a little arithmetic makes clear the immense
and sobering feet that... 100,000 men would refuse to go and the war would end.” Thus,
by refusing to be pigeonholed into one o f those safety valves, the members o f the
Resistance sought confrontation, the kind of confrontation the government would find
uncomfortable.6
Resistance organizers, then, not only argued for draft resistance as a matter of
conscience, but as a strategic breakthrough, too. The prospect of thousands o f middleclass men being marched off to prison for failure to carry their draft cards would bring
terrible publicity to the government and enrage countless other Americans. They
anticipated a ripple-effect for every resister in which more and more people (family,
friends - and then their family and friends, etc.) would leam of his plight as he went
through each stage of resistance; by the time the government sent him to prison, dozens
o f people would have turned against the war. Furthermore, organizers believed that if
they mobilized ten to twenty thousand draft resisters, it would be sufficient to swamp the
relatively small federal court and penitentiary systems. Draft resistance, therefore,
combined an act of moral witness with a new practical approach to ending the war. And
it appealed to a lot of people who opposed the war and felt guilty about their privileged
place in the Selective Service System.
Over the next year, draft resistance became the driving force of Boston’s antiwar
movement. On October 16, Resistance leaders collected more cards in Boston than in

6 Michael Walzer, “Democracy and the Conscript,” Dissent, Jan/Feb 1966, p. 16;
Staughton Lynd, essay, Liberation, April 1967.
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any other city in the country, save San Francisco. This chapter outlines the intellectual
origins of draft resistance strategy, and charts the rapid rise o f the movement in Boston.
The men and women who organized Boston’s October 16 draft card tum-in - most o f
whom were Vietnam Summer and BDRG veterans - had been protesting the war in
Vietnam for more than a year, but in the summer and fall o f 1967, they grew impatient.
In spite o f their letters to Congress and their participation in teach-ins, marches, and other
demonstrations, the war ground on unabated. The time had come, they decided, for more
radical action. By returning their draft cards to the government, those who chose to
become draft resisters raised the stakes for themselves as opponents of the war, and
placed the administration in the uneasy position of having to consider the prosecution of
almost 1,000 young men nationwide.
Within the broader New Left, draft resistance generated considerable controversy.
Consequently, this chapter also navigates the ideological debates between proponents of
draft resistance and their critics in SDS and other organizations. Like a child striking out
on her own for the first time, the Resistance owed much of its view of the world to its
ideological parents in the New Left; at the same time, however, an interesting amalgam of
anarchist, existentialist, and especially religious thought distinguished the New England
Resistance, in particular, from other New Left organizations. Most significant, despite
SDS accusations o f “bourgeois moralism,” Resistance faith in building a mass movement
o f mostly middle-class students (as opposed to leading the poor and working-class to
revolution) complicated what it meant to be a New Leftist Resistance organizers sought
only to end the war - not foment revolution - and supposed that if thousands o f articulate,
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educated, middle-class young men confronted their government through a series of
somber draft card turn-ins, and began filling the courts and prisons, they could apply
enormous public pressure on the Johnson ad m in istration to withdraw from Vietnam. If
they had any doubts about this approach, they were erased by the success o f October 16.
Seeds o f Resistance
The rise o f the Resistance took place as the public’s views o f the war started to
turn against the Johnson administration. A Gallup Poll taken in the middle o f the summer
for the first time showed the majority of Americans (52%) disapproving o f “the way
President Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam.”7 For years the White House and
Pentagon had been able to claim that despite protests, the majority of Americans
supported their actions in Southeast Asia. But now those days were gone, and the timing
for large scale draft resistance could not have been better.
In Boston, however, the Resistance did not at first find a receptive audience.
Lennie Heller, to whom the task of organizing draft resistance efforts east o f California
had been assigned, arrived there in the late spring, shortly after the publication o f the
Harvard We Won’t Go statement and the formation o f the Boston Draft Resistance
Group. The men and women behind those efforts had little time between Early Morning
Shows and Horror Shows to consider further dramatic action. Moreover, it was not at all
clear that they would not be rounded up and arrested for their current activities, so to
contemplate upping the ante at such an early stage seemed premature. In the late spring

7 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Vol. HI (New
York: Random House, 1972), p. 2074.
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and early summer, few besides Robert Talmanson seemed interested in turning in draft
cards. Talmanson had burned his draft card in Post Office Square in April 1966 to
demonstrate his solidarity with the CNVA men and women who were beaten in South
Boston; in June 1967, the government convicted him for failing to report for induction
and sentenced him to three years in prison. Although he responded positively to Heller’s
plan for a national draft card tum-in, by the end of the summer, despite setting up shop in
BDRG’s office, he had compiled only a short list of names o f Boston men who were
interested in October 16.8
In September the situation changed dramatically. The concentration of colleges
and universities in Boston were full of potential activists and it took only a few to spark a
movement. In previous months, several graduate students, all experienced organizers,
gravitated independently toward resistance. Alex Jack, a seminarian at the Boston
University School of Theology, had been active with BDRG and Vietnam Summer.
Before that, as an undergraduate at Oberlin College, he had twice gone to Mississippi
(where he narrowly escaped death at the hands of segregationists) and spent a week in
Selma, Alabama doing civil rights work. He also had been editor of the school
newspaper, a job that led to three months o f reporting from South Vietnam early in 1967
where he wrote two to three articles a week for 25 to 30 school and small town
newspapers. There he met the American ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, and flew with
American forces on combat missions. But he also became close to the Buddhists and
interviewed the Zen master, Thich Tri Quang, who profoundly influenced his own life

8 Ferber & Lynd, pp. 104-105.
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because Quang was so “completely calm and clear” about the war. Equally important,
Jack also managed to visit hidden hospital wards where he saw children who had been
burned in American napalm attacks and were kept away from the mainstream press. Such
experiences affected him deeply.9
Over the summer, Alex Jack’s father, Homer Jack (then social action director of
the Unitarian Universalist Association and former head of SANE - the Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy) introduced Alex to Michael Ferber, a Harvard graduate student in
English. Like Jack, Ferber grew up in the Unitarian church. As a high school student in
Buffalo, New York, he had peppered his representatives in Congress with letters
protesting nuclear testing and participated in a march across the Peace Bridge to Canada
on Hiroshima Day in 1959. Later, as a student at Swarthmore College, Ferber got
involved in civil rights work in nearby Chester, Pennsylvania. His first arrest came as he
participated in protests at the city hall there calling for better funding o f schools in black
neighborhoods. After graduating summa cum laude with a degree in Greek, he went on to
Harvard in 1966. During his first semester, Ferber participated in the blocking of Robert
McNamara’s car and other antiwar activity. In 1967, he took part in Vietnam Summer,
worked a little with BDRG, and moved toward resistance.10
Sometime in late August, during a demonstration at the Boston Army Base,
Ferber introduced Alex Jack to Bill Dowling, another Harvard graduate student in
English. Dowling and Ferber had discussed noncompliance several times over the

9 Alex Jack, interview with author, 21 Mar 1997; Ferber & Lynd, p. 106.
10Michael Ferber, interview with author, 10 Feb 1997; Ferber & Lynd, p. 105.
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summer, though Dowling, like Alex Jack, was more committed to the idea. Ferber took a
more gradual path to resistance. Earlier in the year, feeling guilty about his student
deferment, he wrote to his draft board and told him that he should be categorized as a
conscientious objector. “I was about as close to a pacifist as I could be without having
really been put to the test,” he later remarked. But since the Selective Service did not
recognize Unitarianism as a denomination with the kind o f pacifist tradition of, say, the
Quakers or the Mennonites, they rejected his claim and reclassified him 1-A. By the end
o f the summer, he remembered, “I got more and more kind of sick o f it and felt guilty for
even trying to be a CO. On the one hand I wanted to get the claim so I could have it as a
fall-back position, but on the other hand, I began to feel bad for even trying to get it. I
was quite tom.” So when Alex Jack and Bill Dowling started talking resistance, Ferber
grew more interested.11
Soon the three attracted others to help organize for October 16. Alex Jack
recruited Nan Stone, a young Methodist minister then also attending the School o f
Theology at Boston University, to help organize as well. Although she could not be
drafted, Stone, who grew up in a conservative farm family in Iowa, had a long history of
social activism and had been outspoken in her opposition to the war. Over the next two
years, despite her “continual struggle” with the male organizers for equal participation in
strategic decisions, Stone became the backbone of day-to-day operations of the New
England Resistance. In addition, Bill Dowling rounded up three former schoolmates
from his undergraduate days at Dartmouth: Neil Robertson, Steve Pailet, and Ric Bogel.

11 Ferber interview, 10 Feb 1997; Ferber & Lynd, pp. 105-107.
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Bogel had gone on to graduate school in the English department at Yale and, thus became
the point man in New Haven (hence the name New England Resistance). Robertson, who
had dropped out o f Dartmouth, came to Boston to study jazz drumming under the
legendary Alan Dawson, and Pailet, Robertson’s best friend and also a superb musician,
soon followed.12 Bill Hunt o f the BDRG also joined the effort. Within weeks this small
group of activists, almost all o f whom were 22 to 24 years old and enrolled in graduate
school, planned the largest - and most dramatic - antiwar demonstration Boston had ever
seen.
Intellectual Roots and Debates on the Left
The New England Resistance, and indeed the national Resistance effort, differed
from other New Left, student, and antiwar organizations in its unusually complex
intellectual grounding Although the Resistance owed much to the early ideals of the
New Left, the draft resistance movement in Boston, in particular, derived its theoretical
underpinnings from a blend o f existentialism, anarchism, nonviolence, and especially
religion. In some ways, this mix of influences made the movement appealing to certain
people, but it also led to very public disagreements with other influential New Left and
antiwar organizations.
Existentialism most obviously influenced Resistance organizers on the west coast
who seemed to adopt the trappings o f modem day existential cowboys. They wore their
hair long, rode motorcycles, and read Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Nietzsche. As Bill Hunt

12Nan Stone, interview with author, 28 Mar 1997; Neil Robertson, interview with
author, 24 Aug 1997; Neil Robertson, interview with author, 22 Dec 1997; Ferber &
Lynd, p. 107.
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recalled, “there was a real kind of Western, gun-slinger, macho style” to the Bay Area
resisters.13 It was very glamorous. The New England Resistance lacked that flair but still
showed similar influences. Literature promoting October 16 often included one quote or
another from Albert Camus. For example, a campus newspaper ad for October 16 used
the following Camus quote as an epigraph:
Whether these men will arise or not I do not know. It is probable that
most of them are even now thinking things over, and that is good. But one
thing is sure: their efforts will be effective only to the degree they have the
courage to give up, for the present, some o f their dreams, so as to grasp
more firmly the essential point on which our very lives depend. Once
there, it will perhaps turn out to be necessary, before they are done, to raise
their voices.14
In addition, as Michael Ferber later noted, existentialism inspired in many resisters a
sense for the “unexpectedness and absurdity of life, the contingency of life, and the
importance of living life with passion.” These were vague concepts, but they inspired
some in the educated leadership ring of the Resistance to plunge into certain causes
without worrying about the probability of success. “It sort o f discouraged waiting until
you got a whole correct theory,” Ferber concluded.'5
Most important, however, draft resistance philosophy in Boston distinguished
itself as a merger of religious and political belief; the group reflected their own
geographical ties in being, as one said, much more “Unitarian and transcendentaiist” in its

13 Ferber and Lynd, pp. 82-86; Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
14 Advertisement for October 16 draft card tum-in, BU News, 11 Oct 1967, p. 5.
15 Ferber interview, 21 Apr 1998.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
philosophical grounding.16 The influence o f the two organizers from the BU School o f
Theology ( Jack and Stone) and lifelong Unitarian (Ferber) set the group apart from the
more typical New Left strain o f Resistance chapters popping up all over the country.
Alex Jack, in particular, pushed the organization in this direction. In his efforts to reach
out to clergy and laity in the weeks leading up to October 16, he produced his own
newsletter which, on behalf o f the Resistance, first articulated a strategy o f not simply
undermining the draft, but o f building a community of religious people who would
continue to work to reshape America into a more compassionate society. In his call to
clergy and laity, he wrote:
The Resistance is conceived as a first step in building a mass
movement that can aspire to win the respect of young people and their
active support. It will be several months probably before any arrests are
made. During this interval, we will organize other waves of young men to
non-cooperate. First 3000, then 10,000, then 30,000, then 100,000. We
will make the government either end the war, or fill the jails. The major
objective, however, is not prison. Rather it is to stop serving the system of
conscription, without whose smooth functioning the war in Vietnam could
not be waged. Prison is the price we may have to pay for effective
resistance...We must be willing at least to live (however restrictedly in jail
for a few years) for our supreme convictions. Prison is not the end of our
activities. Both in jail and afterwards, we will create a community o f men
to transform the society into a fully human one. We choose to stay and
struggle for the kind o f America we believe in.
He concluded by quoting the great Jewish theologian, Martin Buber, who, when asked
why protests against social injustice so often failed, responded, “They are only addressed
to other people and do not involve any personal commitment.” Through draft resistance,
Alex Jack argued, clergy and laity could demonstrate their personal commitment, end

16 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
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American involvement in Vietnam and, simultaneously, begin to transform America
itself.17
Jack’s focus on personal commitment resulted not only from his own religious
upbringing, but from his experience in Vietnam earlier in the year. He returned from
Vietnam believing that the “thousands of burned villages and Vietnamese deaths” caused
by American forces constituted “no less a crime against humanity than Nazi genocide of
the Jews.” He likened the napalm and phosphorus burning o f Vietnamese civilians to the
use o f German death camp ovens in World War n. Jack told o f seeing Vietnamese
hamlets “encircled, their inhabitants massacred, and the remains bulldozed over by US
Marines,” thus paralleling the 1942 Nazi destruction o f Lidice, Czechoslovakia where
German forces killed the town’s entire male population, shipped women and children to
concentration camps, and burned the town to the ground. Michael Ferber would later
describe Alex Jack as “modest and quiet in his behavior, almost inscrutable in his oriental
calm.” That kind of personality, combined with his experience in Vietnam, made him
that much more persuasive when he appealed to fellow seminarians by saying, “we must
now act, as well as speak.”18
The religious foundation o f the New England Resistance also fostered a continued
commitment to Gandhian teachings o f nonviolence among the organization’s founders.

17 “A Call for Boston Clergy and Laity to Support Draft Resistors,” undated (c.
late Sep 1967), MKFP.
18 “Seminarian Refuses Ministerial (4-D) Exemption,” press release included with
“A Call for Boston Clergy and Laity to Support Draft Resistors,” undated (c. late Sep
1967), MKFP.
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Although, by 1967, many in the civil rights movement had begun to move toward the
more radical Black Power perspective and away from nonviolence, the Resistance
remained confident in the potential for nonviolent protest to end a violent war. The
organizers’ strong belief in this strategy evolved in part from their own experiences as
activists in the civil rights movement and their reverence for Martin Luther King and his
commitment to nonviolence; at least a few o f them had attended the 1963 March on
Washington, and heard King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. In addition, Alex Jack’s father,
Homer Jack, knew King quite well and had, himself, published a widely-read edition o f
Gandhi’s writings.19 So, although they recognized that they might be attacked physically attacked - for resisting the draft, there was never any question that the
movement had to remain nonviolent.
In addition to the existential and religious influences on Resistance philosophy
and strategy, the organization reflected a unique blend of political ideologies. For
example, some organizers possessed an uncommon affinity for anarchist theorists of the
late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. They preferred the arguments of Mikhail
Bakunin, for example, over those of Karl Marx, and were well aware of the critiques o f
the Russian Revolution made by Peter Kropotkin, Rosa Luxemburg, and the American
anarchist Emma Goldman. And the anarchist spirit also served as a way to make the
serious work o f confronting the government fun. Dan Tilton, a 28 year-old Coast Guard
veteran and constant presence in the New England Resistance office after October 16,

19 Homer Jack, The Gandhi Reader (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1956).
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successfully encouraged a number o f his Resistance colleagues to form a chapter o f the
anarcho-syndicalist organization, the Industrial Workers o f the World. Although the
government all but crushed the IWW in the early 1920s, the Resistance felt an historical
connection. Organizers liked the Wobblies’ “willingness to do anything to make their
point,” Tilton later reflected. “It was a fun link to the p a st”20
Resistance founders also were influenced by the original Port Huron-era SDS
anarchist spirit. SDS’s call for participatory democracy - that is, for all citizens to
participate in making decisions that affect their lives - illuminated a distrust of centralized
government that derived from anarchist principles. Indeed, what made the New Left new
was, in part, its recognition that the Soviet model was a betrayal of Marxist ideals. In
general, then, the New England Resistance rejected any kind o f concentrated power, and,
instead, hoped to build a broad-based draft resistance movement, one that operated from
the grass-roots, and did not turn on the whims o f a small core o f leaders. Organizational
decisions were made at meetings not by majority vote, but by consensus, thus making the
meetings more democratic but also notoriously long.
Finally, like other New Left organizations, the New England Resistance showed
the influence o f Frankfurt School social theorist Herbert Marcuse, who until 1965, had
taught at nearby Brandeis University. Marcuse’s writings, especially One-Dimensional
Man, Essay on Liberation, and Negations, urged his readers to “negate” the totallyadministered world, to overcome the ideological waves o f the establishment, and to assert

20 Ferber interview, 21 Apr. 1998; Dan Tilton, interview with author, 16 Jun
1997.
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their individuality in the face of the technologized status quo. Most important for the
student generation o f the 1960s, Marcuse saw in the civil rights movement and the
Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964 reasons to believe that young people (as
opposed to, say, the proletariat) might be the ones to lead the revolution against one
dimensional society in America. As Marcuse scholar Douglas Kellner has noted, OneDimensional Man showed that the problems confronting radicals in the 1960s “were not
simply the Vietnam War, racism or inequality, but the system itself.”21 Resistance
founders recognized this, and saw the Selective Service, with its channeling strategy, as
one o f the most hideous examples of the one-dimensional “system” at work. They did
not need Marcuse to confer legitimacy on their planned confrontation with the
government - after all, students across the country had been leading social movements
throughout the decade - but his ideas were important to shaping the way they viewed their
society, their government, and the Vietnam War.22
Although the Resistance shared these ideological influences with other New Left
and antiwar groups, not everyone in those larger movements agreed on the efficacy of
draft resistance. Within national and local antiwar organizations the Resistance endured
considerable criticism in the early days. The Boston Draft Resistance Group, for
instance, remained aloof until just days before the planned action. Even though the words
“draft resistance” made up half of the organization’s name, the BDRG’s attitude toward

21 Douglas Kellner, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” in Herbert Marcuse,
One-Dimensional Man, 2nd ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. xxxv.
22 Ferber interview, 21 Apr. 1998.
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complete noncompliance with the Selective Service made it clear that “resistance” meant
different things to different people. In their first newsletter o f the summer, BDRG
described noncompliance as an act of “foolish bravado” and although they admitted that
draft resistance represented “a serious intensification o f anti-war activity” they feared that
it presented just as many “new pitfalls” as opportunities.23
An August newsletter seemed to indicate that the BDRG had become sarcastic in
expressing its doubts about the value o f resistance. “The Resistance,” they wrote, “has so
far announced its presence in Boston only by the somewhat cryptic 'October 16' button
worn by a few BDRG members. (Too cryptic, maybe: Resistance people have been
finding out that the button is mostly a good way to meet passers-by with birthdays in midOctober)...” They went on to point out that in some cities, the Resistance had become the
“major focus of anti-draft activity.” but that in Boston it remained “only an unofficial
project o f the BDRG.” Such a portrayal implies a kind o f turf war between the two
groups, yet the rest of the newsletter's description o f the Resistance made it clear that the
real source of contempt arose from a disagreement over tactics:
Simplicity o f concept makes the Resistance...the most obvious
target for the curious cynicism which is just now inseparable from radical
protest as a whole. It might be called the phenomenon o f the fullyrationalized II-S [student deferment]: a classification which is still, on the
group discussion level, a moral blight, but which seems to be viewed
functionally as a great radical labor-saving device ('If I'm safe, I can use
my time better to fight the war...'). The October 16 protestor will have to
withstand, right up to the last moment, the argument that he is set on an act
o f useless martyrdom. The task o f locating and enlisting those people
committed to radical protest at great personal risk is the major job that lies

23 BDRG Newsletter #1, 29 Jun 1967, p. 1, Papers o f Charles S. Fisher (hereafter,
CSFP).
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before the Resistance in the weeks ahead. But beyond this, there is the
problem o f creating a unity of purpose and belief which is the only final
answer to cynicism and doubt.24
The BDRG, therefore, grudgingly continued to accept student deferments, and steadfastly
kept its focus on trying to organize the working class and the inner cities through
community outreach. Unlike the Resistance, they professed no interest in mobilizing the
middle-class either in the suburbs or on Boston area campuses.
The Boston Draft Resistance Group’s adherence to community organizing
mirrored that of Students for a Democratic Society, who were then also busy debating the
pros and cons of draft resistance in their weekly national newspaper, New Left Notes. In
late June, Mark Kleiman wrote that “The prospect o f putting 200 to 500 o f our people in
jail for such a long time in such a reckless fashion concerns me. I have no desire to
expend either the organizational or human resources required in such an action. We are
not the Wobblies - we cannot fill the jails.” Although Kleiman acknowledged the value
of the Resistance’s “militant national action,” he urged its expansion into other anti-draft
activity. The following month, the issue of resistance came up at the national SDS
convention. Discussion resulted in a new resolution which stated that “a draft resistance
program must move beyond individual protest to collective action.” That said, the
resolution reaffirmed SDS’s call for “the formation o f draft-resistance unions” and argued
that Resistance-like tactics “such as civil disobedience and disruption of the Selective
Service System are among those advocated” but only “when they complement the overall
strategy o f resistance to the draft and to other forms o f oppression.” Just what SDS

24 BDRG Newsletter, undated (c. August 1967), MKFP.
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meant by an “overall strategy of resistance" was not clear, however. And although the
resolution clearly stated that “SDS does not urge going to jail as a means of resisting the
draft,” it persisted in its ambiguity by expressing support for “all those whose actions
result in imprisonment.”25
In the weeks leading up to October 16, though, criticism from SDS grew more
strident. Steve Hamilton, one of the original Berkeley founders o f the Resistance, broke
ranks and wrote a blistering column in New Left Notes, in which he condemned what he
saw as middle-class elitism at work in the Resistance: “I don't think moral witness on our
part can have any concrete effect on those who cannot afford to make a moral witness...no
revolution is built on bad consciences but on the organizations o f those who are
exploited. Middle-class tears and money mean very little.” Instead, he called on those
who had ‘the perspective of being political organizers” to “get off the campus and do
draft resistance work... in communities, on high school and junior college campuses.” As
Hamilton saw it, the goal of the Resistance had shifted from political organization to
“public effect,” and consequently the "primary mistake” of such an approach lay in
“building a movement that hoped to stir one more wave of middle-class liberal sentiment
against the war and American militarism" in lieu of organizing “those who can make
revolutionary change - black, poor white and working-class people.”26
Locally, SDS leaders agreed with both Kleiman and Hamilton. Steve Shalom of

25 Mark Kleiman, “Resistance and Non-Cooperation,” New Left Notes, 26 Jun
1967, p. 8; “Draft and Resistance,” New Left Notes, 16 Jul 1967, pp. 4-5.
26 Steve Hamilton, “October 16...A Moral Witness?,” New Left Notes, 2 Oct 1967,
p. 3.
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MIT SDS: “Whether we get out [of the draft] with...bizarre behavior [at a pre-induction
physical] or whether we get out by a student deferment or whether we get out by going to
jail, a Cambridge working class kid - that slot is still made available for him.” So, for
SDS, the goal became “how can we best bring the war to an end so that Cambridge kid's
not going to have to go? And a lot us thought that probably the best way was not to be in
jail, but to be out organizing... it wasn't an easy decision, because we realized...the moral
conflict of interest that not going to jail was also very personally pleasing.” But the
overriding concerns involved organizing not the middle class, but the working class, and
staying out of jail to do so.27
Hamilton’s and Shalom’s argument against widespread draft resistance by middleclass college students reflected an Old Left kind of faith in the working-class that
remained strong in SDS. Just a few years earlier, from 1963 to 1965, the organization
had focused much o f its attention on an Economic Research and Action Program intended
to galvanize the poor and working-class in northern cities to see their potential political
power, much like the civil rights movement had done in the South. In the fall of 1967,
although many in SDS, faced with persistent inequality between the races and the
ongoing escalation o f war in Vietnam, began to swerve away from a more moderate Leftliberalism toward Marxism-Leninism, that emphasis on mobilizing the masses in their
neighborhoods toward some kind o f leftist revolution remained prominent.
The key difference between SDS and the Resistance, then, arose from an issue of
ultimate objectives. Whereas Steve Hamilton and others in SDS urged continued

27 Steve Shalom, interview with author, 18 May 1997.
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appeals to the poor and working-class as a way to create “revolutionary change,” the
Resistance sought more specifically to end the war. Although Resistance founders in
Boston and elsewhere held out some hope o f attracting working-class men to their
movement, making the mobilization o f large numbers of poor and working-class men to
revolution the primary objective o f an antiwar movement seemed an unnecessary
distraction away from their primary goal o f stopping the war. While the Resistance
sought to instigate an uprising against the Selective Service, it harbored no illusions
about creating a revolution against the government.
The New England Resistance organizers, therefore, found the arguments o f SDS
and BDRG unpersuasive. The notion o f keeping oneself out of jail to continue one’s
antiwar work sounded, as Bill Hunt (one o f the few BDRG - NER crossovers) put it, “a
little bit like you’re saving yourself for the junior prom.” As he later recalled, the
question came down to an individual's view of politics, history, and morality:
Who the fuck are we, frankly?....! mean, if you really see yourself
building a conspiratorial network that’s eventually going to overthrow the
world (and this is what Lenin would, of course, have done...Lenin was
quite unscrupulous about protecting his own butt, because he figured he
was Lenin), [that is one thing]. But if you didn't view yourself like
that...and didn't really support that notion of social change, then it seemed
to us that our power to go to jail was probably the best weapon that we had
in a sense that it was going to be embarrassing [for the government] to do
that. We were educated, we were articulate, we could make good speeches
in the courtroom...We might be nuts, but we were clearly not selfinterested here - that could come across....There's not all that much that a
21, 23 year old, even Harvard graduate could do directly except stand up
and put the government in a situation in which [they] either had to start
locking up fair numbers o f people or it would spread...28

28 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
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Thus, proponents of resistance recognized that, for the most part, they came from
positions o f relative privilege that were tied to their middle class upbringing. In
acknowledging their class status, they hoped to preempt charges of elitism and, in turn,
use it to their advantage in garnering big headlines. As they told the media, “we will not
be bought off with draft deferments and exemptions that keep most of us who are white,
middle-class, and educated free and alive, while blacks, poor people, and working-class
people who could not afford an education are sent to the war and die.”29
Ironically, the Johnson administration’s decision to maintain student deferments
gave Resistance leaders reason to be confident. According to James Reston of the New
York Times, the administration chose to continue the 2-S deferment because they
estimated that without it, one out o f every four male undergraduates might refuse
induction. Knowing that the White House feared such a development and had taken
positive action to try to prevent it, the Resistance sought to make it happen anyway.
Citations from Reston’s article appeared in the New England Resistance’s first newsletter
along with a widely quoted piece written by Tom Wicker in May 1967 in reaction to
heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali’s induction refusal. Wicker wondered
what would happen if “enough citizens simply refuse to obey the positive commands of
government and of the national majority...if only, say, 100,000 young men flatly refused
to serve in the armed forces?” The result, he theorized, would be that the government’s
“real power to pursue the Vietnamese war or any other policy would be crippled if not

29 “The Resistance Begins in Boston,” Press Release, MKFP; Eventually, Harvard
SDS reluctantly endorsed the Resistance - but only after Michael Ferber attended three o f
their meetings seeking help, Ferber & Lynd, p. 109.
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destroyed. It would then be faced not with dissent but with civil disobedience on a scale
amounting to revolt.”30
Crippling the government’s ability to prosecute the war became the primary
objective o f the New England Resistance and other Resistance chapters around the
country. No one expected to get 100,000 men to pledge refusal on October 16, and even
if they thought they could, Resistance organizers were not so naive as to believe that the
military could not go on without those 100,000 men. Too many acquiescent conscripts
prevented that. Still, the scale o f dissent was important. Thousands o f middle class
college students breaking the Selective Service laws would cause an uproar not only in
Washington but in suburbs across the country. The administration would have to react.
And when they did, the resisters believed that the resulting confrontation would shatter
public support for the war, once and for all. America would have to get out of Vietnam.
Planning October 16
At first, the New England Resistance went to work trying to mobilize campuses
across the region for October 16. The numerous colleges and universities in Boston alone
occupied most o f the organizers’ time, but they also sought to reach out to the state
universities in Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. They
sent speakers to Brown, Dartmouth, Middlebury, Amherst, Williams, Yale, and the
Rhode Island School of Design. At most of those schools, they relied on SDS chapters
for assistance, but given the ambivalence of the national SDS, such efforts were rarely

30 James Reston, ATT, 5 May 1967; Tom Wicker, “In the Nation: Muhammad Ali
and Dissent,” NYT, 2 May 1967, p. 46; “October 16!,” Newsletter of the New England
Resistance, undated (c. Sep 1967), MKFP.
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enough. The second and final newsletter put out before October 16 boasted that the NER
planned to distribute 50,000 leaflets “in a serious effort to hit everyone in the New
England area who holds the H-S deferment.”31
Resistance organizers divided up assignments and spoke with each other daily.
Bill Dowling and, to a lesser degree, Bob Talmanson ironed out the details for October
16, getting permits for the demonstration planned for Boston Common, arranging
speakers and doing outreach to other antiwar groups. Michael Ferber promoted October
16 on college campuses, thus doing most o f the public speaking for the group. Alex Jack
and Nan Stone focused on the religious community, reaching out to clergy, seminarians,
and lay people for support. In this last respect, especially, the Boston plan for October
16 developed much differently from other cities.32
In late September, Alex Jack suggested that the Boston draft card tum-in take
place in a church. The others loved the idea immediately, for as Michael Ferber later
wrote, “what better way to underscore the moral gravity o f the act we were embarking on
than to hold it in a place o f worship? It was a little like a confirmation or a baptism: a rite
o f passage into manhood, from slavery and ‘channeling’ to the promised land o f peace
and freedom.” The difficult task, they thought, would be in finding a church that would
allow such a controversial ceremony to take place in its sanctuary. As usual, though,

31 “October 16!,” second newsletter o f the New England Resistance, undated (c. 1
Oct 1967), MKFP.
32 “October 16!,” Newsletter o f the New England Resistance, undated (c. Sep
1967), MKFP; Ferber and Lynd, p. 107.
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Alex Jack had a plan.33
Jack and Ferber arranged a meeting with the Rev. Jack Mendelsohn o f the
Arlington Street Church, a Unitarian-Universalist church adjacent to Boston’s Public
Gardens. At the time, Jack and his parents were parishioners there and the minister was
an old family friend. Mendelsohn had been preaching against American involvement in
Vietnam for a long time and could be counted upon to be sympathetic. Even so, he
hesitated when first asked to hold the draft card tum-in in his church. His reluctance
stemmed not from any misgivings about the nature of the ceremony, but from his
appraisal that everyone in Boston would expect such a ceremony at Arlington Street. “It
was assumed that things of that nature would occasionally be held there,” he later
remarked. Therefore, he suggested that the organizers approach some o f the more
establishment churches in town, Trinity or Old South Church, to see if they might
consider hosting the event. Newspaper and television images of hundreds o f draft
resisters assembling in Copley Square and marching into Trinity Church, Henry Hobson
Richardson’s great architectural masterpiece and a monument to Boston’s rich intellectual
and cultural legacy, would have stunned the city. To be welcomed in such a place would
imply that even the most powerful families in Boston so firmly opposed the war that they
were willing to approve a plan o f radical civil disobedience. In the end, however, it did
not happen. Those establishment churches rebuffed Resistance organizers and they

33 Ferber & Lynd, p. 108.
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returned to Arlington Street.34
The history of the 'Arlington Street Church made it an ideal site for a draft card
tum-in. The church itself was constructed in 1861, the first public building built on the
newly filled Back Bay. But, in fact, three congregations from other churches had
combined to create the one that the Rev. Mendelsohn led in the 1960s. The first parish,
started by Scots-Irish immigrants who had moved to Boston from Londonderry, New
Hampshire, in 1729, named itself the Church o f the Presbyterian Strangers. Eventually, it
relocated to Federal Street, where, in 1803, the parish recruited a young minister named
William Ellery Charming. Charming transformed the church by applying its ministry to
social justice causes and a more liberal theology. In 1825, he founded the American
Unitarian Association in the vestry o f the Federal Street Church, and he himself later
became an articulate champion of the Abolitionist movement. In ensuing decades, the
Arlington Street Church played an integral role in the development of Unitarianism. In
the twentieth century it eventually merged with two other churches: First Unitarian, and
the Church of the Disciples. During the Vietnam era, draft resisters and parishioners
alike found reassurance in the history of the Church o f the Disciples as well. Under
minster James Freeman Clark, the Church issued the following resolution, signed by
Clark and 130 others, in opposition to the Mexican War:
We the undersigned members of the Church o f the Disciples, or religiously
connected therewith, wish by a solemn declaration to free ourselves, as far
as possible, from the responsibility of the war of invasion now waged by
the United States against Mexico.

34 Alex Jack, interview with author, 21 Mar 1997; Jack Mendelsohn, interview
with author, 19 Dec 1997; Ferber & Lynd, pp. 107-108.
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We take this step because we believe this war to be unjust +
inhuman., +■to be carried on from the lust of territory and for the extension
of slavery, because the attitude o f silence in which this country stands
before the nations with regard to this war is one o f approval + because thus
our influence and character individually + collectively, as Americans and
Christians goes to strengthen a scheme of oppression and blood.
We therefore, as far as by this public act we can, absolve ourselves
before God + the Christian world o f all participation in or approval of this
deed o f violence, + we protest in the name o f humanity + religion against
the existence + continuance o f this war, as dishonorable to our name +
race, as the forfeiture of our mission as a people + as one of the great
crimes o f modem history.
During the 1960s the original copy of that resolution hung, framed, on the wall o f the
entry foyer o f the Arlington Street Church’s offices at 355 Boylston Street. One needed
little imagination to apply that 1846 resolution to 1967, and many in the church looked to
it for inspiration during the difficult days o f draft resistance.35
Despite this legacy of commitment to social activism in the nineteenth century,
the Arlington Street Church grew fairly conservative in the twentieth century through the
late 1950s. It had itself become an establishment church. During the thirties, forties, and
fifties, many o f the church’s Brahmin members who had moved to some of the affluent
suburbs outside Boston still came in on Sundays to hear “one o f their own,” the Rev.
Dana McLean Greeley, preach. But when Jack Mendelsohn came to Arlington Street,
that changed. Mendelsohn entered the Unitarian ministry because it was turning its
attention toward social issues and he wanted to work in an institution that would apply

35 “The Century and the Quest,” centennial pamphlet (c. 1961), Arlington Street
Church Archives; “Arlington Street Church,” brochure, undated (c. late 1960s), Arlington
Street Church Archives; Mendelsohn interview, 19 Dec 1997; original copy of the
Mexican War resolution hangs today in the James Freeman Clark room in the Arlington
Street Church.
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itself to “trying to find better approaches to solving human problems.” He quickly set to
work transforming Arlington Street into a vibrant urban church, one that reached out to
the city’s diverse population.36
Most important for the Resistance organizers, Jack Mendelsohn and the Arlington
Street Church already possessed a record o f commitment to antiwar activity. The march
that ended with counterprotesters hurling eggs at antiwar activists on the steps of the
church in the spring of 1966 had firmly established Arlington Street as a home for such
activity. Alex Jack and Michael Ferber were not too surprised, then, when the Rev.
Mendelsohn agreed to host the draft resistance service and also volunteered to participate.
“The notion of the ‘bully pulpit,’ which we apply generally to the President of the United
States,” the minister said years later, “equally applies to a downtown religious institution.
It’s a great place for great thoughts and people who express great thoughts - or at least
who express unconventional thoughts.”37 Certainly, the notion o f returning Selective
Service documents in an elaborate church ceremony did seem unconventional.
The plan for October 16 now included a rally on the Common to be followed by a
march to the church where the draft card tum-in would take place. Organizers recruited
from among the usual suspects o f the antiwar movement to speak on the Common:
Boston University professor Howard Zinn, MIT professor Noam Chomsky, former SDS
national president Nick Egleson, and former Boston University News editor, Ray Mungo.

36 Stanley Moss, telephone conversation, 24 Feb 1998; Mendelsohn interview, 19
Dec 1997; G. Robert Hohler, interview with author, 11 Dec 1997.
37 Mendelsohn interview, 19 Dec 1997.
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In contrast, the service outlined for the church leaned, appropriately, toward the religious
com m unity: Alex Jack and Michael Ferber planned to speak in addition to Yale chaplain

William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Father Robert Cunnane o f the Boston Committee o f Religious
Concern for Peace, and George Hunston Williams, Hollis Professor o f Divinity at
Harvard Divinity School.
The inclusion of several older sympathizers in the plans for October 16 runs
counter to the popular belief that participants in the student movements o f the sixties
trusted no one over thirty. In fact, the Resistance, both locally and nationally, benefitted
from the invaluable support o f a deeply committed group of older men and women who
were not subject to the draft but wanted to register their disgust regarding the war in
Vietnam by supporting draft resisters. The most obvious example of this resulted in the
“Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority.” a statement published in the New York Review o f
Books and the New Republic in early October and signed by 320 people. Much like the
student We Won’t Go statements o f the previous spring, dozens o f such petitions
circulated among intellectuals and prominent antiwar activists in 1966 and 1967. Each
expressed the intention of the signatories to counsel and assist young men in resisting the
draft and were therefore presented to the public (and the government) as complicity
statements, sufficient evidence for indictment under Section 12 of the Selective Service
Act.
The Call to Resist became the most successful and widely known o f these
complicity statements, eventually attracting over 2,000 signatures over the next year.
The statement itself turned out to be rather lengthy, but its underlying theme underscored
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the “moral outrage” felt by a growing number of citizens regarding the war in Vietnam.
Its authors, Marcus Raskin and Arthur Waskow, both o f the Institute for Policy Studies, a
Washington think tank, and Robert Zevin, professor o f economics at Columbia
University, argued that the war was unconstitutional and violated the United Nations
Charter and the Geneva Accords o f 1954. They cited examples o f American war crimes:
The destruction o f rice, crops, and livestock; the burning and bulldozing of
entire villages consisting exclusively of civilian structures; the interning of
civilian non-combatants in concentration camps; the summary execution
o f civilians in captured villages who could not produce satisfactory
evidence o f their loyalties...; the slaughter of peasants who dared to stand
up in their fields and shake their fists at American helicopters...”
These deeds, they argued, were exactly like those determined to be crimes against
humanity by the Allies following World War II. As a result, they argued, “every free man
has a legal right and a moral duty to exert every effort to end this war, to avoid collusion
with it, and to encourage others to do the same.” They acknowledged the “excruciating
choices” facing young men in the military or threatened by the draft and praised the
courage of those resisting the “illegitimate authority” of those institutions. They pledged
to support those who resisted the war by raising money, organizing draft unions, and
supplying legal defense and bail. And in the most eloquent passage of the statement, they
justified their actions by saying,
We feel we cannot shrink from fulfilling our responsibilities to the youth
whom many o f us teach, to the country whose freedom we cherish, and to
the ancient traditions o f religion and philosophy which we strive to
preserve for this generation. We call upon all men o f good will to join us
in this confrontation with immoral authority...Now is the time to resist.
Despite the length and what poet Allen Ginsburg called its “humorless prose,” the list of
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signatures gathered over the summer included names that most Americans and, in
particular, readers o f the New York Review and New Republic recognized. Among the
signatories were poets Ginsburg, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Grace Paley, Robert Lowell, and
Denise Levertov; artists Raphael Soyer and Alexander Calder; columnists Nat Hentoff
and Jack Newfield; clergymen Philip Berrigan, James Bevel, Robert McAfee Brown,
William Sloane Coffin and Dick Mumma; famed pediatrician Benjamin Spock; and
scholars and writers - the largest group - Gar Alperovitz, Noam Chomsky, Paul
Goodman, Mitchell Goodman, Gabriel BColko, Christopher Lasch, Paul Lauter, Staughton
Lynd, Dwight MacDonald, Herbert Marcuse, Ashley Montagu, Conor Cruise O’Brien,
Linus Pauling, Hilary Putnam, Philip Roth, Edgar Snow, Susan Sontag and Howard
Zinn/8
During the summer, as organizers of the Call to Resist realized that enthusiasm
for their statement overlapped with growing interest in the national draft card tum-in
planned for October 16, they sought a way to bring the two together. Specifically, Mitch
Goodman, the writer and teacher, conjured up the idea of delivering the cards collected
across the country on October 16 to the Justice Department on October 20, the day before
the massive march on the Pentagon. On October 2, several o f the educators, clergy, and
literary figures who signed the Call gathered for a press conference in New York. They
discussed the statement and Goodman’s plans for returning the draft cards to the Justice
Department. The Rev. William Sloane Coffin promised that resisters would be granted

38 “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” New York Review o f Books, 12 Oct
1967, p. 7. See also “320 Vow to Help Draft Resisters,” NYT, 27 Sep 1967, p. 13; Ferber
& Lynd, pp. 122-123.
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sanctuary in churches and synagogues across the country and the group issued a statement
that again combined their sense o f history with their moral outrage: “We hope that by
using traditional American tactics o f nonviolent civil disobedience against conscription
and militarism, we will spur further antidraft activity and help to build the tidal wave of
revulsion that will lead to the withdrawal of our Army from Vietnam and an end to the
unconstitutional intrusion o f the Pentagon into policymaking.” On the same day, a Louis
Harris poll indicated that only 31 per cent of Americans supported President Johnson’s
handling of the war, while continued support for the war dropped from 72 per cent in July
to just 58 per cent.39
In Boston, the kind o f backing evident in the Call to Resist had been present in
Boston for some time. The ubiquitous professors Zinn and Chomsky could be heard at
almost all antiwar demonstrations, and an organization started by Harvard philosophy
professor Hilary Putnam, the Boston Area Faculty Group on Public Issues (BAFGOPI),
laid the ground work for continued interaction between the two generations o f activists.
Since 1965, BAFGOPI had been running antiwar ads in the New York Times and working
with students to organize teach-ins and other protests. By the time the New England
Resistance began to organize for October 16, a well established antiwar infrastructure the kind needed for large scale activism - made planning easier.40

39 “War Foes Are Promised Churches as Sanctuary,” NYT, 3 Oct 1967, p. 5;
“Harris Poll Shows a Decline to 58% in Support for War,” NYT, 3 Oct 1967, p. 5.
40 Hilary Putnam, interview with author, 18 Dec 1997.
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Obedience to a Higher Allegiance
October 16 dawned clear and bright. Although Boston attracts tourists by the
thousands in summertime, it is in September and October that the city can come closest to
attaining a certain barometric perfection. The humidity o f summer is replaced by dry air,
crisp mornings often give way to splendid warm afternoons. On the Monday o f the
planned demonstration, crystalline skies held out the promise o f a glorious day.
Organizers carried chairs and sound equipment from the basement of the
Arlington Street Church to the dewy, green rise o f Flagstaff Hill, the only remaining hill
on the Common. Flagstaff Hill and the parade grounds on its western slope (approaching
Charles Street) have played host to innumerable public events in Boston’s history, and in
some ways, it was the ideal choice for the location o f a rally aimed at encouraging
resistance to conscription. The city once stored its gun powder supply on top o f the hill,
and the Marquis de Lafayette, hero of the Revolution, ceremonially fired a cannon from
the hill during a visit in 1824. Most significant for the Resistance, Army officers used
Flagstaff Hill as their recruiting station during the Civil War - the war to preserve the
Union. Although the organizers who now set up chairs and a speaker system on that
hallowed ground did so in preparation for an event that those Union officers might have
found puzzling, the hill’s patriotic heritage dovetailed seamlessly with their own sense of
the Resistance’s adherence to - and desire to preserve - the best of American traditions.41
By 10:00 a.m., small groups o f young people began approaching Flagstaff Hill

41 On the history o f Flagstaff Hill, see John Harris, Historic Walks in O ld Boston
(Chester, Conn.: Globe Pequot Press, 1981), pp. xv, 9,11, 17.
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from all directions. When speeches began at 11:00, over 5,000 people stood or sat on the
now dry grass, listening. Buses filled with students from Dartmouth, Yale, Brown, the
University of Rhode Island, the University o f Massachusetts, and nearly every Boston
area college circled the Common looking for places to park. Uniformed officers stood by
with police dogs to cope with any potential violence. On the hill, in the middle of a group
o f seated young people, a middle aged woman, blonde, wearing sunglasses, held a sign
that read “LBJ KILLED MY SON.” Dozens o f people held signs. Some of the slogans
included, “Suppose They Gave a War and Nobody Came?”; “The Resistance: Don’t
Dodge the Draft, Oppose It”; “Wars Will End When Men Refuse to Fight”; “The
Resistance Shall Not End”; “UMB [UMass-Boston] Veterans Against the War”; “They
Are Our Brothers Whom We Kill”; “No Draft - Don’t Enlist - Refuse to Kill”. Counter
demonstrators came armed with placards, too. One said “Tough Enough to Criticize, Too
Weak to Defend - USMC,” another, “Draft the Draft Dodgers - Yes LBJ.” Two others,
held by self-described Polish Freedom Fighter, Josef Mlot-Mroz, said “Lets Fight
Communism, Red Dupes, Vietniks, Peaceniks, and Clergy,” and “Fight Communism and
Zionist Stooges, Peaceniks, Vietniks, and Anarchists.” Police eventually took Mlot-Mroz
into “protective custody,” when he began disrupting the speeches.42
Several speakers took turns at the microphone in the shadow o f the Soldiers’

42 Police dogs appeared in a photograph that ran with “Vietnam War Called
‘Immoral,’” Boston Record American, 17 Oct 1967, p. 3; Slogans noted in photographs
appearing in “Resist the Draft,” Avatar, No. 11, p. 5; “Resistance: Boston Style,” Avatar,
No. 11, p. 4; “Youths Bum Draft Cards on Boston Church Altar,” Boston Globe (Evening
Edition), 16 Oct 1967, pp. 1-2; and from photographs taken by Tom Rothschild (contact
sheets in author’s possession).
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Monument. Homer Jack chaired the rally and introduced each speaker. Everyone who
addressed the crowd emphasized morality, conscience, and the responsibilities o f citizens.
The Rev. Harold Fray, of the Eliot Church in Newton and chair of the Committee o f
Religious Concern for Peace stood first before the vast crowd in his clerical robe. “What
does it profit a nation,” he asked rhetorically, “to impose its military might upon peoples
o f the world, while in so doing it loses its soul?” He called it a dark period in the nation’s
history, but added, “the light will shine again when the moral conscience o f America will
not submit to national policies that violate honor, decency, human compassion and those
qualities o f life which alone make a nation strong.” Fray praised the “great courage” o f
the men who would resist the draft on this day, but told them that, henceforth, they would
have to “bear the penalty o f adverse public opinion and the long arm of government
suppression.” Better to endure those penalties, he concluded, “than to allow your
consciences to atrophy because you were afraid to give expression to them.” Ray Mungo,
former editor of the BU News, and director of Liberation News Service, took up the issue
o f draft resistance, telling the crowd that the prospect of going to jail should not be
feared; indeed, he saw it as “an honorable alternative to serving in Vietnam.”43
Nick Egleson was not as sanguine about the prospects of a protest rooted in
“individual conduct.” Egleson possessed extensive Movement credentials. He had been
national president of SDS, and in the fall o f 1967 he assumed a leadership position in the
Boston Draft Resistance Group. The thrust o f what he said to the crowd sounded much

43 “67 Bum Draft Cards in Boston,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, pp. 1, 12; Harold
Fray, Mimeographed copy of statement on Boston Common, 16 Oct 1967, papers o f
James Hunt.
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like the SDS line - only more persuasive. First, he lamented the antiwar movement’s lack
o f a “base of power” and what he saw as the resulting shift toward “moral acts” of
protest. Specifically, he warned of the temptation to “measure actions in the movement
by a code of individual conduct,” to establish certain moral acts as minimum standards
for appropriate dissent:
Some refuse to enter the army because no moral man could engage in
combat in Vietnam; some dissociate themselves from the Selective Service
System because association with the machinery of slaughter is
unconscionable; others assume the jeopardy o f draft refusal even if they
are not subject to the draft because no moral man can let others suffer
injustice alone.
He argued that “such an individual code easily becomes the primary or only standard for
political conduct” and pointed to the nation’s “individualist ethic,” the “religious frame of
reference” that so many protesters had adopted, and the “absence of widespread political
experience” as factors that pushed the movement toward an individual code and closed
o ff the possibility o f other political standards.
Ultimately, Egleson acknowledged that that standard o f individual conduct might
be useful in organizing people on campuses - those not immediately threatened by the
draft - but noted that “all the while the men o f Charlestown and South Boston and
Riverside, of Roxbury and Dorchester and o f the working-class parts of cities all over the
country are threatened by the draft and are more gently coerced by the security of
enlistment.” To address this issue he urged a prescription more consistent with the
missions of BDRG and SDS:
Our solution must be to begin to organize those most threatened by
the US armed forces. How many people gave out information about the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174
October 16 rally in Boston in poor and working-class neighborhoods?
Who put up posters speaking the language of those communities? Who
tried to counter, thereby, the image the press promotes o f us as hippies,
cowards, and peace finks? Who suggested in those places that we - not the
US Army - speak to people’s immediate and long-range interests?
BDRG, o f course, had already been working in this direction for several months through
the Early Morning Shows and their counseling efforts. Although some crossover in
membership existed between BDRG and the New England Resistance, and relations were
generally cordial, the Resistance did not plan to duplicate BDRG’s work.44
For the assembled crowd, however, Egleson’s speech caused a bit of a startle.
Suddenly, they had to come to terms with one o f the clay’s main speakers choosing not to
provide the kind o f ringing endorsement o f draft resistance offered by the others. In fact,
Egleson implied that it might amount to the kind of “useless martyrdom” that BDRG had
warned o f in its recent newsletter. Although he did not address one of the Resistance’s
central strategies - that widespread resistance might actually create the base o f power for
which he longed (through the imprisonment o f thousands of resisters and the resulting
outrage o f their parents) - his arguments gave some potential resisters reason to pause and
reassess their plans for the day. David Clennon, a third year graduate student at the Yale
School of Drama, for instance, recalled that Egleson’s speech caused him to completely
rethink his reason for being there. “When I heard Nick Egleson make his speech, I really
began to have some serious doubts about what I was doing. Here was a guy who...had a
lot o f political savvy, much more than I had [and he disagreed with the draft resistance
strategy].” Clennon, who “came at it mostly from a kind o f politically naive point of

44 Ferber & Lynd, pp. 112-113.
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view [and] a very strong moral point of view” found himself “easily confused and easily
swayed” by such arguments.45'
Just in time for Clennon and others, though, Boston University professor and
World War II veteran Howard Zinn strode to the microphone. Zinn, like Noam
Chomsky, was by then a well known critic o f the war. He frequently participated in
antiwar teach-ins on area campuses, and his recently-published book, Vietnam: the Logic
o f Withdrawal, attracted a wide readership. Zinn did not respond directly to Egleson’s
critique o f draft resistance as creating an uncomfortable standard of individual conduct by
which all antiwar activity might be judged, however. Instead, the older man raised issues
o f a government’s responsibilities to its citizens and the citizen’s loyalty to his
government (he was, after all, a professor o f Government at BU). “Ever since
governments were first formed and tyranny, the natural companion of government,
began,” he observed, “people have felt the need to gather in the forest or the mountains or
in underground cellars, or, as here, under an open sky, to declare the rights o f conscience
against the inhumanity of government.” The tyranny of the present administration had
already killed 13,000 Americans, men who “died in Vietnam because they were sent there
under the orders of politicians and generals who sacrificed them on behalf o f their own
ambitions,” he said. Zinn criticized those men in positions of power for appointing
themselves “guardians of every spot on the earth against Communism.” He derided them
for trying to save people everywhere from Communism “whether the people want to be
saved or not, and even if they have to kill them all to save them,” and assailed President

45 David Clennon, interview with author, 12 Jim 1997.
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Johnson for breaking his pledge to those who supported him in the 1964 election on a
peace platform. A government guiltyof such betrayals and abuse o f power, Zinn
reasoned, no longer deserved the allegiance o f its citizens. “I don’t believe we owe
loyalty to a government that lies to us,” he said. “I do believe we owe loyalty to our
fellow Americans who are in danger of being killed by the incompetence of this
government.”
Rather than emphasize the individual principled acts o f defiance decried by Nick
Egleson, therefore, Zinn argued for holding the government to a reasonable moral
standard. He said he felt ashamed, “deeply ashamed” to call himself an American.
When I read, and in the most conservative newspapers, that the U.S. Air
Force has bombed again and again the residential areas of North
Vietnamese cities, that it has bombed, again and again - too often to be an
accident - villages that are devoid o f military significance - that it has
bombed a hospital for lepers in North Vietnam 13 times...I am ashamed,
and I want to disassociate myself from these acts. That is not my idea o f
what America should stand for.
In the end, although individual morality surely intertwined with responsibilities of
citizenship, for Zinn the latter provided the most compelling reason for draft resistance.
“We owe it to our conscience, to the people of this country, to the principles of American
democracy,” he concluded, “to declare our independence of this war, to resist it in every
way we can, until it comes to an end, until there is peace in Vietnam.”46
As the last speaker at the demonstration, he called on those who planned to resist
to assemble in one area of the hill from which they would be directed to take their places

46 “Youths Bum Draft Cards on Boston Altar,” Boston Globe Evening Edition, 16
Oct 1967, pp. 1-2; “67 Bum Draft Cards in Boston,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, pp. 1,
12.
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in the column o f marchers that would walk to the Arlington Street Church. David
Clennon, his doubts assuaged, joined the line. Zinn “spoke so eloquently about the
horrors o f the war,” he remembered, •‘that I was convinced all over again that turning in
my draft card was the right thing to do.” He felt so committed, he began to weep. “I was
crying with relief I think...that I was about to do the right thing as dangerous and
controversial as it seemed to be...I was just overcome emotionally but I really felt solid
then in my decision about what I was doing.”47
Most marched purposefully, quietly. Others were more expressive and playful.
Marshals organized the marchers into distinct groups. The clergy led, followed by
Veterans for Peace (in uniform), then the resisters. This order gave the march a wellplanned look of respectability. Moreover, the resisters themselves did not look like
“hippies, cowards, and peace finks.” The hair on some men touched their ears and
collars, but most were fairly clean cut. A few beards could be seen, but the vast majority
had bare faces. Many wore coats and ties, perhaps because they were going to church, or
because they wanted to somehow demonstrate the gravity of the act they were about to
undertake. The second Resistance newsletter told its readers to “smile as you march, but
think defiance.” They marched across the Common to Tremont Street, down Tremont to
Boylston Street, and down Boylston to the church at the southwest comer of the Public
Gardens. A woman crossing Tremont Street saw the marchers and, obviously disgusted,
turned to a police officer and said: “Why don’t you send them all back to Cambridge?”
“Oh, they’re from all over,” he answered. As the marchers approached their destination,

47 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997.
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the carillon in the tower o f the church played “We Shall Overcome.”48
The church filled quickly, leaving nearly 3,000 others outside waiting to hear the
service over loudspeakers. The actor Peter Ustinov, in town for a performance, mingled
with the crowd. (When reporters asked him if he was with the Resistance, he responded:
“No, because I am British. But if I were an American I would be part of the group/’)49
Like some o f the oldest churches in New England, the pews at Arlington Street are
separated into boxes that the church’s earliest parishioners (or “Proprietors”) could
purchase. About 1,000 people squeezed into these boxes and the balconies above, and sat
on the lumpy cushions filled with horsehair. Reporters took notes, flash bulbs flashed,
and an NBC News photographer standing in the balcony with correspondent Sander van
Ocur trained his camera on the sanctuary below. The atmosphere was hushed, respectful
- and electric.
The printed programs called it “A Service o f Conscience and Acceptance,” and all
of the speakers emphasized moral and religious justifications for civil disobedience.
After Jack Mendelsohn gave the invocation, the congregation sang Once to Every Man
and Nation:
Once to every man and nation
Comes the moment to decide
In the strife o f truth with falsehood,
For the good or evil side;

48 “Youths Bum Draft Cards on Boston Altar,” Boston Globe Evening Edition, 16
Oct 1967, p. 2; “October 161,” second newsletter o f the New England Resistance, undated
(c. 1 Oct 1967), MKFP; Skip Ascheim, “Resistance: Boston Style,” Avatar, No. 11, p. 4.
49 “4000 Defy Draft in Common Rally,” Boston Record American, 17 Oct 1967, p.
3.
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Some great cause. God's new Messiah,
Off ring each the bloom or blight,
And the choice goes by forever
Twixt that darkness and that light.
A responsive reading (“The Young Dead Soldiers”) followed and, after that, Alex Jack
read a Vietnamese prayer.
The real power o f the service, however, derived from the four addresses - or
sermons - given. Like the speeches on the Common, the statements given in the church
are worth considering in detail because o f their incomplete coverage in the press. Two
graduate students spoke first. Jim Harney, a Catholic studying for the priesthood at St.
John’s Seminary in nearby Brighton, told the congregation that he had spent the last few
weeks reading about German “men of faith” who stood up to the Third Reich and paid for
it with their lives. “Their witness,” he said, “has affected my life enormously.” He
quoted Father Alfred Delp, a German priest who did not survive the concentration camps:
The most pious prayer can become a blasphemy if he who offers it
tolerates or helps to further conditions which are fatal to mankind, which
render him unacceptable to God. or weaken his spiritual, moral or
religious sense.
Hamey then cited the German peasant, Franz Jagerstatter, who also died “in a solitary
protest”:
For what purpose did God endow all men with reason, and free will, if, in
spite of this, we are obliged to render blind obedience, or if, as so many
also say, the individual is not qualified to judge whether this war started by
Germany is just or unjust? What purpose is served by the ability to
distinguish between good and evil?
Forced by his country’s actions in Vietnam and by the burden o f a conscience that would
not allow him to study quietly for the priesthood while his ministerial deferment protected
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him from the d raft the 27 year old seminarian found inspiration in the example set by
these little known German heroes. He explained to the crowd:
For me, these words from the past have great meaning: my faith is
put on the line, and above all, my life is directed to the cross-roads o f the
living. They are hard words to live; for, they point to the very crucibles of
life and death. Now I must take a stand on behalf of the living.
Conscience must prevail. Man’s transcendent dignity brings him not only
inalienable rights but also an awesome responsibility. I must not stand by,
while the very survival o f the Vietnamese people is in jeopardy...
I come here today, a Catholic seminarian, to be obedient to my
God, to conscience, and to the pleas o f the Vietnamese people...! take my
stand in the Spirit of the Franz Jagerstatters, the Father Delps, the
[Dietrich] Bonhoeffers, who opted for life rather than for death...I join my
voice to the 2,500 ministers, priests and rabbis who urged President
Johnson: “In the Name of God, Stop It!” and further than this, on this
October the 16th, I resist.50
Hamey later went on to greater notoriety as a member, with Bob Cunnane, o f the
Milwaukee 14, a group of Catholic pacifists who, following the examples o f Daniel and
Philip Berrigan, raided a Milwaukee draft board and destroyed thousands of files. As a
seminarian about to break the law on October 16, however, he risked the priesthood for
which he had been preparing himself for so long.
Michael Ferber followed Hamey to the pulpit. The lifelong Unitarian felt
comfortable in such situations. He had delivered sermons at his home church in Buffalo,
and as one o f the main speakers for the New England Resistance (for whom he gave talks
or “raps” almost daily), his “low key Harvard style” seemed ideally suited for this
moment. In what Howard Zinn later called an “extraordinary, passionate, personal

50 Jim Hamey, address delivered at Arlington Street Church, 16 Oct 1967,
mimeographed copy circulated by New England Resistance, MKFP.
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statement,”51 the 23 year old graduate student began:
We are gathered in this church today in order to do something very
simple: to say No. We have come from many different places and
backgrounds and we have many different ideas about ourselves and the
world, but we have come here to show that we are united to do one thing:
to say No. Each o f our acts o f returning our draft cards is our personal No;
when we put them in a single container or set fire to them from a single
candle we express the simple basis of our unity.
But what I wish to speak about now is what goes beyond our
saying No, for no matter how loudly we all say it, no matter what
ceremony we perform around our saying it, we will not become a
community among ourselves nor effective agents for changing our country
if a negative is all we share. Albert Camus said that the rebel, who says
No, is also one who says Yes, and that when he draws a line beyond which
he will refuse to cooperate, he is affirming the values on the other side o f
that line. For us who come here today, what is that we affirm, what is it to
which we can say Yes?
Before answering that question, Ferber told the congregation that they must acknowledge
the differences that existed within the inchoate Resistance community. For one, many of
those assembled might feel a sense o f hypocrisy for participating in the religious
trappings of the day’s ceremonies, because they themselves were not churchgoers. In
response, he told of the “great tradition within the church and synagogue which has
always struggled against the conservative worldly forces that have always been in
control.” In modem times, he said, that radical tradition “has tried to recall us to the best
ways o f living our lives: the way o f love and compassion, the way o f justice and respect,
the way o f facing other people as human beings and not as abstract representatives of
something alien and evil.” He continued with an example:
As a part of this service we will break bread together. We do this,

51 Howard Zinn, You C an’t Be Neutral On a M oving Train: A Personal History o f
Our Times, (Boston: Beacon, 1994), p. 116.
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however, not because some churches happen to take Communion; we do
this for one o f the root reasons for Communion itself: that men around the
world and for all time have found it good to eat together when they are
sharing in something important
The radical tradition is still alive: it is present here in this church.
Those o f us who disregard organized religion, I think, are making a
mistake if they also disregard this tradition and its presence today. This
tradition is something to which we can say Yes.
Ferber then warned the assembly not to “confuse the ceremony and symbolism” of
the service with the “reality” that they were only a few hundred people “with very little
power.” He told them that American policy would not change overnight, that, indeed, the
“world will be in pretty much the same mess it is in today” and because they, as a
community, would have to “dig in for the long haul,” October 16 represented not the End,
but the Beginning. To change the country, he said, would mean “struggles and anguish
day in and day out for years...it will mean people dedicating their lives and possibly
losing them for a cause we can only partly define and whose outcome we can only guess
at.”
As he moved toward his conclusion, in the most important part of the sermon,
Ferber engaged the critique of “moral acts” as protest made by his old friend and former
roommate at Swarthmore, Nick Egleson:
Earlier today, Nick Egleson spoke out against the kind of resistance
whose primary motivation is moralistic and personal rather than political.
He is saying that we must make ourselves relevant to the social and
political condition of the world and must not just take a moral posture for
our own soul’s sake, even though that too is a risk.
To some extent this argument depends on terminology rather than
fact. Today we have heard our situation described in religious terms,
moral terms, political terms, legal terms, and psychological terms...What is
happening today should make it clear that these different modes of speech
all overlap one another and they often all say the same essential things.
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Albert Camus, who struggled in a more serious Resistance than ours,
believed that politics is an extension o f morality, that the truly moral man
is engaged in politics as a natural outcome of his beliefs.
To return to Nick’s concern, the real difference is not between the
moral man and the political man, but between the man whose moral
thinking leads him to political action and the man whose moral thinking
leads him no farther than to his own “sinlessness.” It is the difference
between the man who is willing to go dirty himself in the outside world
and the man who wishes to stay “clean” and “pure.”
Ferber, therefore, acknowledged the potential damage that moral actions could have on
the antiwar movement. This kind o f “sinlessness” and “purity,” he said, is “arrogant
pride,” and “we must say No to it.” “The martyr who offers himself meekly as a lamb to
the altar is a fool,” he warned. “We cannot honor him...unless he has helped the rest of
us.” The morally pure act o f draft resistance would be useful in ending the war only if it
produced a tangible political effect beyond cleansing the souls of those who carried it out.
“So what then are we to do?” Ferber asked.
We must look at ourselves once more. We all have an impulse to
purification and martyrdom and we should not be ashamed o f it. But let us
be certain that we have thought through the consequences o f our action in
the outside world, and that these consequences are what we want to bring
about. Let us make sure we are ready to work hard and long with each
other in the months to come, working to make it difficult and politically
dangerous for the government to prosecute us, working to help anyone and
everyone find ways to avoid the draft, to help disrupt the workings of the
draft and the armed forces until the war is over. Let us make sure we can
form a community. Let us make sure we can let others depend on us.
If we can say Yes to these things, and to the religious tradition that
stands with us today, and to the fact that today marks not the End but a
Beginning, and to the long hard dirty job ahead o f us - if we can say Yes to
all this, then let us come forward together and say No to the United States
Government.
Then let our Yes be the loudest No our government ever heard.S2

52 Michael Ferber, “A Time to Say No,” in Jessica Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock
(New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 262-265. Ferber’s sermon also appeared in several
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Michael Ferber’s emphasis o f community formation as the key to supporting the
moral purpose o f the Resistance into the political arena highlighted an issue about which
organizers truly worried. Up until the end o f the ceremony, planners thought that
everyone who resisted might well be rounded up and arrested on the spot When that did
not happen, they sought to maintain the solidarity felt in the church among the now
scattered brethren o f the Resistance. It would not be easy. They would soon leam that
the government would not go after them as a community, but individually. Building a
community under such circumstances could be difficult, but in the church, on that day,
the sense o f fellowship engendered by Ferber’s speech and the simple feeling o f being
surrounded by others who were equally passionate about ending the war inflated their
hopes.
For the keynote address o f the service, Alex Jack had recruited the Rev. William
Sloane Coffin, himself a veteran of the Second World War, a former CIA operative, and
now chaplain at Yale University and a tireless antiwar protestor. He also had a playful
sense of humor. When he arrived that morning and encountered Jack Mendelsohn, he
told him that he wished the service were taking place in a Presbyterian church, but said, “I
have to hand it to you Unitarians: you really know how to combine a thin theology with a
thick ethic.”53

religious journals at the time, such as Respond, the magazine of the Unitarian
Universalist’s Laymen’s League; portions of it have more recently been reprinted in
Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, Takin ’ It To the Streets: A Sixties Reader (New
York: Oxford, 1995) pp. 245-248.
53 William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Once to Every M an (New York: Atheneum, 1978),
p. 242. Note: this is Coffin’s version o f the story. Jack Mendelsohn remembers it
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For nearly two years, Coffin had been one of the leading lights o f Clergy and
Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV), and gained considerable notoriety as one
o f its most articulate spokesmen.54 That quality was in evidence on October 16. He
began by quoting Socrates and St. Peter, both o f whom chose to follow their consciences
before obeying others. Their words, Coffin said,
tell us that because there is a higher and hopefully future order of things,
men at times will feel constrained to disobey the law out o f a sense of
obedience to a higher allegiance. To hundreds o f history’s most revered
heroes, not to serve the state has appeared the best way to love one’s
neighbor. To Socrates, St. Peter, Milton, Bunyon, Gandhi, Nehru, it was
clear that sometimes bad subjects make good neighbors.
Coffin then answered the charges of critics who argued that civil disobedience is the first
step on the road to anarchy. The “heroes” he listed did not try to “destroy the legal
order,” Coffin said. In fact, “by accepting the legal punishment, they actually upheld it.”
Furthermore, like those assembled before him, these men broke the law as “a last, not as a
first resort”and once they did. "they were determined to bend their every effort to the end
that the law reflect and not reject their best understanding o f justice and mercy.”
The central force driving the incipient Resistance, Coffin argued, was the issue of
conscience: “Let us be blunt. To us the war in Vietnam is a crime. And if we are correct,
if the war is a crime, then is it criminal to refuse to have anything to do with it? Is it we

slightly differently. As Coffin entered the church with his robe over his arm, he shook
Mendelsohn’s hand and shaking his head, said, “You Unitarians...So thin in your
theology, so thick in your social ethics!” This is how Mendelsohn recounted it at the
Arlington Street Church thirty year reunion service on 18 Oct 1997.
54 In addition to Coffin’s memoir, see Mitchell K. Hall, Because o f Their Faith:
CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186
who are demoralizing our boys in Vietnam, or the Administration which is asking them to
do immoral things?” He then called on churches and synagogues to provide sanctuary for
draft resisters. He quoted from the 23rd Psalm (“Thou spreadest a table before me in the
presence of mine enemies”) and explained that the passage referred to “an ancient desert
law which provided that if a man hunted by his enemies sought refuge with another man
who offered him hospitality, then the enemies o f the man had to remain outside the rim o f
the campfire light for two nights and the day intervening.” In the Middle Ages, Coffin
explained, this practice expanded until every church in Europe was considered a
sanctuary even for common criminals. Coffin acknowledged that if the American
government decided that “the arm of the law was long enough to reach inside a church,”
the church would be unable to prevent an arrest. “What else can a church do?” he asked.
“Are we to raise conscientious men and then not stand by them in their hour of
conscience?” He concluded by noting that the resisters assembled that day were taking
action within two weeks o f the 450th anniversary o f the Reformation. He urged them on
in their new reformation, their reformation o f conscience and said: “You stand now as
Luther stood in his time. May you be inspired to speak, and we to hear, the words he
once spoke in conscience and in all simplicity: ‘Here I stand, I can do no other. God help
me.’”55
The Rev. George H. Williams, also recruited by his nephew, Alex Jack, spoke last
and gave the call for draft cards, the “Call to Acceptance.” The appearance of this very

55 William Sloane Coffin, Jr., “Church and Synagogue: Sanctuary of Conscience,”
in Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 266-269.
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distinguished looking man, the Hollis Professor o f Divinity at Harvard Divinity School,
and one of the nation’s leading scholars in religious history, shocked many o f the faculty
and students at Harvard. Few would have expected him to align himself so publicly - and
so forcefully - with the leading edge o f the antiwar movement. Alex Jack remembers that
“the general feeling about my uncle was that he was trapped in the 12th century.-.people
would assume he was conservative.” Williams himself stated on October 16 that he was
one o f the more “conservative” members of the clergy to participate. On this day, though,
he displayed a moral outrage that belied that image.56
Williams began by explaining that in a just war scenario, he would view the
exemption o f clergy and conscientious objectors favorably, as an act representative of “a
high degree o f moral sensibility” on the part of the society in question. That said, he did
not believe the war in Vietnam to be a just war. Therefore, he agreed to stand with the
resisters in their protest. He told the congregation that like “countless others,” he had
sought to register his opposition to the war in Vietnam through all the “appropriate
channels of democratic, academic, and religious activity.” When that failed, however,
Williams concluded that the Administration would “only take notice o f a resolute show of
moral force.” Therefore, he said,
I am driven to show my solidarity with fellow seminarians in an act
o f civil disobedience out o f moral indignation at the miscarriage o f
American ideals o f international behavior. What we are doing in Vietnam
is not appropriate for a great society with a long religious heritage...

56 Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997; “280 New Englanders Turn in Draft Cards,”
Harvard Crimson, 17 Oct 1967, p. 1. Note: Alex Jack’s comment on George H.
Williams might more appropriately have referred to the 16th century as Williams is most
noted for his scholarly work on the Radical Reformation.
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Our military action is in my judgement immoral whether one
argues as a pacifist or as a proponent of the just and necessary war...A
decent respect for the opinions o f mankind requires ever more o f us in this
nation under God - a democracy o f the people, by the people, for the
people - to declare the reasons for our separation from the ill-conceived
and now ruthless policy in Vietnam, lest our form and conduct o f
government perish as an ideal among the nations o f the earth.
...we interpret the action o f these seminarians as moral courage;
and we trust that the democratic society of which we are a part will look
upon this solemn action of moral dissociation as redemptive for our
society, that the Church herself in all lands and in times to come will count
these young men as true servants o f the peaceable kingdom, and that Jesus
Christ and the Sovereign o f the universe will acknowledge them as His
true sons and subjects...
Without intending to detract from the heroism o f our men fighting
in Vietnam as they understand their duty and without minimizing the
anguish o f all those at war and at home who, feeling as do we that this war
is somehow wrong, nevertheless, consider it also their solemn civic duty to
abide by our national policy until it is officially modified - 1, for my part,
support these seminarians who, relinquishing their clerical immunity, in an
orderly and solemn manner disavow this war...An orderly nation has the
right to make grave demands upon its citizens in time o f conflict or
emergency. But a citizen also has the ultimate right to determine what
constitutes licit demand upon him and his life, in other words what
constitutes a just war.57
As he neared the end of his address, perhaps anticipating that in addition to the
collection of draft cards, some men might bum their cards, he argued against such an act.
“I deplore the burning o f draft cards,” he said.
The more solemn and responsible act is to withdraw from the social
covenant on this specific issue o f conscience against a barbaric,
unnecessary war being waged between pitifully unmatched opponents in
quite disparate stages of national and social evolution. The manner of
dissociation from this unjust war should be solemn and not impetuous,

57 George H. Williams, “Vietnam: October 11 and October 16, 1967,”
mimeographed copy o f address circulated by New England Resistance, MKFP.
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anguished but not disorderly, respectful but resolute.58
He then asked the resisters-to come forward and stepped down from the pulpit to the edge
o f the chancel where the Reverends Mendelsohn and Coffin, Father Cunnane, and
Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam (who had been recruited to accept cards from the
nonreligious resisters) joined him. Each held an offering plate for the collection of draft
cards.
All eyes (and cameras) turned toward the forward pews. Flashes popped as the
first man rose, jiggled the stubborn latch on the old door at the end o f the pew, and
stepped out into the aisle. As he walked forward, several other men stood and began
moving toward the aisle and their moment o f truth. Although the promotional leaflets
predicted that 500 men would turn in their draft cards and join the Resistance in Boston,
organizers had commitments from only about 20 to 25 men. They were hopeful for
maybe 50. It soon became apparent that many, many more would resist on this day. The

58 Williams, “Vietnam: October 11 and October 16, 1967;” Note: I believe this
portion of Williams’s address (which comes from the widely distributed mimeographed
copy o f it that was circulated by the New England Resistance in the weeks following
October 16) is accurate. The quote, “I deplore the burning o f draft cards,” appeared in
several news reports: “67 Bum Draft Cards in Boston,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, p.
12; and “280 New Englanders Turn in Draft Cards,” Harvard Crimson, 17 Oct 1967, p. 1.
Having said that, the Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., who spoke just before Williams
during this ceremony, recalls Williams saying something that actually led to the burning
o f more draft cards: “Suddenly, I heard his [Williams’s] voice rise. I saw an excited
finger shaking in the direction o f the single candle on the table below. ‘There,’ he
shouted in words I recall as follows, ‘there is Charming’s own candlestick, the one he
used night after night to illumine the progress o f his writing. I am certain that were he
also here for this occasion, its flame, illuminating as it does the faces o f you resisters,
would seem to him almost pentecostal. For you, gentlemen, are the very pillar of fire this
nation needs to lead it our o f the darkness now covering its people.’” To date, I have been
unable to corroborate this recollection o f the Williams address.
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first trickle o f men quickly became a steady stream that continued to swell for over
twenty minutes. They came not just from the pews reserved for resisters but from all
comers o f the church. At some point, someone pushed open the massive church doors to
let resisters in from outside. One woman, the Reverend Nan Stone, joined the long line
as it moved slowly, quietly. When she reached the altar, she burned Steve Pallet’s card in
the flame o f a candle held by one o f William Ellery Channing’s own candlesticks. As
they turned over or burned their cards, some of the men smiled. Others wept softly. No
one spoke above a whisper. The loudest sounds came from the TV cameras whirring
away in the balcony. It seemed like it would never end. There were brief exchanges of
encouragement between the resisters and their older accomplices holding the plates.
When a student he recognized from the law school at Yale handed him his card, though,
Coffin tried to give it back. “Don’t be a fool,” he said. “With this on your record you
would destroy a law career.” The resister replied, calmly, “I don't care. I know I’m not
going to become a lawyer.” Then he broke the law /9
When the last man placed his card on top o f the pile sprouting from one of the
collection plates, elated Resistance organizers hugged one another. “The most irreligious
o f us,” Bill Dowling later said, “perhaps, are ready now to believe in miracles.” After the
service ended, they counted 214 cards tumed-in with another 67 burned at Channing’s
flame. NBC News correspondent Sander van Ocur, tears in his eyes, descended from the
balcony to speak to his friend, Bill Coffin. “What a country this would be,” he said, “if

59 Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, p. 134; Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997;
Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997; Coffin, Once to Every Man, p. 243; “The Draft Resisters:
In Search o f a New Morality,” Yale Alumni Magazine, Dec 1967, p. 47.
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something like this were now to take place in every church.”60
Indeed, it had been-a surprisingly moving day for many of those in attendance, and
a gratifying culmination to many long hours o f planning by New England Resistance
organizers. As the strategy o f noncompliance came under attack by other antiwar and
New Left groups in preceding weeks, few could have predicted the success o f October 16.
The call for draft resistance resulted in the mobilization o f the largest antiwar rally the
city had yet seen, and a much greater number of returned draft cards than anyone
anticipated. More important, the day signaled the successful transformation of the CNVA
pacifists’ individual defiant acts into a large-scale, mass protest that organizers believed
would have lasting political effect. Moreover, as Sander van Occur’s reaction indicated,
the moral clarity o f the participants came through in a serious, respectful, and thoughtful
confrontation with the government. In the days and weeks that followed, the media and
the public often missed that point, but leaders o f this new driving force in the antiwar
movement were heartened by the extensive coverage they did receive. Draft resistance, it
seemed, could not now be ignored.

60 Newsletter, New England Resistance, 25 Oct 1967, MKFP; Coffin, Once to
Every Man, p. 244.
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CHAPTER rv

FILTERED RESISTANCE: RESISTERS’ IMAGE AND REALITY

Naturally, the common people don’t want war, neither in Russia, nor in
England, nor for that matter Germany. That is understood. But after all. it
is the leaders o f the country who determine the policy, and it is always a
simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a
fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or
no voice, the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the
leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being
attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack o f patriotism and exposing
the country to danger. It works the same in every country.
Herman Goering, testifying at Nurmeberg1
New England Resistance planners attempted to shape public opinion regarding
their protest almost as soon as the service at Arlington Street ended. They issued a press
release that linked the day’s events to some of the city’s most celebrated historical
precedents and emphasized the patriotic underpinnings o f the rally and the service. 'T he
site of the Boston Tea Party, Garrison and Parker’s Abolitionist crusade against slavery,
and Thoreau’s refusal to support the Mexican War,” they wrote, ‘‘the Hub of the Universe
today witnessed the launching o f a nationwide campaign of civil disobedience against the
Selective Service System and the war in Vietnam.” In a brief article for Avatar, one of
Boston’s “underground” papers, Bill Hunt wrote that the resisters who were at the
Arlington Street Church might have said “no” to the laws o f the country, but
simultaneously, they said “yes, everlastingly yes, to the spirit o f America.” Indicative of

1In the spring o f 1968, the New England Resistance used this quote liberally in its
newspaper, The Resistance, and in other literature.
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his training as a graduate student in history, he invoked the names o f American heroes in
describing the way he felt on October 16:
I sat in the Arlington Street Chinch and I could not tell if we were the
names and the bodies we are known by now or if we were Paine and
Franklin and Jefferson or Emerson, Lincoln, and Thoreau. We were all of
them, all of them on our way to becoming more of them, for the
knowledge that was theirs is yet for us to learn, but we are learning, the
pure vision that was theirs we must yet see, but we are seeing, and the
strength to manifest that vision that was theirs, must be ours also - and yet
we do not have it, but we will.
For Hunt, one o f the most appealing sides to the Resistance grew from the way in which
it could so easily be associated with "an indigenous, patriotic, American tradition of
protest and dissent.”2
In the end, few news outlets bought this line. The Resistance took some pleasure
in seeing NBC Nightly News anchor, John Chancellor, turn to the camera after viewing
the van Ocur report from Boston and say, “If men like this are beginning to say things
like this, I guess we had all better start paying attention.” But such comments from the
media came few and far between.3
The Boston press, for instance, took a completely different approach, emphasizing
the burning - not tuming-in - o f draft cards. The headline on the front page o f the Boston
Globe's October 16 evening edition said, “Youths Bum Draft Cards on Boston Church
Altar.” The next morning, surrounded by no less than three photographs o f flaming draft
cards, the Globe headline read: “67 Bum Draft Cards in Boston.” The sub-headline, in

2 Bill Hunt, “Resist the Draft,” Avatar, #11, p. 5; Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
3 Coffin, Once to Every Man, p. 244.
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much smaller type. said. “214 Turn in Cards. 5000 at Rally.” The Boston Herald
Traveler and the Boston Record American also ran images o f cards being burned and
similar headlines. The Record American echoed the Globe, saying “67 Bum Draft Cards
at Hub Peace Rally.” while the Herald's headline read: “291 [sic] Youths Bum, Turn in
Draft Cards.”
In addition, reporters from each newspaper emphasized the speeches of Howard
Zinn, William Sloane Coffin, and, to a lesser degree, George Williams. Not even the
briefest snippets from the statements o f Jim Hamey, Michael Ferber, or Nick Egleson
appeared in any o f the three papers. In fact, the articles did not mention the three men at
all. Each newspaper instead provided details on the physical appearance of the resisters.
Although the Herald Traveler said they looked more “mod” than “typical American,”
“scholarly rather than athletic,” and that some were even “neatly attired in suit and tie or
in casual college wear,” the Record American (which boasted the “largest daily
circulation in New England”) focused their readers’ attention on a few “shaggy-haired,
bewhiskered youths,” that they photographed burning draft cards at the altar. Several of
the men in the photograph were “shaggy-haired” and “bewhiskered,” though no more so
than Peter Ustinov, whom the paper did not describe in the same way. In the
accompanying story’s lead sentence, Record American reporters Tom Berube and Al
Home characterized the church service as a “macabre ceremony.”4

4 “Youths Bum Draft Cards on Boston Church Altar,” Boston Globe (Evening
Edition), 16 Oct 1967, p. 1; “67 Bum Draft Cards in Boston,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct
1967, p. 1; “67 Bum Draft Cards at Hub Peace Rally,” Boston Record American, 17 Oct
1967, p. 1; “291 Youths Bum, Turn in Draft Cards,” Boston Herald Traveler, 17 Oct
1967, p. 1; “The Youths Tell Why,” Boston Herald Traveler, 17 Oct 1967, p. 1.
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Only the Herald Traveler attempted to address the motivations of the resisters but
did so superficially. Reporter Earl Marchand quoted several resisters saying things like
“the war is wrong,” and “it’s an immoral and illegal war,” but offered no follow up on
how the resisters had arrived at those conclusions or why they believed draft resistance
would be an effective way to protest the war.5
In an October 17 editorial, the liberal Boston Globe doubted that the Resistance
had accomplished anything for their cause. The editors acknowledged the inequities of
the draft system, but argued that a better way to challenge it would be to “obey the law
and seek to change it.” Like a condescending father talking to his wayward son, they
cited Gandhi in warning that a campaign o f civil disobedience would only succeed “if a
large majority of the people support it.” They concluded that “the Resistance will result
only in making martyrs out o f some students who have great courage but little
judgement.” In contrast, the Record American the paper favored by Boston’s working
class, argued that the demonstrators “once again inevitably will be helping to prolong the
war instead o f shortening it.” American forces, they said, were “clearly winning in
Vietnam,” but the enemy, encouraged by the antiwar movement in the United States, still
had reason to keep fighting.6
On the whole, New England Resistance organizers were elated with the extensive
press coverage that October 16 received, and essentially indifferent to its generally

5 Earl Marchand, “The Youths Tell Why,” Boston Herald Traveler, 17 Oct 1967,
p. 26.
6 “The Resistance,” Editorial, Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, p. 16; “Paradox of
Protest,” Editorial, Boston Record American, 20 Oct 1967, p. 34.
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negative tone. Media attention, any media attention, they believed, served their purposes.
But in the weeks following October 16, it became clear that the press proved more
successful at shaping public opinion than the Resistance did. And public opinion was
often unfavorable. Without the benefit of scientific polling data, it is impossible to say
just how the public’s view o f draft resisters broke down statistically, but evidence from
letters to the editor and other newspaper sources indicates that a significant segment of
the population either misunderstood or disagreed with draft resisters. Those who
participated in the Arlington Street service were widely regarded as hippies, cowards, or
communists, and were accused of being disloyal and unpatriotic.
This chapter examines these images of draft resisters and compares them with
actual demographic data on the resisters themselves. Ultimately, it becomes clear that the
media’s tendency to focus on the more unusual aspects of a story contributed to the
development of a false image o f the typical draft resister. In fact, very few of Boston’s
draft resisters were hippies or communists, and they were not cowards either; a coward
would more likely dodge the draft than openly resist it and risk a five year prison
sentence. Instead, the men who turned in their cards, many of whom were seminarians
and theology students (and many more who were not religious), did so because they saw
it as their moral and civic duty to commit civil disobedience. They did not commit draft
resistance thoughtlessly. Most came to their decision after months, if not years, of
protesting the war through legal channels and, more significant, after lengthy periods of
soul searching. The majority o f these resisters viewed the war and the draft with a moral
clarity that derived in part from earlier civil rights and antiwar work. The civil rights

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198
activists, especially, felt comfortable confronting authority.
Perhaps most important, the overwhelming majority o f draft resisters came from
ordinary, middle-class homes. Their parents were not communists, but professionals who
lived in the suburbs. Consequently, at the time o f the turn-in, most of them held
deferments that protected them from the draft; by protesting in this way they risked losing
those deferments (as most did) and made themselves subject to immediate prosecution.
They chose resistance in part because they believed the country could not tolerate seeing
its government lock up the sons o f the middle class, particularly if their actions were
rooted in a conscientious adherence to values that their parents had taught them were
consistent with the best American traditions.
Inflammatory Images
Some readers of the Boston papers were so outraged by what they saw and read in
their daily paper regarding the October 16 events, that they immediately wrote to the
editors condemning the protesters. Every single critical letter that the Globe printed (6
letters attacking the resisters were published compared to two supporting them),
consistent with their own reporting of the original story, emphasized the burning o f draft
cards. Central to their themes were issues o f patriotism, loyalty, and duty to country.
Letters published in the other two papers were similar. The Record American printed
only 3 letters, all attacking the antiwar demonstrators, and two o f which specifically
condemned draft card burning. “All those who participated in the demonstrations,” one
writer said, “should go to Russia and see how they would like living under Communism.”
Likewise, the Herald Traveler printed seven letters, all negative, and six o f which
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focused on card burnings. “Must the meaning o f unity, loyalty, and love o f country,” one
Unitarian woman wrote, “go out the window with the burning o f draft cards on a church
altar?” Another woman, exasperated, asked the Herald Traveler to run weekly articles
about the “nice young people o f our wonderful country.” She had grown tired, she said,
o f all the stories about “hippies and draft card burners.”7
Another reader, Paul Christopher o f Wakefield (a suburb north o f Boston), saw
photographs o f draft cards being burned and became so angry that he decided to organize
a rally to demonstrate support for the war. The Boston papers carried numerous stories
on the 19 year-old Christopher in the days leading up to the event. Like the letter writers.
Christopher emphasized responding to the unpatriotic draft card burners. A promotional
leaflet read:
Outward rebukes of our nation's policies with relation to the draft and
Vietnam cannot go unchallenged. To be silent when confronted with draft
card burning, sit-ins, and other demonstrations only consoles those hippies
and others who are bent upon desecration of our great country.
Senator Saltonstall and even the White House called to praise Christopher. Entertainer
Wayne Newton offered to sing at the rally. Ultimately, after just two weeks of planning,
Christopher hosted a demonstration that brought 25,000 to 50,000 people (estimates
varied) to the Wakefield Common where, across the street from a memorial to the
“Spanish American War, Philippine Insurrection, and China Rebel Expedition,” attendees

7 Letters, Boston Globe, 21 Oct 1967. p. 6; Letters, Boston Globe, 24 Oct 1967,
p.20; Letters, Boston Record American, 20 Oct 1967, p. 34; Letters, Boston Record
American, 21 Oct 1967, p. 18; Letters, Boston Herald Traveler, 19 Oct 1967, p. 10;
Letters, Boston Herald Traveler, 20 Oct 1967, p. 18; Letters, Boston Herald Traveler, 21
Oct 1967, p. 4; Letters, Boston Herald Traveler, 23 Oct 1967, p. 12; Letters, Boston
Herald Traveler, 25 Oct 1967, p. 34; Letters, Boston Herald Traveler, 27 Oct 1967, p. 20.
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waved flags, recited the Pledge of Allegiance, and heard the bells in the Congregational
Church across the green play the Battle Hymn o f the Republic.
The role o f the Boston draft resistance ceremony as a catalyst for this rally should
not be overstated, o f course; the large Wakefield crowd probably would have turned out
for the demonstration anyway. But the rally’s speakers made repeated reference to the
Arlington Street event. Joseph Scerra, National Commander of the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, proclaimed: “All of our young people are not burning up their draft cards. All of
our young people are not tearing up the flag. All o f our youth are not supporting North
Vietnam and carrying Viet Cong flags.” As young men in the crowd waved signs that
said, “We Will Carry Our Draft Card Proudly” and “Draft the Anti-Demonstrators,”
Scerra told the crowd. “It’s too bad we can’t give pictures of what’s happening here today
to every individual in the country who asks for a pause in the bombing.” A photographer
captured one man in the crowd kissing his draft card as his sweetheart smiled her
approval. Massachusetts Governor John A. Volpe also spoke briefly, and in an obvious
reference to draft resisters, said that some Americans were “forgetting their duty and
responsibility to their country” and accused them of being unpatriotic. “Patriotism,” he
said, “may be old fashioned today to some, but it should never be out o f fashion.”
Nearby, an effigy o f Ho Chi Minh - holding a gun marked “USSR” - hung from a maple
tree with an arrow through its chest and a knife stuck in the back of its head.8

8 “Students to Stage Pro-Vietnam Rally,” Boston Herald Traveler, 24 Oct 1967, p.
8; “Johnson Hails Wakefield Rally,” Boston Herald Traveler, 27 Oct 1967, p. 3;
“ 100,000 Expected for Viet Rally,” Boston Herald Traveler, 28 Oct 1967, p. I; “Rally
Boss Paul Bans Birchers,” Boston Herald Traveler, 29 Oct 1967, p. 62; “50,000 Hail
Red, White ‘n Blue,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Oct 1967, p. 1; “25,000 Shout Support
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In contrast to their coverage o f the Resistance events, Boston newspapers openly
supported the Wakefield rally. John Sullivan, a columnist for the Boston Record
American, revealed that the rally moved him to tears. The Wakefield demonstration, he
wrote, ‘‘told a nation and a world that we are united and that we are proud and that we are
Americans. And we are - you and I - and, by golly, a Wakefield kid proved it.” The
Boston Herald quoted several high schoolers in the crowd who, like Paul Christopher,
were disgusted with the draft card burnings of October 16. They told reporters that they
thought resisters were “mostly hippies,” “cowards [who] should be drafted”or “banished
if they don’t want to fight for their country.” And the Boston Globe sent a reporter, Alan
Lupo, to Wakefield to profile the young man behind the rally. Lupo wrote glowingly of
Christopher, describing him as “good-looking,” and possessing “maturity uncommon for
his age.” He also noted that Christopher hoped to join the Special Forces. Despite trying
to portray themselves as the heirs o f a patriotic American legacy, members of the New
England Resistance could not get the kind of media coverage afforded Paul Christopher.9
In the decades since the end o f the Vietnam War, defenders of American policy
have long viewed the media as a “major factor in the United States’ failure in Vietnam.”
According to Clarence Wyatt, one side o f this popular perception argues that the press
fulfilled the role o f a “savior” that “pulled aside the veil o f official deception” and led the

o f War Effort,” Boston Globe, 30 Oct 1967, p. 1; ‘“ We Wanted to Be Heard in
Vietnam,”’ Boston Globe, 30 Oct 1967, p. 8.
9 John Sullivan, “Tears Flow at Huge Pro-Viet Rally,” Boston Record American,
30 Oct 1967, p. 2; “Teenagers Voice Solid Support,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Oct
1967, p. 8; “‘We Wanted to Be Heard in Vietnam,”’ Boston Globe, 30 Oct 1967, p. 8.
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American people to demand an end to the war. On the other hand, others have seen the
media as the “villain” that, “inspired By political and ideological biases,” intentionally
misrepresented the nature and progress of the war, “thus leading the American people to
turn their backs on a ‘noble cause.’” If such charges are valid, it follows that the press
should have been at least mildly sympathetic to the antiwar movement, and especially to a
group o f educated, articulate young men who saw themselves as heirs o f Thoreau. But as
the articles and letters published in the Boston papers demonstrate, the press did little to
help draft resisters win a more favorable public view. This was entirely consistent with
media treatment o f the antiwar movement nationwide. In Covering Dissent (1994),
historian Melvin Small shows that “time and time again,” the nation’s newspapers,
magazines, and television networks concentrated on the most “colorful” behavior (which
sometimes meant emphasizing violence or some other displays of fringe radicalism) and
“ignored political arguments the protesters’ leadership presented.”10 Readers of the

10 Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War,
(New York: Norton, 1993), p. 7; Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the
Anti-Vietnam War Movement, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 2.
See also, Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and
Unmaking o f the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Gitlin
applies Antonio Gramsci’s theories of hegemony in explaining the role o f the media in
covering opposition to government policies. He argues that in a liberal capitalist state,
the media, owned by elites and operated by the upper-middle class and middle class
college graduates they hire, “quietly invoke the need for reform - while disparaging
movements that radically opposed the system that needs reforming.” During the Vietnam
War, for example, the mainstream press portrayed those young people working on
Eugene McCarthy’s presidential campaign as “respectable opposition,” in contrast to the
“radical, confrontational Left.” Gitlin’s view is consistent with that o f Edward S. Herman
and Noam Chomsky who use a “Propaganda Model” to argue that the media serves “to
mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity.” The
media, through its “manufacture o f consent” acts as a propaganda arm o f the government.
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy
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Boston papers learned little about the motivations of the resisters or even that most were
giving up the security of deferments to risk prosecution for their beliefs. Mostly, they
saw flaming draft cards.
Just why draft cards were burned at all on October 16 is a point worth exploring.
In the weeks leading up to the service, and even during the proceedings that day,
Resistance organizers emphasized the returning - rather than burning - o f draft cards.
Most o f those who decided to participate in the day’s events recognized that by turning in
one’s card - with the understanding that it would be delivered to the Department of
Justice - the government would know the identity of the resister and could take measures
to punish him. Burning a draft card essentially destroyed the evidence of one’s protest
and greatly minimized personal risk. David Clennon later reflected: “I was persuaded
that turning them in was the better way to go because it was a way o f saying this is who I
am, this is where I can be found, and if you are serious about enforcing the laws that you
have passed, then come and get me. And so that’s what I did...”11
At the same time, however, the Resistance planners made allowances for cards to
be burned at the altar. They knew that some men, because they were required to carry
two cards (a registration certificate and a classification certificate) at all times, would
want to tum-in one card and bum the other. In addition, they did not feel that they could
deny those who saw the burning of one's card at the altar as a kind of sacramental act the
opportunity to follow through on that belief. Moreover, no one knew how the police or

o f the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
" Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997.
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FBI were going to react to the ceremony. It seemed quite possible that everyone who
burned or turned in a draft card could be arrested immediately following the service.
Simple failure to carry one's draft card could lead to arrest, in which case it did not matter
if the evidence had been destroyed. Finally, for Nan Stone, the only woman to participate
in the ceremony, burning a draft card was the only act of protest available.12
Perhaps the most persuasive case for burning - but the one that received the least
mainstream exposure - came from seminarians and theology students who favored the
tactic as “symbolic identification with Buddhist monks and American immolators like
[Quaker pacifist Norman] Morrison.” Alex Jack, in particular, offered a vigorous defense
o f card burning on these grounds. “Draft card burning,” he wrote in an early position
paper, “is designed to challenge and change people’s perspectives.” Since most
American war resisters did not express their protest by setting themselves on fire,
destroying one’s draft card in this way demonstrated “symbolic understanding and
support” for those who did. In addition, burnings were useful in dramatizing American
war crimes:
The crime at issue in America is the burning o f people, not a piece of
paper. Those who enflame the Vietnamese countryside with napalm and
white phosphorus and bum down villages and entire forests, not those who
put the match to the ticket that stands for their compliance and service of
this inhuman system - they are the real non-cooperators.
Jack invoked the historical precedents o f abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s burning
o f the American Constitution, and the burning o f passbooks in South Africa to support his
argument that torching symbols of “oppression and inhumanity” have long been judged as

12On chance of immediate arrest, see Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997.
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acceptable forms of protest. He saw no reason to “abandon the historical significance of
fire” just because the Ku KIux Klan burned crosses and the Nazis burned books.13
O f course, not everyone agreed. In addition to George Williams, neither Jack
Mendelsohn nor William Sloane Coffin approved of draft card burnings. Coffin was
quite distressed when the burning of cards began, because he believed it to be “needlessly
hostile.” He later recalled that, as he stood there accepting cards, he could see Sander van
Ocur “pushing his cameraman to zero in on these cards that are in the flame. [I thought],
‘Aw, shoot, we lost it.’” The following week, when many regular members o f the
Arlington Street Church expressed their unhappiness over the burning of draft cards in
their church, Jack Mendelsohn, who had final authority to allow it in the first place,
addressed it in his sermon. “It may come as surprising news to some that I react very
negatively to the burning of draft cards." he said. “It is too flamboyant for my taste, too
theatrical, too self-indulgent.” He went on to tell his flock, however, that although he did
not encourage the burnings, he did not forbid them either. He decided that because the
leaders of the Resistance possessed such a great degree o f “integrity and moral depth,” he
agreed to go along with whatever plan o f action they chose. And since they felt
compelled by the moral outrage o f a minority who would want to bum their cards and
“made orderly, respectful provision for it.” Mendelsohn permitted it. Therefore, the
handout distributed to resisters when they arrived at the church included a “Suggested
Procedure” section that said: “Hand your draft card to the clergy member of your choice,

13 Alex Jack, “The Case For Burning,” undated position paper (c. Sep/Oct 1967),
AJP; “ 100 Seminarians and Ministers Turn In 4-D Ministerial Exemptions, New England
Resistance Newsletter, 25 Oct 1967, MKFP.
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or, bum it in the altar candle. Make it smooth.” That the card burnings were orderly and
respectful did not, however, make it into the press accounts. M
Children o f the American Dream
For draft resistance organizers, the overwhelming success o f October 16 greatly
overshadowed the inflam m atory headlines. They had pulled off the largest antiwar rally
in the city’s history, greatly exceeded their expectations in collecting so many draft cards,
and were thrilled that a real sense of solidarity seemed to have developed over the course
o f the day; they had, it seemed, built the foundation for a powerful movement that would
not only challenge their government to rethink its policies in Southeast Asia but that
likewise dared their fellow citizens to consider the moral implications o f tacit acceptance
of the war.
When authorities failed to take any resisters into custody immediately following
the service at Arlington Street, Resistance organizers went back to their office in
Cambridge and began sorting through the collected draft cards. They created a “Master
File” that included key information on each resister (since the cards themselves were
destined for the Justice Department by the end of the week, most participants filled out a
brief form for this purpose). Using these cards, they produced a mailing list so that
everyone could stay in touch and begin building the kind of community that Michael
Ferber described in his sermon. Fortunately, a sizeable portion of the Master File has
survived thanks to Alex Jack, who has held on to it for 30 years. These records are very

14 Coffin interview, 28 Aug 1997; Jack Mendelsohn, “The Church and Draft
Resisters,’’sermon, 22 Oct 1967, Archives o f Arlington Street Church; “67 Bum Draft
Cards in Boston,” Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, p. 12.
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revealing in beginning to construct a kind of group biography of rank and file draft
resisters.
First, it is important to note that, in standard Movement fashion, the chore of
typing up index cards with pertinent information for each resister fell mostly to the one
woman working in the office, Nan Stone. In 1967, even organizations dedicated to
principles o f fairness and equality continued to exhibit sexist tendencies. In Boston, not
only did a considerable debate develop over Stone’s participation in the October 16
service, but in the week that followed, male organizers argued over Stone’s status again,
disagreeing on whether or not an index card with her name on it should be kept in the
Master File o f resisters. What did one have to do to be considered a “resister?” As a
woman she could not be drafted, but as a Resistance organizer she had been complicit in
“aiding and abetting” violation o f Selective Service laws. Furthermore, she had clearly
broken the law when she burned that draft card at the altar. In the end, it took the
appearance o f FBI agents - then investigating all o f the October 16 resisters and showing
interest in Nan Stone at the same time - for Stone’s index card to find a place in the
Master File.15
The Master File that Stone created shows that most of the men who resisted on
October 16 were white college and graduate school-age men - educated at some of the
more prestigious schools in New England - who were willing to give up the security of

15 Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997; see also Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The
Roots o f Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York:
Vintage, 1979), pp. 179-185; and Barrie Thome, “Women in the Draft Resistance
Movement: A Case Study o f Sex Roles and Social Movements,” Sex Roles 1 (1975), pp.
179-195.
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the draft deferments assigned by their draft boards. The average (and median) age o f the
men who turned in their cards in New England that fall was 22. Students made up 76
percent of the resisters who took part, with the largest contingents coming from Harvard,
Boston University, and Yale. The Selective Service classifications assigned to these
students varied, however (Appendix A, Table 4.1). 49 percent were classified either 2-S
(the standard student deferment) or 4-D (the deferment for ministers and divinity
students). Most telling, though, is that only 17.5% of resisters were classified 1-A,
available for military service. Therefore, at least 82 percent o f the men who resisted in
Boston risked their deferments by breaking the law, an important detail never reported to
the public by the media.16
What the draft cards that were collected could not say was that the resisters who
returned them were children of the American Dream. This is apparent from a 1997
survey administered to former resisters and resistance activists. For the most part, they
grew up in comfortable homes, raised by parents who were better educated than previous
generations and who worked at professional careers. Nearly 50% of resisters’ fathers

16New England Resistance Master File, papers o f Alex Jack (hereafter AJP); The
Master File that has survived is not complete. The extant version includes 203 resisters
from October 16 and 59 others from three smaller tum-ins between November 16, 1967
and January 29,1968. Significantly, it contains no names from the one other major
Boston draft card tum-in o f April 3, 1968. Of 262 records, 215 include the age o f the
resister. The average age is 22.3 years old and the median age is 22. Of 226 resisters for
whom an occupation was listed, 173 (76.5%) were students. They attended a total o f 31
schools, but 45 (26%) came from Harvard, 33 (19%) from Boston University, and 26
(15%) from Yale. No more than 8 students came from any other single school. Statistics
gleaned from the 1997 survey o f resisters roughly confirm these figures. O f 121 resisters
who responded to the survey, the average age was 23.2 years old; the median was 23. 89
(73.6%) of the 121 were students, 24.7% of whom came from Harvard, 16.9% from BU,
and 14.6% from Yale.
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graduated from college with a total o f 37% going on to graduate school; 22% held
professional (M.D., J.D., etc.) or doctoral degrees (Table 4.2). 40 percent o f resisters’
mothers were college graduates with 15 percent possessing advanced degrees. These
educational achievements meant that most resisters’ fathers (70%) held professional jobs
as physicians, attorneys, accountants, engineers, academics, scientists, and ministers, etc.,
or ran their own businesses as real estate and insurance brokers or another kind of small
business proprietor (Table 4.3). Not surprisingly, more than half o f their mothers were
homemakers but another nearly 30 per cent held professional positions (most as teachers,
librarians, and nurses). Nearly 80 per cent o f resisters in Boston identified themselves as
coming from middle class (44%), upper middle class (33%), or upper class families (2%)
(Table 4.4). This, they believed, was their greatest strength: they came from families that
were quite ordinary. They grew up in the years following the Second World War as
children of a burgeoning middle class and lived in middle class neighborhoods all across
America. They were the boys next door.
The men who resisted the draft in Boston also do not seem to have been bred for
this kind of activism any more than other middle class children. Although most resisters
identified their parents (84% of fathers and 91% o f mothers) with one or another religious
denomination (Table 4.5), none were members of the historically pacifist (and antiwar)
sects such as the Quakers or Mennonites. Four of the resisters themselves were Quakers,
but had not been raised so. In fact, 40 percent o f them came from homes in which one or
both of their parents were veterans of the Armed Forces and many o f whom had seen
combat duty during World War II (Table 4.6). Most significant, however, is that few
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resisters’ parents ever took part in any kind o f social activism or protest themselves. Only
25 percent o f Boston’s resisters grew up with a parent who had a history of activism,
including only 15% with a union member for a parent.17
If, as Polish Freedom Figher Josef Mlot-Mroz believed, the draft resisters had
been “duped” by “Reds,” it is clear that it did not happen under their parents’ roofs.
While many draft resisters saw themselves as members o f the New Left, they were not
“red diaper babies,” that is, children of Old Left communists. Indeed, the majority o f
resisters’ parents were Democrats and the rest Republicans (Table 4.7). Of 121 resisters
surveyed, only five identified both of their parents as either socialist, communist, or
anarchist (Table 4.8). In 80 percent of resisters’ homes, both parents belonged to the
same political party;18 the vast majority (62%) were Democrats. Thus, by challenging the
draft and Lyndon Johnson’s foreign policy, most resisters confronted an administration
voted into office by their own parents. Even among the resisters, 46 percent called
themselves Democrats; less than 2 percent were Republicans (Table 4.7). That said, it is
true that a significant minority of resisters (39%) thought of themselves as either
socialists, communists, or anarchists. Yet it is apparent that this did not mean that these
New Leftists were hell-bent on revolution. Actually, only about 20 percent of them felt

17 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: Out of 121 respondents, 31
(25.6%) indicated that they had at least one parent who participated in some form o f
social activism or social protest before they (the resister) got involved with draft
resistance. This includes 18 (14.9%) resisters who had a parent who was a union
member.
18 Out o f 121 draft resisters, 113 listed political affiliation o f both parents. Thus,
the 80 % figure was calculated by dividing 90 (number o f couples with the same political
leaning s as shown in Table 4.8) by 113 = 79.6%.
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comfortable with radical labels like “revolutionary” or “politico.” Rather, more than two
thirds o f Boston’s draft resisters saw themselves as “activists.” Most felt very American
and like Michael Ferber, “fully engaged in a big struggle with my country...having what
Coffin always called ‘a lover’s quarrel with my country.’” This distancing from their
parents’ political ideology no doubt originated in some o f their earlier social activism, not
a love o f the Soviet Union.19
For the overwhelming majority o f the Boston draft resisters, the decision to join
the Resistance followed an earlier track record of participation in protest movements.
Three fourths o f them had a history o f prior activism including working with campus or
community peace and civil rights organizations. More than half of the resisters in Boston
(50.4%) had been involved in either campus or community civil rights work. Likewise,
53 percent worked in either campus or community peace efforts before coming to the
Resistance. A smaller number of these men, 15.7 percent, worked on Vietnam Summer
in the months before October 16. In addition, even though the official SDS line remained
dubious on the value of draft resistance, 30 percent of the resisters in Boston were present
or former members o f that organization. Such experiences helped to demystify civil
disobedience and going to jail for many. Michael Ferber, who had spent a night in jail
during the civil rights movement, noted that by the time he helped launch the New
England Resistance, he “no longer cared that [he] had an arrest record.” ”Some o f the

19 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: Resister labels: Out o f 121
resisters, 25 (20.7%) saw themselves as “politicos,” 25 (20.7%) saw themselves as
“revolutionaries,” and 82 (67.8%) saw themselves as “activists.”
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finest people in America,” he said, “are now getting arrested for one thing or another.”20
These figures notwithstanding', the statistics still peg nearly one quarter of
Boston’s resisters as men who were participating in a protest movement for the first time.
And although more than half o f the men who turned in or burned their cards knew friends
in the movement, 45 percent did it on their own and knew no one else among the
hundreds who resisted with them. These individuals were so highly motivated by their
outrage regarding the war that they were willing to take the risky step of defying the draft
to make their protest. And they did it all by themselves.21
For weeks, Resistance leaders tried to make plain the degree of potential peril that
participation in the October 16 service might bring. Leaflets included warnings that
turning in one’s card could result in arrest and, if found guilty of breaking Selective
Service laws, a possible five year prison sentence and a $10,000 fine. They hoped that no
one would turn in or bum his card without having thought it through completely, in
advance, in the cool light of reason and not in the emotional atmosphere of the ceremony

20 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: Activist backgrounds o f
resisters: Out of 121, 61 (50.4%) had been involved with civil rights on either campus
and/or in their communities, 64 (52.9%) had been involved with peace issues either on
campus and/or in their communities, and 19 (15.7%) had participated in Vietnam
Summer on campus and/or in their communities. Out o f 121 resisters, 36 (29.8%) were
members of SDS; Ferber interview, 10 Feb 1997. See also, Staughton Lynd, “The
Movement: A New B eginning,” Liberation, May 1969, p. 14. Lynd theorizes that much
of the connection between civil rights and the Resistance derived from white radicals
being forced out of civil rights with the onset o f the Black Power movement: “We were
looking for something white radicals could do which would have the same spirit, ask as
much of us, and challenge the system as fundamentally as had our work in Mississippi.”
21 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: 29 out o f 121 resisters (24%)
had no previous activist or protest experience. 66 resisters out of 121 respondents (55%)
had close friends in draft resistance when they got involved; 55 (45%) did not.
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itself. For the most part, they were successful in this. More than half of Boston’s
resisters (54%) planned in advance to turn in or bum their draft cards. An additional onethird said they had been considering resistance carefully in the weeks before they did it,
but only decided to turn in their cards on the day o f the event. Therefore, only 13.4
percent spontaneously turned in or burned their cards in the heat o f the moment. In some
ways, organizers were unrealistic in expecting that no one would resist on the spur of the
moment. The quality of the speakers assembled at each turn-in, coupled with the
atmosphere of a church (as on October 16), made these services a little like revival
meetings. Some could not help having, as Alex Jack described it, “a conversion
experience.” For example, Bill BischofF, a Harvard graduate student in history and a
veteran, recalls that the array of passionate, reputable speakers assembled on October 16
made him think of it as a kind o f test o f his commitment to protesting the war. “Well,” he
thought to himself, “I don’t know how I can stay out of this when I feel as strongly [about
the war] as I do.” Similarly, Harold Hector, a leader in the Boston Draft Resistance
Group and one who did not advocate risking jail through open confrontation with the
Selective Service, turned in his card on the same day. He did it because it was “one of the
most moving days” o f his life, so moving that he thought he “would have done anything
that day.” “I could not not turn it in,” he said. “I couldn’t walk out of there with my card
in my pocket...You knew there were FBI agents up in the balcony; I felt like I wanted to
wave it under their nose - that’s how I felt that day....there were moments when you just
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couldn’t hold back.”22
The vast majority o f resisters, though, came to their decisions after long periods o f
careful consideration. Just as William Sloane Coffin, George Williams, and Michael
Ferber had criticized and protested the war through other more moderate means in
previous years, many o f the resisters now felt that the time for civil disobedience had
arrived. As Coffin noted, for each person, a time arrives when,
having done everything legal, you really have to decide...you've done what
you could, so you can now tuck your conscience into bed, and sort of
move on. Or you can say, ’alright, we've exhausted the legal
possibilities’...so, you have to look into possibilities o f civil disobedience,
which challenge the injustice o f the law and it’s a way of...being more
dramatic about calling attention to the horrors o f whatever you're
opposing.23
Draft resisters had marched. They had written letters and attended teach-ins. They had
protested more than most o f the war’s opponents and they did not want to tuck their
consciences into bed. Instead, they chose to act in the strongest way they knew, short o f
violence, to protest the inequities of the draft and what they believed to be the illegality
and immorality of the war in Vietnam. In making the emotional, life-altering decision to
resist the authority o f their government, resisters justified and rationalized their acts using
moral and political arguments.

22 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: Out of 112 respondents, 15 men
(13.4%) say they turned in or burned their cards spontaneously; 37 men (33%) say they
had been considering turning in their cards beforehand, but only decided to actually do it
when the moment arrived; meanwhile, 60 men (54%) did not resist spontaneously at all:
they had made their decisions to resist in advance; Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997; Bischoff
interview, 5 Jan 1998; Hector interview, 9 Apr 1997.
23 Coffin interview, 28 Aug 1997.
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First, most resisters recognized the potential political impact o f widespread draft
resistance. They aimed to make the government face the prospect o f jailing thousands of
middle class sons in order to continue on the same course in Vietnam, and they gambled
with their own freedom believing that enough men would join them and the costs of the
war would become too high to continue the war. The greatest cost, one resister argued,
would be “the criminalization o f large numbers of elite college students - future
‘leaders,’” Eventually, they believed, “upright, respectable, middle class citizens,” the
kind who were potentially influential, would not stand for too many o f their children
going to prison.24
More important, draft resisters - both leaders and the rank and file - recognized
their place within society, within the system of conscription, as symptomatic of an
existential dilemma that needed to be addressed. Instead o f being asked to serve in the
military alongside their less fortunate fellow citizens, many of them were being protected
through an unfair draft apparatus. As working-class and minority men died each day in
rice paddies and jungles on the other side of the world, they breathed in the aroma of the
drying leaves then blanketing the grounds of their picturesque New England campuses.
They felt guilty. Most holders o f deferments could live with that guilt.25 But those who
would resist the draft could not ignore it or the reality that their own sense of good and
evil, morality and immorality, spawned that guilt. Many of them, therefore, committed

24 Respondent Number 40, 1997 survey o f Boston draft resisters; Daniel Brustein,
interview with author, 30 Dec 1997.
25 For a notable exception, see the outstanding essay by James Fallows: “What Did
You Do in the Class War, Daddy?, The Washington Monthly, October 1975.
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themselves to the risky business o f openly defying their elected government out of a sense
of personal integrity and a deep sense o f morality. For Michael Zigmond, a 26 year old
postdoctoral fellow at MIT, the decision to resist resulted from “at least equal parts trying
to be more effective and just trying to get the weight o ff” Zigmond, who attended the
October 16 service but did not return his card until the following month, felt a “need to
respond somehow and also to basically come out of the closet from being this
protected...kind o f person.” He felt like his draft card “was getting very heavy...it was
really heavy,” and the opportunity to resist relieved the moral strain o f keeping it.
Similarly, David Clennon felt like he had to “do something personally to help to end the
war.”26
Many resisters report similar experiences of agonizing over their decision to resist
and then being overwhelmed with emotions at the moment o f resistance. For Larry
Etscovitz, a 21 year old junior at Boston University, October 16, 1967 became the
culmination of two years of anguish over the Vietnam War. Since entering BU with a
deferment in 1965, he and many of his friends had grown more and more involved,
emotionally and intellectually, with the war. The war “was just getting worse and worse,”
he said. “After a while, it. was the only thing any of us talked about.” On October 16 he
went to the Common because he had heard that a huge antiwar rally was scheduled and
that Howard Zinn, the BU professor, would be speaking. Despite Resistance publicity, he
did not know about the scheduled draft card tum-in. When Zinn finished his speech and

26 Michael Zigmond, interview with author, 29 Dec 1997; Clennon interview, 12
Jun 1997.
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told the resisters where to line up, Etscovitz, not fully aware of what this meant, simply
thought, “Yes, I’m a resister. Ok, I’m going to line up over there.” He marched with the
group to the church and took a seat in one o f the forward pews. “Even then,” he said, “I
had no idea or knowledge or intention o f taking my draft card out; I felt I just needed to
be there and be a part of this event.” But when the call was made, Etscovitz turned in his
draft card. He was scared but resolute. “Everything was leading up to this moment
and...this is the moment when I was going to let my voice be counted. Up until that
moment, whether I was at a demonstration or not, was not a matter o f record. I wanted it
to be a matter of record, that I was there...That was my protest.” When he caught a ride
back to BU with some friends, one o f them, a woman, told him: “Today, you are a
man.”27
Like Etscovitz, many draft resisters later saw the moment of their turn-in as a kind
of rite o f passage into manhood. In resisting the draft publicly, they overcame
tremendous anxieties and fears stemming from the unnatural act of openly defying the
will o f one’s government. They were, after all, middle class children, raised in an era of
confidence and taught to revere the promise of the American Dream. But suddenly that
Dream seemed tainted by a war they found repulsive. James Oestereich, a seminarian at
Andover Newton Theological Seminary recalls debating the merits o f draft resistance
with one o f his professors while taking a Green Line trolley car from Newton Centre on
the way to the service at Arlington Street. Oestereich emphasized to his mentor that by
turning in his card he would be making a statement, and that was what mattered. “I mean

27 Larry Etscovitz, interview with author, 12 Aug 1997.
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I was definitely taking a step to criticize my government.” Despite his firm belief that he
planned to do the right thing that afternoon, he could feel the knots in his stomach tighten
as they got closer to downtown. The prospect o f challenging the authority o f one’s
government chilled him. “It’s hard,” he later said. “You know, we know how to pay our
taxes...but we don’t know how to oppose our government in a way that’s responsible and
that will be listened to. None of us knew that.” When he walked up the aisle toward the
Rev. Coffin, draft card in hand, he felt his emotions swirl unexpectedly around him. On
the one hand, he felt strongly that through this act he was saying, “whatever this
movement is, I’m in...I’m not going to read about it, I’m not going to be this isolated sort
of graduate student on the hill; I’m in.” At the same time, though, he could not ignore the
gravity of the act. “When I dropped that card in the tray...I really just had a very
emotional reaction to it. I was very moved at what we were doing. It hit me just that, my
God, this is important. I don't think it was fear or anything, I was just very emotional
about it. I had a lot o f tears in my eyes.”28
Others simply felt fear. On October 16, no one knew what would happen to those
who chose to resist the draft. “We knew that the faster the movement grew, the better off
we’d all be,” explained Bill Hunt. “But if you found yourself out there, you know, just a
handful o f us out there alone, that was going to be a lonely experience.” Very few draft
resisters knew what it would be like to experience the full force of the government’s law
enforcement powers. Some had been arrested at other peace and civil rights
demonstrations, but at their worst, those resulted in minimal fines. Those choosing

28James Oestereich, telephone interview with author, 20 Dec 1997.
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resistance knew that the penalties for not cooperating with the Selective Service, if
enforced, would be severe. “So it wasn’t a lark,” recalled Hunt. “It wasn’t something
people did as a gag.” Years later, William Sloane Coffin echoed Hunt as he reflected on
the resisters he encountered. “I was very moved by the seriousness with which they were
organized, the seriousness with which they took their actions,” he said.
This wasn’t something they decided to do when they were high on dope or
something like that. They were very conscientious. And there were some
very fine students in the group. These weren’t the far Left or the flakiest at
all. So I was impressed by the quality.... What was courageous about them
is that they had an out (staying in college) and they refused to take the out.
And that was really fine.29
Critics of the sixties generation and the antiwar movement, in particular, have
been successful in using stereotypes of smaller, radical Movement minorities to portray
the whole Movement, but it would have been difficult for an observer o f the October 16
rally on Boston Common and the service at Arlington Street Church to confuse the
assembled protesters with the hippies, Yippies, and Weathermen that dominate those
histories.30 True, a significant number of resisters (50%) thought of themselves as
members of the “counterculture” - undoubtedly because they grew their hair longer than
their fathers’, listened to Bob Dylan, and smoked an occasional joint - but far fewer called
themselves “hippies” (16.5%). Similarly, although the majority of resisters claimed

29 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997; Coffin interview, 28 Aug 1997.
30 For critical appraisals of the sixties generation and the antiwar movement, see
Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the
60s (New York: Summit Books, 1989); and Adam Garfinkle, Telltale Hearts: The
Origins and Impact o f the Vietnam Antiwar Movement (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995);
see also Stephen Ambrose, “Foreword,” in Garfinkle, Telltale Hearts.
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membership in the New Left (66%), only one fifth o f them felt like “revolutionaries.” As
historian David Farher has argued, the myths that portray antiwar protesters as either
stoned hippies or dupes of an international communist conspiracy - both “officially
promoted by guardians of the standing order” - die hard in America. At least in Boston,
draft resisters did not fit either stereotype.31
The men (and woman) who chose to resist the draft rather than submit to it or
“dodge” it do not seem to fit the traditional perceptions about Vietnam era antiwar
protesters. They came from stable homes, had parents who were professionals and who
had inculcated their children with mainstream, not radical, political ideas. They were,
themselves, well-educated and often in the process o f pursuing graduate degrees. As a
result, most were protected from the draft and, like millions o f beneficiaries o f an unfair
Selective Service System, could have ignored both the war and the draft. Before 1967,
many resisters gained experience in other types o f social protest, including the Civil
Rights Movement. Just as civil rights leaders sought nonviolent moral confrontation with
state and federal authorities, draft resisters hoped to use similar tactics in confronting
what they saw as a war machine out o f control in Southeast Asia. Also like civil rights
leaders, members o f the New England Resistance, because of the efforts of certain
organizers, created a unique blend o f religious and political rationales for their work. In

31 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: Out of 121 resisters, 60 (49.6%)
saw themselves as part of the counterculture, and 20 (16.5%) saw themselves as “hippies”
at the time they resisted the draft. Likewise, 25 (20.7%) saw themselves as “politicos,”
and 25 (20.7%) as “revolutionaries.” 80 (66.1%) considered themselves members of the
New Left. David Farber, “The Counterculture and the Antiwar Movement,” in Melvin
Small and William D. Hoover, eds., Give Peace A Chance: Exploring the Vietnam
Antiwar Movement, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), p. 21.
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the days and weeks that followed October 16, resisters would be faced with the reaction
of the federal government and with the task o f sustaining a movement that burst onto the
Boston antiwar movement like a supernova but which might easily be snuffed out in the
face o f official pressure.
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CHAPTER V

UNEASY WAITING: DRAFT RESISTERS AND THE
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

What really prevents the great majority from refusing to take part in
military service is merely fear of the punishments which are inflicted by
the governments for such refusals. This fear, however, is only a result of
the government deceit, and has no other basis than hypnotism.
Leo Tolstoy, "Carthago Delenda Est,” 1899
On October 20, 1967, four days after Boston’s most stunning antiwar
demonstration to date, Michael Ferber delivered the draft cards collected at the Arlington
Street Church (along with the charred remains of those burned) to the United States
Department o f Justice in Washington. Early that morning, 500 draft resistance activists
from across the country gathered at the Church of the Reformation at 212 East Capitol
Street in anticipation o f the march to Justice. Like Ferber, other resisters brought draft
cards with them from ceremonies held on October 16.
Many older advisers joined them, including William Sloane Coffin, Benjamin
Spock, Mitch Goodman, Robert Lowell, and Dwight MacDonald. After marching the
mile and a half to their destination, they arrived to find three rows of policemen, outfitted
in helmets and other riot gear, guarding the building’s massive bronze doors. Across the
street a crowd o f reporters and photographers jostled one another for the best viewing
positions. Once again, Coffin filled the role of featured speaker. On the steps of the
gleaming white building, he spoke into a bullhorn, telling the crowd and the mass of
reporters that he and other older supporters intended to “aid and abet” draft resisters in
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every way possible. ‘T o stand up in this fashion against the law and our fellow
Americans is a difficult and even fearful thing,” he said, echoing some of the themes in
his Arlington Street sermon. “But in the face of what to us is insane and inhumane, we
can fall neither silent nor servile.” He stressed that the resisters and their supporters,
many of whom were veterans, felt the “highest sympathy” for the men fighting in
Vietnam and their families at home, but he asked those who backed the war out o f loyalty
to their “sons or lovers or husbands” in Vietnam to understand that “sacrifice in and of
itself confers no sanctity.” "There can be no cleansing water,” he said, “if military victory
spells moral defeat.”1
Mitch Goodman then issued the call for draft cards. Young men from within the
crowd walked up the stairs of the Justice Department, stated their names, announced the
city or college that they represented, and told how many cards they carried on behalf of
their fellow resisters. Each then turned to the tall man holding a plaid fabricoid briefcase
open before them. Dr. Spock. wearing his trademark three-piece suit, smiled as the men
took turns dropping the returned Selective Service documents into the satchel that he held
in his hands. Norman Mailer, the novelist who later won a Pulitzer Prize for Armies o f
the Night, his book chronicling the events of this weekend in Washington, stood in awe of
the number of draft cards put in the bag and especially of the young men doing it:
As these numbers [of draft cards collected] were announced, the
crowd...gave murmurs of pleasure, an academic distance from the cry they
had given as children to the acrobats of the circus, but not entirely
unrelated, for there was something of the flying trapeze in these maneuvers

1William Sloane Coffin, Once to Every Man, pp. 247-248; Norman Mailer,
Armies o f the Night (New York: Signet, 1968), p. 86.
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now; by handing in draft cards, these young men were committing their
future either to prison, emigration, frustration, or at best, years where
everything must be unknown, and that spoke o f a readiness to take moral
leaps which the acrobat must know when he flies off into space - one has
to have faith in one's ability to react with grace en route, one has,
ultimately, it may be supposed, to believe in some kind of grace.2
For the Resistance representatives and their supporters, the time to confront their
government, their moment of truth, had arrived. Although every resister had taken the
personal step toward outright resistance on the sixteenth, their identities remained
unknown to those in power - until now. When the line of resisters finished, Spock's
briefcase held 994 draft cards from across the country. To complete what Alex Jack later
called the "largest collective act o f civil disobedience in modem American history," the
cards needed only to be delivered to United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark.3
A small group of resisters and supporters, including Spock, Coffin. Marcus
Raskin, Arthur Waskow, and Bay area resister Dickie Harris, thus entered the Justice
Department building. There they hoped to be greeted by the attorney general himself.
An escort led the group down a long hall to a conference room where, instead of finding
Ramsey Clark, they were introduced to Assistant Deputy Attorney General John
McDonough and John Van de Kamp, the deputy director of the Executive Office of U.S.
Attorneys. Clark, it turned out, decided to send McDonough in his stead because he
believed that receiving “evidence o f potentially criminal conduct." would be irresponsible
and “not the role of the attorney general." McDonough, on leave from his teaching post

2Mailer, Armies o f the Night, pp. 88-90.
3 Alex Jack, “Press Ignores Trial Issue,” Boston Free Press, undated (c. 11 Jul
1968), p. 11, Papers o f Rob Chalfen (hereafter cited as RCP).
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at Stanford Law School, had joined the Department o f Justice only six weeks before.
Although he greeted the group cordially, he disagreed with their tactics. Specifically,
McDonough thought that the ''solicitation'’ o f young men to resist the draft “was not
appropriate behavior." and. more generally, he saw civil disobedience as a precursor to
“anarchy."4
After offering coffee to the group. McDonough told them that he represented the
attorney general in this meeting, and that Clark had instructed him to report back to him
on the substance o f the discussion. He then recorded the names and addresses o f each
visitor. He sat through brief statements made by each protester and conspicuously
ignored Marc Raskin when he asked if the Justice Department planned to investigate
alleged war crimes in Vietnam. Years later. McDonough acknowledged that he did not
"undertake to discuss with them on the merits of the points which they raised:*’ he simply
wanted to make an accurate report to Clark. Finally, after being subjected to an intense
“rap” by the flamboyant Harris, McDonough pulled a piece of paper from his pocket and
read a brief statement warning the group that they might be breaking the law. Then, he
began an unusual verbal tango with Coffin. He turned to the Yale chaplain and asked,

4 John McDonough, interview with author, 3 Jun 1998. McDonough explained
his skepticism about the value of civil disobedience in this interview: “I am skeptical,
quite skeptical, about civil disobedience. You see, its logical consequence has to be
anarchy. Now, one says, 'well, but this is only small, only relates to this particular
matter, whether it’s abortion or something else, and we, because we hold this set of
views, are entitled to disobey the law because we hold those views o f our own, are
superior morally to the law, and command our first allegiance.’ There’s no logical
stopping point for that, so I find it difficult intellectually to defend it. However appealing
the cause may be, it is, I would think, justified only under the most extreme circumstances
- not likely to occur in our society.”
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“Am I being tendered something?”
“Tendered something?” Coffin responded.
“Yes, tendered something.”
Coffin suddenly understood. “Yes, Mr. McDonough,” he said, “you are herewith being
tenderly tendered these draft cards and supporting statements.” and he held the briefcase
out for the assistant deputy attorney general. Perhaps McDonough thought that, after the
reading of the draft law, the group would take their fabricoid briefcase and go home.
When they did not, he refused to accept the bag. Indeed, according to Coffin, he nearly
recoiled. Coffin tried again, but McDonough kept his hands in his lap. Coffin later
recalled that when he finally put the briefcase down on the table in front o f McDonough,
the assistant deputy attorney general “stared back as though it contained hot coals.”5
Such accounts of McDonough's response are probably exaggerated, for although
Ramsey Clark later speculated that participation in this meeting made McDonough
uncomfortable, the Stanford legal scholar knew what he was doing. As John Van de
Kamp understood, McDonough refused to accept the cards because he “did not want to
give countenance to the tum-in of draft cards.” To do so only would have encouraged
more protesters to seek meeting with the attorney general for similar purposes.6
Nevertheless, on this day, the activists were nonplused. Even after Arthur
Waskow exploded, demanding that McDonough fulfill his duties as a law enforcement

5 Wells, The War Within, pp. 194-195; Coffin. Once to Every Man. pp. 247-251;
McDonough interview, 3 Jun 1998.
6 Ramsey Clark, interview with author, 29 Apr 1998; John Van de Kamp,
interview with author, 9 Jun 1998.
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officer (and collect the evidence of a probable crime), McDonough did nothing.
Disgusted, the activists left the building to tell the crowd what had happened. As they
walked down the hall to the door, two FBI agents burst into the conference room and
scooped up the fabricoid briefcase. The following week, FBI agents began their
investigations of draft resisters by swarming down on college campuses across the
country, including Harvard, Yale, and Boston University. The government, it appeared,
had taken an interest in the resisters' protest.7
The Johnson administration had been aware of opposition to the war for some
time; they had seen the marches and demonstrations. Some cabinet members (Robert
McNamara, for instance) had been targeted personally by these protests. But the episode
at the Justice Department marked a new phase of antiwar protest and a new challenge to
the administration. For the first time, the antiwar movement brought their protest to the
seat of power and confronted the administration directly. Just as resisters raised the
personal stakes for opponents of the war. their mass civil disobedience likewise upped the
ante for the administration. Now. the White House could no longer ignore the antiwar
movement. The president’s men would have to act. The Resistance counted on it.
Draft resisters soon learned, however, that the government’s response would not
be as quick and decisive as they imagined. Just as John McDonough surprised the
Resistance emissaries with his reaction to them at the Justice Department, the
administration did not follow the course most resisters believed - and hoped - it would

7 Wells, The War Within, pp. 194-195; Coffin, Once to Every Man, pp. 247-251;
McDonough interview, 3 Jun 1998.
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follow. Most expected to be arrested, perhaps swiftly, once the government received their
draft cards, the evidence o f their crimes. But their showdown with the administration did
not work out that way.
This chapter follows the reaction of President Johnson and his advisers to draft
resistance in the two months following October 16. It charts the disagreements between
key administration officials that contributed to an ambivalent, sometimes conflicted
response. This uneven and inconsistent reaction, to the extent that it was tangible to
outsiders, caught the Resistance off-balance; as the FBI investigated resisters and local
draft boards moved to punish some of them, the Resistance scrambled to respond - while
still anticipating arrests or indictments. Ultimately, the chapter demonstrates that in the
weeks after October 16, resisters and the administration engaged in a kind o f uneasy
dance, like two prize fighters sizing each other up in the first round; as each side tried to
evaluate the other, both showed signs of uncertainty regarding their next move. The
confrontation the resisters sought, therefore, simmered a while before reaching full boil.
All the President’s Men
News o f the meeting at the Justice Department infuriated the president of the
United States. At 7:30 that evening, Lyndon Johnson pulled Joseph Califano, his top
assistant for domestic affairs, into the Oval Office. Next to the president’s desk, a
teletype machine pumped out wire reports from news organizations. Obviously agitated,
Johnson tore off the United Press International report from the tape spitting out o f the
machine. He read the news to Califano that nearly 1,000 draft cards had been left at the
Justice Department. ‘T want a memo to the Attorney General tonight,” he told Califano.
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"I want the FBI investigating.*’ Soon after, attorney general Ramsey Clark received a
terse memo from the president:
With reference to reports that several individuals turned in their draft cards
to an official o f the Department o f Justice this afternoon. I would like you
to inform me promptly, as well as periodically, thereafter, concerning:
~ The progress of investigations by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation o f any violations o f law involved.
—Steps you are taking to prosecute lawbreakers in accordance with
established procedures.
It is important that violations of law be dealt with firmly, promptly, and
fairly.
LBJ
On separate copies o f the same memo sent to J. Edgar Hoover and Lewis Hershey, the
president wrote, *T want you to be personally responsible for keeping me informed on
this.” Johnson did not know that, a few hours earlier, at 4:30 p.m., John McDonough and
John van de Kamp. head of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, had already handed
over the briefcase full of draft cards to FBI agents. The following day. a teletype went out
to all FBI field office Special Agents in Charge instructing that individual cases be
opened up on each person who turned in his card. "Indices are to be searched, respective
Selective Service files reviewed, and registrants interviewed...,” the memo said. The
battle had been joined.8
Meanwhile, Johnson and his administration focused on a more pressing matter:
the march on the Pentagon scheduled for October 21. The National Mobilization to End

8Joseph Califano. The Triumph and Tragedy o f Lyndon Johnson (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 198-199; Memo to Ramsey Clark from LBJ, 20 Oct
1997, WHCF, JL, Box 26, LBJL; Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), p. 113; FBI memo, 23 Oct 167, William
Bischoffs Freedom o f Information Act papers, author’s files; FBI teletype, 21 Oct 1967,
Bischoff FOIA papers, author’s files.
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the War in Vietnam (Mobe). had organized the protest under the direction of David
Dellinger. In addition. Dellinger recruited Jerry Rubin to be program director. In hoping
to fuse antiwar activism with countercultural flair, Rubin publicized the march by
announcing plans to levitate the Pentagon. The Administration feared much worse.
Some advisers believed that coordinators o f the event planned to encourage rock and eggthrowing at the windows of the Pentagon, and possibly breaching the massive building’s
security through basement windows. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara suggested on
October 3 that the president might consider being somewhere other than Washington on
the day of the march, but Johnson responded. **they are not going to run me out o f town!”9
The president did feel sufficiently concerned, however, to ask Ramsey Clark for
daily updates on plans for the demonstration. For his part, Clark assigned the
responsibility of planning for the event to his deputy. Warren Christopher. By 8:00 p.m.
every night for the next two weeks, reports from the Justice Department appeared on
Johnson’s desk. He read not only of the administration's preparations for the march, but
also details of the protesters' plans, including who would speak at various locations,
details on the Mobe’s leadership, and their ties to other organizations. Although the
president spent most o f the day of the march in the Rose Garden, fashioning for reporters
an image of a chief executive with a full schedule of meetings (and with only a slight
interest in the demonstrations), Joe Califano fed Johnson frequent updates on the progress

9 Memo to Ramsey Clark from Walter Yeagley, Asst. AG, 3 Oct 1967, attached
to memo from Clark to LBJ, 4 Oct 1967. personal papers of Warren Christopher, Box 8,
LBJL
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o f the protests throughout the day and night.10
The president learned that perhaps as many as 100,000 people congregated in
front o f the Lincoln Memorial that day to hear speeches condemning his policies in
Vietnam. It constituted the most significant antiwar demonstration in the nation’s capital
to date. Although the rally and the march that followed it did not have any direct ties to
the draft resistance movement, the rhetoric used by speakers that day reflected the
influence o f October 16. “This is the beginning o f a new stage in the American peace
movement.” David Dellinger told the crowd, “in which the cutting edge becomes active
resistance.”11
But if organizers intended to send a message o f "active resistance,” it got lost in
the media’s attention on the clash between marchers and the federal troops assigned to
protect the Pentagon. As approximately 35.000 marchers approached the Pentagon from
the Arlington Memorial Bridge following the earlier rally, they could see that U.S.
marshals and Army regulars surrounded the building. It marked the first time since the
Bonus March of 1932 that the federal government called out the armed forces to protect
itself against its own citizens. Almost everyone in the crowd assembled in the Pentagon's
north parking lot, a space for which march organizers had secured a permit. Several
small groups of militants, however, charged the troops and attempted to gain entry to the

10 Memo to Ramsey Clark from Walter Yeagley, attached to memo from Clark to
LBJ, 4 Oct 1967, personal papers o f Warren Christopher, Box 8, LBJL; Minutes of
meeting, 3 Oct 1967. Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Box I, LBJL; Wells, The War
Within, pp. 184,201.
11 Terry Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties (New York: Oxford, 1995), p.
178.
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Pentagon (a few did, and were beaten and arrested for their efforts). When these flare-ups
settled down, the afternoon actually took on a “festival atmosphere” as more musicians
played for the crowd and speakers conducted what amounted to an impromptu teach-in.
Still, that night, events turned ugly.
After midnight, when only a few hundred demonstrators remained on the plaza in
front of the Pentagon - most sitting and sleeping directly in front of the troops - those in
charge of security ordered the marshals and soldiers to form a wedge and begin driving
the protesters away from the building. As one official later reported to the attorney
general, in some cases the marshals **used more force than was warranted.”12 The troops
used batons and their rifle butts to club the protesters. A number of women, in particular,
suffered the most severe beatings - apparently as part of a strategy to provoke male
protesters into attacking the troops. The demonstration fizzled the next day and, at the
end of the weekend, the Justice Department counted 683 arrests. 51 jail terms (of up to 35
days), and $8,000 in fines.13
Most significant for the draft resisters who had taken their fateful step of defiance
the previous week, the media coverage o f the march completely obscured the previous
day’s events at the Justice Department. The 100.000 participants at the Lincoln Memorial

12 Stephen Pollack to Ramsey Clark, 22 Oct 1967, Personal Papers of Ramsey
Clark, box 29, LBJL.
13 The story o f the March on the Pentagon has been told by many historians and
participants. Perhaps the most engaging and least objective of these accounts is told by
Norman Mailer in The Armies o f the Night (New York: Signet, 1968). See also: Zaroulis
and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, pp. 136-142; DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, pp. 197198; Wells, The War Within, pp. 195-203; Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties,
pp.178-179.
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made the 500 people who turned out for the demonstration at the Justice Department on
Friday seem comparatively puny. Moreover, as historian Charles DeBenedetti has
observed, Rubin’s provocative rhetoric and the violent clashes between a small number o f
protesters and the soldiers and marshals guarding the Pentagon “reinforced the image of
the antiwar movement as a radical fringe and pushed it further to the political margin.”
By Monday, October 23, the papers and television newscasts reported only on the wild
events of the past forty-eight hours; Friday afternoon’s draft card turn-in had been
forgotten.14
In Boston the following week, however, resisters soon learned that, despite the
attention focused on the Pentagon demonstrations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
did not overlook the receipt o f their cards in Washington. Beginning on October 24, FBI
agents from the Boston field office visited dozens of resisters at their homes and on
campus. They also appeared at the homes o f resisters’ parents. Out of 121 former
resisters surveyed, 62 (51.2%) remember their FBI encounter, while only 21 (17.4 %)
recall their parents receiving a similar visit. Generally, agents pressed resisters to respond
to three questions: 1) Did you tum-in your draft card purposefully and knowingly?; 2)
were you coerced in any way?; 3) and why did you do it? Parents were asked if they
knew of their sons’ activities and if they were aware of the possible consequences. Most
resisters and their families had always been law-abiding citizens and had no experience
with being questioned by federal authorities. Few had ever even seen an FBI agent

14 DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, pp. 188-189; For more on the march on the
Pentagon, see Mailer, Armies o f the Night; Wells, The War Within, pp. 195-204; For more
on media coverage o f the demonstration, see Melvin Small, Covering Dissent, pp. 70-84.
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before. Opening one's door to find two FBI agents displaying their credentials could,
therefore, be a little unnerving.15
The New England Resistance, knowing that many resisters might be easily
intimidated when confronted alone by FBI agents, scrambled to respond. Several pages
of a hastily-produced newsletter dated October 25, the day after the first FBI visits,
addressed the issue. Organizers warned all resisters that the federal agents were visiting
people singly, “with a heavy emphasis on parents.” The goals of such “harassment,” they
argued, included trying to “intimidate or frighten” resisters, “split families,” and scare off
others who might consider becoming resisters. They noted that the FBI arrested no one
on its first day and in their first efforts at maintaining solidarity, urged rank and file
resisters to stay committed to the cause and to one another:
THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPON WE HAVE IS OUR
COMMITMENT AND UNITY AS A GROUP. WE MUST LET THEM
KNOW THAT HARASSMENT OR ARREST OF ONE OF US WILL
MEAN A RESPONSE BY ALL OF US. WE ARE FREE MEN NOW
AND WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED. WE WILL STAND UP FOR
OUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND MORAL CONVICTIONS. WE HAVE
TOLD THE ADMINISTRATION AND SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM WHERE IT [sic] CAN GO, AND THE FBI AND JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT CAN FOLLOW THEM...NOT WE, BUT THE
GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORCED TO BACK DOWN.
Next, they included a lengthy section on how to handle an FBI visit. First, they reminded
resisters that they did not have to speak with them or let them into their homes (unless
they were equipped with a search warrant); resisters should submit to interviews only
with an attorney present. Second, the newsletter provided tips on how to handle an FBI

15 “FBI Questioning Campus War Foes,” New York Times, 25 Oct 1967, p. 8;
“FBI Queries Students Who ‘Resist’ Draft,” Harvard Crimson, 25 Oct 1967, p. I.
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search, recommending that resisters only allow agents in after getting a lawyer or minister
on the phone so that he could describe everything the agents did. They also
recommended keeping the agents together to “make sure nothing is planted or taken.”
The newsletter did not, however, indicate how compliant one could expect the FBI agents
to be with such demands. Finally. Resistance organizers counseled their brethren never
to be on the defensive. “The FBI is generally a bunch of political hacks,” they wrote,
■‘who threaten loudly but back down when their bluff is called.” Interviews by FBI agents
constituted standard operating procedure for the Justice Department, the newsletter said,
noting that civil rights workers in the south had been subjected to the same kind of
treatment.16 Most important, they concluded, no one had yet been arrested.
NER Meets FBI
That the FBI arrested no one in that first fortnight following October 16 surprised
the New England Resistance: they had expected "rapid and massive prosecutions” of the
first resisters. Not only did resisters remain free and uncharged of crimes, but the FBI did
not even interview some of them. The slow pace and inconsistency of government
response bewildered resistance organizers. In fact, when representatives o f Resistance
groups from across the country met to discuss strategy following the scene at the Justice
Department on October 20. they made few plans. Other than agreeing on responsibilities
for maintaining a communications network through newsletters and setting December 4
as the target date for the next national action (though Michael Ferber indicated that
Boston would probably do something earlier), the resisters made no significant decisions

16NER Newsletter, 25 Oct 1967, MKFP.
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about how to move forward over the following weeks and months. They waited for a
government crack-down they believed to be imminent.17
Only in rare instances did resisters feel the force o f the government’s wrath in the
first two months following the turning in of their draft cards. In Boston, authorities
singled out one resister. Chris Venn, and even that took six weeks. Venn had grown up in
the Back Bay neighborhood of Boston, and in the fall o f 1967 had taken a semester off
from the University o f Colorado. On October 16, he worked as part o f a painting crew
on the Mystic River Bridge. At work the next day. when the draft card tum-in came up in
conversation. Venn found himself supporting the resisters in a heated argument with the
rest o f the crew. Eventually, one o f his coworkers asked Venn why, if he felt so strongly,
he did not turn in his own card. That did it. Venn tracked down Michael Ferber at his
Phillips Street apartment on Beacon Hill and gave him his draft card in time for it to be
conveyed to Washington with the rest. He immediately began working in the New
England Resistance office in his spare time. A few weeks later. FBI agents interviewed
him with his parents in their four-story house on Gloucester Street in the Back Bay. The
meeting was civil. In fact. Venn today remembers the agents being surprised that
someone who lived in one of the nicest neighborhoods in the city might have participated
in such law-breaking behavior. The agents left and Venn continued to work with the
Resistance.
Chris Venn’s personal history, however, made him more vulnerable than other
resisters to an accelerated reaction to his draft card tum-in. Venn had been arrested

17 Ferber & Lynd, p. 149.
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earlier that year for drug possession as he reentered the United States on his way back to
Colorado following a vacation in Mexico. The judge in El Paso saw that Venn did not
have a prior record and gave him a suspended sentence, but required him to see a federal
probation officer on a regular basis. On Friday, December 1, 1967, when Venn made his
monthly visit to the federal building in Boston’s Post Office Square, U.S. Marshals
arrested him and locked him up. They immediately began preparing him for extradition
to Texas, but Venn’s lawyer interceded and demanded a hearing to review whether or not
probation had been violated. In a hearing held the following Tuesday, Venn was found
guilty of violation o f probation. His lawyer filed an appeal to have his case transferred
from Texas to Boston, but when it was denied, the state o f Texas extradited him. After a
couple of weeks in jail in Boston, two marshals put him in a car with some other
prisoners and started off down the Massachusetts Turnpike toward Texas. The trip to El
Paso took several days with stops at several federal penitentiaries where Venn and the
other prisoners slept at night. Among other places, Venn remembers being locked up in
St. Louis, Oklahoma City, Abilene (Texas) and, finally, in El Paso. Venn’s parents
appeared in court with him and again the judge let him go. Venn returned to Boston and
resumed his work with the Resistance. He continued to fulfill his probation obligations
and never heard from the FBI again.
Chris Venn’s arrest and cross-country odyssey demonstrated that federal
authorities would at least exploit opportunities to punish draft resisters when additional
circumstances made it possible. Resistance organizers seized on Venn’s story to warn
fellow resisters about law enforcement officials. That the marshals tried to ship Venn to
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Texas without a probation hearing, in particular, alarmed them. It demonstrated that the
authorities were willing to-"cOmpletely disregard a person’s rights in favor of their ‘law
enforcing’ instincts,” a notion that most resisters found frightening. “We must always be
on the defensive,” the newsletter read, “in the event that any of us are arrested.”18
When it became clear that the authorities did not have plans to move swiftly and
decisively against most other draft resisters, however, a flaw in Resistance planning
revealed itself: they did not know how best to proceed. As Michael Ferber and Staughton
Lynd later wrote, “beyond the single tactic of draft card tum-ins, [the Resistance] had no
political program, no plan o f day-to-day work (comparable to. say, voter registration in
the South) which could help individuals and groups keep themselves together.”
According to Neil Robertson, one of the original organizers and a full-time paid staffer by
late October, after being “catapulted into notoriety” by the remarkable success of October
16, Resistance leaders “were totally confused about what to do next.” They believed they
had created an organization, “or the beginnings of one,” Robertson later recalled, “but
that was always a misunderstanding.” Just because 281 men had "in one way or another

18NER Newsletter, 15 Dec 1967. MKFP; Chris Venn, interview with author, 12
Jun 1997; Note: In an interesting postscript, Chris Venn himself did not ultimately stay on
the defensive against being arrested. In 1969, after moving from Boston to San
Francisco, he took part in the demonstrations to save People’s Park in Berkeley. When
the police fired tear gas canisters into the protesters, Venn lobbed one back at the police.
The police continued to advance and, as Venn ran down the street away from them, an
Alameda County Sheriff’s Deputy shot him in the buttocks with bird shot. Venn
managed to escape and had most o f the bird shot removed by a sympathetic doctor. But
the FBI tracked him down a few days later and arrested him for violating his probation.
This time he spent a year in the federal penitentiary in El Reno, Oklahoma. For more on
People’s Park, see W. J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley At War: the 1960s (New York: Oxford,
1989, pp. 155-166.
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divested themselves o f their draft cards” did not mean they had an organization of that
many men. In Robertson’s view, the Resistance possessed "‘more o f an appearance o f
solidity in the newspapers than it did in reality.” 19
Indeed, mobilizing the first rank-and-file resisters to sustained levels of protest
proved to be very difficult. Just keeping track of all the resisters and other supporters
could be a challenge: in the first post-October 16 newsletter, organizers listed more than
30 men who had turned in or burned their draft cards that day for whom addresses
remained unknown. By the time the third newsletter after October 16 went out,
Resistance organizers pleaded with rank-and-file resisters to maintain a higher degree of
activism. They were beginning to conclude that the “majority” of resisters treated the
Resistance as little more than “another extracurricular activity:”
It’s really quite alarming when guys are called...and asked to be members
of a squad of men willing to demonstrate at any time, and they reply 'I
can’t be bothered.’ or 'I don't want to be awakened at weird hours.' or 'I
have papers and exams.' AH of us have papers and exams, or something
that takes up our time...nevertheless, we have lots of work to do and
everyone should be doing something,
Neil Robertson later concluded that by turning in a draft card, by committing “that defiant
act,” most men had taken “an incredible step....that was a really pivotal event in their
lives,” or a “watershed event.” and that alone made many men feel like they had done
their part - and risked enough - to end the war. “For a lot of guys it summarized many,
many different things, a good deal of which were not articulated or even fully conscious.”
Trying to build community among “such a disparate group of people,” each of whom had

19 Ferber & Lynd, p. 149; Robertson interview, 24 Aug 1997.
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moved toward Resistance for individual reasons, Robertson believed, may have been
“doomed to failure.”20
In some respects, the decision to participate in draft resistance activism beyond
tuming-in one’s own card depended on temperament. As Robertson suggested, some
rank-and-file resisters wanted to resist quietly, alone. They turned in their cards like
everyone else and chose to simply wait for an official response. Bob Bruen, an
undergraduate at Northeastern University later remarked that resisting “was something I
was going to do and take a stand at that point, but I wasn’t going to go around getting
people all excited, giving speeches, and participating in all the other stuff. I thought a lot
o f that was a waste of time.” Others chose to work on draft resistance in their own
communities. For example, many o f the seminarians offered draft counseling in the
parishes where they conducted youth ministries rather than out of the Resistance office.
In addition, some resisters were intimidated by the Resistance ringleaders. Howard
Marston, Jr., a resister from the North Shore town of Rockport remembered that when he
visited the Resistance office in Cambridge, "they all made me very nervous” because they
were “just so gung-ho.” To some 18 or 19-year-old resisters, an encounter with a Harvard
graduate student who worked 12 hours a day almost every day on draft resistance activity
could be a little overwhelming.21
In several ways, however, Resistance organizers did make efforts to reach out to

20 NER Newsletter. 15 Dec 1967, MKFP; Robertson interview, 24 Aug 1997.
•

21 Bruen interview, 13 Aug 1997; J. Michael Jupin, interview with author, 28 Dec
1997; Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Howard Marston, Jr., interview with author, 13
Dec 1997.
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their brother resisters. Every Monday night, they held pot-Iuck dinners in the basement o f
the Arlington Street Church. They invited all resisters and supporters and, although the
conversation almost always revolved around the war and protest against it, it remained a
social occasion where anyone might feel at home. As one resister later put it, “Mike
Ferber, Bill Hunt, and the Community feeling in the resistance were probably more
convincing than the war as reasons to hand in your draft card.” On October 31, the New
England Resistance hosted a masquerade party to raise money for future draft resistance
events and also to try to keep bringing rank-and-file resisters together in one place. A few
weeks later, they arranged some football games between the New England Resistance and
the Boston Draft Resistance Group, or the "Peace Creeps” and the “Commie Dupes.” as
they facetiously called themselves. Anyone could play for the Resistance and when they
won, they joked that "rumors have it that BDRG men were weighted down by the mass of
their draft cards.” Finally, the New England Resistance also adopted the Greek letter
Omega. Q, as a symbol of their "determination to resist the draft and the war machine
until the last.” Omega is the symbol for an Ohm, the unit o f electrical resistance in
physics, and as Michael Ferber later wrote, it suggested many useful metaphors: “friction
in the machine, attrition in the supply lines, turbulence in the conduits to Vietnam.”
Moreover, the omega is also the last letter - or the end - o f the Greek alphabet and
therefore, stood for the end of the draft and the end of the war; it made an ideal symbol
for the Resistance and eventually Resistance chapters nationwide adopted i t too. Dozens
o f white buttons with a large black Omega printed on each were distributed to resisters as
another way o f making everyone feel like they were part of a much larger, growing
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community. Rather than “leave for Canada,” NER leaders wrote when they introduced
the Omega, “we choose to stay in America...and build an effective political movement to
inaugurate the greater society that we believe in.”22
Even with some sense o f solidarity and community, individuals on their own are
often vulnerable, and law enforcement officials were skilled at bringing pressure to bear
on people one at a time. Resisters never reported being interviewed by only one FBI
agent; they always worked in twos. Resisters who did not turn them away immediately
could expect the standard questions about why they made their decision to resist or
whether they had been coerced. Frequently, however, the conversation extended to
discussions of the draft system and even the war. Often the agents disagreed with the
resister about his duties as a citizen; tensions would rise, and the feds usually left saying
something like, '"you’ll be hearing from us.”23
Still, although encounters with the FBI were remarkably similar from resister to
resister, there were a few notable exceptions of resister defiance. Faculty and
administrators at Yale Divinity School were so outraged at the disruption caused by
agents tracking down resisters, they posted a note where the agents would see it: “Dear
FBI, ‘Let your foot be seldom in your neighbor’s house, lest he become weary of you and
despise you.'” One resister attended a meeting with two agents in Boston wearing a

22 Richard Hyland, “The Resistance: An Obituary ''Harvard Summer News, 8 Aug
1969, pp. 3-4; NER Newsletter, 15 Dec 1967, MKFP; NER Newsletter, 25 Oct 1967,
MKFP; Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, pp. 251-252.
13 Dan Tilton, interview with author, 16 Jun 1997; Robert Bruen, interview with
author, 13 Aug 1997; Hector interview, 9 Apr 1997.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243
button that said, “J. Edgar Hoover Sleeps with a Night Light.” The most celebrated FBIResistance meeting took place in the offices o f the Boston University News between two
agents and Alex Jack. Jack had been expecting a visit and he and his colleagues in the
office were well prepared when the agents arrived. Jack welcomed the agents and invited
them to sit down. Up to that point. Alex Jack seemed very accommodating, but before
they could pose the first question, he turned the tables on them. As he sat down and put
his feet up on the desk, he said. "Thank you for coming. I just have a few questions.”
Then he handed each of them a three page document called ‘‘FBI for the Resistance:
Questionnaire.” It included a waiver o f Fifth Amendment rights not unlike the one agents
often used with resisters, a questionnaire, and a pledge sheet that would, when completed,
make the agents members of the Resistance. The questionnaire asked questions like "Do
you believe the war in Vietnam is illegal, immoral, unjust, and not in the interests o f
America’s national security?” and "Do you feel it is the patriotic and legal duty of the
Bureau to investigate president Johnson. Secretary [of State] Rusk, Secretary [of Defense]
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and General Hershey for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, treason...on the basis of the US Constitution, the UN Charter,
the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and the Nuremburg Statutes?” After a few moments, the
agents realized that Alex Jack was giving them a taste of their own medicine. They
terminated the interview and left "in a huff.” Following them, a group of Resistance
“agents” teased them all the way to their car by looking them up and down, scribbling in
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note pads, and saying 'Ah, yes," and ‘very interesting,’ until they drove off.24
News of this confrontation spread quickly within the antiwar community in
Boston. Bill Hunt wrote an article in Avatar. a leading underground newspaper in the
city, which told the story o f Alex Jack turning the tables on the FBI. The piece also
included Hunt’s own description of two FBI agents who had come to Avatar’s offices and
then left after failing to find the resister they sought for questioning. Hunt himself
departed a few minutes later and, as he left the building, found the two agents jiggling a
coat hanger through the window of their car; they were locked out o f their car. He asked
the G-Men if they would mind him photographing the scene but. when the agents begged
him not to, he relented. Stories like this made great copy in movement newspapers.
Another group of students at UMass-Boston followed Alex Jack’s example. Soon after
two agents sat down with a resister in an empty room, a group of the young man’s
supporters jammed into the room with several cameras, and photographed the agents in
mid-sentence. The pictures later appeared on leaflets and in the student paper.25
Although such instances of counter-harassment of federal agents soon entered
Resistance lore because o f their bravado and apparent playfulness, the perpetrators of
these pranks took their actions seriously. At least some of those resisters felt, as Alex
Jack later reflected, that since 'th e government was immoral and illegitimate,” not only

24 “FBI For The Resistance: Questionnaire.” leaflet, MKFP; Ferber & Lynd, pp.
153-154; Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997; Bill Hunt, “The Resistance Turns the Tables,”
Avatar #12, p. 4.
25 Bill Hunt, “The Resistance Turns the Tables,” Avatar #12, p.4; NER
Newsletter, undated (c. early Nov 1967), AJP.
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did non-cooperation make sense, but
now we were kind of moving'into that vacuum where you're creating your
own government - almost like a provisional authority in which you begin
to assume in the name o f humanity, or the Nuremburg statutes, or
whatever, some kind o f civil authority and put these people on record that
their actions are being monitored.
The agents, and even Resistance supporters might have seen such episodes as pranks, but
from the perspective o f those who did it. "it was an exercise o f legitimate counter
authority,” Jack said.26
Some Resistance activists, particularly those involved in day-to-day operations,
eventually found humor in their relations with the FBI. Nan Stone recalls that, at first,
meetings with the FBI could be fairly intimidating. FBI agents benefitted from a widely
held image (bolstered by The FBI, the successful television show featuring Efrem
Zimbalist, Jr.) that portrayed them as elite members o f the law enforcement community.
One generally shuddered at least a little when an agent introduced himself and said he
needed answers to a few questions. After a while, however, that luster began to fade and
Resistance activists grew more bold. "It got to be a game for us,” recalled Stone. They
learned to pick FBI agents out of a crowd - each agent usually standing incongruously
among scores of young people in trench coat, fedora and sunglasses - and pose for them
as the G-Men photographed demonstrators. Similarly, Bill Hunt recalls trying to hand out
leaflets to FBI agents at a demonstration; when an agent asked him what he did for a
living, Hunt, a graduate student in history at Harvard, told him he was that university’s
head of the Department o f Anthropophagy (i.e., Cannibalism). In addition, resisters

26 Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997.
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sometimes found FBI investigative methods and tactics to be amusing, such as the time
Harold Hector found three agents, dressed as homeless men sleeping (or pretending to be
asleep) in the hallway of his Cambridge apartment building. Although they were
“dressed like bums,” they were clean shaven, and still wore white socks and shiny
wingtip shoes. After Hector yelled at them to get out o f his hallway, he looked out the
front window o f his place and watched them all pile into a creme-colored car and speed
away. “It was so crazy,” he said, “It was even funny at the time.”27
At the same time that the FBI seemed inept, however, they also went to great
lengths to investigate their targets. A reporter from the Harvard Crimson and a
Resistance sympathizer once saw FBI agents standing outside the Arlington Street
Church on a Monday night when the New England Resistance held a pot-luck supper. As
resisters and supporters entered the church, agents would, the reporter claimed, “aim
umbrellas at you and take your picture, click.” Similarly, Nan Stone learned years later,
when she first found photographs in her FBI file (which she acquired through the
Freedom of Information Act), that agents had tailed her to a friend’s wedding on Cape
Cod, an event completely unrelated to draft resistance, and took pictures o f her enjoying
the celebration with friends. Stone and others also reported finding wiretap devices in
their home phones and everyone in the New England Resistance believed that the office
phones were bugged. Given the president's personal interest in the investigation of draft

27 Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997; Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997; Hector interview,
9 Apr 1997.
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resistance, the use o f such tactics on the part of the FBI seems plausible.28
These encounters with the FBI notwithstanding, the kind o f information the FBI
relayed back to Washington and the White House (though resisters could never hope to
know the substance o f it) is what should have concerned the Resistance most. Resisters
would have been interested to know that, from the start, the president seemed a little
perplexed about the nature of the protest directed at his administration by draft resisters.
At an October 23 meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary o f Defense
Robert McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler,
Johnson said. “I am concerned as to how we handle the draft card burners who are
handing in their draft cards at various federal centers.” The Resistance practice of
allowing the burning of draft cards at ceremonies where cards were collected no doubt
contributed to the president’s confusion. The FBI capitalized on it. First, the Bureau
challenged the Resistance's claim that 994 draft cards had been returned to the Justice
Department on October 20. According to a memo sent to the president from Ramsey
Clark, an FBI inventory of the fabricoid briefcase found 185 registration certificates and
172 notices o f classifications, “which due to duplication appears to represent
approximately 300 individuals.” In addition, they found 14 facsimile registration cards,
photostat sheets with reproductions of 155 registration certificates and notices of
classification, an envelope containing the ashes of 67 draft cards, and numerous letters,
statements, and discharge orders expressing antiwar and antidraft views. According to

28 Richard Hyland, •'The Resistance: An Obituary,” Harvard Summer News, 8 Aug
1969, pp. 3-4; Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997.
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these figures, at most, 593 people turned in their cards on that day. By the time President
Johnson met with Democratic Congressional leaders on October 31, he felt comfortable
using a figure of only 256 people and claimed that those individuals, according to the
FBI, were '‘crazy people” with a history o f being institutionalized. Furthermore, he said,
informants in the Communist Party reported that “the communists decided to do all they
could to encourage demonstrations against the draft.” The president told his audience
that he did not want to sound like a “McCarthyite.” but he believed the country was in “a
little more danger than we think and someone has to uncover this information.”29
The reference to Senator Joseph McCarthy is telling because, by 1967. aides to the
president frequently saw him exhibit a kind of paranoia regarding communist
manipulation o f Congressional opponents of the war as well as the antiwar movement
itself. Speech writer Richard Goodwin later wrote that as early as 1965, "Johnson began
to hint privately...that he was the target of a gigantic communist conspiracy in which his
domestic adversaries were only the players - not conscious participants, perhaps, but
unwitting dupes.” As far as the president was concerned, this included not only antiwar
activists, but doves in Congress, too. He used both the Federal Bureau of Investigation

29 Minutes, Meeting. 23 Oct 1967. Tom Johnson's Notes o f Meetings, Box I,
LBJL; Ramsey Clark to LBJ, 21 Oct 1967, box 29, Clark papers. LBJL: Minutes,
Congressional Democratic Leadership meeting, 31 Oct 1967, Meeting Notes File, Box 2,
LBJL; Richard Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1988) pp. 404-405. Note: Goodwin recalls a meeting at the LBJ ranch in
which Johnson invoked the “mental institutions” and “McCarthyite” references. His
quotations are nearly identical to those found in the meeting notes for the meeting on 3 1
October with Congressional leaders (which I found at the LBJ Library). It is not clear
which is correct - or if both are correct - but I am relying on the meeting notes as my
source. The mention o f the communist party supporting draft resistance is, however,
unique to Goodwin’s story. Interested readers should refer to both sources.
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and, beginning in 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency to gather information on his
critics and to especially seek to find communist ties to these people. Operation CHAOS,
the illegal domestic spying program run by the CIA to gather information on the antiwar
movement, relied on burglaries, interception of activists’ mail, and wiretapping in
investigating their targets. According to Eric Goldman, historian and special assistant to
the president, Johnson claimed to have information from the FBI and CIA proving that
the Soviets were manipulating certain antiwar senators. These senators, the president
suggested, attended luncheons and social functions at the Soviet embassy; children of
their staff people dated Russians. ’’The Russians think up things for the [antiwar]
senators to say,” Johnson argued. "I often know before they do what their speeches are
going to say.”30
In the fall of 1967, the president’s belief in communist control o f opposition to his
Vietnam policies became a frequent theme of meetings that addressed antiwar opinion
and activism. Reports fed to Johnson by J. Edgar Hoover caused the president to believe
firmly that those planning the march on the Pentagon were communists; he then leaked
this information to the press in hopes o f reducing the number of mainstream antiwar
sympathizers from coming to Washington. In a meeting with congressional leaders a few
days after the march, he read a ‘’secret report” that allegedly proved that the
demonstration’s planners were Hanoi's puppets. The report dealt primarily with a
conference that had taken place in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia a few months earlier during

30 Goodwin, p. 400; Wells, pp. 183-184; Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon
Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford, 1998), p. 367.
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which some o f the activists, the report charged, had made contacts with the National
Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese government. House Minority Leader Gerald
Ford (R-MI) found the president’s charges so compelling that, from the floor o f the
House, he remarked that the march had been '‘cranked up by Hanoi.” Several days later,
the president told Ramsey Clark, “I’m not going to let 200,000 of these people ruin
everything for the 200 million Americans.” Johnson wanted investigations into any
antiwar activist “who leaves this country, where they go, why they are going, and if
they’re going to Hanoi, how are we going to keep them from getting back into this
country.” By mid-November when CIA Director Richard Helms presented a report
concluding that “no significant evidence" existed to “prove Communist control or
direction of the U.S. peace movement or its leaders,” Johnson and several o f his aides
refused to believe it. They simply could not understand, as Joe Califano said, how “a
cause that is so clearly right for the country...would be so widely attacked if there were
not some [foreign] force behind it.” Despite the evidence to the contrary, the president
continued to press the FBI and CIA to investigate the antiwar movement for its ties to the
communist world.31
The job of uncovering information on draft resistance belonged primarily to the
FBI, though the accuracy o f their intelligence remains unclear. Given the demographics
o f the resisters from Boston, the assertion that most of the people who had returned their
draft cards were former mental patients seems silly. Perhaps only J. Edgar Hoover knew

31 Frank J. Donner, The Age o f Surveillance: The Aims and Methods ofAm erica's
Political Intelligence System (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 259-261; Dallek, p. 490;
Wells, pp. 204, 210; DeBenedetti, pp. 204-205.
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why the FBI characterized the protesters this way. The question o f how many real draft
cards were turned in. however, is another issue. Unfortunately, neither side (the resisters
nor the government) can today support their own figures; the evidence is gone.32 Michael
Ferber acknowledges that, although he brought genuine draft cards from Boston, the brief
case left at the Department o f Justice did contain photocopies o f hundreds of other draft
cards. These copies, he believes, came from many different parts o f the country where
resisters had turned in the originals to their local draft boards, FBI offices, and U.S.
Attorneys; to be counted in the nationwide tally in Washington, these groups sent copies
of the cards they collected and had already returned. From the administration’s
perspective, the facsimiles o f draft cards did not constitute sufficient evidence for further
investigation or prosecution. Stating the "true” number of cards left with John
McDonough also helped to make the Resistance seem less significant as a force in the
antiwar movement. If the FBI had its figures right. 256 returned draft cards could not
have seemed very significant to the White House. Nevertheless, the president wanted
something done about it.
Selective Service Responds
On the evening o f October 20. at a time when his concern over communist control
o f the antiwar movement seemed to reach a new level, the president continued to stew

32 The cards collected from across the country on October 20, 1967 and left at the
Justice Department were introduced as evidence in the trial of the Boston Five the
following June and, as evidence in a federal trial, should be part of the public record
today. Inexplicably, however, they are not among the records o f the trial at the National
Archives in Waltham, Massachusetts. Court officials speculate that the evidence was sent
back to the FBI, but numerous Freedom o f Information Requests and appeals have turned
up nothing. Most likely, they were destroyed.
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over the draft card tum-in at the Justice Department. According to Joe Califano, he
seemed genuinely bewildered about why anyone would want to bum a draft card and also
wondered who the '‘dumb sonofabitch” was who “would let somebody leave a bunch of
draft cards in front o f the Justice Department and then let them just walk away.” In fact,
the day’s events only reinforced the president’s concern about the attorney general’s
commitment to prosecuting draft violators. Consequently. Johnson went after the
resisters by another route. That night, in addition to instructing his attorney general to
keep him informed about draft resisters, the president called the Director o f Selective
Service, to see if anything else could be done. Even before he had received the FBI’s
analysis o f the evidence left at Justice. Johnson gave Hershey ”an earful” about the need
to punish draft protesters. According to George Q. Flynn, an historian o f the draft and
Hershey’s biographer, the old soldier responded by telling the president about the
provision in the draft law that discussed the drafting of any registrant who becomes
delinquent. In Hershey’s view, tuming-in or burning a draft card, both illegal forms of
protest, seemed obvious cases o f delinquency. “Johnson immediately approved the idea.”
Flynn tells us, “and instructed Hershey to send out the orders.” Rather than contributing
to a unified response to draft resistance on the part o f the administration, this directive
would ultimately lead to an embarrassing spat between Ramsey Clark and Hershey, and a
more serious crisis over how to handle dissenters who targeted the draft.JJ

33 Joseph Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy o f Lyndon Johnson, pp. 198-200;
George Q. Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 259; Flynn, The Draft. pp. 215-216; Note: Flynn
has confirmed Johnson’s involvement in the decision to draft resisters through various
sources including Hershey Califano. Primary source documentation linking the president
to this issue has not yet been uncovered. That said, the staff at the Lyndon Baines
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Following the orders o f his Commander-in-Chief, Hershey moved to squash draft
resistance the only way he could. Just four days after Coffin and the others left the bag of
draft cards at the Justice Department, the Selective Service chief issued Local Board
Memorandum No. 85 which effectively established procedures for the drafting o f draft
resisters. It said, in part:
Whenever a local board receives an abandoned or mutilated registration
certificate or current notice o f classification which had been issued to one
o f its own registrants, the following action is recommended:
(A) Declare the registrant to be delinquent for failure to have the card in
his possession
(B) Reclassify the registrant into a class available for service as a
delinquent.
(C) At the expiration of the time for taking an appeal, if no appeal has
been taken and the delinquency has not been removed, order the
registrant to report for induction...
On October 26, Hershey followed this memo with a letter to all members of the Selective
Service System, explaining the rationale for the new policy. Before laying out his
argument, he emphasized that the m ilitary obligation for young men was universal and
that deferments were given only "when they serve the national interest/’ The key
determinant in his analysis of draft resistance derived from the assumption that “any
action that violates the military selective service act or the regulations, or the related
processes cannot be in the national interest.” Therefore, he wrote, “it follows that those
who violate them should be denied deferment in the national interest.” Upon the receipt
o f information regarding illegal protest by a registrant, local boards, Hershey said, should

Johnson Presidential Library have begun releasing audio tapes of conversations held in
the Oval Office and over the telephone during Johnson’s presidency. My hope is that
when the tapes for October 16 to 31, 1967 are opened, we will finally hear this
conversation between Hershey and LBJ.
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reopen the classification o f the registrant and “classify him anew.” He also asked local
board officials to consider sending some cases to the nearest U.S. Attorney, but as Flynn
notes, the board members had years o f experience and they “knew the director preferred a
draft action to a prison term.”34
When news o f the Hershey directives surfaced in early November, it sparked a
firestorm of protest. Scores of letters poured into the White House. Big city newspapers
across the country criticized Hershey including the Boston Globe and the Boston Record
American. The Globe s editors wondered whether Hershey had “outlasted his usefulness”
in attempting to use the United States Armed Forces as a “penal colony.” The Director's
“meat axe approach” to draft resistance demeaned the draft act, they said. Even veterans
groups felt disgraced by Hershey’s action. Eugene D. Byrd, chair o f the American
Veterans Committee sent a telegram to the White House urging “the removal o f General
Hershey as Director o f Selective Service System as essential to the national interest.”
Most of the protest focused on the vague wording of Hershey’s letter. If, as Hershey
declared, “any action” which violated Selective Service “processes” could be considered
illegal and not in the nation’s interest, critics envisioned thousands o f youths being
reclassified simply because they participated in a sit-in at a local board. They
remembered the 1965 reclassification o f student protesters at Ann Arbor, Michigan and

34 Local Board Memorandum No. 85,24 Oct 1967, Califano files, box 55, LBJL;
Hershey to Members o f SSS, 26 Oct 1967, National Security Defense files, ND 9-4, box
148, LBJL;
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did not want to see it repeated.35
Since Hershey's instructions to local boards originated in his conversation with
the president, the general expected Johnson to back up his letters. Hershey, too.
remembered the outrage over the reclassification o f the Ann Arbor protesters. Therefore,
he sought to solidify his position by authoring an executive order on the subject which he
submitted to the White House for Johnson's signature, and thus, his endorsement. The
executive order would have changed the regulations so that the definition of delinquency
would include positive actions against the draft in addition to the standard provisions
requiring a failure to register or appear for induction. Anyone disrupting the operation of
a draft board, even through picketing or sitting-in. would become subject to prosecution.
As the first draft of the executive order circulated around the White House, such
sweeping language caused many aides to urge restraint.36
Severe criticism of Hershey also came simultaneously from the halls of Congress.
Senators Edward Kennedy. Philip Hart. Mark Hatfield. Jacob Javits. and others
cosponsored a bill to outlaw the drafting of protesters. In the House, John Moss, a
Democrat from California, led the charge against the Director. In a series of letters to
Hershey, Moss, then chair o f the Foreign Operations and Government Information
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, called repeatedly for
Hershey’s resignation. “Your October 26 'recommendations’ to local Selective Service

35 For letters, see National Security - Defense files, ND, Box 151, Nov - Dec 1967,
LBJL; “Demeaning the Draft Act," editorial, Boston Globe, 9 Nov 1967, p. 14; Eugene
Byrd telegram to LBJ, 11 Dec 1967, Hershey folder, Macy Files, LBJL.
36 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, pp. 260-261.
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Boards concerning reclassification procedures,” Moss wrote in the first missive, "can
only serve to underscore once again your callous disregard and contempt for the law, the
Constitution, and the rights o f Americans...! cannot comprehend how a person in your
position could exhibit so blatently [sic] a total lack o f understanding o f fundamental
democratic principles.” Hershey's often dense and nearly incomprehensible responses to
Moss only made matters worse. Moss finally responded to Hershey that his ‘rimintelligble
and wholly confused” reply demonstrated his “complete lack of understanding o f the
Selective Service Act and of the legal and constitutional provisions and limitations
governing [Hershey's] authority.” He again urged Hershey to resign.37
Several aides to the president joined the chorus o f protest regarding Hershey’s
directive and the executive order proposal. Although most o f them felt the same
contempt for the draft resisters as their boss, these advisers unanimously cautioned the
president (through Joe Califano) that signing Hershey’s executive order would be
extremely ill-advised. Special counsel Larry Temple, deputy special counsel Larry
Levinson, and White House aide Matt Nimetz each wrote to Califano urging the president

37 Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 262; Moss to Hershey, 17 Nov 1967, Califano
papers, Box 56, LBJL; Hershey to Moss, 13 Dec 1967, Califano papers. Box 56, LBJL;
Moss to Hershey, 15 Dec 1967, Califano papers, Box 56, LBJL. An example of Hershey’s
dense prose from the 13 Dec 1967 letter to Moss: "As I stated before, the charges which
you have levied against the operation of the System are based on your underlying
contention that actions or inactions inimical to the national interest because their
objective is to defeat the purpose of the selective service law should be construed solely
as violation o f the criminal law and prosecuted as such, and that they cannot serve as a
basis for local board action in carrying out the mandate o f the law that a deferment is
nothing but a temporary delay in consummating a man's statutory obligation to serve his
country and that such delay can be granted only where it is clearly demonstrated that the
national interest can be best served by such temporary delay.”
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to rein in Hershey and to avoid issuing the executive order. All three emphasized that
criminal courts - not draft boards - were the proper forums for imposing penalties on law
breakers and that a prison sentence - not service in the armed forces - was the most
appropriate punishment. "The obvious argument,” wrote Temple, "is that if induction is
to be used as a type o f punishment here then what are the hundreds of thousands o f young
men who serve willingly being punished for?” Califano agreed. In a memo to Johnson,
he wrote: "I believe it is important for you to stay out of this controversy” and
recommended against the executive order. He advised the president in this way not
because he thought Hershey had stepped out o f line. In fact, Califano speculated that
Hershey might actually have had the authority to reclassify draft resisters, and if he did.
he wrote to the president, "then he should continue to proceed on that basis...and keep
you out o f it.” Hershey, Califano urged, should be left to "carry the can” alone.38
Most important, however, the president’s own attorney general, Ramsey Clark,
disagreed with Hershey's new policy and proposed executive order. It complicated
matters that the two shared a long personal history. Hershey had known Ramsey Clark
and his father, former Supreme Court justice Tom Clark, for years. When the elder Clark
had been an assistant attorney general during the Second World War, he had prosecuted
some o f the earliest draft violation cases: he had also protested punitive reclassification of

38 Memo to LBJ from Larry Temple, 16 Nov 1967, attached to memo to LBJ from
Califano, 18 Nov 1967, Califano papers. Box 56, LBJL; Memo to Joe Califano from
Larry Levinson, 8 Nov 1967, Califano papers, Box 55, LBJL; Memo to LBJ from Matt
Nimetz, 16 Nov 1967. attached to memo to LBJ from Califano, 18 Nov 1967, Califano
papers, Box 56, LBJL; Memo to LBJ from Joe Califano, 14 Nov 1967, Califano papers,
Box 5 5 , LBJL.
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registrants at that time. In 1967, Tom Clark and Hershey were still working together (this
time with the Boy Scouts of America on Operation Patrick Henry, a public speaking
program for kids), but now Clark’s son was the nation’s chief law enforcement officer.
Hershey did not mind telling people that he had known the current attorney general since
young Ramsey’s high school years. For his part, Clark believed Hershey was “a little
nutty but basically sweet.” On the other hand, the Director’s new policies obviously had
not been authorized by Congress and Clark believed that there were '‘grave doubts” about
their constitutionality. Even if induction could be used as punishment, he wrote,
“registrants are certainly entitled to procedural due process in the proceedings for
determination of whether they have violated the law and should be punished.”39
Ramsey Clark's views on the prosecution of draft resisters originated in an
understanding much deeper than the law, however. In 1944, Clark, joined the Marines at
the age o f seventeen (though he was ineligible to go overseas), but many of his friends
chose to be conscientious objectors to the war. “In many ways, the most sensitive and
thoughtful and good (if there is such a thing) people among my classmates were those
who resisted,” he reflected in 1998. “And some of them were permanently hurt by the
social ostracization” that resulted among their peers. It made a lasting impression on the
future attorney general. Clark felt that the nation had “needlessly damaged many of [its]
best young people,” and that it should always seek to eschew doing so again. Inflicting
such pain on people o f conscience is not, he said, “a decent thing for a society to...expose

39 Lewis B. Hershey, interview with Harry B. Middleton, 15 Dec 1970, pp. 17-18,
LBJL; Ramsey Clark, interview with author, 6 Jan 1998; Ramsey Clark to Charles L.
Schultze, draft letter, 14 Nov 1967, Califano papers, Box 55, LBJL.
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people to.” In addition, Clark had seen enough draft law prosecutions to conclude that
those who lacked money or status, “the poorer and defenseless” were the ones who went
to jail:
And to see lonely youngsters (because it’s finally lonely when it happens
to you; you’re by yourself even if all your buddies get indicted, too, you’re
by yourself) face this alone, face this without resources more times than
not, face it without maturity or experience or background, is cruel and not
productive of the best law because the law wouldn’t be thoroughly
considered; each case would just be processed through.
Clark felt a duty to "avoid injuring innocent people.” Resisters, he believed, were not
innocent in the sense that they had not broken any laws, but innocent in that they were
“not engaged in an act of moral turpitude;” they were “acting on conscience and they
were probably right,” he said. About Vietnam era resisters, he later remarked: “These
are the gentlest we have. And these are the ones that we should want to protect the most,
perhaps. They tend to have more initiative - it’s a hell o f a lot easier to go than not to
go.” Consequently, he instructed all United States Attorneys that they were not to
prosecute a case based on an acceleration of induction which was premised on draft
resistance activity.40
The attorney general’s action - or inaction - displeased Johnson. Clark claims that
the president leaned on him only lightly, yet Joe Califano’s records recall a November 18
meeting between the president, Hershey and Clark in which Johnson started o ff by
demanding to know why the Justice Department had prosecuted only 1,300 o f 7,300 men
who had been arrested for failing to report for induction. Clark, who today is certain that

40 Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998; see also Tom Wells, The War Within, pp. 233-236.
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Hershey had been '‘pumping” the president with statistics on draft violators that were not
being prosecuted, responded that many o f these no-shows were unintentional and,
therefore, should not have been arrested in the first place. When he concluded by saying
that he was doing all he could under current law, the president blustered. “If you need
more laws, submit your suggestions at once!” Shortly after the meeting, Johnson sent
another memorandum to Clark detailing every criminal statute on sabotage, espionage,
and interference with the government. He directed Clark to pass the information along to
all United States Attorneys with instructions to prosecute anyone who participated in
illegal acts covered by these laws. “If you need ftirther legislation in this connection.”
Johnson again commanded, '‘please submit your suggestions at once.” Indeed, when
Congressman Mendel Rivers heard about Clark’s concerns regarding punitive
reclassifications, he said '‘if there exists the slightest doubt in the attorney general’s mind
that General Hershey’s action is not fully supported by the law, he need only say so and I
am certain the Congress will correct any deficiency.”41
Despite the president's intense interest in ensuring that draft resisters be pursued
by the Justice Department, and his own role in encouraging Hershey to go after protesters
notwithstanding, Johnson ultimately grew tentative on the issue o f reclassifying resisters.

He offered no public sign of support to Hershey and the general’s executive order
proposal never made it out o f the White House. And when Johnson received advance
warning of an unflattering New York Times article on Hershey in early December, he

41 Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998; Wells, The War Within, p. 234; Califano, The
Triumph and Tragedy o f Lyndon Johnson, p. 201.
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brought Hershey together with Ramsey Clark again to issue a joint announcement on the
subject which he hoped would lay to rest any more concerns regarding the director’s
memoranda on punitive reclassification. Before the White House released the statement,
Johnson himself read it and. according to Joe Califano. approved ’’every word of it.”42
Both Clark and Hershey compromised on the content o f the communique.
Hershey consented to leave lawful protesters alone. There would be no more Ann
Arbors, a point repeatedly emphasized in most press reports. But Clark gave up even
more. Despite his own experiences as a young man and his philosophical beliefs
regarding the prosecution o f those acting on conscience, the attorney general went along
with Hershey’s existing policy of reclassifying those who turned in their draft cards, and
pledged the Department's cooperation in prosecuting those who refused an accelerated
induction resulting from reclassification:
A registrant who violates any duty affecting his own status (for example,
giving false information, failing to appear for an examination, or failing to
have a draft card) may be declared a ’delinquent’ registrant by his local
draft board... When a person is declared to be a delinquent registrant by his
local board, he may be reclassified and becomes subject to the highest
priority for induction if otherwise qualified. If he fails to step forward for
induction, he is subject to prosecution by the Department o f Justice. This
procedure is firmly established, approved by the courts, and has been
followed since the enactment of the 1948 Selective Service Act, as well as
under earlier Selective Service Acts.
The Justice Department, meanwhile, would not prosecute a draft resister simply for
failing to possess his draft card. In addition, the statement indicated that the Department
planned to form a special unit in the Criminal Division in Washington to oversee the

42 Flynn, The Draft, pp. 217-218; Califano, pp. 201-202;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

*

262
prosecution o f draft law violators. U.S. Attorneys across the country could expect to
work closely with this new unit in bringing cases against draft resisters in their cities.43
Most lawyers within the Justice Department regarded the joint statement as a
victory for the Attorney General: it stopped Hershey from targeting demonstrators and
made no commitment to prosecute men who returned their draft cards. Years later,
however, as Ramsey Clark reflected upon his acquiescence to Hershey’s reclassification
and induction policy, he acknowledged the difficult situation in which he found himself
during that period. Even though he saw draft card tum-ins as an issue o f free speech and
an expression o f conscience, he felt obligated to uphold the Selective Service laws. Clark
believed that if one accepted the idea of a conscription system like Selective Service
(which he did because he thought it was “more compatible with civilian authority and
government, and less likely to lead to militarism”), then the Selective Service rules had to
be upheld. “As much as I opposed the war,” he said, “the law has to have integrity. It
has to do what it says even if what it says is wrong. I thought, therefore, that I had to act
to protect the Selective Service System.”44
At the same time, however, Ramsey Clark took another approach to the draft
resistance issue. He asked John Van de Kamp to head up the Criminal Division’s new
special unit on draft resistance, and rather than have him focus on individual draft law

43 “Joint Statement by Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Director o f Selective
Service Lewis B. Hershey,” 9 Dec 1967, Califano papers, Box 55, LBJL; Flynn, The
Draft, pp. 217-218; Califano, pp. 201-202.
44 John Van de Kamp describes the joint statement as a victory for the DOJ: Van
de Kamp interview, 9 Jun 1998; Clark interview, 29 Apr 1998.
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violators, Clark instructed Van de Kamp to look into the existence of a possible
conspiracy aimed at inducing young men to resist the d raft Clark was much more
concerned with the notion that older advisers were soliciting draft-age men to resist the
draft. Therefore, until the Department could make a determination on the conspiracy,
Clark directed all U.S. Attorneys to suspend prosecution o f men who had refused
induction when the call to report was based on a reclassification stemming from a prior
protest against the Vietnam War or against the Selective Service System.45
In the end, in spite of Clark's concessions, the joint statement did little to allay the
controversy caused by General Hershey’s October instructions to local boards. To the
president’s dismay, Hershey violated an agreement negotiated by Joe Califano that neither
Clark nor Hershey would discuss the issue with the press. Within days, the Selective
Service director told Neil Sheehan of the New York Times that the recent clarification did
not invalidate his October letter. Furthermore, he acknowledged a fundamental
difference o f opinion between himself and the attorney general regarding the definition of
delinquency. The original standard of delinquency required the failure of a registrant to
perform some duty required of him by the Selective Service Act. But Hershey wanted to
go after those who took some other form o f positive action against the draft. This is
where the disagreement with Ramsey Clark arose, he told Sheehan. “When a fellow goes
into a draft board and pours ink on his own file, then there’s no disagreement,” Hershey
said, “he’s affecting his own status. But when he goes in and pours ink on his brother’s

45 Clark interview, 29 April 1998; Van de Kamp interview, 9 Jun 1998;
McDonough interview, 3 Jun 1998.
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file - there's the disagreement." In the latter case, Hershey would declare the perpetrator
delinquent and accelerate his induction process. Clark, on the other hand, would not
assert delinquency, but would have him prosecuted for criminal conduct. Sheehan's
piece caused further outrage among the w ar's critics the public and left Hershey
backpedaling.46
Suddenly, the “embarrassing public spectacIe”of Clark and Hershey feuding
challenged the already beleaguered president. Califano appealed to Johnson for some
kind of decision, com plaining that Hershey “keeps citing you [Johnson] to Ramsey and
me as authority for his earlier memorandum.” Still, the president tried to stay out of the
way. Only when the presidents of eight Ivy League colleges and universities signed a
letter of protest did Johnson instruct Califano to write to them with the pledge that he did
not advocate using the draft as "an instrument to repress and punish unpopular views."
This, too, did little to settle the issue. As Colonel Paul Feeney, the Massachusetts
Director of Selective Service noted, the joint statement reinforced existing policy. Illegal
forms of protest, he said, included nonpossession or mutilation of draft cards; therefore,
anyone turning in or burning a draft card could expect to be reclassified and called for
induction. Only the courts would be able to settle the issue once and for all, and it
seemed apparent that in 1968 they would get their chance as dozens of draft resisters

46 Neil Sheehan, “Hershey Upholds Induction Policy,” New York Times, 12 Dec
1967, p. 16; Califano, pp. 202-203; Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, p. 265; Flynn, The Draft, p.
218.
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challenged punitive reclassification across the country that fall.47
Each of the four thousand local draft boards in the United States, it seems,
handled draft resisters differently. Unfortunately, the Selective Service System destroyed
all of its local board records in the late 1970s when the agency went into “Deep Standby”
status, making it impossible to leam how individual draft boards interpreted directives
from General Hershey. But the anecdotal evidence that survives shows that some boards
clearly took a hard-line approach, and immediately reclassified resisters per Hershey’s
instructions. By 1 Dec 1967, draft boards declared approximately 25 of the men who had
turned in their draft cards at the Arlington Street Church delinquent and changed their
classifications to 1-A. Eventually, almost two-thirds of Boston’s draft resisters (64%)
received reclassification notices from their draft boards.48
When the New England Resistance realized that the government might first adopt
this reclassification approach instead of, say, indicting resisters immediately for failure to
carry their draft cards, the organization urged resisters to notify the Resistance office
promptly if they thought their local boards might take that course. They then directed
resisters to a group of lawyers who would plan an “aggressive legal injunction as soon as
possible,” before the resister received an induction notice. As the new year approached,
more and more men needed the legal assistance offered by a growing number o f antiwar

47 Califano, pp. 202-203: Flynn. Lewis B. Hershey, p. 265; “Hershey’s Order is
Affecting Few,” New York Times. 17 Dec 1967, p. 15.
48 Lewis Brodsky (SSS Public Affairs Officer) e-mail to author, 29 Apr 1998,
author’s files; From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: 77 (63.6%) out o f 121
resisters were reclassified to I -A.
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lawyers. O f course, draft resisters simply could have let the Selective Service reclassify
them and call them for induction; in turn, the resisters would refuse induction and.
consistent with their goal of bogging down the court system, await prosecution (as some,
indeed, did: see Chapter 7). The sense of strength derived from the October 16 service,
however, led them to seek confrontation with the government not just in the courts, but
anywhere they could find it. Legal injunctions against local boards fit neatly into the
broader strategy of putting their bodies "‘upon the gears of the machine.”49
Some draft boards, however, did not follow General Hershey’s instructions with
the same degree of enthusiasm as others did. Many, it seems, actually tried to give
resisters a second chance and, consequently, tested some resisters' commitment to their
cause. David Clennon. the Yale Drama School graduate student, and Bob Bruen, the
Northeastern University undergraduate, both were offered new draft cards with their
student deferments intact. In Bruen’s case, his local board, located in Malden,
Massachusetts, wrote to him to tell him that he should apply for a new draft card if he had
lost or misplaced his originals. Three weeks later, when Bruen did not reply, they simply
sent him a new card with his original deferment. Clennon’s draft board in Waukegan.
Illinois did the same thing (though without the preliminary letter). Here again, the
Resistance had warned its members that their draft boards might try to tempt them,
“bribe” them, “with a luxurious determent or exemption.” If that happened. Resistance
leaders advised the rank-and-file to “treat it just like...the last one.” Soon after receiving

49 The Resistance, National Newsletter #2, I Dec 1967, MKFP; NER Newsletter,
25 Oct 1967, MKFP.
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a new card from his draft board, Clennon turned it in at ceremony in New Haven similar
to the one at Arlington Street. A small number o f resisters chose not to be so aggressive.
Out o f 121 resisters surveyed for this study, nineteen (15.7%) either asked their draft
board for a new draft card or accepted the unsolicited one sent to them. Bob Bruen, for
instance, simply did nothing after his draft board sent him a new card. He did not carry it
with him but neither did he send it back. Bruen figured that someone on his local board
knew his father, a career military man. and decided to give him another chance; perhaps
his father intervened on his own. To this day, Bruen is not sure why his draft board did
not go after him. In any case, he decided not to return the new card back. ‘"I just took it
as it was pointless to push it." he said later, '"because if they chose to pretend that I didn't
do anything wrong, they weren't that interested.” Draft boards did not have to worry
about resisters who. for whatever reason, did not rise to the challenge and resist all over
again. Naturally, this greatly simplified the situation for both the resister and his local
board.50
In contrast, some resisters heard little or sometimes nothing from their local
boards. Given the intensity of debate regarding official response to resisters in
Washington, that some men would be altogether ignored seemed odd. After all, the
strategy of turning in one’s draft appealed to many men because they believed it made it
easier for the government to track them down. Thirty years later, the reasons behind draft
board inconsistencies are no more obvious, but the example of Boston’s resistance

50 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Bruen interview, 13 Aug 1997; NER
Newsletter, 25 Oct 1967, MKFP; From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: 19
(15.7%) of 121 resisters accepted or asked for a new draft card.
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co mm unity offers some clues. In Boston. 27 out of 105 (25.7%) men who turned in their

draft cards (this does not include those who burned their draft cards) were not contacted
at all by their draft boards following their act o f defiance. The majority o f this group
were much older than the average resister. In fact. 12 of the 18 resisters over the age of
26 - two-thirds - were left alone by their draft boards. In these cases, it seems, local
boards decided to go after the men more likely to be drafted once stripped of their
deferments. In other instances, some draft boards appear to have steered clear o f
resistance movement leaders. Alex Jack’s draft board, for instance, never contacted him
after October 16 even though he was classified 1-A when he returned his card. Bill Hunt,
on the other hand, received a letter from his Akron, Ohio draft board demanding to know
why they suddenly found themselves in possession o f his draft card. They instructed him
to explain himself either in Akron or at the nearest draft board. Rather than return to
Ohio, Hunt visited the Cambridge draft board with a film crew led by Norm Fruchter of
Newsreel. There he made a speech about the war to several bewildered draft board
secretaries. He never heard from his draft board (or a U.S. Attorney) again. That Hunt
held a fatherhood deferment (3-A) at the time may have contributed to his draft board’s
reluctance in punishing him, but it could be that the Akron draft board, like Alex Jack’s,
wanted nothing to do with a crusading draft resister. Drafting him would only make a
martyr o f him and give him a forum for more antiwar speeches.51

51 From the 1997 survey o f Boston draft resisters: 27 (25.7%) o f 105 resisters
heard little or no response from their draft boards after turning in their cards; 12 (66.7%)
o f 18 resisters over the age o f 26 were never contacted by their local draft boards; Jack
interview, 21 Mar 1997; Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
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Perhaps the most striking instance of the government ignoring a draft resister
(purposefully or not) occurred in the case o f former Boston University News editor, Ray
Mungo. During Mungo’s tenure at the school paper, the News had become a leading
critic of the Johnson Administration's policies in Vietnam. Mungo’s name and image
became well-known throughout the city. After turning in his draft card on October 16,
Mungo’s Lawrence, Massachusetts draft board called him for induction (he was I-A at
the time of the tum-in). Mungo responded by doing just about everything he could to
draw the government’s ire. About 600 people turned out at the gates of the Boston Army
Base on the morning of Mungo's scheduled pre-induction physical and watched him
stand on the hood of a car, tear up his induction papers and cast them into the frigid
coastal wind. He never set foot on the base itself and thus did not appear for his physical.
Despite this flagrant violation o f the law. neither the Selective Service nor the Justice
Department moved to punish him. He received additional orders for physicals and
induction, and the FBI interviewed him several times, but nothing ever came o f it.
Today. Mungo is certain that his notoriety in Boston protected him from prosecution, 'i t
was an open and shut case," he said. "I expected to be prosecuted...but they never
prosecuted me...I can only conclude that they didn't want to give me the right to make a
martyr out o f myself’52
And so, for many resisters, the wait continued. In the first weeks and months
following October 16. draft resisters were left with few clues about how the

52 Ray Mungo, interview with author, 13 Jun 1997; Ray Mungo, Famous Long
Ago: My Life and Hard Times With Liberation News Service (New York: Citadel, 1990),
p. 87.
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administration would react to their protest. The experience o f earlier draft resisters like
the men from the Committee for Non-Violent Action led the new resisters to believe that
their dissent would be handled with dispatch by law enforcement authorities. After all.
the CNVA men were indicted within a month o f their protest. Yet. despite FBI
interviews, no arrests or indictments followed October 16. Even the proposed response
o f Selective Service - the reclassification o f resisters - clearly did not have the full support
o f everyone in Washington. Resisters had no choice but to wait. But as they waited,
other consequences o f their actions began to unfold. Family members, friends,
employers, and others expressed concern. Resistance organizers, meanwhile, had to plan
to settle in for a long fight with the government rather than a quick knockout. They
needed more financial and moral support. Most important, they needed to maintain the
momentum generated on October 16.
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CHAPTER VI

GETTING BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THEIR FRIENDS

You all know me and are aware that I am unable to remain silent.
At times to be silent is to lie. For silence can be interpreted as
acquiescence.
Miguel de Unamuno, Salamanca, Spain, 1936
On the eve of the October 16 draft card turn-in at the Arlington Street Church,
David Clennon wrote a letter to his parents from his New Haven apartment. He drank
heavily that night, downing somewhere between a half-gallon and a gallon o f cheap wine
as he wrestled with the prospect of returning his draft card. He found himself, he later
said, without "anybody that I could really confide in." After vomiting at least once, he
dropped the letter to his folks and another to his Waukegan, Illinois, draft board into a
street comer mailbox. Although Clennon awoke the next morning with a mean hangover,
he drove to Boston with some friends and, inspired by Howard Zinn’s speech, he turned
in his draft card.1
A few days after the Arlington Street ceremony. Virginia and Cecil Clennon
received their son’s letter. They were not pleased. David's 16 year-old sister, Jean,
immediately noticed the tension. Ordinarily, whenever her brother wrote home from
Yale, her parents left the letters out for Jean to read. This time, however, they broke with
protocol and when Jean inquired about the letter she knew had arrived, her mother
withheld it. “Your brother’s done something bad,” she explained in a tone that Jean

1Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997.
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understood to mean that there would be no further discussion. The 16 year-old walked
away pu l l ed, wondering just what kind of crime her brother had committed.2
Virginia Clennon, in particular, always maintained her family’s privacy
assiduously and although no one knows the extent to which she and her husband
discussed David’s situation between themselves, to others she limited mention of it to
brief one-sentence pronouncements. Jean, who lived in the same house, for example, last
heard her mother refer to it that first night after the letter came. She said, simply, ”your
father is going out to see Dave,” and they never talked about it again, even after her father
returned from Connecticut. Likewise. Virginia brought up David’s situation only rarely
to her own sister Joan, and never mentioned it to her older daughter. Kathy, both of whom
lived in Waukegan, too.3
Meanwhile, the tension between David and his parents sharpened. As Clennon’s
mother had told his sister. Cecil Clennon boarded a plane bound for New Haven within
days of receiving the letter. There he hoped, as David later recalled, to 'talk some sense”
into his son. But the younger Clennon anticipated the visit and arranged for a meeting
between his father and Yale chaplain. William Sloane Coffin. David figured that since
his parents were ’'good Catholics,” talking to a man of the cloth (event though Coffin was
Presbyterian) might help his father to better understand his position. The meeting did not

2 Jean Kirkland, telephone conversation with author, 10 Sep 1998 (notes in
author’s files).
3 Kirkland conversation, 10 Sep 1998; Kathy Bower, telephone conversation with
author, 28 Jul 1998 (notes in author’s files); Joan Dehmlow, telephone conversation with
author, 24 Sep 1998 (notes in author’s files).
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go well. Although it remained respectful. Cecil Clennon disagreed emphatically with
Coffin’s views of the war. He expressed his concern for his son’s well-being and left
without being comforted or persuaded by the pastor. Before he returned to Illinois.
Clennon urged his son to seek a job teaching in the inner city; David’s draft board would
give him a deferment, he reasoned, and he would send money to David to support
him self. The son refused and a kind o f cold war began between them.4

The FBI soon made the crisis in the Clennon family even worse. Within weeks o f
the draft card turn-in. two agents from the Chicago field office knocked on the door o f the
Clennons house in Waukegan. They were not home. Undeterred, the agents went next
door and spoke to their neighbors, inquiring about David. Naturally, word slowly began
to spread that the son of Cecil and Virginia Clennon was in trouble with the FBI. It is
unlikely that the FBI had any legitimate reason to inquire with anyone about David
Clennon or his whereabouts. His case, no doubt, had been referred to them by his local
board after receiving his letter and/or draft card; they had all the information they needed
to find him. These visits were aimed more at pressuring parents into getting their sons to
reconsider their actions. And a visit to the neighbors added a twist; the possibility that
one’s peers might learn of a son’s illegal activities/
The threat o f such humiliation could be a powerful motivator. Except for David,
the Clennons never told anyone else about the FBI visit, not even their daughters or other

4 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; David Clennon, telephone interview with
author, 17 Jun 1998.
5 Clennon interveiw, 12 Jun 1997.
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relatives. Virginia Clennon. her sister said, •‘wanted everything to be right, to look right,
to seem right...[she] didn't- want any crises in her life." Both her son's defiance and the
potential embarrassment of a public trial caused considerable anxiety. “I sensed from
her,” David reflected years later, “that it would be a profound humiliation just to have a
son on trial for anything, never mind a matter of principle...she feared that there would be
a tinge of the unpatriotic about it.” David’s sister Kathy confirmed that her parents •‘were
extremely concerned with ‘what would people think?’” And so, when another Waukegan
youth, Bill Drew, went on trial for “crimes” arising out of his own antiwar activism, but
was supported by his parents. Virginia Clennon remarked to her sister that “of course the
Drews are a house united whereas we are a house divided.”6
It would be a mistake, however, to view the Clennons’ reaction to their son’s draft
resistance as rooted solely in a fear of public embarrassment, for the source of their
response grew out of the complicated dynamics o f familial relationships. According to
David Clennon, his father was a dedicated family man. A veteran o f World War II (he
served in a clerical position in North Africa), Cecil Clennon worked as an accountant and
later a data processing supervisor for the Johns Manville Corporation from 1946 until he
retired. He worked 9 to 5 every day. rarely more, and always put his family first. He was
very active in the Boy Scouts, serving as Scoutmaster of the Mount Vemon, New York
troop to which David belonged. Under his father’s guidance, David became an Eagle
Scout at 13 and also won the Ad Altare Dei award for outstanding Catholic scout.

6 Clennon interview, 17 Jun 1998; Bower conversation, 28 Jul 1998; Dehmlow
conversation, 24 Sep 1998.
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Clennon’s mother was a homemaker and local Democratic Party activist. Both o f his
parents were lifelong Democrats and encouraged their children to get involved in
mainstream politics; in 1960. they urged David and his sister Kathy to campaign door-todoor in support o f John F. Kennedy. In 1964 they, o f course, supported Lyndon Johnson.7
The Clennons, then, were an active, liberal, middle-class family, and in 1967, with
the exception o f David, they still believed in their president. Lyndon Johnson possessed
more information than the general public knew, they thought, and must have good reason
for pursuing the current course in Vietnam. Consequently, they very much disapproved
o f their son's protest - especially his method of protest - against the war. In addition, as
members of the World War II generation, the Clennons harbored a strong sense o f duty to
one’s country. Not only did Cecil Clennon serve in the war, but both of Virginia’s
brothers fought in it. too, including one who did not come home. Although David’s
sister, Kathy, believes today that her mother would have been devastated if David had
been drafted, her Aunt Joan (Virginia’s sister) thinks Cecil would have been proud to tell
his friends that his son was in the Army.*
Eventually, after many months of tension, Virginia and Cecil Clennon softened
their position somewhat; they came to respect their son’s views o f the Vietnam war if not
his tactics. Mrs. Clennon finally told David that she and her husband would stand by
David even though they remained bewildered about his decision to choose draft resistance

7 Clennon interview, 17 Jun 1998; Bower conversation, 28 Jul 1998.
8 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Bower conversation, 28 Jul 1998; Dehmlow
conversation, 24 Sep 1998.
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as his form of protest. They still hoped he would find some way to lodge his protest
without being indicted, tried, and imprisoned. They feared for his safety and were
concerned about the ramifications draft resistance might have for his future. Reflecting
on it years later. David recalled his own confusion about their attitudes: *T of course
thought I was acting on values that I had learned from them.”9
Although parental reaction varied significantly from one resister to another, many
resisters found themselves trying, like David Clennon, to explain their actions to parents
who either did not approve or did not understand. Some draft resisters did receive steady
support from their parents, but others, hoping for comfort (if not validation) from their
parents, found themselves confronted instead with ambivalence, disappointment, and
sometimes hostility. In addition, many resisters did not anticipate the wider chain
reaction that their protest often set off. Some were fired from their jobs; others were
cajoled by friends who thought they had gone too far. The parishes where at least two
seminarians worked erupted in controversy as some parishioners expressed outrage at the
young ministers’ protest while others rallied to their defense. Resisters expected that
their protest would incur the wrath o f their government, but this kind o f extensive ripple
effect often caught them off guard - and it made resistance more difficult.
At the same time that resisters faced the unpredictable reactions of non-resisters,
however, support came from a growing number of citizens who decided to take up the
cause o f draft resistance. Older "adult" supporters, in particular, formed organizations
designed to raise money to keep groups like the New England Resistance afloat and also

9 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997.
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to pay for bail and court costs once the anticipated crack-down occurred. Lawyers and
law students started groups that studied every intricacy o f draft laws with hopes of
challenging the legality of local draft board actions and certain Selective Service policies,
especially punitive reclassification. These organizations and the people who joined them
greatly bolstered the draft resistance cause in the weeks and months following October
16. Thus, as resisters awaited the federal government’s official response to their protest,
they confronted criticism and ambivalence from those to whom they traditionally looked
for support while they were simultaneously sustained by new groups o f people unknown
to them before their resistance. This chapter examines the dynamics o f those
relationships and the effects they had on resisters and the draft resistance movement as a
whole.
All in th e Fam ily

After October 16. many resisters learned that following through on their
commitment to confront the draft and the war meant they also had to face repercussions
that they did not at first anticipate. First among these was the effect o f their resistance on
their families, and especially their parents. To be sure, the responses on the part of
parents varied considerably, but some patterns do emerge from data gathered in a survey
of draft resisters conducted for this dissertation.. Most resisters' fathers, for example,
disapproved on some level: 46 of 82 respondents (56%) categorized their fathers as
either disapproving (22) or strongly disapproving (24) of their resistance (see Table 6.1 in
Appendix). Approximately 25 percent o f resisters’ fathers supported their sons while
another 18 percent were identified as non-committal. In a mild contrast, resisters’
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mothers seemed slightly more tolerant o f their sons’ behavior 47 percent disapproved of
their resistance while 21 percent were non-committal and 32 percent approved. Only
three couples split (i.e., mother and father disagreed), two o f which featured a mother
approving o f resistance while her husband did not. But among couples who agreed with
each other regarding their son’s resistance. 36 disapproved to 18 approving - a 2 to 1
margin.10 The numbers do not tell the whole story, however; the reasons for disapproving
or approving o f a draft resister in the family varied greatly.
In some cases, such as David Clennon's, parents believed the government had
more information than the general public knew and. therefore, could reasonably expect
support from the citizens it represented. Ray Mungo, for example, saw his parents as
“pretty apolitical.” They toiled in factories in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and had always
voted for the Democrats - especially the Kennedy s. An 8 by 10 inch photograph o f John
F. Kennedy hung in the living room o f their home. When their son, Ray (named after an
uncle killed in France during the Second World War), resisted the draft from atop the
hood of a car outside the Boston Army Base. Ray recalls, they were ‘‘freaked out.” They
did not want any of their three sons to go to Vietnam, but they likewise could not
understand why one o f them would try to get thrown in jail. Mungo’s parents may not
have liked the war in Vietnam, but they grudgingly maintained the attitude that one

10 From the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters: 116 resisters responded to the
survey, though only 82 responded to the question about their father’s reaction to draft
resistance (34 were left blank or marked N/A) and 95 responded to the question about
their mother’s reaction.
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should obey one’s government."
In other instances, draft resistance hit a family as the final blow in a series of
indignities ultimately resulting in estrangement between a son and his parents. By the
time Chris Venn resisted and prompted his extradition to Texas, his parents were resigned
to accepting that he had - at 20 years old - stepped out from under their influence. No
arguments resulted, but Venn's parents, although they went to El Paso, offered no support
for his stand on the war or the draft. The philosophical gulf that existed between some
resisters and their parents frequently meant that the issue went undiscussed. In rare
cases, though, the initial disaffection created from draft resistance could be bridged. Neil
Robertson’s father, for example, at first saw his son’s draft card tum-in as the culmination
o f troubles that began with his withdrawal from Dartmouth College. Robertson’s parents
chose to break off contact, and essentially "disowned” him. When Robertson informed
his fellow resisters of his deteriorating relationship with his parents, one of them
suggested that he send them a copy of Howard Zinn’s book, Vietnam: The Logic o f
Withdrawal and the Selective Service memo on channeling. Two weeks later, his parents
wrote a letter of apology and told him that they supported his resistance. In an amazing
transformation, Robertson’s mother soon got involved with antiwar and women’s
liberation activism; his father went to Chicago in August 1968 as a delegate for Eugene
McCarthy but was arrested after leaving the convention to march with comedian and
presidential candidate Dick Gregory. Neil Robertson then posted bail for his father.12

11 Mungo interview, 13 Jun 1997.
12Venn interview, 12 Jun 1997; Robertson interview, 24 Aug 1997.
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There is not much evidence to suggest that many parents did completely disown
their sons because of draft resistance. The New England Resistance Master File noted
that the parents of one resister from Northeastern University should not be contacted
because, as the card read, they “don't want anything to do with him /’ Such cases seem
rare, however. What appears to have occurred more frequently is that resisters who knew
their parents well enough to realize that resistance would not meet with their approval,
consequently, chose not to discuss it with them. As one resister wrote, “while I never
informed my parents o f my ’activities.' if I had I’m sure their reaction would have fallen
into the ’strongly disapproved’ category.” There did not seem to be much of a reason for
a resister to talk about his resistance activity with parents who he knew would not
understand or would not approve; they experienced enough stress just waiting for the FBI
to visit. Debates with Mom and Dad over draft resistance would not improve the
situation. This actually made matters easier for those resisters who expected disapproval.
Resisters such as David Clennon who were not sure how their parents would respond,
only to experience disapproval, suffered the most. *T thought they might well
disapprove,” Clennon reflected in 1998. ”1 hoped they would understand. I hoped that
they would see my actions as a reflection of values that I learned from them.” 13
Some parents could understand their sons’ outrage over the war but disagreed
with their method of protest. Total non-cooperation seemed too extreme. Virginia

13 Master File, New England Resistance, AJP; Respondent number 105, 1997
survey o f Boston draft resisters. Note: this propensity to resist without discussing it with
parents may account for the high proportion of responses marked “not applicable” with
respect to parental reaction; Clennon interview, 17 Jun 1998.
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Clennon thought David’s willful surrender of his deferment was foolhardy. Similarly,
Homer Jack, the father of New England Resistance founder Alex Jack, would have
preferred that his son seek conscientious objector status while still protesting against the
war. The parents o f Michael Zigmond, a postdoctoral fellow at MET, saw futility in the
strategy of draft resistance. Michael and his comrades would never get enough men to
resist the draft to actually slow or stop the war, they asserted. But Zigmond himself
argued that if he wanted to continue speaking out against the war, doing so would be
much easier if he refused to cooperate with the Selective Service than if he did submit to
their rules.14
Most of all, parents o f resisters just worried. They worried about their sons’
safety and about their futures. When they learned o f a son’s decision to resist, the
prospect of a prison sentence loomed most prominently in their minds. Most middle class
parents could not bear to think o f one of their children in a place as alien to their placid
suburban lifestyles as a federal penitentiary. On one level, then, they quickly grew
concerned with the physical protection of their law-breaking sons. This describes the
parents of Ray Mungo and David Clennon. And this concern for safety was not limited to
parents who disapproved of draft resistance. Indeed, several respondents indicated that
although they supported them, their folks could not help but be nervous and anxious
about the course of action chosen by their boys. One resister said that both of his parents
were “fearful of the effects o f a jail term on me,” and another noted that his parents did

14 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Jack interview, 21 Mar 1997; Zigmond
interview, 29 Dec 1997.
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not want him to go to jail any more than they wanted him to go to Vietnam. Like parents
who have given so much o f themselves to raise a child until he is eighteen or nineteen
years old only to see him drafted into the army, the parents of resisters feared losing their
sons - not on a battlefield but in a prison. They also feared how American society might
treat them years later, long after the war ended.
Resistance simply did not fit the vision o f life that parents planned for their
children. Harold Hector’s family thought his draft resistance activity as both a resister
and a draft counselor might keep him from ever getting a decent job. Women who
worked in draft resistance organizations especially heard this line o f thinking from their
parents. The father of Connie Field, a full-time worker in the New England Resistance
office after October 16. kept telling her that if she kept this kind of behavior up, she
would never get a good position working for the government. Likewise, the parents o f
Bliss Matteson, an office manager for the Boston Draft Resistance Group, feared that she
was losing out in the "career chase.” Years later. Matteson’s summary of the effect o f her
draft resistance work on her relationship with her parents seems to fit the experience of
most participants: draft resistance, she said, "didn’t really wreck our relationship, but I
think it was very hard for them.”15
At the same time, o f course, that 25 per cent or so of parents who supported their
resister sons included the rare few who cut an image o f fearlessness. Howard Marston of

15 Mungo interview, 13 Jun 1997; Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Respondents
numbers 50 and 150, from the 1997 survey of Boston draft resisters; Hector interview, 9
April 1997; Connie Field, interview with author, 17 Jun 1997; Bliss Matteson, interview
with author, 29 Aug 1997.
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Rockport, Massachusetts, took the position that until his son, Howard "Chick,” Jr.,
reached the age o f 21, he and Chick’?m other were responsible for him. Therefore, the
elder Marston forbade his son to submit to the draft. Chick later recalled that he had his
parents’ “full support and then some.” At times he felt that his parents - especially his
father - “really pushed” him into resistance much stronger than he might have gone
himself. By the time he refused induction (see Chapter Seven), Marston’s father had
become a virtual fixture on Boston TV newscasts and in the papers. Reporters found the
flamboyant Marston. Sr.. to be articulate and controversial so they covered his son's draft
case closely. Unlike Harold Hector’s parents, who lamented that their son’s activities
might jeopardize his future, Chick Marston’s father pushed him into those same
endeavors.16
On the whole, very few parents took their support of their sons’ resistance as far
as Howard Marston. In fact, most disapproved of draft resistance and were frequently
bewildered by their sons’ actions. Resisters who hoped for support from home, then,
often had to turn elsewhere. David Clennon found some comfort in regular telephone
discussions with his Aunt Joan, but many resisters found that just as their parents
disapproved, so too did others from whom they might ordinarily expect support.
Sometimes resisters overestimated the amount of sympathy that they could hope for from
others; they found that draft resistance could get pretty lonely.
U nexpected Consequences

If some resisters could have predicted a possible clash with their parents following

16 Marston interview, 13 Dec 1997.
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their protest others did not anticipate the fallout that resulted in their places of
employment their schools, or among others from whom they thought they could expect
understanding. In one o f its first post-October 16 newsletters the New England

Resistance called on its readers to help assemble a job file for resisters “in the event they
are fired.” In just a short time, a few resisters had lost their jobs because of their
expression of dissent and the Resistance hoped that sympathetic employers and friends
would be able to provide temporary or permanent work for those who lost their jobs.17
The Reverend J. Michael Jupin. newly installed as an associate rector at an
Episcopal church in Winchester, Massachusetts (8 miles north of Boston) learned the
hard way about the combustible effect that could be generated by one man’s decision to
part with his draft card. News of Jupin turning in his registration certificate to William
Sloane Coffin at the Arlington Street Church on October 16 hit his place of employment,
the Parish of the Epiphany, like a tsunami. Neither Jupin, 25, nor the church’s rector, the
Reverend Jack Bishop, had any idea that they were about to set off a firestorm of protest
when they announced Jupin’s resistance in the weekly parish newsletter. Three Crowns o f
the Epiphany. Indeed, Bishop (who wrote the newsletter) sandwiched the rather matterof-fact announcement of Jupin’s stand between other routine parish notes. He indicated
that Jupin returned his draft card and wrote that the associate rector would report on his
draft protest (and his experience in the march on the Pentagon) in a sermon on November
26. Here, however, Bishop misjudged his flock. Most parishioners, it turned out, could
not wait over a month to hear from Jupin - or from Bishop. Not a few assumed that

17NER Newsletter, undated (c. Early Nov 1967), AJP.
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Jupin’s resistance and Bishop's support o f it had been planned ahead o f time and felt
insulted that the parish had not first been consulted. They demanded explanations almost
as soon as the newsletters landed in their m ailboxes.18
Both Mike Jupin and Jack Bishop arrived at Epiphany with a history o f social
activism. In the year or so that they had worked there, they sought to raise the parish’s
level of concern with respect to contemporary issues of social justice and, in particular,
civil rights. Bishop came to Winchester in the autumn of 1966 straight from a sabbatical
leave at the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge where he worked under Harvey
Cox. (A theologian and sociologist, Cox stressed making religious faith relevant in an
increasingly secular American society. His first book. The Secular City ( 1965), became a
popular best seller.) Prior to his year in Cambridge, Jack Bishop had been active in the
civil rights movement. He marched from Selma to Montgomery with Martin Luther
King, Jr., and later did civil rights work in Boston. Early in 1967, Bishop went to
Washington to join the first mobilization organized against the war by Clergy and Laity
Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV). Similarly, Mike Jupin had answered the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s call for college students to protest
segregation in St. Augustine, Florida in April 1964, the month before King himself would
bring national attention to that city’s racist ordinances. In addition, Jupin had been
protesting American involvement in Vietnam since November 1965 when he participated
in the SANE-sponsored march on Washington. He first came to the Parish o f the

18 Jack Bishop, interview with author, 11 Dec 1997; Michael Jupin, interview with
author, 28 Dec 1997; “The Draft, Conscience, and the Church," Three Crowns o f the
Epiphany, 22 Oct 1967, pp. 1-2, Papers o f Jack Bishop (hereafter cited as JBP).
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Epiphany soon after Jack Bishop; then in his last year at the Episcopal Theological
School, he started as a student minister who became so well-liked by the congregation
that they hired him as assistant minister when he graduated from seminary in June 1967.
Given their personal histories, then, Mike Jupin’s decision to resist the draft and Jack
Bishop's readiness to support him did not seem unusual, at least not to the two o f them .19
The parishioners, led by their wardens (elected representatives of the
congregation), however, found these developments to be highly irregular. The two
wardens, one a successful businessman and the other a retired Rear Admiral and veteran
o f World War II, asked Rev. Bishop for a special meeting on October 21. Almost
immediately, the former Navy man defined this crisis as the worst the parish had known
in its 85 year history. The two asked Bishop how they could “get rid of Mike.” When a
stunned Jack Bishop replied, "you get rid o f the rector.” the meeting ended at an
impasse.20
Bishop later said that he should have seen this kind o f reaction coming. He
viewed Winchester, a wealthy town, as a “very conservative suburb” that attracted highly
educated working professionals from the city. The parish itself, made up of 1,200
baptized members, flourished economically. In one o f his first meetings with the wardens
the year before, one o f the two suggested that Bishop bring the American flag forward for
the singing o f “God Bless America” at the start of every service. He refused. He later

19Bishop interview, 11 Dec 1997; Jupin interview, 28 Dec 1997.
20 Rev. Jack Bishop, “Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” unpublished paper, 18
Dec 1967, p. 3, JBP.
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regarded this as representative o f the parish’s patriotism and a clear harbinger of the
request for a meeting following the announcement o f Michael Jupin’s draft card tum-in.
But Bishop did not notice it at the time. And in the meantime, he had been pleased with
the way the church had responded to some initial social action work, especially with
respect to civil rights. He had no idea what he and his assistant were walking into in the
fall o f 1967.-'
On October 22, 1967, the day after the wardens sought Mike Jupin’s removal,
Jack Bishop spoke of the controversy from the pulpit. He noted that certain members of
the parish had expressed deep concern over the draft card tum-in and that he wanted
everyone to know that he supported Jupin in his protest. This did nothing to minimize the
unrest. Over the next week. Bishop felt obliged to set aside almost all o f his time for
“countless meetings, appointments, telephone calls” to let parishioners air their
complaints. One man, a respected Winchester physician and influential parish member,
came to see Bishop in those early days. As the rector later recalled the story, the doctor
told him, “Jack, I want you to know that I’ve been a member of this parish for twenty
years and I’ve been close to the clergy all along, and my family has been raised here, and
my kids have grown up here, and it means everything to us. And I have to say you’re the
worst thing that’s happened [to this church].” On Thursday, October 26, the Vestry (a
committee of members elected to administer the temporal affairs in the parish) convened
a special meeting to discuss the participation of their clergy in antiwar activities.

21 Bishop interview, 11 Dec 1997; Bishop, “Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” p.
2.
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Although two members o f the Vestry had already resigned in protest, no fireworks
erupted at this meeting. Instead, the group recommended that Bishop and Jupin address
the issue squarely the following Sunday, October 29, and that the entire parish be notified
that this would be the focus o f the services that day.22
On October 29, the parish finally heard from the assistant minister himself. In an
address that lasted about 15 minutes, the Reverend Jupin detailed all of the factors that
brought him to his decision to choose draft resistance. First, he discussed the “immoral”
nature o f the American war in Vietnam. He cited statistics putting the number of
civilians killed to the number o f soldiers at “somewhere between five and ten to one.”
More bombs had already been dropped by American planes on North and South Vietnam,
he asserted, than on Germany during all of the Second World War. He described the
relocation o f nearly one million South Vietnamese civilians and the use by American
forces of napalm and antipersonnel bombs on civilians. But he also explained to the
parish that he did not make his decision to resist solely on the immorality of the American
war effort. In addition, Jupin felt that the Johnson administration had not presented the
public with a reasonable justification for the war. He argued that fighting the war to stop
the spread o f communism, a commonly held rationale for supporting the war effort, did
not jibe with American policy toward other communist nations. After all, the United
States traded with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations, he said. Nor did he
accept the notion that Americans were fighting in Vietnam to contain China, noting that

22 Bishop, “Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” pp. 2-5; Bishop interview, 11 Dec
1997.
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historically, China and Vietnam were at least distrustful o f one another and frequently
enemies. He had come to the conclusion, he said, that “the administration’s arguments
for our presence in Vietnam are totally inadequate.”23
In fact, Mike Jupin had been opposed to the war since 1965 when American
escalation o f the war began in earnest. First he wrote protest letters to his Indiana
congressman and Senators Hartke and Bayh. They assured him of their concern and their
efforts to “do something about it.” Yet, “that was two years ago,” Jupin told his
Winchester parish. “Nothing has happened but greater escalation.” Since coming to
Massachusetts, he had spoken with Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Edward Brooke, and
his Congressman but had seen them do nothing serious to end the war. Since none o f the
traditional legal channels of protest seemed to be working, Jupin said, he and his friends
began to contemplate nonviolent civil disobedience. He chose to violate Selective
Service laws, he said.
because with others I firmly believe that what this administration is doing
is evil and that as a follower o f Jesus Christ and as a member o f his
Church I have no choice but to oppose evil. In this act I accepted the
consequences of breaking the law o f the land because I felt I must respond
to a higher law of opposing evil which to me and many is a clear and
present danger in this country.
Jupin also noted that even before committing themselves to draft resistance, he and his
friends had been called "unpatriotic, cowardly, vicious, rebellious, un-American, and
even treasonous.” In response, he asked the congregation rhetorically, "where did
democracy and freedom and individualism end in this country and unthinking blind

23 J. Michael Jupin, sermon, 29 Oct 1967, pp. 1-2, JBP.
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obedience to even that which may be evil begin?”24
Finally, the young minister acknowledged that he had misread the members of the
Parish o f the Epiphany. “I thought that my position was understood by most and that my
action would be understood,” he said. “In this I have erred and I am sorry.” He also
wanted them to know that he felt the greatest sympathy for those with loved ones in
Vietnam. “I want them home and unhurt.” he said. “I do not want to see all these
American boys killed for what appears to me to be an absurd war.” He closed by
reminding his listeners that he had nothing to gain from draft resistance. He was not
trying to “dodge” the draft; as a minister he could not be drafted.

Instead, he asserted, "I

do this as an act o f conscience out o f love for this nation and the desire that it truly search
its heart, and know and do the will o f God.” Several weeks later, reflecting on the crisis
with some detachment, Jack Bishop said that “October 29 surpassed any day I have
known in its power and dignity.”25
Jupin's sermon affected different parishioners in various ways. Following the
9:00 a.m. service, all members of the church were invited to the normally scheduled adult
education class where they were given the opportunity to write down their personal
reactions to the morning’s service. More than 100 parishioners wrote comments - most
of which have survived to this day in Jack Bishop’s papers - and others sent letters over
the subsequent week. A review o f these comments reveals that a majority (56%) o f the
parish supported Jupin’s protest (See Table 6.2 in Appendix A). Some of these were very

24 J. Michael Jupin, sermon, 29 Oct 1967, pp. 3-4, JBP.
25 J. Michael Jupin, sermon, 29 Oct 1967, pp. 4-5, JBP.
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enthusiastic. One woman noted that ‘‘this may be the shot in the arm the parish needs!”
Others were moved by Jupin’s sermon. “We feel that Mr. Jupin has conducted himself
with dignity and humility, and we have great respect for his commitment,” wrote one
couple. “His statement in church today was impressive in its clarity, intelligence, and
concern for both the larger issues and the problem of his relationship with this particular
parish.”26
Still, a significant number o f parishioners disapproved o f Jupin’s actions, some
strongly. Nearly 20 percent were so upset that most called for some kind of disciplinary
action, including firing Jupin. Several themes emerged from these responses, but three
stood out: First, many parishioners simply could not tolerate an assistant minister who
broke the law for any reason; second, some were concerned about the influence Jupin
would have on the younger members of the parish; and third, many believed Jupin's own
youth, immaturity, and naivete (not his conscience) were responsible for his resistance.
Some critics incorporated all o f these themes into their notes. "Responsible citizens,”
wrote one, “do not perform acts o f treason and take the law into their own hands by either
destroying or turning in their draft cards...I do not care to have my children taught
disrespect for their country and its laws.” Another woman was most concerned with the
impact the event would have on her children. She wrote.
I must accept Mr. Jupin’s action as an individual willing to accept
whatever penalty the government wishes to impose...However, Mr. Jupin
cannot behave solely as an individual while he is in a position o f teaching
and advising young people...We have three teenage children...Do I tell

26 Written responses (numbers 89 and 124), Parish o f the Epiphany, 29 Oct 1967,
JBP, copies in author’s files.
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them that in critical situations they should let their consciences be their
guides, regardless o f the law? Would it not be better - morally and
ethically - to use their most conscientious efforts, within the law, to
combat difficult situations?
Others were certain that Jupin did not know what he was doing. Some o f them called the
young minister “naive,” “gullible,” or described his resistance as “an uncounseled act of
youth.” One parishioner saw Red amid this apparent ignorance: “When well-intentioned
but not very well-posted individuals...go out and preach and practice Civil Disobedience,
and worse breaking the Law; they are dupes and instruments o f [an] Anti-Christ by the
name o f Communism.”27
Finally, the written responses indicated that the last large group of parishioners
(about 17 percent) disapproved of Jupin’s views and his methods, but did not think he
should be punished for what amounted to an act of conscience. Like their fellow
members who were more upset, this group also feared the example that draft resistance
set for the younger members of the church and questioned using illegal methods to make
a political point. But overall their criticisms were muted by their faith in freedom of
expression and their admiration for anyone who stood up for his beliefs. At times, these
parishioners showed an ambivalence which even they seemed to recognize and
sometimes found frustrating. For instance, one man wrote that he. too. opposed the war
and saw the loss o f American lives as “horrendous and futile,” but he remained unsure
about how to effect a change in policy. “How to withdraw from Vietnam at this point is
an enigma to me!” he said. Civil disobedience, he knew, was not the answer. “Thus, Mr.

27 Written responses (numbers 105, 113, 13,14, 117), Parish of the Epiphany, 29
Oct 1967, JBP, copies in author’s files.
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Jupin, I agree with your opinion but not your method. But at least you have the courage
o f your conviction - which: is more than most of us!”28
Despite some support for Jupin in the parish and the grudging respect paid to him
even by some o f those who disapproved o f his behavior, Jupin’s sermon on the 29* did
not quell the upheaval in the parish. In the middle o f a service on November 1, All
Saints Day, several parishioners walked out in protest; three others refused to take
Communion from the hands o f a draft resister. Meanwhile, several people suggested that
Jupin was a Communist and a dealer o f marijuana. Jack Bishop, for his part, continued to
meet with angry members o f the church, including one o f the wardens who hoped Jupin
might consider getting a haircut as a gesture of goodwill. At the same time, the story
began to creep into the local weekly newspaper, the Winchester Star in the form of
readers’ letters. Over several weeks in November, letter writers accused Jupin (though
usually without naming him specifically) of being "Un-American,” "disrespectful,” and
"fostering anarchy." Defenders responded with their own missives equating Jupin and his
fellow draft resisters with participants in the Boston Tea Party, abolitionists, and Christ
himself. One man said they were guilty only of "the highest form of responsible
patriotism.” If it did nothing else, Michael Jupin’s draft resistance provoked debate in a
place that had not yet confronted the issue.29

28 Written responses (number 32), Parish of the Epiphany, 29 Oct 1967, JBP,
copies in author’s files.
29 Bishop, "Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” pp. 6-7; "Decries Clergy’s
Advocation o f ‘Lawlessness,’” letter, Winchester Star, 2 Nov 1967, p. 5; "For Clergymen
Who Live As They Believe: Admiration,” letter, Winchester Star, 9 Nov 1967, p. 7; “Our
Obligation to Hear Critics o f Administration,” "Illegal Acts Lose Sympathy for the Peace
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Ultimately. Jack Bishop sought outside assistance to help placate the discontented
in his parish. On November 4. he and”the two wardens o f the church visited with the
Right Reverend Anson Phelps Stokes, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese o f Boston.
Following two hours o f productive discussion, Stokes agreed that he would speak to the
Parish o f the Epiphany. He came to Winchester on November 26. the Sunday o f
Thanksgiving weekend. The two services at which he preached were packed but the
riming was not ideal; three days earlier Winchester learned that it had lost its second son
in Vietnam. Marine Corporal Francis J. Muraco, known to friends as “Butch,” and
already a Purple Heart winner, died when he stepped on a land mine while on patrol duty
in the province of Quang Tri. He was 2 1 years old and a “short timer” - due to come
home in six weeks. As the 26th approached, Jack Bishop worried about the juxtaposition
o f this war hero’s funeral at St. Mary’s, the Catholic church in town, with - in the same
week - his own church’s recruitment o f Bishop Stokes to attend to its draft resistance
crisis/0
When Bishop Stokes came to Winchester and spoke at both services that Sunday,
he said all the right things for people on opposite sides of the issue. Looking resplendent
in his full Bishop’s regalia, Stokes ascended to the pulpit and at first spoke generally

Cause,’’and “‘Gross Injustice’ of War Justifies Counter Actions,” letters, 16 Nov 1967, p.
6.
30 Bishop, “Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” p. 8; Bishop interview, 11 Dec
1997; “Corporal Francis J. Muraco Killed In Action In Vietnam,” Winchester Star, 30
Nov 1967, p. 1; Tom Greenwood, “A Fallen Hero’s Power to Inspire,” Boston Globe, 11
Nov 1998, p. A23. Note: in 1969, the town of Winchester named a new elementary
school after Francis Muraco.
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about the Church’s longstanding concern with war, its victims, and those who fight it. He
noted that, historically, Christians frequently sought conscientious objector status or noncombatant options. He told the parish that he, personally, thought the tuming-in or
burning of draft cards “unnecessary and unwise.” Nevertheless, Stokes continued, “if
done prayerfully, after consultation and with a willingness to bear whatever criticism or
penalty must be bom,” draft resistance could be “one expression of a desire to face the
evil o f war and to bear witness against it.” After all, he said, “a man who gives up his
card to the government is not doing a popular thing and he is certainly not avoiding any
penalty.”
Though apparently supportive of Michael Jupin’s general stand o f resistance, the
Bishop gave clear signals that he understood how uncomfortable this kind o f lawbreaking made some members of the parish. In certain cases, he counseled, thoughtful
people use such measures to press their point. “Obviously, we must seek to avoid
unlawful steps.” he said, “except as a very last resort, as law and order are necessary for
freedom.” Stokes invoked the illegal methods o f abolitionists - maintaining an
underground railroad, for example - in the movement to end slavery. Although it might
rankle their families, friends, and acquaintances, in difficult times there would always be
a small number o f people whose “strong convictions” would lead them to take “unusual
measures” to underscore their position of protest. At last, the Bishop turned directly to
the ongoing crisis at the Parish of the Epiphany:
The Reverend Mr. Jupin in his action at least reminds us of the complexity
and importance o f some of the issues. He let us hear clearly what many
are saying secretly. He is concerned on a conscientious basis with a great
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contemporary issue. If we do not approve the form his protest takes, at
least we can leam from his action the depth of concern o f many people. I
am sure that he is willing to recognize that on these issues no man can
have easy or altogether satisfactory answers. I am sure that he is willing to
bear the legal costs he may have to bear. He has not been furtive. He can
help make us think, and I believe we can trust the processes of thought and
discussion....Let us in the name o f Christ be big enough to understand and
appreciate those whose concerns lead them to such actions as he has taken.
And, thus, Bishop Stokes concluded by emphasizing his themes of tolerance and
maintaining - even in the face o f disagreement - some level of harmony within the parish.
Speaking extemporaneously following his prepared remarks, Stokes said, “It should be
the glory of the Church that its men differ in their concern. [Jupin] may or may not be just
in what he did...and we may disagree among us about this., .but we pray God that out of it
there may be a new unity here, not of opinion, but of concern." Here the Bishop sought
some common ground on which the entire parish could stand. If there would be division
over the method of Jupin's protest, perhaps, the Bishop argued, parishioners could at least
agree that the war in Vietnam was an issue that warranted the attention of the Church, its
members, and its clergy. “If together you turn your back on him now,” Stokes warned, “it
will indicate that you cannot tolerate all concern.”'’1
The Bishop’s visit to the Parish of the Epiphany produced an almost immediate
calming effect. Following the service, one parishioner approached Mike Jupin. “I
understand better now,” he said as he shook the assistant rector’s hand. “I couldn’t have
done this before.” About ten days later, after another meeting of the Vestry, the two

31 Anson Phelps Stokes, “The Church and War,” statement, 26 Nov 1967, JBP;
“Bishop Anson Stokes Asks Epiphany For ‘Unity In Concern,’” Winchester Star, 30 Nov
1967, p. 1.
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wardens issued a letter to all members which they hoped would bring the matter to a
close. They enclosed copies o f the Bishop's statement and a position paper on civil
disobedience produced by the national House of Bishops in 1964. That document,
written in response to the civil rights movement, made it clear that the Episcopal Church
recognized the right o f anyone to break laws ‘‘for reasons of informed conscience,'’ as
long as the person violated the law nonviolently, accepted the legal penalty, and exercised
restraint in “using this privilege of conscience.” Even so, the wardens included a
paragraph in their letter noting that the clergy (Jack Bishop and Mike Jupin) had
apologized for the unexpected “unrest they have caused.” and assured parishioners that
neither of them would take any similar future action without first consulting with the
wardens and the Bishop. Therefore, they wrote, “it is the consensus of your Vestry that
Mr. Jupin can continue effectively at Epiphany as Assistant Minister and as a leader of
our youth.” (In fact, the Vestry did not reach a complete consensus; two days later, the
one person who voted against the continued employment of Mike Jupin became the third
member of the Vestry to resign.)32
The wardens and the remaining members of the Vestry hoped that the letter would
begin a period o f reconciliation and. indeed, in the weeks following the Bishop’s visit, the
clergy at the Parish of the Epiphany sought to establish a ministry that would foster
greater communication, understanding and. as the Bishop had urged, a unity o f concern.

32 Fred Foye. “Bishop Defends Anti-Vietnam Cleric,” newsclip (possibly Boston
Record American), JBP; John K. Colony and William H. Buracker letter to parishioners
of the Parish o f the Epiphany, 7 Dec 1967. JBP; “On Christian Obedience,” position
paper of the national House of Bishops, 1964, JBP.
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The church, after all, had weathered the loss o f several families, some o f whom were
longtime members, and also saw other parishioners withhold their pledges of financial
contributions: at the end of the year approximately $12,000 in pledges (out of about
$82,000 total) had been withheld by angry parishioners. In addition, there were simply
sore feelings among members on both sides of the issue. Even the rector’s two older
sons, ages 10 and 12, were teased and ridiculed by other children who heard about the
controversy at their own dinner tables. The Vestry and the clergy now sought to heal
those divisions.33
At the same time, however, the thrust of the wardens’ letter insinuated that the
two ministers, by apologizing, had admitted to making a mistake, to accidentally stirring
up trouble; the Vestry now seemed unwilling (at least in this letter) to consider the larger
implications of Michael Jupin’s draft card tum-in as an act o f protest and instead
portrayed it as merely an error of judgement. As Jack Bishop and Mike Jupin moved
forward with adult education classes designed to discuss ways to bridge the new divisions
in the parish, this development weighed on Bishop. In mid-December, as he reflected on
the crisis for the first time to a group of fellow ministers, Bishop told his colleagues that
the swirl of controversy had been so intense that for most of the parish it may have
obscured the most important issue: the Church’s role in matters o f war and peace. The
frequent references to Mike Jupin’s youth and naivete in the parishioners' written
responses supported this. Despite Bishop Stokes’s hope that the church would unite in its

33 Bishop, "‘Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” pp. 9-11; Bishop interview, 11 Dec
1997.
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concern regarding the war in Vietnam, the reconciliation within the parish, it seemed,
would take place at the expense o f confronting such difficult societal dilemmas. “In all of
it,” Jack Bishop later remarked, most parishioners “didn't face the real issue.” Instead,
they focused on returning the church to its former noncontroversial state by pointing to
aspects of Bishop’s and Jupin's ministries that they could support. Several months later
in May 1968, the Parish o f the Epiphany did send a busload of volunteers to Washington
to take part in the Poor People’s Campaign, an undertaking that may not have happened
before Jack Bishop and Mike Jupin began to turn the parish’s attention toward
contemporary issues, but it never returned to the issue of Vietnam.34
To Mike Jupin's relief, the Boston Globe at least seemed to soften its position on
draft resistance in light of the Winchester controversy. The day after Bishop Stokes
spoke at Epiphany, the Globe ran an editorial that used Jupin’s situation as a basis for
defending civil disobedience. In part, the paper issued a clarification that defined civil
disobedience not as a '‘dissociation from society,” but "an act of profound commitment to
it.” Some Americans, like Michael Jupin, saw the war in Vietnam, they said, “as so
contrary to national ideals and personal beliefs as to warrant civil disobedience...” This
was a point that resisters had been trying to make from the start but that had failed to
receive much consideration from the press. “While not agreeing with them, we should
not condemn them.” the editorial concluded. “They are brave and honorable men.” Such
a characterization of draft resisters demonstrated an important shift in thinking at the

34 Bishop, "Winchester: Crisis in Conscience,” pp. 13-14; Bishop interview, 11
Dec 1997; Jupin interview, 28 Dec 1997.
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newspaper; only five weeks before, the editors had characterized the resisters o f October
16 as “misguided,” and possessing “little judgement.”35
Michael Jupin now believes that if he had still been in seminary in October 1967.
no outcry would have resulted. But his position in Winchester made his protest much
more difficult. “I really hadn't understood the move that I made, that I lived in a
completely different community that would respond in a completely different way,” he
reflected. “Fools rush in,” he chuckled.36
A Network of Support
The New England Resistance and other advocates of draft-centered protest
recognized that individual draft resisters might be left feeling isolated and alienated in the
weeks and months following their initial act of defiance. Organizers knew that they could
not realistically expect that an individual resister’s depth of commitment might not wither
under the weight of FBI visits, letters from draft boards, and the palpable concern of (if
not alienation from) family and friends. Thus, as it became evident that the federal
government did not plan the kinds of mass arrests or indictments that might act as a
crucible from which Resistance solidarity would continue to grow spontaneously,
members o f the Resistance and other groups began to devote some of their energies to
holding the movement together. This happened deliberately within groups like the New
England Resistance but often, as in the case of some o f the older supporters, it occurred

35 “The Limits of Protest,” editorial, Boston Globe, 28 Nov 1967, p. 20; “The
Resistance,” editorial, Boston Globe, 17 Oct 1967, p. 16.
36 Bishop interview, 11 Dec 1997; Jupin interview, 28 Dec 1997.
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organically as different people gravitated to draft resistance in the belief that it was the
most effective way to protest the war.'
Just like draft resisters themselves, those who were rallied to activism by the
Zeitgeist of draft resistance were children o f the American Dream. Although many came
to the cause with varied backgrounds and different expectations, in general, most
supporters of draft resistance came from middle-class homes, were well-educated, and
had a history of social movement activism. Frequently, they were older than the resisters
themselves. The 1997 survey o f draft resistance activists from Boston revealed an
average age of 25 and a median age o f 23 among the 68 respondents who could be
classified not as resisters but as supporters. Nearly 50 percent were students followed by
professors, the second largest group, who constituted approximately 15 percent o f
supporters (Table 6.3). In addition, as many as half of all supporters may have been
women.37
Those who stood behind resisters in their confrontation with the government came
from the same kinds of homes and neighborhoods as the resisters did. Their parents were
mostly professionals and proprietors (Table 6.4). 81 percent of supporters’ fathers, for
instance, held professional jobs or ran their own businesses. And although 40 percent of
their mothers were homemakers, another 42 percent held professional positions or were
entrepreneurs. Moreover, when supporters were asked about their class backgrounds,

37 In the 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey, 44 o f the 68 supporters who
responded were male; 24 were female (or 35%). However, in the activist database
assembled before administration of the questionnaire, I identified 127 non-resisters of
whom 68 (or 54%) were women.
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nearly 85 percent identified themselves as coming from middle class (47%), upper middle
class (36%), or upper class (2%) families (Table 6.5). Like resisters, then, other draft
resistance activists came from the same social strata as those in power, as those
responsible for American policies in Vietnam. In some cases, such as that o f novelist
James Carroll, whose father ran the Defense Intelligence Agency, draft resistance
supporters were actually the children o f the war makers.38
Resistance supporters from Boston came from varied backgrounds, most of which
offered no hint that they would become activists. Although most of their parents
identified themselves with a religious denomination (82% of fathers and 87% of
mothers), only one parent, a Quaker, came from any of the historically pacifist sects
(Table 6.6). Indeed, in addition to the 43 percent o f supporters who came from homes in
which at least one parent was a veteran o f the armed services (similar to the 40 percent
for resisters), 25 % of the men who supported draft resistance in some way without also
becoming resisters were themselves veterans (Table 6.7). Unlike the parents o f resisters,
however, more parents of supporters had a history of social activism and protest of their
own (38% to 23% for parents o f resisters), including 19 percent who had a parent active
in a union.39
The parents of supporters, however, were more like resisters’ parents in their less-

38 See James Carroll, An American Requiem: God, My Father, and the War That
Divided Us (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).
39 In the 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey, 26 of 68 (38%) supporters came
from homes in which at least one parent took part in some form o f social activism. This
figure includes 13 supporters (19%) who came from homes in which at least one parent
was a union member.
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than-radical political leanings. Although many o f the activists viewed themselves as part
of the New Left (69%) (Table 6.8), their parents were overwhelmingly mainstream in
their politics. In 75 percent of supporters’ homes, both parents belonged to the same
political party; 57 percent o f these couples were Democrats (Table 6.9). Among the
supporters themselves, although 46 percent identified themselves as either socialist,
communist, or anarchist, 48 percent also were Democrats (Table 6.10). Again, by
protesting against the draft in this way. many resistance supporters confronted an
administration that either they or their parents (or both) had put in office. Even among
those supporters who thought of themselves as New Leftists, nearly 43 percent were
Democrats, too.40 Their protest against the draft, then, had less to do with political
affiliation or ideology than it did with outrage over the war.
The activism o f draft resistance supporters also seems to have stemmed in part
from earlier participation in protest movements. Compared to the draft resisters they
supported, supporters came to draft resistance equipped with more impressive protest
resumes. Out of 68 supporters surveyed only seven had no prior activist experience which means that nearly 90 percent of all supporters came to draft resistance with a
previous history of activism (Table 6.11). Almost 21 percent had participated in Vietnam
Summer, 34 percent were members of SDS, 56 percent had been active with various

40 In the 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey, 19 supporters identified
themselves as both a Liberal Democrat and a member of the New Left; 1 supporter
identified himself as both a moderate Democrat and a member o f the New Left.
Therefore, 20 of 68 supporters (29%) considered themselves Democrats and members of
the New Left. Likewise, 20 of the 47 supporters (42.6) who identified themselves as part
of the New Left also were Democrats.
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peace organizations, and 62 percent came from a background in the civil rights
movement. This level o f experience with other social movements fueled the rapid growth
o f a community o f supporters for draft resisters in late 1967 and early 1968. As the New
England Resistance gained more prominence through its demonstrations and draft card
turn-ins, more and more men faced the pressures brought by the FBI, their draft boards,
and often their parents. In Boston, groups of young supporters flocked to organizations
like the Boston Draft Resistance Group or other draft counseling organizations, while
older supporters joined organizations like Resist. All of these groups were critical to the
ongoing efforts o f draft resisters.
BDRG and the Resistance
In the fall o f 1967 and winter o f 1968. resisters could rely on a budding draft
resistance community formed first and foremost by the alliance o f the New England
Resistance with the Boston Draft Resistance Group. By October and November. BDRG
had firmly established itself as a leading antiwar and antidraft organization in Boston.
They continued to mount Early Morning Shows. Horror Shows, and during this time saw
their draft counseling efforts grow by leaps and bounds. Dozens of young men sought
their services at their office on Columbia Avenue in Cambridge every day. More
significant, the BDRG's initial reluctance to support draft card tum-ins gave way to a
more general sense o f collaboration.
In addition to the touch football games, social events, and Monday night dinners,
both the NER and BDRG encouraged their members to work for each group and to turn
out for each others’ demonstrations and public events. An early Resistance newsletter
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noted that they were “working closely” with BDRG and that the two groups shared
“considerable overlap in membership.” The newsletter urged draft resisters to plan to do
regular work for the BDRG when not occupied with a specific NER project. “Unless we
are to do nothing but pull o ff spectacular demonstrations once a month, we must all be
ready to do serious, steady, unspectacular work.”41
This kind of bipolar characterization o f each group’s mission (“spectacular” and
‘‘unspectacular”) betrayed a certain snobbery on the part of the Resistance that served as
counterpart to a similar strain of condescension directed at NER by some BDRG activists.
“Tensions continue to exist,” one BDRG newsletter noted, “between those who see draft
resistance as essentially an act o f moral witness and those who see it as an organizing
program with broad implications for radical change.” For several reasons, however, the
two groups put their differences aside in the months following October 16. First, as
BDRG counselor Charles Fisher later commented. “BDRG grudgingly admitted that the
Resistance did attract attention and convert people.” That attention resulted in financial
assistance not only to the Resistance but also to BDRG whose fund-raisers, Fisher said,
were “acutely aware of how much BDRG's affluence” owed to soliciting donations from
Resistance contributors. Furthermore, BDRG activists suggested that while Resistance
chapters clashed with their draft counseling counterparts in other parts o f the country, in
Boston a gradual "convergence of attitudes.” had occurred leading both groups to realize
that their approaches were complementary. “It would seem that demonstrations can be an
important adjunct to anti-draft organizing,” a BDRG newsletter noted, “particularly by

41 NER Newsletter, undated (c. early Nov 1967), AJP.
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creating a sense o f a city-wide movement.” Indeed, through the fall, BDRG saw its
counseling caseload double, a development they attributed to participation in Resistance
rallies and draft card tum-ins. By February, some in BDRG were starting to worry that
the organization might be getting too ■‘hung up on mass actions to the detriment o f its
ongoing organizing programs.” In the early months of draft resistance, however, the
sense o f solidarity and camaraderie that resulted from collective action warranted the
combined efforts of these organizations. Not a day went by, it seemed, when one could
not find work to do for either BDRG or the Resistance.42
“Girls Sav ‘Yes’ to Guvs Who Say ‘No’”
Among those who sought work in Boston’s draft resistance movement were a
significant number of women. Although the draft did not threaten women directly, the
draft resistance movement attracted them for the same reasons it attracted draft-age men:
it seemed like the most direct way to challenge the government’s war policies.
The kind of work that women could find in draft resistance organizations,
however, was frequently limited even within support roles. In 1967, women who chose
to target the draft as their primary focus in protesting against the war in Vietnam
generally had two options open to them. Some worked with the local Resistance
organization while others chose to work with draft counseling groups like BDRG. (In
time a smaller number joined groups of the so-called “Ultra-Resistance” in raiding draft
boards to either steal or destroy draft files). For the most part, the male-centered

42 BDRG Newsletter, 1 Feb 1968, MKFP; Charles Fisher, “Midwives to History:
The Boston Draft Resistance Group,” unpublished manuscript, Chapter EX, p. 10; papers
o f Charles S. Fisher (hereafter cited as CSFP).
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experience o f the draft and resistance to it marginalized women within these
organizations.
Even so, the dramatic public events staged by the New England Resistance
attracted support from women, though they soon found themselves channeled into the
most mundane work. On October 16. the first draft card tum-in yielded 214 cards with
another 67 burned in the flame of a church candle. Although it went unnoticed by the
mass o f reporters in attendance. Nan Stone, a young Methodist minister then enrolled in
Boston University’s School of Theology, burned one o f those cards; she was the only
woman to participate in the ceremony. In fact. Stone had fought hard with the event’s
other organizers for the right to do so. In anticipation o f mass arrests at the church, the
planners decided that several people - including Nan Stone - would not participate, thus
guaranteeing that someone would be available to arrange bail and find legal assistance for

the others. But Stone, perhaps more than the others, felt a powerful need to somehow put
herself at the same level o f risk as the men. not only to demonstrate her passionate stand
against the war, but also to prove herself an equal within this young organization. As she
later recalled, “most o f the guys sort of dismissed that...they looked at me as not having
the risk that they had, ‘cause I didn’t have a draft card, wouldn’t be drafted.” Steve
Pailet, one o f the few sympathetic men. pushed for her participation and gave her his own
card to bum.43
This episode is representative of the kind of treatment women could expect in

43 Nan Stone, interview with author, Belfast, Maine, 28 Mar 1997; Alex Jack,
interview with author, Becket, Massachusetts, 21 Mar 1997; Neil Robertson, interview
with author, Skowhegan, Maine, 24 Aug 1997.
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those resistance organizations that made noncompliance their primary tactic. As Sara
Evans has found in other New Left and civil rights organizations, women were most often
limited to doing the “shitwork”: typing, stuffing envelopes, and making coffee. The men
who founded the Resistance, after all. conceived it as a kind o f brotherhood of resisters.
Like a college fraternity that admits women only as “little sisters,” the New England
Resistance welcomed “resister sisters” only in clearly defined support functions.44
Still, some women like Stone were able to attain positions o f influence in the New
England Resistance, though it was a “continual struggle.” First, they had to put up with
frequent sexist allusions to women that appeared in NER literature. One leaflet intended
for resisters, for instance, noted that organizers were planning a “huge, incredibly noisy,
chick-laden” party for the night following the 3 April 1968 draft card tum-in. Another
leaflet targeting GIs invited them to another gathering that would offer '“beer and chicks
and things.” These attitudes were consistent with the prevailing understanding of
women's place in draft resistance as articulated by some of the leading women in the
movement. Folk singer Joan Baez, the wife of Palo Alto resister David Harris,
perpetuated this mode o f thinking when she coined the expression, “Girls Say ‘Yes’ to
Guys Who Say ‘No’” as a way o f attracting more men to draft resistance. The down side
of that campaign - which included posters o f beautiful young women emblazoned with
the Baez quote - appeared in the alienation it created among women who took their draft

44 Sara Evans, Personal Politics (New York: Knopf, 1979); Barrie Thome,
“Gender Imagery and Issues o f War and Peace: The Case of the Draft Resistance
Movement of the 1960s,” in Dorothy McGuigan, The Role o f Women in Conflict and
Peace (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Center for Continuing Education of Women,
1977), p. 56.
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resistance work seriously - only to be viewed as sex objects.45
In addition, women also had to overcome feelings of distrust and competition
among other women, particularly if one was involved in a relationship with one of the
men in the group. The men would often forget to tell Nan Stone about a meeting to
which some of their girlfriends (who also worked in the office) would go. Stone resented
one woman in particular, she said, “because she had this boyfriend that gave her...an in.
somebody who would listen to her. She was paid attention to because o f who she was
fucking.”46
Interestingly, women who were involved in relationships with men m the NER
today seem less likely to recall male chauvinism as a salient aspect o f their experience.
The consensus among these women seems to be, as one said, that “you weren’t treated
any differently than you were anywhere else in the Movement.” Another is certain that
women in the NER participated actively in the leadership of the organization: women
“certainly spoke out at meetings whenever they wanted; there was no attempt to silence
women. And I certainly didn't feel that I wasn’t a part of the organization nor that I
couldn’t speak up if I wanted to speak up...Power is in the hands o f those who seize the
power.” Sometimes power is not so easily seized, however. Although women like Nan
Stone did become (and all o f the men now acknowledge this) an essential member of the

45 New England Resistance letter, 20 Mar 1968, collection o f William Clusin
(copy in author’s possession); Thome, “Women in the Draft Resistance Movement,” p.
190.
46 Nan Stone, telephone interview with author, 8 Oct 1997; Connie Field,
interview with author, 17 Jun 1997.
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New England Resistance leadership, Stone notes, “I was never invited in to the inner
circles, I had to push my way in.”47
In the Boston Draft Resistance Group, the city’s leading draft counseling
organization, circumstances for women differed somewhat from those of the New
England Resistance. Participation in BDRG was not gender coded in the same way that it
was in the Resistance. Women made up at least half o f the draft counselors and also took
part in “Early Morning Shows” in which members o f BDRG arrived at local draft boards
to talk to potential draftees on the mornings that they were being bussed into the city for
their physicals. Unlike draft card tum-ins and induction refusals, such activities were
open to women.
BDRG women, however, disagreed then (as they do today) about the extent to
which they participated in leading the organization. Generally, those who held one of the
few paid staff positions claim to have experienced very little male-chauvinism. Both
Sasha Harmon and Bliss Matteson, successive office managers for BDRG, agree that they
never “felt any particular discrimination or any particular shutdown” in weekly steering
committee meetings or in the office itself. They acknowledge, however, that if they had
not had clearly defined roles as part of the office staff, they might have felt “at more of a
disadvantage.”48
Other women in BDRG recall the situation differently. The historian Ellen

47 Field interview, 17 Jun 1997; Olene Tilton, interview with author, San
Francisco, California, 16 Jun 1997; Nan Stone, interview with author, 28 Mar 1997.
48 Sasha Harmon, telephone interview with author, 14 Sep 1997; Bliss Matteson,
interview with author, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 29 Aug 1997.
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DuBois, who worked for BDRG while in graduate school, believes that although women
such as Harmon and Matteson were influential, a fundamental inequality kept them and
other women from ''advancing beyond a certain point.” Dana Densmore, Abby
Rockefeller, and Roxanne Dunbar pushed this view further, charging that an “astonishing
male hierarchy,” most apparent in steering committee meetings, dominated BDRG.
According to Densmore, “if a woman spoke up...there would be a dead silence for a few
seconds, and then they would pointedly pick up exactly where they were before her
comment.” Such experiences led Densmore, Rockefeller, and Dunbar to leave BDRG in
1968 to form Cell 16, one of the first radical feminist groups in the country.49
Steering committee meetings at BDRG, like those at the New England Resistance,
were notoriously long as decisions were reached by consensus rather than by majority
rule. As a result, those who excelled in debate and carried themselves with confidence
(the “highly aggressively verbal easterners...New Yorkers,” according to one woman)
often dominated these sessions. Although there were some exceptions, far fewer women
felt comfortable with this kind of confrontational dynamic than men. One male BDRG
founder remarked that he had always been proud of the organization’s emphasis on this
informal style of decision making until years later when he recognized that it resulted in a
kind of “tyranny of informality” that yielded to a “charisma based” form of leadership.
Since few women in those days were socialized to master the “mass-haranguing style”

49 Ellen DuBois, interview with author, Los Angeles, California, 11 Jun 1997;
Tekla Louise Haasl, “'I Want to Knock Down the World:’ A Study of Radical Feminism
and Cell 16,” (M.A. thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1988), 24-24, 29; Roxanne
Dunbar-Ortiz, telephone interview with author, 17 Sep 1997.
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needed to make a point in meetings, men dominated decision making.50
Ultimately, the draft resistance movement attracted many women to its cause,
though proportionately few lasted with groups like the New England Resistance, which
emphasized noncompliance. Without a draft card to turn-in or bum. women were pushed
to the margins in these organizations. They could never be seen as equal partners without
taking the same risks as men. Therefore, the vast majority o f the younger women who
supported targeting the draft as their primary form of antiwar protest gravitated more
toward draft counseling organizations; older women joined other support organizations
that were either older and rooted in pacifism or newer and focused on raising money to
support resisters.
"A Child Has Spawned Parents”
In the early weeks following October 16, draft resistance organizers soon found
out that they could count on encouragement from individuals and groups other than
BDRG. Although an early New England Resistance newsletter boasted that for the “first
time in history...a child has spawned parents,” in fact many o f the organizations that
moved to ally themselves with draft resistance had been protesting against the war for a
long time. Members of the Committee for Non-Violent Action and the American Friends
Service Committee, for example, showed up at all NER demonstrations and draft card
tum-ins. When Bill Hunt o f BDRG and the Resistance later reflected on it. he remarked
that in those first months after October 16, resisters came to realize that they could always

50 Sasha Harmon, telephone interview with author, 14 Sep 1997; Tim Wright,
interview with author, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, 25 Aug 1997.
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count on the Quakers and other pacifists to be there. While liberals in the Democratic
party might have shared the Resistance analysis o f the war, Hunt said, most felt that
nothing justified damaging the party; such individuals could not be expected to publicly
back draft resistance. The AFSC and CNVA. however, were rooted in pacifism and
although many resisters may not have been strict pacifists (e.g.. believers in the just war
theory), their demonstrated opposition to the Vietnam War was sufficient to merit
assistance.51
On the surface, though, the notion o f a child spawning parents seemed more
accurate with respect to Resist, the organization formed out of the Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority. Certainly, most o f the older advisers of Resist, like those o f the
AFSC and CNV A, were long-time dissenters to American involvement in Vietnam; yet
they acknowledged that the impetus to make draft resistance their main focus came in
response to the actions o f their younger counterparts. “We are certainly in an
embarrassing position to be looking to the young to make our will effective." Paul
Goodman wrote in the New York Review o f Books earlier in the year. “I am ashamed to
be so powerless...”52
Intellectuals were not in fact powerless to protest the war effectively; indeed,
some had been trying to marshal support from colleagues for a long time. Noam
Chomsky, in particular, churned out numerous articles imploring his fellow academics to
act. In the fall 1966 issue of the Harvard Educational Review, he wrote: “One can only

51 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
52 Paul Goodman, “Appeal,” New York Review o f Books, 6 Apr 1967, p. 38.
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be appalled at the willingness o f American intellectuals, who, after all, have access to the
facts, to tolerate or even approve of the deceitfulness and hypocrisy [of the
administration].” His most influential essay, “The Responsibility o f Intellectuals,” which
appeared in the New York Review in February 1967, moved scores o f academics to act in
ensuing months. “It is the responsibility o f intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose
lies,” he wrote. Regarding Vietnam, Chomsky implied, intellectuals had been content
through the 1950s and 1960s to quietly accept the decisions of foreign policy and national
security “experts” in successive administrations. In light of this inaction, Chomsky
alerted his colleagues that “no body of theory or significant body of relevant information,
beyond the comprehension o f the layman...makes policy immune from criticism.” He
expected them to speak out against what he viewed as an obviously “savage American
assault on a largely helpless rural population in Vietnam.”53
Although Chomsky issued this charge to the academic community in February,
the actual catalyst for the intellectual community’s activism - anticipation of the national
draft card tum-in on October 16 - arrived only at the end of the summer. At that time the
“Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” began to pick up steam; scores of adoptive parents
lined up to support the resisters. As Sandy Vogelgesang has written. Chomsky’s strategy
aimed to both stop the war and “resolve the larger dilemma of powerlessness which
underlay the Vietnam experience.” He hoped that the addition of older adults to the
resistance movement would raise the economic and political stakes for the government

53 Noam Chomsky, “Some Thoughts on Intellectuals and the Schools,” in
American Power and the New Mandarins, p. 315; “Responsibility o f Intellectuals,” in
American Power and the New Mandarins, p. 324-325, 334-335.
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and would make it “impossible for the government to ignore the protesters.” He then
counted on what he called “the unpredictable effects of a really large-scale repression” of
the resisters and their supporters to raise “questions about the range o f meaningful
political action.” The popular outrage generated by this repression would, it followed,
cripple the administration’s capacity to wage war in Southeast Asia.54
Not all intellectuals agreed with Chomsky, however. As Vogelgesang points out,
prominent intellectuals like Michael Harrington, Theodore Draper, and Michael Walzer
thought intellectuals should stick to speaking and writing against the war rather than
resorting to civil disobedience - even if it was nonviolent. Harrington, for instance,
warned that trying to reach Americans through “middle class tantrums” o f draft resistance
risked turning the antiwar movement into a “morally self-satisfied but ultimately impotent
cult.” Walzer commented that no one could be “morally justified in acting (however
heroically) in ways that defeat his own stated purpose.””
Despite such criticism, a significant group of older advisers, mostly academics,
moved ahead with a program to support draft resisters. Following the October 2, 1967
press conference announcing the “Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” Columbia
University economist Robert Zevin hosted a large group of the participants at the
Columbia Faculty Club where they laid out plans for a new organization called Resist.
As the first donations came in to support the Call, Zevin hired Herschel Kaminsky to

54 Sandy Vogelgesang, The Long Dark Night o f the Soul: The American
Intellectual Left and the Vietnam War, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 127-128.
55 Vogelgesang, The Long Dark Night o f the Soul, pp. 135-136.
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open an office in New York. Meanwhile, in Washington on the eve of the Pentagon
March, Resist held the first steering committee meeting at which the members
administered grants to antiwar and draft resistance organizations. In their first newsletter
(printed in early November), Resist organizers outlined their intention to mount two
fundraising programs, one for general support and another to save money for a defense
fund that they expected would be necessary once the government started indicting draft
resisters. At this early stage, Resist members primarily wanted to continue to apply
pressure on the administration. “We cannot emphasize too strongly the need to stay
together...,” they wrote. “On occasion when we have mobilized strength, we have made
them back off or overreact, as in Hershey’s recent pronouncements [in the October 26
memo], and thereby jeopardize their legal power.” The advisers of Resist, like Resistance
organizers, expected the government to try to intimidate them; they were challenged with
successfully maintaining their momentum in the face o f that intimidation.56
As members of Resist received their own visits from FBI agents and as some of
the younger professors among them saw their own draft status changed (punitively),
Resist responded with very public support for draft resisters. Chomsky, again writing in
the New York Review, declared, “It is difficult for me to see how anyone can refuse to
engage himself, in some way. in the plight of these young men.” He suggested that older
adults might help resisters through legal and financial aid, participation in
demonstrations, learning to counsel potential draftees, and signing complicity statements.
56 Paul Lauter, interview with author, 12 Jun 1998; Louis Kampf, interview with
author, 10 Sep 1998; Resist Newsletter, No. 1, Nov 1967, Papers of Benjamin Spock
[hereafter noted as Spock Papers], Syracuse University, Series n, Box 28.
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In addition, Resist sent over 100 letters to poets, writers, and other academics and
activists, asking that they “add appearances for Resist to their scheduled speaking
engagements,” or that they offer to speak at Resist-sponsored events. From New York
Resist and New York Resistance came a suggestion - modeled after the original Cornell
graduated tum-in plan - that “students opposed to the war...be asked to sign a conditional
pledge stating the minimum number o f students (along a scale, from 1000 to 50,000) they
would join in refusing the draft.” The conditional pledge would allow each student to set
a benchmark for himself as the point at which he would commit to possibly going to jail.
“Those who need the reassurance of great numbers can set a high quota for participating,”
the planners said. “Those, who for whatever reason are ready to incur greater risk, can set
a low quota.” The project never got off the ground but it demonstrated the close relations
between Resist and local Resistance organizations.57
By the middle of December, Resist leaders grew unhappy with Herschel
Kaminsky and the inefficient operations o f the New York office. They decided to move
the office to Cambridge, Massachusetts where Louis Kampf, a professor of American
Studies as MIT, believed the organization could easily find activists to run it. K am pf s
confidence stemmed from his experience with a local organization called the Educational
Cooperative which had attempted to set up a community school in Cambridge in 1966.
Within the Educational Cooperative a young faculty group had formed, made up o f at
least ten people. This group, Kamp figured, was “ready-made” to handle running the new

57 Noam Chomsky, “On Resistance,” in American Power and the New Mandarins,
p. 380; Resist Newsletter No. 2, 18 Dec 1967, Spock Papers, Series II, Box 28.
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Resist office. Paul Lauter, another expert in American Studies and an experienced
political organizer from his work with the American Friends Service Committee and
SDS, became national director for the organization and Kampf took on the role o f
associate national director. In January, Lauter, Florence Howe, and Kampf set up the new
Resist office in Central Square in Cambridge, across from the Post Office. Not long after,
a postal employee informed them that an FBI agent regularly staked out the Resist office
from the attic story o f the Post Office building. Henceforth, it became common practice
for Resist staffers and volunteers to wave to the agent and mug for his camera as they
entered and exited the office.58
Most important for draft resisters, Resist raised and distributed money to local
draft resistance groups nationwide. Bob Zevin conceived the idea o f a monthly pledge
system that sustained levels of funding from the start, and when the indictments o f the
Boston Five came down in January 1968, the money came pouring in. Regular steering
committee meetings were held, most often in New York, to make grant decisions. At
first, most of the groups that applied for funding were well-known to the Resist
leadership, but in an effort to spread the wealth more evenly, the steering committee
divided the country into geographical zones and assigned each zone to one or two of the
younger faculty volunteers. These regional representatives or "area people” as they were
known, took responsibility for finding and communicating with local organizations that
might need funding. Whenever possible, members of the steering committee and regional
representatives accepted lecture invitations and found other reasons to travel as a way of

58 Lauter interview, 12 Jun 1998; Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998.
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scouting other parts of the country for potential grantees.59
As an organization, Resist was so concerned with avoiding disproportionate
funding of local organizations (which they already knew so well) that the steering
committee assigned two regional representatives just to Boston and environs. Hilde Hein
and Saul Slapikoff, both of whom were on the faculty of Tufts University at the time,
were charged with operating their own kind of mini-Resist just for Boston. As Hein
recalls, they did all the outreach that other area people did but also were responsible for
doing their own fundraising distinct from the national effort. “We did all the equivalents
o f bake sales,” she recalled. She and Slapikoff organized art shows, concerts, and poetry
readings to raise money for local groups. The money went back to Resist where funding
decisions for Boston area organizations still were made by the steering committee. O f
course, the New England Resistance and BDRG did their own fundraising, too, but Resist
could always be counted upon for the largest regular donations (or grants) to such
organizations. These funds contributed to paying the few paid office workers, helped pay
the rent and other bills, and covered production costs for Resistance and BDRG
newsletters and other literature. Although resisters were grateful for the moral support
provided by older advisers, the financial benevolence of Resist and other individual
patrons kept the draft resistance movement afloat; without it, the Resistance might have
crumbled soon after October 16.60

59 Lauter interview, 12 Jun 1998; Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998; Hilde Hein,
interview with author, 18 Sep 1998.
60 Hein interview, 18 Sep 1998.
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Although Resist consistently buttressed the draft resistance movement over the
next eighteen months, like their younger counterparts, the older organizers experienced
their own divisions and strained internal relations. Not long after the organization began
distributing grapts. the majority of the steering committee advocated expanding Resist's
objectives to include the funding o f other groups working for social change. While some
members, notably Paul Goodman, thought the grants should be limited to draft resistance
organizations, the others thought that draft resistance was meaningless outside o f a

broader context o f the larger antiwar movement and other movements for peace and
justice. Some o f the younger draft resistance leaders themselves agreed with Goodman.
At one point, about a dozen draft resistance leaders from different parts of the country
crashed a steering committee meeting held at Paul Lauter's mother's house in New York.
They demanded that Resist fund only draft resistance organizations. Noam Chomsky
answered for the group by suggesting that the Boston draft resistance representatives
present return to Cambridge and sift through Resist records to see if they could honestly
disagree with any of the funding decisions. The steering committee never heard any
complaints again.61
Resist’s hierarchical organizational structure also created some tension, most
notably around gender issues. Men dominated the steering committee, and although it
included Florence Howe and Grace Paley. Hilde Hein was the only female regional
representative in the organization. The staff, in contrast, consisted almost entirely of
women who were, as Hein says, “just errand runners.” It did not matter that the members

61 Lauter interview, 12 Jun 1998; Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998.
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o f Resist were intellectuals; the men in the group were guilty of the same sexism as their
younger draft resistance counterparts.' Hilde Hein recalls that neither Florence Howe nor
Grace Paley felt intimidated at steering committee meetings, but she did. “I certainly
know that if we went around the room expressing opinions and I said something, nobody
paid any attention. And if somebody two seats down repeated exactly what I had said and was male - it would be heard.” In addition, though she did not think much o f it at
first, it later rankled her that male members o f the steering committee asked her husband,
George Hein, a chemistry professor at Boston University, to do some public speaking on
behalf of Resist, instead of asking Hilde. '‘It suddenly dawned on me that this was a little
odd,” Hein remarked, particularly since she did so much more work for Resist than her
husband.62
In spite o f these difficulties. Resist’s support of draft resistance, both financial and
moral, helped to sustain the movement from the very start. As resisters faced
counterprotesters, intimidating FBI agents, hostile draft boards, and often skeptical
parents, the community of supporters that sprung up among their peers and especially
among this group o f older academics and advisors assuaged the internal doubts that
naturally crept in when resisters felt most vulnerable. The resisters themselves created
the movement and presented it as a fa it accompli to their sympathetic older allies, who
expanded the movement’s reach and helped to carry it forward in the months following
October 16.

62 Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998; Hein interview, 18 Sep 1998.
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November 16 and December 4
Emboldened by the euphoria of October 16 and the rush of support that followed,
New England Resistance organizers steadily planned their next actions. Although the
Resistance chapters across the country planned to carry out new draft card turn-ins on
December 4, the NER wanted to move more quickly. They set the date for November 16
and began planning almost immediately after the Pentagon march. Thus, at the same time
they sought to organize a worthy follow-up to their successful debut, resisters
simultaneously encountered FBI agents seeking interviews, unhappy parents, friends and
employers hoping to talk some sense into them, and new friends and acquaintances
offering them support. The intensity of the times cannot be overstated. The Resistance
office, still in Memorial Hall at Harvard, swirled with activity as the organization tried to
keep track of their '‘members,” provide work for everyone who wanted it. supply
information to nervous resisters regarding government reaction, galvanize support for
future draft card tum-ins, and raise money to pay for it all. In the last newsletter
distributed before November 16. Resistance leaders described plans for a service similar
to that o f October 16 to take place at the Old West Methodist Church on Cambridge
Street in the West End. It would be called “A Service o f Conscience and Memorial for
All Who Are Dead and Dying in Vietnam.” The draft card tum-in would be followed by
a march to the federal building in Post Office Square where Resistance representatives
hoped to deliver the collected cards to Paul Markham, the United States Attorney. The
newsletter strongly urged all resisters to attend.
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERY OCTOBER 16 RESISTANT PLAN
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TO BE THERE. CUT CLASSES OR TAKE OFF FROM WORK IF
YOU MUST. BUT BE THERE. RESISTANTS ARE NEEDED AS
MARSHALS: THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES MUST SEE OUR
STRENGTH, AND THE PUBLIC MUST KNOW WHO WE ARE NOW.
With a second act o f mass civil disobedience coming so soon after the first, the New
England Resistance hoped to send a message to both the government and their fellow
citizens that said that more and more reasonable, responsible Americans were joining this
growing movement. The confrontation between the federal government and the
Resistance on November 16. they wrote, “will be on our terms, in the open and for the
public to see.”63
When the day arrived, however, the event did not take place on their terms but the
public still saw it. First, a major snowstorm the day before greatly hindered mobility
within the city and surrounding towns. Instead of the expected turnout of 5,000
supporters, fewer than 500 showed up. Second, and most important, a scuffle broke out
between supporters o f the war and resisters, and it - rather than the strength o f the
movement - garnered all of the press coverage.
As the service began, approximately 450 people sat in the pews with a significant
number of FBI agents and reporters on hand as well. The Reverend William Alberts
opened by inviting the FBI men to sit in the front pews, rather than stand uncomfortably
in the back; none o f them responded. Father Larry Rossini, a Catholic Priest at the
downtown Paulist Center and one o f the organizers o f the event, later recalled being more
apprehensive at this event than at the October 16 service. “It was a smaller crowd but

63 NER Newsletter, undated (c. early Nov 1967), AJP.
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there was more press. And the FBI was more obviously there. And I was very
frightened. I did not know whether I was going to be arrested walking out o f there and
kind of put to shame by all these guys who were all Catholics...there was an emotional
sense of betrayal that I felt on my part/’ Several of the agents blended in with news
reporter cameramen as they swept the pews with motion picture cameras. One resister
later remarked that “you got the feeling that the people who were systematically
photographing every face with the flood lights had to be FBI agents but the people who
were simply photographing the speakers or the [resisters] might well be working for the
press.”64
Outside the church, Jozef Mlot-Mroz. the Polish Freedom Fighter, burned a
Soviet flag before a growing crowd of counter-demonstrators. He then marched into the
church with a sign that said, "Priests, Rabbis, Ministers, Start Fighting Communism.
Don’t Be Duped By the Reds.” Harold Hector, the brawniest o f the Resistance marshals,
escorted Mlot-Mroz out o f the church. A few minutes later, however, he returned - this
time singing “God Bless America” at the top of his lungs. Again Hector removed him.
This time, however, Mlot-Mroz struggled with Hector, and when they reached the top o f
the steps outside the church, the freedom fighter fell. In a scene reminiscent of the South
Boston beatings, at least fifteen men surged toward Hector and began pummeling him.
Years later, Hector (who was never a pacifist) described what happened next:
I'm fighting now. I'm just up there throwing punches, landing - I’m doing
all right - but I was grabbed and pulled down the steps. Got to the ground,

64 Lawrence Rossini, interview with author, 5 Sep 1997; William Clusin,
interview with author, 17 Jun 1997.
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and I'm still punching, but there’s too many guys. Just too many. They
grabbed me, kicked me, every which way...[I get up], the ground had little
ice patches on it, so I was slipping and sliding. I was down on the ground
and two guys held me and kicked me in the face and I went down. And I
was trying to get back up and continue fighting and I was losing energy...I
was just getting weak....And a cop, patrolman [James P.] Barry, broke
through the crowd. He came in. held his hand up and they knocked him
down.
Officer Barry called for back-up and soon 50 uniformed police officers arrived including
a squad o f helmeted police on horseback and two with German Shepherds. They
dispersed the crowd. When Hector finally got to his feet, he could feel the blood coursing
from a gash on the side of his head. Several other participants suffered bloodied noses,
some inflicted by Hector. Finally, the crowd cheered as police officers helped Hector into
the police ambulance that would take him to City Hospital65
Inside the church, the draft resistance ceremony continued without incident. The
Reverend Harold Fray acknowledged to those in attendance that although certain pitfalls
accompanied any act o f civil disobedience, the state of the war in Vietnam demanded that
“acts o f last resort” be seen as “appropriate modes of expression.” Returning and burning
draft cards, he argued, just might provide "the therapeutic shock required to revive our
moral sensibilities numbed by the war.” Fray told the audience that he was “convinced
that the majority of these young men in the Boston area who are tuming-in and burning
their draft cards do so as genuine acts of moral conviction and conscience.” When the

65 “Fists, Insults Fly at Hub Viet Protest,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 16 Nov
1967, p. 1; “Fists Fly at Hub Anti-War Rally,” Boston Record American, 17 Nov 1967, p.
I; “Punches Swing, Cards Bum in Anti-Draft Rally, Boston Herald Traveler, 17 Nov
1967, p. 1; NER Newsletter, 15 Dec 1967, MKFP; Harold Hector, interview with author,
9 Apr 1997.
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ministers issued the call for draft cards, 54 new draft resisters (far fewer than the 1,000
organizers had hoped for) quietly turhed-in their cards. Father Rossini, and Reverend
Albert joined Jack Mendelsohn. Rabbi Herman Pollach, and Professor Hilary Putnam to
receive the documents and looked on as another eight burned their cards at the altar.66
Although this service did not match the first one at Arlington Street in scale, it
possessed much o f the same electricity. Resisters walked up the center aisle silently,
deliberately. Some o f those who burned their cards paused to pray as they did it. ‘‘We
really believed that these were movements of the spirit,” Larry Rossini later commented
about the Old West Church ceremony.
These were true religious events. This was not theater...! don't think I
could have ever done it without a sense that this is the right thing to
do...The emotion of the thing was that this was like being the early
Christians in a hostile environment doing what they absolutely believed
had to be done because if somebody didn't stand up for what was
happening this craziness would never end and more and more people like
this would get hurt. So there was a sense o f righteousness about it... there
was a belief that we were right. There also a sense that there really was a
presence o f the Spirit in these activities and that there was something
important about the flame that was coming off the draft cards, that that
was a Light and that that was a candle and that those burning draft cards
were bringing a light of understanding and belief into the world.
The power o f such sentiments greatly outweighed the concern that card burning might
offend some o f their fellow citizens.67
Besides, everyone knew that burning one’s draft card was an illegal act; those few

66 “Fists, Insults Fly at Hub Viet Protest,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 16 Nov
1967, p. 32; “Punches Swing, Cards Bum in Anti-Draft Rally, Boston Herald Traveler,
17 Nov 1967, p. 36.
67 Rossini interview, 5 Sep 1997.
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who chose that option expected to suffer the consequences. Bill Clusin, an MIT
sophomore from Oak Park, Illinois, and one o f the eight who burned his card at Old
West, realized that the men who turned in their cards were more likely to be arrested but
figured card burners might get picked up on the spot. Clusin felt that the government
would be making a ’*very strong statement” if they arrested someone like him - an Eagle
Scout and an outstanding student. So he decided to test them. “If they wanted to arrest
me they could get evidence that what I had done was illegal,” he recalled in subsequent
years. “I was surprised that no one [who burned their cards] was arrested.” When he
made it back to Cambridge safely later that day, he began waiting to hear from the
authorities. Since all eyes and cameras had been focused on him when he burned the card
and Noam Chomsky, with whom he had taken a course at MIT. shook his hand afterward,
he fully expected to be easily located and arrested. It could happen at any time. When it
had not happened after six months or so. he stopped worrying. The FBI never caught up
with Bill Clusin, instead choosing to pursue those men who turned in their draft
documents.68
Another o f the card burners from November 16 tried to make it easier for the
government to punish him for his crime. In a letter to his Paterson, New Jersey draft
board, Michael Levin, also a student at MIT, reported his crime and noted that he felt
compelled to break the law in this way only after concluding that all of the other legal
forms o f protest in which he had taken part had accomplished nothing. “Time is running
out,” he wrote. Therefore, he continued,

68 Clusin interview, 17 Jun 1997.
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I have pledged that I will not carry a draft card or classification notice, that
I will not be inducted into the armed services o f the United States, and that
I will aid as many young people as possible, showing them the reasons
why this is a right and moral thing to do, and offering any assistance that I
can to shelter them from the legal consequences. In this way, I hope that
we can do what our government will not do — end this awful war.
Levin deviated from standard Resistance strategy in promising to shelter other resisters
'‘from the legal consequences;” the Resistance had originated in part with the objective of
clogging the courts. Nevertheless, Levin's letter captured the spirit of Resistance protest
and demonstrated that at least some draft card burners were willing to accept the price set
by society for the commitment of such sins.69
Meanwhile, immediately following the service at the Old West Church, and in the
aftermath of the melee outside, approximately 200 resisters and supporters marched the
mile-long route to the federal building under police escort. As they walked, counter
protesters heckled and pelted them with snowballs. They carried signs that said, "Draft
Hippies, Not Beer,” and “We Want Soldier Power, Not Flower Power.” When the group
arrived in Post Office Square, more fights broke out, though the police - and their dogs quickly restored calm. While Lenny Heller (of Berkeley Resistance), Michael Ferber and
Howard Zinn spoke to the crowd outside the building, four others - Rev. Fray, Neil
Robertson and Alex Jack of the New England Resistance, and Louis Kampf of Resist went inside to deliver the draft cards and complicity statements signed by 140 people to
the U.S. Attorney. Just as Ramsey Clark sent a substitute to refuse acceptance o f the draft
cards delivered to Washington on October 20, Paul Markham sent Assistant U.S.

69 Michael Levin letter to Local Board No. 36, 19 Dec 1967, papers of Michael
Levin (copy in author’s files).
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Attorney William Koen to do the same. When Koen told the group that Ramsey Clark
had ordered them not to accept the cards, the four men left them on his desk anyway.
“Do with them as you see fit,” one o f them said.70
The next day, press accounts in all three Boston newspapers emphasized the fight
outside the church and the burning o f draft cards. Each carried multiple photographs
(with at least one on the front page) of Harold Hector being beaten and with blood
streaming down his face. The headlines were remarkably similar: “Fists, Insults Fly at
Hub Viet Protest,” read the Boston Globe: the Record American ran with “Fists Fly at
Hub Anti-War Rally;” and “Punches Swing, Cards Bum in Anti-Draff Rally” greeted
readers o f the Herald Traveler. The Record American article reported a counter
demonstration of 2,000 at the federal building, though this may have been a typographical
error intended to say 200. a more accurate estimate according to New England Resistance
members. That paper also claimed that construction workers stepped in to help (not
punch) Hector, another point strenuously challenged by the Resistance in their next
newsletter. In sum, the newspaper reports o f the ceremony at the Old West Church
conveyed very little of the Resistance’s message. Their hopes of reaching more of the
public through a confrontation with the government on the resisters’ terms did not bear
fruit. 5,000 people did not participate and 1,000 men did not part with their draft cards.
Snow or no snow, measured against these expectations, the day could only be viewed as a

70 “Fists, Insults Fly at Hub Viet Protest,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 16 Nov
1967, p. 1; “Fists Fly at Hub Anti-War Rally,” Boston Record American, 17 Nov 1967, p.
1; “Punches Swing, Cards Bum in Anti-Draff Rally, Boston Herald Traveler, 17 Nov
1967, p. 1; The Resistance National Newsletter #1, 24 Nov 1967, MKFP.
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setback. The Record American called it a '‘flop.” For their part. New England Resistance
organizers, reflecting on the day said “it was generally agreed that one month was not
enough time to adequately engineer the confrontation.” They now thought they should
have waited until December 4 (like the rest of the country) to flout the government’s
will.71
When December 4 did arrive, some New England Resistance activists from
Boston joined their comrades in New Haven for another draft card turn in at Yale’s Battel
Chapel; others went to Manchester, New Hampshire to join other demonstrators from the
CNVA and other groups in a large protest at the induction center there. The event in New
Haven took place without incident. 1,200 people turned out and 35 new cards were
turned in at the county courthouse following a march from the chapel. In Manchester,
however, despite a promising start to the morning, things went horribly wrong.
Approximately 300 to 400 demonstrators - a sizeable crowd - arrived at the induction
center before 6:30 in the morning and as many as half of these, according to later
estimates, may have been willing to commit civil disobedience by either blocking the
inductees’ bus or the entrance to the induction center. At about 8:30, however, the center
made an announcement that no draftees were going to be inducted that day; local radio
stations repeated the news. Upon hearing this, most of the protesters left. Shortly after
9:00, when most people had already departed, about 40 helmeted Manchester police

71 “Fists, Insults Fly at Hub Viet Protest,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 16 Nov
1967, p. 1; “Fists Fly at Hub Anti-War Rally,” Boston Record American, 17 Nov 1967, p.
1; “Anti-Viet Protest at Church Fizzles,” Boston Record American, 17 Nov 1967 (late
edition), p. 5; “Punches Swing, Cards Bum in Anti-Draft Rally, Boston Herald Traveler,
17 Nov 1967, p. 1; The Resistance National Newsletter #1,24 Nov 1967, MKFP.
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officers suddenly arrived. They formed two lines guarding the steps o f the induction
center as a bus full o f inductees arrived. The remaining 30 demonstrators ran quickly to
link arms and block the steps, but it was useless. As the police pushed and shoved the
protesters, the inductees double-timed it up the steps. Police then arrested 26 of the
demonstrators. While they waited in the Hillsborough County Jail before posting bail,
they could hear the irrepressible Jozef Mlot-Mroz leading fifty counterprotesters in chants
o f “Fee, Fi, Fo, Fum, we smell the hippie scum.” Worst of all, the New England
Resistance later learned that the bus had been full o f enlistees not draftees. “We can
never permit blunders like [that] in the future,” the next newsletter said.72
The year ended, then, with a disappointing setback. The promise of October 16,
bolstered by a growing community of supporters, had been tempered in part by the
negative reactions o f parents and friends, and by the disappointment o f the two
subsequent demonstrations. Resistance leaders began to conclude that they might have to
settle in for a long, protracted battle with the government. As it turned out, the
government would not let them wait long before making the next move. The long,
uncertain dance between draft resisters and the Johnson administration soon came to a
close, and the Justice Department’s own actions helped to spark a new round of activism
in the early months o f 1968.

72 “Bonehead Play o f the Year,” CNVA Newsletter, 15 Jan 1968, p. 2; NER
Newsletter, 15 Dec 1967, MKFP.
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CHAPTER VD

“A NEW BEGINNING”: CONFRONTATION, RENEWAL, AND TRIUMPH

It is my firm belief that in the complex constitution under which
we are living, the only safe and honourable course for a self-respecting
man is, in the circumstances such as face me, to do what I have decided to
do. that is, to submit without protest to the penalty of disobedience."
I venture to make this statement not in any way in extenuation of
the penalty to be awarded against me, but to show that I have disregarded
the order served upon me not for want of respect for lawful authority, but
in obedience to the higher law o f our being, the voice o f conscience.
M.K. Gandhi, Champaran, India, 1917
After spending Christmas 1967 with his parents and sister in his hometown of
Buffalo, New York. Michael Ferber returned to Boston and his quiet Beacon Hill
apartment at 71 Phillips Street on Friday, January 5, 1968. As he cleaned the place and
sorted through his mail he mused about his plans for the upcoming semester. Work with
the New England Resistance, which had become all-consuming at times during the fall,
had tapered off since early December and the group did not have another major event
planned until the spring; he thought it might be time to “cool it a bit” anyway and focus
again on the Ph.D. program that had brought him to Boston in the first place. Others
could step up and take the lead in the Resistance - some already had - and that would give
him time to pursue his studies. Late that afternoon, after settling in, he cracked open a
beer and looked forward to a more relaxed couple of months. But then the phone rang:
“Hello?” Ferber answered.
“Mr. Ferber?”
“Yes.”
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“This is United Press International. Do you have any comments about the
indictment?"
“What indictment?” Ferber responded.
“Well, haven’t you heard? You’ve been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for
conspiracy with Dr. Spock, William Sloane Coffin, Mitchell Goodman, and Marcus
Raskin.”
“No,” a startled Ferber replied, he had not heard. He gave the reporter a
comment, something defiant about the draft and resistance to it, and hung up. The
telephone kept ringing that night and continued to ring off the hook over the weekend
forcing him to leave for a few days. He quickly realized that his plans to “cool it” had
just evaporated.1
News o f the indictments stunned the nation and, especially, the antiwar
movement. Draft resisters expected to be prosecuted eventually, but over the past two
months the government seemed to be in no hurry. As more and more local boards
reclassified resisters and called them for induction, it appeared that the Justice
Department would wait for the resisters who refused induction and then prosecute cases
individually. Few anticipated indictments on conspiracy charges, and those who did
expected the local, draft-age organizers to be charged. No one expected the government
to go after older advisers like Spock, Coffin, Goodman, and Raskin; they, after all.

1Michael Ferber, speech at Town Hall, NY, 14 Jan 1968, transcribed in FBI
memorandum, Exhibit 33a, U.S. v. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, Mitchell
Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Benjamin Spock, CR 68-1, National Archives, Waltham,
MA; Wells, The War Within, p. 231.
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followed the lead o f the draft-age men who started the movement. Yet, although many
feared that the indictment marked but'the first stage o f a wider government crackdown,
many more looked to the impending trial with hope - hope that the confrontation with the
administration over the immorality and illegality o f the war that they had sought from the
start, might now take place. That optimism, coupled with the growing number of
resisters being called for and refusing induction in the winter and spring of 1968, fueled a
new beginning for the draft resistance movement. If mistakes had been made in the fall
and if interest in draft resistance had leveled off (and not everyone agreed on this), the
federal government provided an unintended boost to the movement by indicting the
“•Boston Five,” and through the ongoing reclassification and attempted inductions of
resisters. By April, the organizations and supporters of draft resistance which were
struggling to stay focused in December had transformed themselves into what one
reporter called a draft resistance “industry,” an industry that policy makers in Washington
clearly had noticed.
The Hammer Falls
All five o f the indicted men learned of the charges against them from the press,
including Dr. Spock who saw his own photograph on the front page o f a fellow subway
passenger’s newspaper that Friday as he returned home. Over the weekend they struggled
to answer reporters’ questions without having seen the actual indictment, though they at
times turned the occasion to their advantage. Spock told reporters that he had “no
qualms” about going to prison. “This trial,” the 64 year old pediatrician said, “will better
dramatize the illegal and immoral war in Vietnam, and if this trial will further my efforts
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to stop it so much the better.” Likewise, Ferber, the youngest in the alleged conspiracy,
argued that the indictments betrayed fear on the government’s part and that their action
would “galvanize the peace movement.” Like Spock and “thousands of others in the
Resistance,” he said, “I am fully prepared to go to prison.”2
On Monday, January 8, each defendant received official notice o f his indictment
and, for the first time, saw the government’s charges. The indictments were handed
down by a Boston grand jury to Judge W. Arthur Garrity, a former U.S. Attorney for
Massachusetts who later gained notoriety as the judge at the heart o f Boston’s busing
crisis. In the indictment o f each man. the grand jury stated that "from on or about August
1 ,1967, and continuously thereafter.” William Sloane Coffin. 43-year-old chaplain at
Yale, Michael Ferber, 23-year-old graduate student. Mitchell Goodman, 44-year-old
novelist and teacher, Marcus Raskin, 33-year-old head of a Washington think tank, and
Dr. Benjamin Spock “did unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly, combine, conspire,
confederate, and agree together and with each other...to commit offenses against the
United States.” Those offenses, the government contended, included: 1) counseling,
aiding and abetting “diverse” draft registrants to “fail, refuse, and evade” service in the
armed forces; 2) counseling, aiding and abetting registrants to “fail and refuse to have in
their possession” their Selective Service registration certificates, and 3) their
classification certificates; and 4) hindering and interfering “by any means” with the

2 “U.S. Indicts Dr. Spock, 4 Others,” Boston Globe, 6 Jan 1968, p. 1.
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administration o f the Selective Service.3
To support these charges, the indictment listed several "overt acts” committed by
the defendants in furtherance o f the alleged conspiracy. These acts included the
participation o f the four older men in signing and circulating the Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority, the participation of Coffin and Ferber in the October 16,1967
service at the Arlington Street Church (where they “accepted possession” of draft cards),
the presence o f all five in the demonstration at the Justice Department on October 20, and
the abandonment o f the briefcase full o f draft cards there by Coffin, Goodman, Raskin,
and Spock (Ferber remained outside) and several others. Taken together, the government
asserted, these five men conspired to “sponsor and support a nation-wide program of
resistance to the functions and operations of the Selective Service System.” The
indictment acknowledged that they were not alone in taking part in these activities and
repeatedly referred to "other co-conspirators, some known and others unknown to the
Grand Jury,” but by indicting only the five implied that they were the ringleaders.4
To a layperson unacquainted with the intricacies of conspiracy law, the
government did not appear to have a strong case. Use of the word “conspiracy” conjured
up dark images of criminals meeting in secret, plotting elaborate schemes over a long
period of time. In fact, all of the draft resistance activities detailed as part o f the
indictment occurred publicly and rarely included all five defendants. Ferber, for instance,

3 Indictment. U.S. v. Coffin, et al. CR-68-1, copy in MKFP; Note: complete text o f
the indictment also appears in the appendix of Jessica Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock,
pp. 253-257.
4 Ibid.
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had been introduced to Coffin for the first time at Arlington Street, and had never even
met the other three despite being present with them for the Justice Department rally. As a
result, some within the draft resistance movement saw the indictments as evidence that
the government had rushed to assemble its case. It was a reasonable supposition. Even
John Wall, the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Boston who would prosecute the case, later
admitted that when the case came to him from the Justice Department, it looked like it
was “a jerry-built thing...put together at the last minute.” Speculation on that point aside,
the movement’s reaction to the indictment determined the direction draft resistance would
take in the coming months.5
At first, the responses within the draft resistance community to the indictments
ranged from wariness over what the government might do next to satisfaction that their
movement had elicited such a strong response from Washington. Those who felt anxious
were concerned that the indictments of these five might be just the first in a wave of
repression aimed at squashing draft resistance and the antiwar movement. William
Sloane Coffin cautioned that '"there may be other indictments handed out, and a move to
repress a great many people.” If that happened, he said, then “it gets pretty serious.”
Indeed, predictions circulated that more than one hundred indictments would soon follow
in San Francisco, New York. Chicago and other cities where draft resistance was
strongest. Moreover, some rumors suggested that the indictments were timed to coincide
with an American ground invasion o f North Vietnam, that refrigerator units had been
sited ten miles south o f the DMZ, loaded with blood plasma to support such a

5 John Wall, interview with author, 26 Jun 1998.
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mobilization. (By the end o f the month, the world would learn that the opposite was true
as North Vietnam launched attacks in’dozens of offensives in the South during the Tet
holiday.) The most persistent fear, however stemmed from predictions that the
government repression had only just started. When the five defendants met in New York
the week after being indicted - the first time ever that they did get together in the same
room to plot strategy on anything - Michael Ferber remembers Marc Raskin being
particularly despondent. Raskin believed the indictments were the first move in a
planned “decimation o f the intelligentsia,” soon to be followed by indictments of Noam
Chomsky, Dwight McDonald, Ashley Montagu, Susan Sontag, Howard Zinn, and on
down the line.6
Not everyone in the antiwar movement agreed with Marc Raskin’s dire
predictions, but most were willing to grant that the government at least intended to scare
people away from draft resistance and maybe from criticizing the administration
altogether. Howard Zinn later said that he saw the indictments as typical of a political
trial in which the government goes after prominent opponents in order to send a message
to everyone else. “Whenever the government has moved against radicals,” Zinn later
commented, “it has usually taken the top leadership and used it as a kind of lesson for all
the rest.” Louis Kampf o f Resist agreed. The government went after a representative
group as a way of “scaring the shit out of everybody,” he said. An editorial in Ramparts

6 Ferber speech at Town Hall, NY, 14 Jan 1968, transcribed in FBI memorandum,
Exhibit 33a, U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR 68-1, National Archives, Waltham, MA;
“Indictments protest Planned in Capital,” Boston Globe, 8 Jan 1968, p. 1; Ferber
interview with author, 16 Jun 1998.
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called the indictments an "‘act o f repression” representing a “fundamental break with
previous handling o f opposition to the Vietnam war.” Such “heinous repression of
freedom at home,” they wrote, "forebodes a greater desperation” on the part of policy
makers. John Fuerst of SDS described the indictments as a “trial balloon for the
government, a test of the antiwar movement’s strength and militancy.” In a prescient
observation, he suggested that the most important factor in how this drama would play
out would be the kind of defense adopted by the indicted men: “...it is unclear whether
that defense will also be a defense o f the program they supported; and if the defense of
the men is separated from an active defense o f draft resistance as such, then the
government will know that the way is open for an attack on the resistance movement
itself.” Remaining defiant in the face of prosecution. Fuerst seemed to suggest, would
demonstrate the movement's commitment and give the government pause. In any event,
all such analyses of the indictments assumed that the administration planned a crackdown
- one that could be imminent or that might not occur until after the trial. As Hilde Hein
recalled, the notion that these five formed a conspiracy - the etymology o f the word
reduces to “breathing together" - was absurd. That said, if they could still be indicted for
a conspiracy, she thought, "anybody could be indicted as a member o f a conspiracy.”
Many in the movement grew anxious.7
In reality, the government did not have any additional “repression” planned, and if

7 Howard Zinn, interview with author. 6 Jul 1998; Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998;
“The Repression at Home,” editorial. Ramparts, Feb 1968, p. 2; John Fuerst, “Resistance
and Repression,” New Left Motes, 15 Jan 1968, p. 1; Robert Pardun, “The Political
Defense o f Resistance,” New Left Notes, 15 Jan 1968, p. 1; Hein interview, 18 Sep 1998.
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antiwar activists had been privy to the manner in which the Spock indictments originated,
their concerns might have been eased! Investigation of the men who became known as
the “Boston Five” did not start until December, after Attorney General Ramsey Clark and
General Hershey issued their joint statement on the enforcement of Selective Service
laws. As part o f that communique, the Department of Justice announced the formation of
a Special Unit in the Criminal Division that would handle draft cases. Clark chose John
Van de Kamp to head up the effort. Van de Kamp, a former U. S. Attorney in Los
Angeles, had been recruited by Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher to become
deputy director o f the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys only a few months before, and
was present at the Justice Department meeting between John McDonough and the
delegation bearing draft cards. Van de Kamp quickly put together a small team of
lawyers to “look at if there was any overall conspiracy...any kind o f national effort to
persuade people, to induce them to evade the draft.” Among the first activities they
investigated were the counseling services offered by the American Friends Service
Committee and other religious organizations, which the department found to be “very
careful” about how they dispensed information “without getting into any kind of
inducement that would bring them within any kind o f criminal prosecution.” At the same
time, though, Van de Kamp’s unit focused on the events o f October 20 at the Justice
Department. Eventually, that investigation led to the preparation of an indictment of a
long list of people found to be pushing for a national draft resistance movement. The
attorney general rejected it; he wanted it whittled down to a group o f the individuals who
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were most involved.8
What is most interesting is who the government finally indicted as ringleaders. Of
the five men chosen for prosecution by the Justice Department, only Michael Ferber was
of draft age; the other four were older and, more important, had joined the movement as
supporters, not draft resisters. As Mitch Goodman remarked, '‘the kids invented the
Resistance movement, we came along behind.” According to John Van de Kamp, John
McDonough, and John Wall, however, the government felt obligated to go after the older
advisers who were “inducing,” '‘soliciting,” “inciting,” or “encouraging” draft age men to
violate Selective Service laws. After all, these men invited it. The specific language
used by Coffin on the Justice Department steps, for example, seemed to come right from
the statute books. "We hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their
refusal to serve in the armed forces," Coffin said. '‘And we pledge ourselves to aid and
abet them in all the ways we can.” Indeed, they were asking for it. But more important,
the Department’s interest in prosecuting these conspirators stemmed in large part from a
concern that older, wiser men were urging younger, more impressionable men to break
the law. That was not only illegal, it was offensive. Although Van de Kamp,
McDonough, and especially Wall doubted the wisdom of the administration’s Vietnam
policies, none of them felt that it justified what these older advisers were trying to do by
urging younger men to resist the draft. The Department, as Van de Kamp later noted,
wanted to send a message that although speech would be tolerated, “inducing or

8 John Van de Kamp, interview with author, 9 Jun 1998; Ramsey Clark, interview
with author, 6 Jan 1998.
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procuring evasion” would not. To protect America’s youth and the integrity of the draft
laws, such individuals would have to be prosecuted.9
If the Justice Department truly interpreted the draft resistance movement this way,
then they clearly misjudged it. The young men who founded the draft resistance
movement, who worked in Resistance chapters across the country, who planned draft card
tum-ins and sent the yield to Washington, did all o f those things on their own, with and
without the encouragement of older supporters. Only when the older men who circulated
the Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority sought to raise their own personal stakes did they
seek alliance with the younger men by suggesting that they be the ones to accept the
returned draft cards and then convey them to the attorney general. By the time that idea
occurred to William Sloane Coffin, the Resistance had already built considerable
momentum in several cities across the nation. Of course, the younger men were happy to
accept the support of the older partisans; it gave the entire movement an added air of
credibility that could only help the cause, and their fundraising abilities proved
invaluable, too. Ultimately, however, even a perfunctory review o f the draft resistance
movement should have made government investigators realize that the leaders of the
movement were the resisters themselves. And although they could not be accused of
counseling others to resist the draft (as at Arlington Street, Resistance organizers
everywhere took careful steps to make sure every resister came to his position on his
own) these younger men were certainly guilty of aiding and abetting the mass violation o f

9 Van de Kamp interview, 9 Jun 1998; McDonough interview, 3 Jun 1998; John
Wall, interview with author, 26 Jun 1998; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 31,271.
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Selective Service laws. In this context, indicting Michael Ferber made sense. They
might also have indicted David Harris. Lenny Heller in California, Bill Dowling, Alex
Jack, Neil Robertson, Nan Stone in Boston, and other Resistance leaders from Chicago,
New York, and Philadelphia. Instead, though, the government created the Trial of Dr.
Spock.
Resistance organizers likely would have refused the support o f the older men and
woman if they had known that the government would choose to target them instead of the
resisters themselves. This unexpected response from the administration undermined the
Resistance goal of bogging down the court system and filling the jails with America’s
youth. Then again, maybe someone in the Justice Department knew that.
The answer to this prosecutorial riddle apparently lay at the top. with the attorney
general, Ramsey Clark. It turned out that no one outside the Department - and very few
within it - understood the complicated motives behind Clark's approval of this
indictment. Years after the trial o f the Boston Five, Clark acknowledged that he
intentionally sought a draft resistance "control case" or ‘"test case;” significantly, he
wanted “a case that would justify deterring other aggressive actions” by the Department
against individual draft resisters. Two motives led him to this particular case. First, as he
later said, "the law always has to consider how you test an unpopular law” like the
Selective Service Act. The law, he said, ’‘has an obligation to protect governmental
institutions, even when they’re engaged in erroneous policy.” Sounding almost utopian,
Clark argued that in any society “that wants to be democratic and free,” important issues
like the war and the draft should be “vigorously debated” as early as possible. A draft

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

348
resistance test case, therefore, would “ventilate the issues, escalate them where they can
be seen, [and] provide vigorous defense” for the defendants - or so he hoped. Second,
Clark felt he had a duty to avoid injuring “innocent” people like ordinary draft resisters
who were not engaged in an act o f moral turpitude, but were acting on conscience. Here.
his own experience during World War II and the treatment o f his friends who were
conscientious objectors informed his decision. As he later put it:
The saddest thing to see is a youngster out in the boondocks who's a
pacifist. There's no sympathy there for him, no support there for him, he's
got no way to defend himself or protect himself, and it looks like the
whole world is against him (perhaps his father feels he's a traitor, and his
mother feels he's a coward, his buddies don’t like him). He's got nothing
and you come down on him with a prosecution that’s just devastating.
Clark badly wanted to avoid prosecuting men like this. As an alternative, the Spock
defendants were mature, “had thought things through for a long period of time, and had
firm - even passionate - understanding and commitment o f what they were doing and
why.” he reasoned. They also had the resources to mount a more adequate defense than
an isolated young resister might have. The Department, Clark later commented, “could
have ground up tens of thousands of youngsters and nobody would ever [have] notice[d]
it.” But here, Clark remarked, “with a famous baby doctor and a prominent chaplain of a
major university, attention had to be paid.” As he reflected on it years later, Clark still
liked the plan. “I think it was sound government, sound law, and sound morality,” he
said.10
By this time, Clark himself had turned against the war. Within the administration

10 Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998; Ramsey Clark, telephone interview with author, 29
Apr 1998. Also see Wells, The War Within, pp. 234-237.
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his well-known opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policies rankled colleagues. Clark
believed that the president left him o ff the National Security Council because of it and
later admitted that his relationship with Johnson and others became “very strained.” He
remembered that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board claimed his resolute refusal to
grant wiretaps o f antiwar groups undermined “not only the war effort then but generally
the national security o f the country.” By the time the administration left office, he had
become a virtual outcast, a cabinet official not invited to any o f the many going-away
parties held in the final weeks. So. in early January 1968, when the grand jury handed
down indictments o f the Boston Five, Clark recalls, the president and Joe Califano. in
particular, were “genuinely and actually surprised.” They did not think Clark would do it,
especially on his own. The antiwar movement would have found this hard to believe
since they were certain that Dr. Spock could have been indicted only with the president’s
consent."
As the Department prepared the indictment, Clark brought in Erwin Griswold, the
Solicitor General to look at the case. Clark especially wanted Griswold, whom he
thought of as the “Grand Old Man o f law school deans and legal scholarship,” to vet the
case for two reasons: “to be absolutely confident that it did not involve a violation o f the
First Amendment and that it was a proper use of the conspiracy statute.” For one thing,
he did not want the trial to become a free speech case. The central issues in the case had
nothing to do with free speech. Secondly, Clark believed that, inherently, the five men
charged were engaged in a conspiracy - well-intentioned or not. On many occasions,

11 Wells, The War Within, p. 236; Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998.
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Clark had had numerous older people - college professors, lawyers, other draft counselors
- appeal to him telling him that they wished Clark would prosecute them instead of the
draft-age men. The trouble with that, as Clark saw it, however, was that even if the
government prosecuted these people, it could not ignore “the principal who commits the
ultimate act.” The one tim e that the government could ignore the individual resisters
would be when a “major effort...a continuing effort,” involving “the same circulation of
people,” ringleaders who were more involved in trying to create opposition to draft
registration and compliance. In this way, the conspiracy statute might actually protect the
mass o f individual resisters while targeting only those responsible for inciting these
violations o f the law.12
Since the events detailed in the indictment occurred in Washington, New York,
and Boston, a Grand Jury could have been convened in any o f those cities. The
Department chose Boston. John Van de Kamp later explained that the government did
not want to try what would inevitably be seen as a political case in Washington where
politics would be most emphasized. Van de Kamp saw Boston as “more neutral grounds”
and a place where they could make a strong case. In fact, Ramsey Clark had consulted
with the United States Attorney in Boston, Paul Markham, about assigning the case to
John Wall. At the same time that Van de Kamp and his team were working on the details
o f the indictment, Wall was in Washington working for Clark on special assignment
investigating Congressman Adam Clayton Powell. (Wall eventually put together a
persuasive case for indictment o f Powell, but Clark chose not to pursue it). Wall returned

12 Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998.
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to Boston and presented the Spock case to the grand jury for indictment. He recalls that
one juror clearly sympathized with the five potential defendants. On occasion, this man
would blurt out “Indict the president, why don’t ya?!” or “It’s an illegal war!” He did not
persuade his peers, and the grand jury decided to indict the five men for conspiracy.13
The movement saw the decision to hold the trial in Boston differently. They
believed that a jury in Washington would be predominantly African-American and less
likely to side with the government. Likewise, a jury in Manhattan, a hot-bed of
opposition to the war, might include Jews and minorities more inclined to acquit. A jury
in Boston, in contrast, would be more likely to empanel conservative Catholic (Irish or
otherwise) jurors who would be more eager to convict the five defendants. Years later,
even John Wall, who did not have any role in the decision to bring the trial in Boston,
said that he assumed the case was tried there for that reason: “A lot o f Irish-Catholic
conservatives here in Boston: they'd be more likely to get a conviction here than in
Washington, DC or in New York.”14
Although some in the antiwar movement worried that the indictments represented
the first act in a growing wave o f repression, others speculated that the Justice
Department had done them a favor by choosing five clean-cut, articulate defendants and
by trying the case in Boston. One week after being indicted, Michael Ferber told an
audience, "maybe we have a friend in high places.” He saw Boston as one of the best

13 Van de Kamp interview, 9 Jun 1998; Wall interview, 26 Jun 1998.
14 Ferber interview, 16 Jun 1998; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, p. 220; Wall
interview, 26 Jun 1998.
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communities for the trial due to the strong church and academic support. Similarly, the
choice o f defendants made one wonder about a benefactor. ’‘Why else would they pick a
healer o f babies, the best known doctor in the country, a chaplain at Yale, a novelist, a
research assistant who is in the National Security Council, and me?” Ferber asked. They
could have gone after a group of bearded, long-haired draft resisters, but “none o f us has
so much as a moustache.” he said.'5
Indictments as Catalyst
Indeed, rather than facing the trial with dread, many in the movement looked
forward to it with great anticipation and also with high expectations for what it might
accomplish in furtherance of their cause. Ramparts magazine declared that “the Spock
case will undoubtedly be one of the most important political trials in American history.”
Echoing that sentiment, William Sloane Coffin told a reporter that he looked forward to
“a really good confrontation with the government on the legality and morality o f the war.”
Similarly, the Rev. Dick Mumma, Presbyterian chaplain at Harvard, told some other
reporters that it pleased him that the issue had been joined, “that the legal confrontation"
would at last take place. “A lot of the hope I have in the human race is pinned on these
five indicted men,” he explained. Michael Ferber later reflected: “I felt really good for
the Resistance. I felt grateful that we had Spock in trouble, and Coffin...I thought this
was the best thing for draft resistance that we could do.” Though he knew the trial might
draw some attention away from the resisters themselves, the idea of draft resistance

15 Michael Ferber, speech at Town Hall, New York, 14 Jan 1968, Exhibit 33a,
U.S. v. Coffin, e ta l, CR-68-1, National Archives, Waltham, MA.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

353
would get much more attention and it would be “a huge political problem for the
government.” In fact, he thought the administration was “really stupid to have done it.”
The idea of putting Dr. Spock in prison, he reasoned, should have been the last thing the
government wanted. This sense of confidence shaped Ferber’s reaction to the indictment
when he finally received it in the mail. Accustomed to grading freshman English papers
at Harvard, Ferber sat down with the indictment and, with red pen in hand, corrected it.
He crossed out redundancies (“combine,” “conspire,” “confederate,” and “agree”),
marked the split infinitives (“to unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully, counsel, aid and
abet”) and circled misspelled words, especially “co-conspirator.” in which the “co-”
seemed superfluous. In the margins, he wrote. “You should do better. See me.” He gave
the whole indictment a grade of C- and mailed it back to the U.S. Attorney.16
Although such open acts of bravado were rare, the indictments did elicit a new
sense of defiance and solidarity from draft resisters and the larger antiwar movement. In
the days immediately following announcement of the indictments, Resist, the
organization of older supporters that evolved out o f the Call to Resist Illegitimate
Authority, issued a complicity' statement: “We stand beside the men who have been
indicted for support of draft resistance. If they are sentenced, we, too. must be sentenced.
If they are imprisoned, we will take their places and will continue to use what means we
can to bring this war to an end.” Among the signers were Martin Luther King, Jr., Noam

16 “The Repression at Home,” editorial. Ramparts, Feb 1968, p. 2; “Draft
Indictments Spur Calls for Strikes, Sit-Ins,” Boston Globe, 7 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Indictments
Protest Planned in Capital,” Boston Globe, 8 Jan 1968, p. I; Ferber interview, 16 Jun
1998; Coffin, Once to Every Man and Nation, p. 263; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, p.
4.
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Chomsky, Robert McAfee Brown, Dwight MacDonald, and Howard Zinn. In addition,
Resist called for a nationwide academic strike during the trial and another march on
Washington. Teach-ins were scheduled at universities around the country and the
Resistance predicted that by spring another 10,000 men would turn in their draft cards.
For many opponents to the war, their challenge had been met and now choices needed to
be made. "If these five go to jail and thousands of others do not follow them, we can
forget about serious opposition to the war and civil liberties in this country,” a Ramparts
editorial warned. “We are all on the spot...If these five men are conspirators, then we
must become a nation o f conspirators. If we do not stand with them, it is impossible to
see where the repression at home, and the oppression abroad, will stop.” The indictments
served as catalysts for a closing of ranks, a renewal of that bold rebelliousness that
launched the draft resistance movement.17
The groundswell of support for the five defendants and the draft resistance
movement surprised even the most experienced political organizers. One week after the
indictments came down, Resist organized an event at New York's Town Hall with the
idea that the individuals could line up and sign the group’s complicity statement on stage
in a very public, dramatic fashion. As the day approached, Louis Kampf and others
worried that the turnout might be too small. Instead, when the time came, people packed
Town Hall and overflowed into the streets. The meeting never opened formally as people

17 “Draft Indictments Spur Calls for Strikes, Sit-Ins,” Boston Globe, 7 Jan 1968;
Michael Ferber, speech at Town Hall, New York, 14 Jan 1968, Exhibit 33a, U.S. v.
Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, National Archives, Waltham, MA; “The Repression at Home,”
Ramparts, Feb 1968, p. 2.
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spontaneously began signing the statement and speaking into the microphone one at a
time. “We couldn’t keep people off the stage,” Kampf recalled. “People just rushed up
there wanting to sign up and made a lot o f very heartfelt statements about overcoming
fear.” Even more significant, the money began pouring into Resist. Instead o f scaring the
draft resistance movement and the larger antiwar movement of which it was a part, the
government opened the financial floodgates. “Financially,” Kampf says, “it gave us the
wherewithal to really set up a serious organization and be able to look to the future.” 18
In the hothouse atmosphere o f the draft resistance organizing at this time,
however, passions sometimes collided. Bill Dowling, original founder of the New
England Resistance and. really, its de facto leader in the fail, saw the indictments as an
opportunity to increase the coefficient of friction with the administration. Dowling
suggested a massive sit-in at the federal courthouse in Boston on the day of the
arraignment, scheduled for 29 January 1968. But some of his comrades disagreed.
Ferber, in particular, saw the occasion of the indictments as an opportunity to broaden the
Resistance's base of support, and to continue on the course of resistance already charted
as they prepared for the confrontation with the government. Switching to new tactics at
every new opportunity, just for the sake of creating ongoing discomfort for the
administration, did not seem prudent, he thought. Ultimately, a kind of showdown
occurred between Dowling and Ferber. After discussing Dowling’s plans with the other
defendants - all of whom concluded that the mass sit-in would be supernumerary at best,
and counterproductive at worst - Ferber urged Dowling to reconsider. Dowling refused.

18 Kampf interview, 10 Sep 1998.
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Standing in the failing snow in the middle o f Harvard Yard, Dowling told Ferber that he

and others intended to go ahead with the sit-in anyway. Ferber warned that he would
have to come out against Dowling if he did. Disgusted, Dowling turned and walked
away. On January 29. the sit-in did not materialize. Bill Dowling dropped out of the
Resistance and he and Michael Ferber never spoke to one another again.19
Internal dissension rarely reached such levels within the New England Resistance,
especially at this time when the indictments actually galvanized more fervent support for
the cause. More and more supporters turned out for rallies and teach-ins in the weeks
following the indictments. Donations streamed in to BDRG, to the New England
Resistance, and especially to Resist which began giving out monthly grants to draft
resistance organizations nationwide. Perhaps most telling, a new attitude of confidence
could be discerned in public and in private. The tone o f demonstrations clearly changed
in January 1968. While the draft card turn-ins and demonstrations o f the fail generally
had been somber affairs, the rallies and turn-ins put on by the Resistance in the wake of
the indictments were almost jubilant and raucous. This transition occurred most
noticeably around the time o f the arraignment for the Boston Five. On January 28, the
night before the arraignments, two meetings took place that effectively marked the
passage o f one era to the next. Early in the evening, the First Church o f Boston in the
Back Bay held a service of support. 700 people came to hear William Sloane Coffin in a
contemplative service not unlike those of the fall. But later that evening, the Resistance

19 Ferber interview, 21 Apr 1998. Note: Bill Dowling has agreed to be
interviewed for this project, but only after the defense o f the dissertation.
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sponsored a rally (much like a college pep rally) at Northeastern University in support of
the defendants. 2,200 people showed*up to hear an all-star list of speakers that included
Dr. Spock, Coffin. Paul Goodman. David Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Paul Lauter, Bill Hunt,
and Harvard Professor H. Stuart Hughes. A mood o f both defiance and almost
celebration permeated the entire evening. Each speaker elicited enthusiastic bursts of
applause throughout the night, but one young man, Richard Wolcott, received the most
thunderous ovation when he spontaneously stepped to the podium and told the crowd that
he would refuse to be inducted into the armed forces the next day. The crowd basked in a
new sense of solidarity and seemed emboldened by it. By the end of the night, another
$1000 had been raised to support draft resistance, and 350 people signed a complicity
statement that would be sent to Ramsey Clark the next day.20
No day epitomized the draft resistance movement’s new beginning like the day of
the arraignment itself, January 29, 1968. By the time the five defendants arrived at the
federal courthouse in Post Office Square. 1,200 to 1,500 supporters had been quietly
picketing outside for more than an hour. They carried signs: “Join the New American
Revolution,” “Resist,” “Napalm: Johnson’s Baby Powder,” “Don’t Enlist, Resist.” “Make
Love, Not War,” “End the Draft, Let Men Live,” and the most clever one, “Dr. Spock
Delivers Us Again!” A special detail of 30 police officers monitored the crowd while
several FBI agents weaved in and out o f the picket line with their cameras. Naturally,
Josef Mlot-Mroz and his group o f Polish Freedom Fighters provided the alternative
viewpoint. In the battle o f the placards, Mlot-Mroz offered his standard themes along

20 Resistance National Newsletter #5, 31 Jan 1968, MKFP.
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with some new signs aimed at the media: "‘Squash Communism Everywhere,” “Bum,
Baby, Bum: Your Draft Card, Your Birth Certificate, and Your Citizenship Papers,” “Dr.
Spock - Change Diapers, Not Foreign Policy,” “Press-News-Media: It is High Time That
You Gave U.S. the Truth About the Red Menace, $64,000 Question: Who is Controlling
You?,” and “Why is the Press Always Slanted in Favor of the Reds & Pinkos, Vietniks
and X-niks?” Twelve members o f the conservative Young Americans for Freedom also
counter-protested.21
Inside the courthouse, the five defendants appeared for a mere nine minutes before
Judge Francis Ford. Only relatives of the defendants and reporters were allowed into the
courtroom. Two newsmen from Tass, the Soviet news agency, sat in the back (the next
day’s Izvestia carried the headline: “Crime in Boston: Crude Reprisal Against American
Patriots”). When asked for their plea by Deputy Clerk Austin Jones, each man answered
“not guilty.” Several observers noted that moments earlier, in an adjacent courtroom. 350
new citizens took the oath of citizenship - an oath that called on citizens to uphold the
Constitution and to bear arms if necessary - from Judge Arthur Garrity. The judge set
bail at $1,000 for each defendant and told them that they could travel anywhere they
wanted within the United States. Court officials then took the five defendants to be
fingerprinted and then released them. At some point, word came that British actress
Vanessa Redgrave had cabled her support. By the time the five emerged from the

21 “Dr. Spock Pleads Innocent,” Boston Globe (Evening), 29 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Dr.
Spock’s Trial Set in March,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. I; photograph, BUNews, 31
Jan 1968, p. 9; Bud Collins, “The New Generation’s New Heroes,” Boston Globe, 31 Jan
1968, p. 13.
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courthouse, the line of supporters had become so long that it stretched ail the way around
the massive Art Deco structure in a complete circle from Water Street to Devonshire.
Milk, and Congress Streets. A crowd o f supporters surrounded Dr. Spock as he stepped
into the daylight, but then counter-protesters began shouting “traitor!” and “coward!” A
snowball whizzed by Spock’s head as many of the counter-pickets stormed into the
crowd, grabbed signs from supporters and stomped them on the ground. The draft
resistance sympathizers did not respond except for one who bloodied Josef Mlot-Mroz’s
nose and shoved him to the sidewalk after the freedom fighter called him a “red.” Police
kept the scuffles from escalating, and the crowd dispersed as the defendants rode from the
courthouse to the Arlington Street Church for a 12:30 press conference.22
The scene at the Arlington Street Church at first appeared much like it did on
October 16. As the defendants held their press conference in the basement below, a
teach-in took place in the sanctuary o f the church. Close to 1,000 people jammed the
church. Spock told reporters that “the war in Vietnam is on trial just as much as we are.
There is no question in our minds that we're not guilty because the war is illegal.” The
press conference adjourned as the teach-in upstairs ended and as the “Service of
Rededication” began, the defendants walked triumphantly into the sanctuary where they
were met with several minutes of deafening applause and cheering. After the invocation

22 “Dr. Spock Pleads Innocent,” Boston Globe (Evening), 29 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Dr.
Spock’s Trial Set in March,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Izvestia Gives Hub Big
Play,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. 2; Bud Collins, “The New Generation’s New
Heroes,” Boston Globe, 31 Jan 1968, p. 13; “ 1,200 at Anti-War Rally as Spock, 4 Others
Plead,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Peace and Punches Mar Spock
Hearing,” Boston Record American, 30 Jan 1968, p. 3; “25 All Burned Up Over Spock
Hearing,” Boston Record American, 30 Jan 1968, p. 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

360
and once again singing Once to Every Man and Nation, Bill Hunt read excerpts from
General Hershey’s Channelin g Memo. Denise Levertov then read a few of her poems,
followed by Neil Robertson who read writings o f nonviolent struggle by Gandhi.
The heart of the service, however, centered on the responsive reading led by Bob
Hohler, Director of the Unitarian Universalist Laymen’s League. The text o f the
readings, and the congregation’s responses appeared in the order of service distributed to
those in attendance and, notably, to the press. The readings and responses reflected the
new era of draft resistance. They were critical o f government policy and especially o f the
complacency of American citizens in the face o f what they believed to be an obscenely
immoral war. In a way, the readings were a vehicle for participants to confront their own
past inadequacies in protesting the war while simultaneously renewing their commitment,
'‘rededicating” themselves to constant vigilance in opposing the war. In part, the
exchange went as follows:
Leader: What will we say to the world one day when it asks us why we
paid not attention to the Vietnamese who for over a hundred years
struggled for independence from the foreign power in their
country?
Congregation: We did not care about people with yellow skins. We were
busy building an empire by destroying people with red skins and
enslaving those with black skins....
Leader: Why did we raise no cry o f outrage when our government first
sent planes to destroy the city of Vinh in North Vietnam?
Congregation: We believed the false reports and lies o f our government.
We felt secure because we had elected a President who promised
peace. We buried ourselves in daily trivia and grew numb. We did
not care...
Leader: Where were we when four men burned their draft cards in South
Boston in 1965 [sic]? When over 200 men said No to the
government in this church and in Old West Church last fall?
Congregation: We were hiding behind our student and ministerial
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deferments. We were seeking jobs that were in the 'national
interest.' We were able to afford medical and psychological
excuses, while our black, poor, and working class brothers were
sent to die. We were working within the system. We were paying
our taxes to make the system work.
Leader: The world will say that we were wrong and its judgement will be
harsh upon us. The world will say that we should have disobeyed
our leaders. History will remember us as 'Good Americans' as we
remember those who acquiesced to the slaughter of the Jews as
'Good Germans.' Our children will not accept the excuse that we
were only doing our job.
Congregation: We were wrong. But if it is not too late, we are ready now
to act.
Leader: It is not too late. For although there are many we have ignored
there are many others we can help...Today at the Boston Federal
Court, five men were arraigned for conspiracy to aid and counsel
others to resist the draft.
Congregation. We stand beside these men.
Leader: And tomorrow, and the day after, and every day until the war ends
in Vietnam and our country turns to freedom and justice for all its
people at home, thousands and thousands of young Americans will
stand up and resist the machinery of war and racism.
Congregation: We pledge to work beside these young men. Their struggle
is our struggle. Their fate is our fate. The world shall not say they
stood alone.
When recited in unison, these passages, steeped in self-examination and dedicated to a
renewed activism, produced a kind of catharsis among the participants that reinforced the
growing sense of solidarity within the draft resistance movement. In this house of
worship, they felt cleansed.23
The confidence that this renewed solidarity engendered manifested itself in the
next phase of the service. Father Phillip Berrigan, under indictment himself for pouring

23 “Dr. Spock Pleads Innocent,” Boston Globe (Evening), 29 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Dr.
Spock’s Trial Set in March,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1; “1,200 at Anti-War Rally
as Spock, 4 Others Plead,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1; Order o f Service
o f Rededication, leaflet, 29 Jan 1968, Spock Papers, Series II, Box 11.
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his own blood on the files o f a Baltimore draft board, issued the '“call to resist.” In an
apparent reference to the five indicted men seated in the first pew, Berrigan said: “Those
of you coming forward to turn in your draft cards do not have to be encouraged by me if
you’re not already moved by the display o f resistance here today.” As the Boston Five
looked on, Berrigan, the Reverend Richard Mumma. Rabbi Judea Miller o f Temple
Tilfereth in Malden, and David Dellinger stood in the chancel, prepared to commit the
same acts for which the others had been indicted. A stream of young men, also following
the example o f those who had gone before them, moved up the center aisle of the church
with their draft cards in hand. The first man to approach the older group o f "‘aiders and
abettors” was Patchen Dellinger, a Harvard Medical School student and son o f the
antiwar leader. He embraced his father and handed his draft card to him. Behind the
younger Dellinger, the numbers o f new resisters continued to grow, and as more joined
the line, the spectators cheered louder and louder. The quiet, solemn procession of
October 16 gave way to a more exuberant demonstration. According to one reporter who
witnessed the scene, “the overflow crowd rocked the large church with applause.” From
the balcony, supporters flashed the V-for-victory sign and smiled their approval. Denise
Levertov, sitting next to her indicted husband, Mitch Goodman, wiped tears from her
eyes as the young men turned in their cards.24
Ultimately, 25 men joined the Resistance that day, a much smaller number than in
the fall, but they defied their government in a ceremony that New England Resistance

24 “Dr. Spock’s Trial Set in March,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. I; “ 1,200 at
Anti-War Rally as Spock, 4 Others Plead,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1;
“25 All Burned Up Over Spock Hearing,” Boston Record American, 30 Jan 1968, p. 3.
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leaders called “the most inspiring we have had yet.” In a letter sent with the newly
collected draft cards to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Neil Robertson wrote: “You will
please note that the Resistance has been neither intimidated nor deterred from its activity
by the unjust indictments of the ‘Boston Five.’” Indeed, the Resistance seemed inspired.
The indictments did, as some resisters predicted, galvanize support for the movement and
Resistance leaders took advantage of the chance for a fresh start. The questionable tactics
and public relations errors of the fall were absent on January 29. Resisters turned in draft
cards - they did not bum them. No fistfights erupted on the steps of the church. And
most salient, the climate of support shifted from somber and deliberate encouragement to
something approaching revelry. Rather than intimidate the draft resistance movement,
government “repression” offered proof to resisters that they had grabbed the
administration’s attention. Confrontation, whether in the form o f the Spock indictments
or, increasingly, in attempts to induct resisters, did not for the moment intimidate but,
rather, gave the movement strength.25
Refusing Induction
By the time the Spock indictments came down, draft resisters across the country
had been receiving notices from their local Selective Service boards informing them that
their draft classifications had been changed to I-A, that they could now be drafted. Each
draft board varied in its approach to resisters. Some tried to get them to reconsider.

25 “Dr. Spock’s Trial Set in March,” Boston Globe, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1; “ 1,200 at
Anti-War Rally as Spock, 4 Others Plead,” Boston Herald Traveler, 30 Jan 1968, p. 1;
“25 All Burned Up Over Spock Hearing,” Boston Record American, 30 Jan 1968, p. 3;
NER Newsletter, 8 Feb 1968, MKFP.
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Others simply sent replacement draft cards (with the same classification) to the resister
while still others chose to ignore the defiance o f such registrants. Most draft boards,
however, declared resisters delinquent, reclassified them to 1-A (if they were not already
1-A), and placed their names in the pipeline for future induction.
In early 1968. the Army called the first reclassified resisters for induction, and in
doing so, offered the draft resistance movement new opportunities for confrontation. For
the resister being called, the induction order raised his personal stakes considerably;
noncompliance would certainly mean an indictment and probably prison time. Inductions
were the ultimate test o f a resisters' commitment to his cause. Resisters found it much
easier to turn in a draft card in an act o f fellowship with dozens o f other men than they
did standing up to the Army - to their own government - all alone in an induction center
full of willing, or at least acquiescent, conscripts. Both the New England Resistance and
the Boston Draft Resistance Group recognized this and took pains to provide support to
resisters on the day o f their induction refusals.
In January the Resistance and the BDRG described the coming induction refusals
as marking '‘a new beginning" for the movement. On the one hand, given its experience
with Early Morning Shows and Horror Shows, the BDRG felt comfortable confronting
the Army on its own turf, and to this the New England Resistance added its ability to
mobilize large numbers of supporters for big demonstrations. As the Army called more
and more resisters for induction, large rallies at the Army base became commonplace and
garnered widespread media attention. But in a practical sense, induction refusals - for
the New England Resistance, in particular - solved one o f the most significant dilemmas
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that the organization faced in the fall: the lack o f day-to-day work for rank-and-file
resisters. Equally important. Resistance leaders used induction refusals as motivational
tools, dramatic confrontations that would show their determination to prove to the
administration that it could not '‘silence the American people by resorting to intimidation
and bogus conspiracy charges.” In this respect, General Hershey’s plan backfired.
Instead o f undermining the resistance movement, drafting resisters actually helped to
sustain the confidence and optimism of the movement by providing a vehicle for ongoing
struggle with the government. Resisters predicted that more “acts o f repression” would
follow as the government grew “progressively more frightened of its own people,” but
argued that “history will regard these men [resisters] and the thousands that are prepared
to follow them as the authentic patriots of our time.” As the movement looked ahead to
the Spock trial, then, induction refusals helped to maintain the renewed momentum that
draft resisters felt in the wake o f the indictments. Although numerous draft resisters
refused induction in the winter and spring o f 1968, three separate days at the Boston
Army Base merit closer attention, for the men who resisted on those days - Howard
Marston, Jr, James Oestereich and Richard Hughes, and Ray Mungo - ran the gamut from
almost reluctant to flamboyant and their experiences as resisters demonstrate how varied
life in the Resistance could be.26
Howard Marston. Jr.
The Selective Service had been calling draft resisters for induction at least since

26 “Statement o f the Boston Draft Resistance Group,” undated leaflet (c. 10 Jan
1968), CFP.
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1966 and maybe since 1965, but only on January 10, 1968 - two days after the Boston
Five received their indictments in the mail - did one resister’s induction refusal become
the focus of a mass antiwar-antidraft protest. Unlike the lonely days o f 1966, when a
handful o f CNVA supporters picketed the Boston Army Base on the days that John
Phillips, David Reed, David O’Brien. Gary Hicks, and David Benson each refused to be
inducted, the cold winter day of Howard "Chick” Marston, Jr.’s induction saw hundreds
o f people turn out in the first Resistance reply to what they saw as the Johnson
administration’s attempt to intimidate them.
In many ways, Chick Marston made an unlikely draft resister. Marston and two of
his friends applied to their draft board (local board 72 in Gloucester) for conscientious
objector status over a year before he turned in his draft card on October 16. Their cases
were still pending at the time, but Marston and his friends decided that, at that point, they
could no longer cooperate at all with the Selective Service System. *T figured the time
had come for someone to do something,” Marston said later. Although his father,
Howard Sr., and two older brothers were veterans, they backed his decision to resist as
did his pacifist mother. Marston's father, in particular, supported his 20 year-old son so
much that he practically took over Chick's resistance.27
The younger Marston would have resisted quietly, but his father led him into a
more public role, as he became the first parent in the Boston area to announce that he
would prohibit his son, a minor, from being drafted. Chick later described his father, a

27 “3 Cape Ann Men Join Draft Protest,” Gloucester Daily Times, 20 Oct 1967,
Scrapbook, Howard Marston, Jr., Papers (hereafter cited as HMP); Howard Marston, Jr.,
interview with author, 13 Dec 1997.
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surveyor from Rockport. as “the local left-wing nut.” In the early 1950s he had led
demonstrations in Rockport’s Dock Square protesting the Top Mast Restaurant’s refusal
to serve African-Americans. Later, in the sixties, he fired off letters to the Gloucester
Daily Times charging that the American economy depended on war and the military
industrial complex for its success. The elder Marston was “a great character.” his son
later said, though he could be “a little overbearing and pushy.” Those traits became
apparent when Mr. Marston pushed his son into making his resistance into a cause
celebre and, thus, bringing unforseen consequences to his family.28
The New England Resistance and Boston Draft Resistance Group thoroughly (if
hastily) planned Chick Marston’s induction refusal in advance. First, organizers held a
press conference for the Marstons on January 8 to which they invited a couple from
Dorchester who had lost a son in Vietnam. The mother of the slain soldier, speaking for
herself and her husband, a Marine veteran of World War II. offered the Marstons their
complete support. “We feel the war is exceptionally cruel, immoral and absolutely
unnecessary,” she told the press. “It is a tragic waste” of both Vietnamese and American
lives, she said. “We support our boys in Vietnam. We want them brought home alive,
not dead - as was our only young son.” Howard Marston, Sr. followed, telling the media
that because Chick had not yet reached the age o f 21 and was, therefore, a minor, he
forbade him to go into the armed forces. In light of the Spock indictments, Marston noted
that he realized he might be prosecuted for “counseling” his son in this way. “Friday’s

28“Draft Resistance Involves Quiet Rockport,” editorial, Gloucester Daily Times,
6 Apr 1968, p. 4.
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indictments only made us a little more eager to act,” he said. “It’s an illegal and immoral
war.” The press conference produced" the desired effect. Newspaper, television, and
radio announced that Chick Marston, with the approval of his parents, would refuse
induction two days later.29
Although draft resistance leaders envisioned a “new beginning” with the onset o f
the first induction refusals, resisters like Chick Marston still had to face some of the old
hassles. When Marston arrived in Gloucester to wait for the train that would take him
and his fellow draftees into Boston on January 10, the effect o f the press conference and
the calling o f attention to his plans, became immediately apparent. A group of supporters
(including John Phillips, recently freed from federal prison), passed leaflets while another
group o f hecklers shouted epithets at Marston and his comrades. One young man told a
reporter that he came down just to see if a sniper would “shoot these idiots.” Others
shouted, “Let’s see you bum your draft cards!” and “Go get a haircut,” while one man
said, “somebody ought to offer a medal for putting a bullet through your heads.” If the
Marstons did not expect this kind of hostility, when they got to Boston it became clear
that passions would continue to rage at the Army base/0
Outside the Boston Army Base, a massive building on Boston Harbor, a crowd of
more than 300 people braved sub-zero temperatures to cheer Chick Marston and Corey

29 “Boston Draft Protest Set,” Boston Globe, 8 Jan 1968, p. 9; “Marston, 20, Says
He Will Refuse Induction in Army.” Gloucester Daily Times, 8 Jan 1968, Scrapbook,
HMP.
30 “Marston Praised and Criticized for War Protest,” Gloucester Daily Times, 10
Jan 1968, Scrapbook, HMP; “Gloucester Draftee Resists,” Salem News, undated
newsclip, Scrapbook, HMP.
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Brown, another man who planned to refuse induction that morning. The crowd had been
generated largely by the efforts o f the "New England Resistance and the Boston Draft
Resistance Group and many wore white armbands with the black omega symbol o f the
Resistance. But the large press contingent turned out to see the unusual sight o f two
parents accompanying their son to the base as he planned to refuse service in his nation’s
military. As the family approached the gates, they were mobbed by reporters and
photographers. Howard Marston, Sr. told the crowd o f press and supporters: “I’ve been
opposed to the war all along. I demanded that he not go. He thinks the same way. I told
him not to go, and he was amenable.” Chick himself said little. His father stressed his
primary theme - that he was taking responsibility for his son’s actions. “I would like to
see mothers and fathers across the country forbid their children to enter the service,” he
said. “I would like to see thousands and thousands more resisters.” The ubiquitous Josef
Mlot-Mroz rushed up to the elder Marston and called him a “communist stooge.”31
After Chick Marston and Corey Brown entered the base, demonstrators continued
to tolerate the cold, perhaps because Mlot-Mroz had shown up with 30 of his fellow
“freedom fighters” (his largest group yet), many o f whom were armed with signs
unloaded from the back o f Mlot-Mroz’s red Cadillac, all inscribed with the same
fervently anticommunist messages for which they were well-known. Fistfights were

31 “Army Base Picketed by Anti-Draft Group,” Boston Globe (Evening Edition),
10 Jan 1968, p. 1; “Army Delays On Resisters,” Boston Herald Traveler, 11 Jan 1968;
“Howard E. Marston, Sr. Speaks On His Son’s Refusal to Be Inducted into the Army,”
NER leaflet, CFP; “’Stop Draft!’ Cries Follow Indictments,” BUNews, 17 Jan 1968, p.
3; “Parents Back Boy Fighting Draft,” newsclip from unknown newspaper, Scrapbook,
HMP.
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probably inevitable, and several broke out before police stepped in. Two brawny counterprotesters stuffed a Resistance picketer headfirst into a snowbank while several others
threw eggs.32
Inside, base officials separated Marston from the others and escorted him through
the different stages o f induction. After nearly six hours, however, Lieutenant Colonel
Edward J. Risden. the base commander, sent both Marston and Brown home without
asking them to take the oath o f induction. Risden told the media that the Army needed to
conduct investigations into the men’s loyalty to their country, but would not be more
specific. “I think that there probably was a reason [for the investigation], but I’m not at
liberty to discuss it." he said. This development came unexpectedly; never before and
never after did either draft resistance organization encounter this type of response from
the base. Resistance activists expected Marston and Brown to emerge heroically from the
base after rebuffing the Army, but they would have to wait until January 19 for a second
attempt.33
It is impossible to know exactly why Lt. Col. Risden sent Marston and Brown
home but he may have been trying to buy some time while he sorted out his own mixed

32'"26 in Hub Inducted as 2 Protesters Are Sent Home,” Boston Globe, 11 Jan
1968, p. 1; “Dr. Spock Invites Marstons to Dinner,” Gloucester Daily Times, 11 Jan
1968, Scrapbook, HMP; “Peacenik ‘Inducted’ Into Snow,” photograph, Boston Record
American, 10 Jan 1968, Scrapbook, HMP; “Youths Lose Chance to Refuse Draft,”
Boston Record American, 11 Jan 1968, p. 5.
33“Army Delays on Resisters,” Boston Herald Traveler, 11 Jan 1968, Scrapbook,
HMP; “26 in Hub Inducted as 2 Protesters Are Sent Home,” Boston Globe, 11 Jan 1968,
p .l; “Dr. Spock Invites Marstons to Dinner,” Gloucester Daily Times, 11 Jan 1968,
Scrapbook, HMP; "2 Get Chance to Spurn Induction at Last,” Boston Globe, 20 Jan 1968,
p. 3.
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feelings about Vietnam. Risden, a veteran o f World War II and Korea, served two tours
in Vietnam. In 1957 and 1958 he went to Vietnam as an adviser and returned feeling
good about American efforts there. But after another tour in 1966-1967 - this one a
combat tour - Risden came home disgusted. American forces didn’t know why they were
there or who they were fighting, he thought. Complicating matters, Risden became base
commander at the Boston Army Base in February 1967, just weeks after his own son Joe.
23 had been drafted. In short, Risden felt conflicted. On the one hand, he possessed a
strong sense of duty and commitment, yet his anger about the war led him at times to be
somewhat sympathetic to the antiwar movement. Eventually, he grew weary o f it, and
retired just weeks later on April 1, 1968.34
Although a large crowd of backers again appeared at the Army base when Chick
Marston and Corey Brown returned on the 19th and finally refused induction, the support
offered little comfort. The entire ordeal, now drawn out over more than two weeks, had
taken its toll on Marston, in particular. He later admitted to being "on the verge of a
nervous breakdown through it all.” Unlike his father, who loved the spotlight, Chick
“couldn’t handle the cameras and the interviews.” He would have preferred to resist
quietly. While he fully expected to go to jail, the publicity added a completely new
dimension to it, one that put a tremendous strain on his family. “I hated the whole thing,”
he later said. “Hated it.”3S

34 Edward J. Risden, Jr. (Son o f Lt. Col Edward J. Risden), telephone conversation
with author, 24 Jul 1968 (notes in author’s files).
35 Marston interview, 13 Dec 1997.
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Part o f the reason he hated his draft resistance experience derived from the very
public manner in which it was carried out and the constant harassment and torment it
brought to his family through it all. According to Marston, the head of his draft board
called to tell his family that he had information suggesting that their phones were tapped.
Marston also claims that, during this same period, much o f the mail the Marston family
received had already been opened. Other letters - hate mail - came addressed to
“Chicken” Marston. In addition, Marston and his sister, Deb, recall the day that a local
Boy Scout leader led his troop in a march up the their street so they could throw rocks at
the Marston house. All of this added up to a tense household. Marston's mother was a
"nervous wreck.” especially when faced with reporters seeking interviews. “She'd start
shaking uncontrollably,” her son later said/6
Eventually, the U.S. Attorney in Boston, after indicting Marston and bringing him
to trial in the fall of 1968, dropped the case due to mishandling of Marston’s
classifications by the Selective Service. The legal challenge that Howard Marston, Sr.
wanted never materialized and a technicality ended it all. The press and, for the most
part, the draft resistance movement missed the dismissal. Just like that, the ordeal ended
with no fanfare, though it left Chick Marston “close to a breakdown when it was all
over.” Years later, he told o f being “lost for quite a while” and doing his best to leave
that past behind. He found it difficult to see how useful his resistance had been and did

36 Howard Marston, Jr. and Deborah Jelmberg, interview with author, 13 Dec
1997.
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his best to forget the entire experience for the next thirty years.37
For the draft resistance movement in January 1968, however. Chick Marston's
induction refusal played an important role in building momentum, helping to further
intensify the commitment o f many resisters and activists in the wake o f the Spock
indictments. Just as Chick's father dominated his draft resistance, the movement co
opted it for its own purposes.
James Oestereich and Richard Hughes
If Chick Marston’s induction refusal experience slipped beyond his control, Jim
Oestereich and Dick Hughes cheerfully invited the New England Resistance and Boston
Draft Resistance Group to capitalize on their day of noncompliance a month later.
Neither Oestereich nor Hughes knew each other before February 26, 1968, their date of
induction, but when both approached the BDRG and NER for help in their refusals
(Oestereich had already done some work for NER), the groups paired them together for
promotional purposes. Two resisters always beat one. A leaflet produced jointly by the
two organizations featured photographs of each man with a brief statement encouraging
other inductees and draft-age men to join them. "I have chosen to take a stand against the
Selective Service System which presently functions as an accomplice to mass murder,”
Oestereich wrote in the definitive style of so many resisters, "it is verv clear to me and
the thousands who stand with me that this war is wrong - - and we will not return to our

37 Marston interview, 13 Dec 1997.
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everyday lives until the war is over.”38
Although they arrived at their date of resistance and their evaluation o f the war
with the same sense o f clear-eyed moral righteousness, Hughes and Oestereich came from
very different backgrounds. Oestereich, a seminarian at Andover-Newton Theological
School, turned in his draft card at the Arlington Street Church on October 16. Soon after,
his Cheyenne, Wyoming draft board, acting on the instructions of General Hershey,
changed his classification from 4-D, the ministerial exemption, to 1-A. Like so many
editorial writers did in the days after Hershey’s memorandum to local boards, Oestereich
questioned the legality o f his reclassification. After consultation with Vem Countryman
at Harvard Law School. Oestereich contacted the American Civil Liberties Union which,
under the leadership of Melvin Wulf, jumped at the chance to challenge the
reclassification in court. By the beginning of the new year, Oestereich brought suit
against his local draft board in U.S. District Court in Denver. The Court dismissed the
complaint and the Court o f Appeals quickly affirmed the lower court’s decision. In late
February, as the date o f his induction approached, Oestereich and Wulf waited to leam if
the Supreme Court would hear the case.39
Dick Hughes, a teaching fellow in the Theater Department at Boston University,
on the other hand, did not turn in his draft card. His local board in Pittsburgh,

38 James Oestereich, interview with author, 20 Dec 1997; Richard Hughes,
interview with author, 7 January 1998; i4We Won’t Go” leaflet, 26 Feb 1968, James
Oestereich Papers (hereafter cited as JOP).
39 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Oestereich v. Selective Service System, 393
U.S. 233 (1968).
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Pennsylvania granted his request for conscientious objector status (1-0) even though, as a
former Catholic, he did not belong to any o f the faiths traditionally recognized by the
Selective Service for that deferment. In October 1967, however, Hughes apparently ran
afoul of his local board when his new employer, the Theatre Company of Boston, applied
for an occupational deferment for him. The board denied the request and kept his status
as 1-0, but then sent his file to the Selective Service state headquarters for '‘review and
advice” for reasons that remain unclear. The state headquarters immediately
recommended a challenge to Hughes’s conscientious objector status, and without
notifying him in advance, his local board reclassified him to I-A at their next meeting
(December 18, 1967). Even under General Hershey's new guidelines for handling draft
resisters. Hughes had done nothing to compromise his draft status - no tumed-in draft
card, no draft board sit-ins, no polemical letters to his local board. Hughes could only
guess that they objected to his attempt for an occupational deferment with a theater
company. Meanwhile, throughout the fall, he became more and more "obsessed” with the
war for, as he later remarked, “it was becoming a distraction from the acting world.” He
attended numerous teach-ins, got to know Howard Zinn well (in part because he dated
Zinn's daughter, Myla, for a while), and read the BU News, all of which influenced his
thinking about the war and the draft. When the actor Peter Ustinov spoke at Boston
University and took questions from the audience, Hughes asked him if he had, in the
course of his career, ever jeopardized his work because he felt he had to take a stand over
a certain issue; the crowd booed the question, but Ustinov quieted them with a thoughtful
answer, saying that although he had never been faced with such a dilemma, he
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sympathized with American students who were. In the end, when the Pittsburgh draft
board responded to Hughes’s inquiry about his changed status with an induction notice,
Hughes decided he would go and he would refuse.40
On February 26, 1968, a throng of some 350 people picketed the Boston Army
Base in support of Oestereich and Hughes. They had marched from the Boston Common
through Downtown Crossing, then all the way down Summer Street to the Boston Army
Base. The crowd included ministers and seminarians, all in clerical collars, from
Andover-Newton; faculty and students from Boston University; and a large contingent
from BDRG and the Resistance. Howard Zinn spoke to the crowd as did the two
resisters. Jim Oestereich arrived not knowing how the day would end for him. He and
his lawyer feared that if he refused induction it might jeopardize his court case, but
accepting induction was not an alternative. In the days leading up to the induction,
Melvin Wulf contacted Supreme Court justice Byron White and asked for the induction
to be stayed until the Court decided if it would hear the case. On the morning of February
26, they had not heard. In spite o f this confusion, Oestereich made a strong public
statement to the crowd outside the base, one that conveyed the urgency and moral rigidity
endemic to the movement:
I have come to the Boston Army Base this morning for one reason
alone - to say NO to this government's policy in Viet Nam.
I have come to say that the securities of being a student, a minister,
or a citizen in this land are worth nothing unless I can also affirm the
duties and rights o f moral and political protest when that country engages

40 Hughes interview, 7 Jan 1998; Copy o f Richard Hughes’s SSS File, Local
Board 14, from Hughes FBI file, Richard Hughes Papers (hereafter cited as RHP);
Richard Hughes, e-mail to author, 8 Jul 1998.
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in disastrous and illegal actions against an underdeveloped nation of the
world community.
I can no longer study, teach, nor live in this society until we have
brought enough pressure upon this government to force an end to this war
and the initiation o f a positive program for peace and equality in a world
tom by our fatal misunderstandings and blind destructiveness.
I have renounced my ministerial immunity to stand with these men,
like Richard Hughes, who have chosen to risk their lives and their futures
in the most concrete act remaining to us - the severing o f our relationship
with an illegal system in pursuit o f an unjust war.41
Once inside, the pair o f resisters followed instructions while doing their irreverent
best to disrupt the proceedings enough to attract the attention o f the other inductees.
When base officials administered an intelligence test to the men, Oestereich raised his
hand and said, "Uh. listen, I’m looking at this test, sir, but I don't see any questions about
the legality of the Vietnam war. Shouldn't that be on here if that’s where we’re going?”
Nonplused draftees looked at him as though he had lost his mind. Similarly, Dick
Hughes elicited bewildered expressions as he filled out one of the numerous forms
provided, and asked: “If you’re refusing induction, do you have to fill out question
number...?”42
Not long after Oestereich entered the base, the base commander, Lt. Col. Risden
pulled him aside to tell him that word had just arrived from the Supreme Court that his
induction had been stayed. Oestereich, prepared for this eventuality, produced a
statement for Risden to sign. The statement prepared by his lawyer as a means of
protecting him from any miscommunication or foul play, asserted that Oestereich had

41 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Hughes interview, 7 Jan 1998; Oestereich
statement, 26 Feb 1968, JOP.
42 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Hughes interview, 7 Jan 1998.
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appeared as ordered, that he had not interfered with the induction of other registrants and
that Risden was now ordering Oestereich to leave the premises because o f the injunction
staying the order of induction. The demonstrators outside cheered when Oestereich
emerged with the news. They then marched back into downtown where they picketed the
federal courthouse in Post Office Square briefly before breaking up.4j
Inside, Dick Hughes went through the rest of the Army’s procedures and then
refused induction. He stood with about 40 other men in the room in which all inductees
took the oath of service. An officer told them that the oath was binding and irrevocable.
When he called each man’s name, each stepped forward in symbolic acceptance o f the
oath. They left Hughes until the end and when they called his name, he stepped
backward. They called his name again, and again he refused. A soldier then took him out
o f line and explained that if he did not step forward he would be committing a crime.
When Hughes again refused to comply, base officials asked him to write and sign a
statement indicating that he had intentionally refused induction. Thanks to the FBI and
the Freedom of Information Act. the statement that Hughes wrote has been preserved. On
a blank piece of paper. Hughes began with a quote that he had memorized from the
London newspaper, The Sun, regarding the recent American destruction o f the South
Vietnamese village, Ben Tre: "What meaning is left in language when the Americans
claim to save a town by destroying it? [After the assault on Ben Tre, Air Force Major
Chester Brown of Erie, Pennsylvania explained to the Associated Press that “it became

43 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Copy of statement prepared for base
personnel, 26 Feb 1968, JOP; “200 Peace Pickets Protest 2 Inductions,” Boston Globe
(Evening edition), 26 Febr 1968, p. 4.
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necessary to destroy the town in order to save it,” noting that he thought it “a pity about
the thousands o f civilians who were Itilled and left homeless.] Can President Johnson
and Ho Chi Minh reach the stature to understand that any military gains will count for
nothing in the face of horrors like Ben Tre, a town devastated by fighting? If not, history
in the end will record of them that they made a desert and called it peace.” Hughes then
wrote, extemporaneously, a statement that equaled the force of Oestereich’s morning
speech:
I deeply believe this war is wrong. I deeply believe the present
draft law is wrong. After what I consider to be sincere and painful selfexamination. I see no other choice.
I cannot, regretfully, reconcile this war and the draft law to my
deepest desires: freedom to choose, human survival, and service to
principle. I have searched for other alternatives. I have found none.
There are none.
Thus it seems evident to me that all o f us, as a nation, must face the
inevitable question, 'throughout history, and perhaps even now, have not
the greatest crimes against humanity happened through silence?’
I, Richard Hughes, on this day 26 Feb 1968 refuse induction into
the Armed Forces of the United States. The above statement speaks for
my motivations.
[signed]
Richard Michael Hughes.
When he finished, a base official escorted him to the door and allowed him to leave. The
demonstrators were long gone (he had been inside almost all day), and the grey clouds
overhead produced a light rain. Hughes later described it as “a very sad moment in a
way.” He walked down a rainy, empty street with only the tall street lights for
companions. By the time a BU News reporter caught up with him later that night,
however, Hughes had gained some perspective. He recognized the individual nature of
resistance now. “It’s important to realize that decisions like this [resistance] are
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tremendously personal,” he told the reporter. “But you just have to know that the sin is
not the choice, but in not choosing.”4*
Dick Hughes soon carried his draft resistance over into what Howard Zinn later
called one of the “most imaginative” expressions o f protest made by an antiwar activist in
America. Rather than wait for the imminent indictment and prosecution for violation of
Selective Service laws, Hughes picked up and left the country. But he did not go to
Canada, as more than 30,000 American draft evaders did; nor did he go to Mexico or
Sweden, nations to which another 2,000 Americans fled. No. He did what probably no
other resister did: he went to South Vietnam. In March, having secured a visa from the
South Vietnamese embassy in Washington (based on reporter credentials provided by the
BU Mews), Hughes wrote a letter to the FBI and left it on his desk in his apartment. He
told them that he could be reached in Saigon, care o f the Joint United States Public
Affairs Office (JUSPAO). He packed two sets of clothes, and with a couple o f friends
drove someone's car across the country for pay. Hughes stopped in Pittsburgh to see his
family, but did not tell them where he planned to go. He sent them a post card from Con
Thien. Not long after his parents received the post card, the FBI visited his father, then
director of Lands and Buildings in the Mayor's cabinet in Pittsburgh, at his office. When
the FBI agents asked about his son’s whereabouts (they apparently never entered
Hughes’s Boston apartment), Hughes’s father gave them the post card. The agents left

44 Hughes interview, 7 Jan 1998; “Teaching Fellow Refuses Induction,” B U News,
28 Feb 1968, p. 1; Statement written at request of Army personnel at Boston Army Base,
26 Feb 1968, FBI file, RHP. Note: for more on the destruction of Ben Tre, see: “The
Slaughter Goes On,” New Republic, 24 Feb 1968, p. 13.
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without asking further questions.45
Although Hughes went to Vietnam as a reporter, he intended from the start to do
some kind o f social work. At first, he did do some reporting and helped establish
Dispatch News, the agency that later aided Seymour Hersh in breaking the story o f the
My Lai massacre. But ultimately he settled into social work, starting a home for
orphaned boys in Saigon that eventually grew into the Shoeshine Boys Foundation, a
network of houses set up in Saigon and Danang to house the boys and teach them the
trade of shining shoes. The operation continued to grow every year. When Dick Hughes
finally left Vietnam in August 1976, the last American to leave, his operation had grown
to six homes in Saigon and two in Danang, housing a total o f 300 kids. Over 1,500 boys
passed through his centers in those eight years. In addition, they owned two farms on
which some of the boys worked and developed an extensive program aimed at reuniting
children with their parents after the war ended. By the time the foundation disbanded,
scores of boys had been reunited with their families.46
According to FBI records, in November 1968, John Wall of the Boston U.S.
Attorney’s office informed Selective Service and the FBI that he would not prosecute
Hughes. He believed Hughes to be "sincere in his beliefs” and that he had been
reclassified, probably unfairly, the year before. It did not matter, because Hughes stayed

45 Howard Zinn, interview with author, 6 Jul 1998; Hughes interview, 7 Jan 1998.
46 Hughes interview, 6 Jul 1998; “Vietnam Street Children Getting Better Care,
American Says,” New York Times, 9 Aug 1976, p. 2.
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in Saigon for another eight years.47
Jim Oestereich's story did not unfold quite as dramatically as Dick Hughes's, but
followed its own twists and turns. As a seminarian preparing for a ministerial career.
Oestereich’s decision affected his fellow seminarians as well as members of the United
Parish in Lunenburg, where he served as youth minister. Although Oestereich received
mixed reactions from fellow students at Andover-Newton, the faculty there supported
him without equivocation. At a chapel forum on the issues raised by Oestereich’s
upcoming induction refusal, Dean George W. Peck announced that the faculty had voted
unanimously to “express its faith in Mr. Oestereich's integrity,” and defended his right to
object to the war and the draft in this way. In particular, the faculty and Dean Peck found
Oestereich’s reclassification to be most offensive, “utterly contradictory of what is finest
in the American tradition.” He urged even those who did not ‘take an unequivocal stand
against the war” to speak out against this kind of “mindless repression.” “We are
dangerously close to a course o f action with regard to men like Mr. Oestereich which is
more in keeping with the Nazism we condemned at Nuremberg than with the liberty and
respect for conscience o f which this nation boasts,” he said. “No war, however just, is
worth that.”48
Outside the city, at his suburban church in Lunenburg, however, Oestereich faced
a situation not unlike that which confronted Michael Jupin in Winchester. Though the

47 Hughes interview, 6 Jul 1998: FBI memo on Hughes induction refusal, FBI file,
RHP.
48 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Statement by Dean George W. Peck, 23 Feb
1968, JOP.
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United Parish did not erupt when Oestereich turned in his draft card, it came apart at the
seams when he went to refuse induction. Three days after Oestereich had been sent home
by the Army, the church held a meeting to which more than 100 people came. According
to newspaper reports, most in the crowd were outraged by Oestereich’s stand. Active
duty military men, members o f veterans groups, parents of servicemen, and many others
spoke. Oestereich claims that some o f the people there were members o f the John Birch
Society and that more than one had pistols tucked in their trousers. When one man made
an analogy between the American Revolution and the Vietnam War. Oestereich told him
that the analogy did not fit. unless they likened American involvement in Vietnam to the
British role in the Revolution. The whole crowd, or so it seemed, groaned in response.
As in Winchester, many of Oestereich’s critics feared his influence on the young people
and wanted him removed immediately. The minority of those who spoke in Oestereich's
defense, however, were members of the youth groups; they told the others that the
seminarian had never tried to impose his views on them and that they rather admired the
stand he took on the war. Eventually, however, Oestereich realized he had to resign.
The issue so polarized the parish that he feared his draft resistance might lead to the
removal o f the two ministers. Ultimately, though, his resignation did not save the church.
It remained split until one minister took those who supported Oestereich’s position and
started a “people’s ministry” in nearby Fitchburg. Oestereich, meanwhile, waited for the
Supreme Court to hear his case.49

49 “Youth Leader Defends Position on Refusal to Enter Armed Forces,” Fitchburg
Sentinel, 1 Mar 1968, p. 16; Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997.
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Rav Mungo
On March 6, 1968 Ray Mungo refused to be inducted into the service in a manner
that stood in stark contrast to his predecessors. While the Resistance movement (and his
father) essentially took over Chick Marston’s induction refusal and used if for their own
purposes, and later worked in concert with Jim Oestereich, Dick Hughes and other
resisters in planning their refusals, the two draft resistance organizations basically
grabbed onto M ungo's coattails and went along for the wild ride he orchestrated on his
own. Mungo’s notoriety as former editor of the BU News made him unique among
resisters. He could easily mobilize large numbers of activists and attract the attention of
the media in ways that no other resister could. Chick Marston’s induction refusal made
the front page o f Boston newspapers, but subsequent refusals, like the Oestereich/Hughes
one, turned up deeper and deeper in each paper; Ray M ungo’s induction refusal put draft
resistance back on the front page.
Outrageous leaflets announced Mungo’s act of noncompliance well in advance.
They announced that Mungo would refuse induction into “Lyndon Johnson's Army”
while simultaneously accepting induction into “Sergeant Pepper’s Brigade.” Mungo
promised a rock band, parade, and speech from Howard Zinn, followed by blueberry
pancakes after the demonstration. Then, in an uncharacteristic (for the Resistance)
paragraph, the leaflet predicted that “lots of pretty girls will publically say yes to guys
who say no,” that "young girls will be violated!,” and that “resisters and inductees alike
will goose the sergeants!” Moreover, it said, “Josef Mlot-Mroz’s BOMB PEKING sign
will flip over and say LBJ SUCKS just as the cameras zoom in” and pledged that they
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would plant 8,000 marijuana seeds on the grass surrounding the base, while noting that
one resister threatened to "‘dump two buckets o f his own shit (he’s been saving it for
weeks!) in the path leading to the base.” It concluded as irreverently as it began with two
cryptic slogans: “Fuck the Apocalypse!” and “Rise up and abandon the creeping
meatball!” This kind o f mixing of protest with countercultural impiety, though it
anticipated one direction in which the Resistance would go later in the year, did not
represent current movement dynamics. But it sure caught people’s attention.50
Shocking or not, the advance publicity resulted in more than 600 demonstrators
gathered outside the Boston Army Base to see Ray Mungo say no to his country. Mungo,
wearing a marching band jacket not unlike those worn by John, Paul, George, and Ringo
on the Sgt. Pepper s album cover, appeared at his Lawrence draft board and took the train
with 12 other inductees to Boston. Before the bus carrying the men from the train station
could enter the base, however. Mungo got off and, to the cheers of his huge audience,
climbed on top o f the hood of a car. Instead o f entering the base and going through the
motions like Oestereich and Hughes, Mungo tore up his induction notice and flung the
pieces into the air. “I have nothing to say to the U.S. Army,” he said. “I have nothing to
say to the U.S. government. I have no intention of playing their games. But, oh baby, is
this ever a refusal!” Although the rock band did not materialize (too expensive), and
passing truckers leaned on their horns as Mungo spoke, the event took on a carnival
atmosphere. In the midst of Mungo’s hippie-goofing, he attempted to interject his
analysis of the war and resistance to it:

50 “Spock’s Flocks Rock!” leaflet on Mungo induction refusal, CFP.
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People around the world are saying tonight, Thank God there are
some Americans left who are men and women, and not robots and
murderers...
It is no longer necessary to say the war is wrong, brutal,
economically inspired, imperialistic, etc. Everybody who knows the war
knows these things. It is important to point out that Johnson. Rusk.
McNamara know these things too. It is even more important to realize that
Johnson continues this war because his value system sees money and
power and land and self-aggrandizement as naturally good and desirable
things. He has thus forfeited his humanity, and we should be prepared to
regard him at all times as a beast. The war itself is the greatest and most
powerful statement against war.
When he finished, the crowd marched from the base up Summer and Winter Streets, to
Tremont and Boylston, to the Arlington Street Church, where the blueberry pancakes, like
the band, did not appear. Marchers settled for doughnuts and coffee as they listened to
Howard Zinn talk about the war. Following the huge turn-out and genuinely raucous
confrontation at the Army base, Zinn told the demonstrators that the Resistance would
continue to grow and that they would be successful in ending the war. “I am confident
that very soon we are going to bring this war to a screaming halt.” he said.51
In the late winter o f 1968, with induction refusals - bolstered by a solid group of
supporters, taking place on an almost weekly basis - Zinn’s prediction seemed reasonable
to many within the draft resistance movement. For one, the earlier uncertainty o f the
Boston draft resistance movement gave way to a more intense, hothouse atmosphere in
which the actions of the New England Resistance and Boston Draft Resistance Group

51 “600 Back Draft Resister Here.” Boston Globe (Evening Edition), 6 Mar 1968,
p.l; “600 March as Ex-BU Editor Refuses Draft,” Boston Globe, 7 Mar 1968, p. 2;
Avatar#21, 15 Mar-28 Mar 1968, p. 1; ”BU Draftee Rips Up Induction Papers,” Boston
Record American, 7 Mar 1968, p. 2; “The American Ethic Must Fail,” BU News, 13 Mar
1968, p. 10.
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clearly dictated the direction o f the city’s larger antiwar movement and which continued
to attract considerable publicity. In early February, the New England Resistance, buoyed
by the indictments and recent successes, finally moved into its own office on Stanhope
Street in Boston, right behind Boston City Police Headquarters. Meanwhile, the BDRG
saw the numbers o f men seeking counseling reach new highs while their counselor
training courses continued to attract more than they could handle. This climate of
activism also proved fertile for the birth o f new organizations related to draft resistance.
John Phillips, not long out of prison, formed the Prisoner’s Information and Support
Service (PISS), an organization of ex-convicts (sent to prison for draft resistance) aimed
at demystifying prison experience for resisters. As more and more men were reclassified
and called for induction, such support became more necessary. March also saw the
founding of the Committee for Legal Research on the Draft (CLRD) a new agency
established by law students and lawyers to provide attorneys handling draft cases with all
of the technical information on the draft and military law they might need. Meanwhile,
donations poured into Resist and thousands continued to sign the Call to Resist (15,000
by the end o f March) and complicity statements admitting to ‘‘crimes” equal to those of
the Boston Five (28,000 by the start of the trial).52
No doubt some of the movement’s intensification derived from a sense among
many that they could be facing prison time. Many felt, like Marc Raskin, that the Spock

52 NER Newsletter, 8 Feb 1968, MKFP; BDRG Newsletter, Mar 1968, BTP; “ExCons Talk!,” Avatar #20, 1 Mar -13 Mar 1968, p. 7; “Ex-Cons Talk!,” Avatar #21, 15
Mar - 28 Mar 1968, p. 7; “An Interview with Louis Kampf,” Avatar #22, 29 Mar - 11 Apr
1968; Ferber & Lynd, The Resistance, 124.
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indictments portended greater repression and that could mean jail not only for resisters
but for those who backed them. As Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam later remarked,
since no one knew who would be prosecuted next, “there was a great hurry to get
something accomplished” on all fronts. Many o f these organizations and efforts,
therefore, became the foci of activists' lives. Even social time usually occurred in the
offices o f these organizations or in coffee shops in which conversation never drifted far
from political concerns and the war. Those in the Resistance movement sensed their
strength as the spring approached and felt a simultaneous urgency to use it to their
advantage and, they hoped, bring the draft and the war to an end.5j
Worries in Washington
Draft resisters and their supporters might not have felt so rushed to press their
confrontations with the government if they had known how much they had already
affected Vietnam policy making. They could not know that as their movement gained
momentum in the late winter of 1968. the Johnson administration was reconsidering its
strategy in Vietnam, in part because it feared greater noncompliance with the draft.
In fact, many factors contributed to the reevaluation o f policy in Vietnam. First,
and most important, the Tet Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese on January 30
(the day after the Boston Five arraignment) stunned the administration and the nation.
Military and administration claims that victory lay just around the comer were dashed by
a well-orchestrated offensive that hit 36 o f 44 provincial capitals and 64 o f 242 district
towns, as well as 5 o f South Vietnam’s 6 autonomous cities. In Saigon, one o f those

53 Putnam interview, 18 Dec 1997.
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autonomous cities, the enemy even penetrated the walls of the American embassy
compound. As more and more Americans began to wonder about the efficacy of a
continued American presence in Vietnam, the president sent the chairman o f the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, to South Vietnam to assess the situation. Wheeler,
like General William Westmoreland, commander of American forces in Vietnam, argued
that the American and South Vietnamese had routed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces in the wake o f their initial assaults, though fighting continued. Indeed, the enemy
continued to display remarkable tenacity, particularly in urban areas. American and
South Vietnamese forces were spread thin as they attempted to contain the fighting. As a
result, on February 26 (the same day Dick Hughes and Jim Oestereich refused induction),
Wheeler cabled Secretary o f Defense McNamara with General Wesmoreland’s additional
troop requests, which amounted to another 206,000 men by the end o f the calendar year.
The next day, presidential aide Harry McPherson wrote “We are at a point o f crisis.”54
That troop request initiated reassessments by numerous former supporters of
American policy in Vietnam, especially at the Pentagon. It happened that
Westmoreland’s request came during a changing of the guard in the Department of
Defense. Robert McNamara, no longer the staunch defender of the war that he had been
on top o f that car in Harvard Yard only a year before, resigned in the fall of 1967 and
stepped down officially on February 28,1968. The troop request issue then fell into the

54 Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 506-513; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The
Wise Men, (New York: Knopf, date) pp. 700-703; Townsend Hoopes, The Limits o f
Intervention, (New York: McKay, 1969), pp. 159-161; Harry McPherson Notes, Meeting
o f Advisors on Vietnam, 27 Feb 1968, Meeting Notes File, Box 2, LBJL.
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lap o f the new secretary o f defense, Clark Clifford. When Clifford took office, President
Johnson named an Ad Hoc Task Force on Vietnam to review the Westmoreland request
and examine the potential ramifications at home. The president made Clifford chairman
of the committee. Although considerable debate ensued, most on the committee began
questioning for the first time American ability to win the war - even with the additional
206,000 troops.S5
One theme that consistently rose to the top emphasized declining public support
for the war. Phil Goulding, undersecretary o f defense for public affairs, warned of
increased draft resistance if the additional troops were approved in two separate memos
(March 2 and March 4). "Until a few weeks ago, the people were being told that we were
moving toward victory,” Goulding wrote. "No one was suggesting extra troops,
hardships, more spending, Reserve call-ups, high draft calls and increased casualties.
Now, suddenly, the picture has changed and all o f these emergency, hardship measures
are required.” Under the category, "Problems We Can Anticipate in U.S. Public
Opinion,” Goulding dedicated one sub-section to draft resistance. "Increased draft calls
will accentuate demonstrations, on and off campuses,” he wrote. Noting that the
Selective Service laws had just been changed making graduate students eligible for the
draft, Goulding said, “now it gets worse. Again, it [the additional troops request] was not
anticipated. Letters to Congress will pour in.” This memo eventually made it to the

55 Hoopes, The Limits o f Intervention, pp. 171-181.
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president’s desk as part of a package assembled by Clifford.56
Clark Clifford received similar warnings from other quarters. Undersecretary of
the Air Force Townsend Hoopes wrote a lengthy memo to the new defense secretary on
March 14. “At the present level the war is eroding the moral fibre of the nation,
demoralizing its politics, and paralyzing its foreign policy,” he argued. “A further
manpower commitment to SVN would intensify the domestic disaffection, which would
be reflected in increased defiance o f the draft and widespread unrest in the cities.”
Hoopes had turned completely against continued escalation o f the war. He strongly urged
Clifford to consider a negotiated settlement. He concluded: “Anything resembling a
clear-cut military victory in Vietnam appears possible only at the price of literally
destroying SVN, tearing apart the social and political fabric o f our own country,
alienating our European friends, and gravely weakening the whole free world structure of
relations and alliances...” In addition, another aide wrote to Clifford that “it will be
difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to
‘save’ it, or that we genuinely want peace talks” if the president were to grant
Westmoreland’s request. “This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be,
by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief
that we are neglecting domestic problems runs great risks o f provoking a domestic crisis
of unprecedented proportions.” These concerns over public opinion, coupled with

56 Phil G. Goulding memo to Clark Clifford, “Possible Public Reaction to Various
Alternatives,” part o f package: “Alternative Vietnam Strategies Back-Up Material,” c. 2
Mar 1968, Clark Clifford Papers, Box 2, LBJL; Phil G. Goulding memoranda to Clark
Clifford, “Problems We Can Anticipate in U.S. Public Opinion,” 4 Mar 1968, Clifford
Papers, Box 1, LBJL.
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unsatisfactory answers from military leaders regarding a timetable for victory, quickly
turned Clifford from hawk to dove. Clifford soon agreed that the troop request should be
denied and that the first steps toward a negotiated peace be taken, but he needed a little
more help before he could take his case to the president.57
That extra boost came from a group of advisers whose opinions Johnson had
sought and valued time and again. The Wise Men, as they were known, were generally
older, elder statesmen all of whom had served their country faithfully in earlier
administrations. They included Dean Acheson, secretary of state under President
Truman; Averell Harriman, former ambassador to the Soviet Unions; General Maxwell
Taylor, chairman o f the Joint Chiefs under President Kennedy: Supreme Court justice
Abe Fortas; McGeorge Bundy, former national security advisor: George Ball, former
undersecretary o f state who had lobbied Johnson to end the war before resigning the
previous year; Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador to South Vietnam under President
Kennedy; Douglas Dillon, former Treasury secretary; United Nations Ambassador and
former Supreme Court justice, Arthur Goldberg; Omar Bradley. World War II
Commander and chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Korean War; Arthur Dean, chief
Korean War negotiator; John McCloy, Assistant Secretary o f War during World War II;
Cyrus Vance, formed Deputy Secretary o f Defense; and General Matthew Ridgeway, the
venerated Korean War leader. When Johnson had convened the Wise Men in November

57 Townsend Hoopes memo to Clark Clifford, 14 Mar 1968, pp. 8, 12, Clifford
Papers, Box 1, LBJL; "The Case Against Further Significant Increases in U.S. Forces in
Vietnam,” memo, undated, Clifford Papers, Box 1, LBJL. Note: the 14 Mar Hoopes
Memo is heavily excerpted in Hoopes, The Limits o f Intervention, pp. 187-196.
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1967, they assured the president that his present policies in Vietnam were sound. But at
their next meeting - one recommended by Clifford in large part because he knew that
several were changing their minds about Vietnam just as he had - on March 25 and 26.
1968, the Wise Men offered new advice. Confronted for the first time with sobering data
from the field and reports o f potential domestic unrest, many of the Wise Men
reconsidered their support o f the war. Senator Mike Mansfield and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Paul Wamke, in particular, raised concerns about an increase in draft resistance
to the group. Acheson, whose voice carried the most weight with the president, argued
forcefully against the additional troops and urged that withdrawal begin by summer’s
end.58
Of course, the president's advisers did not argue against Westmoreland’s troop
request solely because they feared more draft resistance. Many other factors were
considered. The importance of the Tet Offensive, especially, in these reconsiderations
cannot be overstated; without Tet, public opinion would not have concerned policy
makers in the way it did. The prospect of imminent victory disappeared and the growing
criticism at home limited the administration’s options. As Acheson put it. '‘We can no
longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left [before the public’s patience is
exhausted], and we must take steps to disengage.” The declining credibility of policy
makers who had for too long presented optimistic projections to the nation hurt the

58 Hoopes, The Limits o f Intervention, pp. 214-218; Isaacson and Thomas, The
Wise Men, pp. 700-703; Memo from Mike Mansfield, re: "Reports o f requests for an
additional 200,000 men in Viet Nam," included in Meeting with Special Advisory Group,
Cabinet Room, 26 Mar 1968, Meeting Notes File, Box 2, LBJL; Small, Johnson, Nixon,
and the Doves, pp. 147, 270n.
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hawks’ case the m ost Still, the commitment shown by draft resisters in the fall, and their
increased defiance following the Spock indictments unquestionably resonated with those
administration officials who pointed to a potential increase in noncompliance as a risk o f
continued escalation. In the end, it all added up to deescalation, though Johnson
biographer Robert Dallek argues that the president’s shift to a slow withdrawal strategy
“came not from what his briefers said...or what some of the Wise Men counseled.”
Instead, Dallek says, Johnson realized on his own that the war had stalemated and that it
could not be won without “an escalation that would risk a domestic and international
crisis unwarranted by the country’s national security.” Draft resistance would have been
at the heart o f that domestic crisis.59
Sensing Their Strength
Resisters and draft resistance activists remained unaware of the impact they had in
Washington. As far as they were concerned, the war continued unabated and resistance
and confrontation continued to be the only reasonable response. In March, however,
following Ray Mungo's raucous demonstration at the army base, momentum began to
sputter. Just as draft resistance saw six to eight intense weeks in the fall followed by a
near month-long lull in December, the renewed Resistance of January and February
slowed to catch its breath for a few weeks in March. Organizers found that maintaining
that kind o f energy could be very difficult to do for long periods of time and that a certain
boom-bust cycle seemed to occur organically.

59 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, pp. 700-703; Dallek, Flawed Giant, p.
512.
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In March, though, other variables contributed to the break in the action following
Mungo’s induction refusal. Most of all, the candidacies o f Eugene McCarthy, who nearly
beat the president in the New Hampshire primary on March 12, and Robert Kennedy who
joined the race several days later, attracted the attention o f antiwar activists everywhere
and, for the time being, took the spotlight off o f draft resistance. This concerned some in
the movement, but they hoped that the huge draft card tum-in and rally scheduled for
April 3 would “restore the balance, and give some needed impetus toward continuing
activity in the summer.” Despite their recent successes in garnering publicity for the
movement, the trademark impatience of draft resistance activists led them to constantly
question their methods and effectiveness. As Martin “Shag” Graetz, the editor o f the
BDRG newsletter, noted, “a strong feeling o f 4What’s Next?”’ could be detected running
through the movement at the time. As a result, BDRG and the Resistance planned a
series o f workshops at the Arlington Street Church for April 4, following the big
demonstration and tum-in on the common on the 3rd. A “new” renewal appeared to be in
order.60
Then, on the night of March 31, without warning, the news arrived that Lyndon
Johnson would not run for another term as president. Johnson’s speech stunned the
nation. The American people heard their president put the war (and peace) ahead of
politics. First, he announced a bombing halt that he wished might lead to negotiations
with the North Vietnamese. “With our hopes and the world’s hopes for peace in the
balance every day,” the president had said, “I do not believe that I should devote an hour

60 Editorial, BDRG Newsletter, Apr 1968, p. 2, BTP.
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or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the
awesome duties of this office.” Johnson’s approval ratings shot up dramatically in the
wake of the speech as pundits, Democrat and Republican alike, applauded his selfless,
patriotic act.61
Whatever the complicated motives for Johnson's withdrawal, antiwar and draft
resistance activists saw it as a vindication o f their protests against the war. They
believed that their unrelenting challenges to the administration’s war policies had created
a climate of friction intolerable to most Americans. The president’s speech had, after all,
referred to “division in the American house tonight” and asked that the country guard
against “divisiveness and all its ugly consequences.” While many o f their fellow
countrymen - like Johnson himself - no doubt continued to fault the resisters and activists
for this tension, more and more began to blame the president and the war for the
disruption in American life. A Gallup Poll from mid-March showed that Johnson’s
approval rating for his handling o f the war had fallen to just 26% o f the public; 63%
disapproved. "Lyndon Johnson's refusal to run for a second term.” a New England
Resistance statement said, “is a clear admission that the policy in Vietnam, already
responsible for 20,000 dead American soldiers and countless Vietnamese, is
indefensible.” At last, it seemed to those in the movement, they were making progress.
Therefore, when Johnson withdrew, the antiwar and draft resistance community in cities

61 Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 529-530.
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like Boston rejoiced.62
On the night that the president announced his withdrawal from the presidential
race, a spontaneous celebration erupted in Boston. About 700 students poured out of
dormitories and apartments at Harvard University and began an impromptu parade across
the river to Boston University. They crossed the Harvard Bridge, turned down
Commonwealth Avenue and began calling for BU students to join them. Another 400
people joined the march by the time it spilled into Kenmore Square.

In a scene more

reminiscent of a New Orleans street party, the crowd (some of whom were in their
pajamas) sang “Ding, Dong, the Wicked Witch is Dead” and other songs to the
accompaniment of trumpets, drums, cymbals, and the honking horns of cars. As the
march grew to more than 2.000 people, they chanted “Hey. Hey. what do you say? LBJ
dropped out today!” They marched down the tree-lined mall o f Boston’s most
picturesque avenue to the Public Gardens and the Common. Boston police aided in
stopping traffic at the cross streets along the way, but became anxious when the crowd
arrived at the State House. Michael Ferber, Bill Hunt, and Neil Robertson of the
Resistance heard one police officer calling for dogs on the radio. It was 2:30 in the
morning, the march did not have a permit, and some o f the police looked tense. As the
three Resistance leaders arrived at the head o f the crowd on the steps o f the State House,
one police captain, recognizing them from earlier demonstrations, turned on his radio and
said, “Ah, thank God the anarchists are here! Now everything is under control.” When

62 Wells, The War Within, p. 253; George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Vol. EH, p.
2114; “Johnson’s Speech Fails to Divert Resistance Rallies,” B U Mews, 3 Apr 1968, p.
11.
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someone handed Ferber a bullhorn, he said, '‘This is not a time for political speeches.
This is a time for celebration.,,6j
Although the party at the State House ended abruptly when the skies opened and
literally rained on their parade, the movement’s enthusiasm carried over to the April 3rd
rally and draft card tum-in on the Common. As one reporter described it, the
uncharacteristically mild, sunny weather, and the afterglow of Johnson’s withdrawal
“gave a carnival air to the rally” o f over 5,000 people (the New England Resistance
estimated the crowd at 12,000) gathered on Flagstaff Hill. Many carried single flowers,
jonquils or roses, to symbolize their desire for peace.

Over the course o f the two hour

rally, they listened to speakers describe Johnson’s “abdication” as a partial victory and
criticize the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns for failing to ask if America had any right
to be in Vietnam at all. Out of the usual speakers (Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky,
Staughton Lynd, etc.), only Michael Ferber's remarks survive thanks to FBI agents who
recorded it for use in his upcoming trial. The challenges that Ferber made to the “men
waging the war” demonstrate just how confident and emboldened the events of the
previous three months had made the Resistance:
Let them face that either the war stops and the draft stops, or they will find
that this country can no longer be governed. Let them face the prospects
o f thousands and thousands of men refusing induction this spring and
summer. Let them face riots on American Army bases, desertions in
Europe, and mutinies in Vietnam. Let them face the exodus o f hundreds
every week to Canada and let them face, what is worst for them - the

63 Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 155; “Students Celebrate LBJ Move With
Harvard Square Parade,” Boston Globe, I Apr 1968, p. 11; “Johnson Quits; Thousands
Cheer,” B U News, 3 Apr 1968, p. I; Michael Ferber, remarks at 30th anniversary reunion
o f Boston draft resistance, Arlington Street Church, 16 Oct 1997.
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return o f men by the hundreds from Canada to join the Resistance. If that
is what they want to face, then we are ready, stronger today than ever to
give it to them.
When he finished, new draft resisters came forward to turn in their cards. At over 60
similar rallies across the country, more than 1,000 men gave up their draft cards; 235 of
them came from Boston.64
If state or federal regulations required the Resistance to file quarterly performance
reports like other organizations and businesses, draft resistance activists could rightfully
have claimed that the first quarter of 1968 and the first few days of the second quarter
were their best yet. The indictments o f Spock. Coffin, Goodman, Raskin, and Ferber
galvanized the movement to greater confrontation and engendered greater solidarity in
January; induction refusals from January through March sustained the momentum created
by that solidarity; and the president’s decision to drop out o f the presidential race seemed
to validate their critique of the war while providing a glimmer of hope that peace could be
achieved. By every standard, the Resistance thrived as it never had coming into April.
The movement continued to attract regular press attention, increasing numbers o f men
were turning in their draft cards and committing themselves to noncompliance, huge
numbers o f people came out to demonstrations to support those men, and public opinion

64 "Foes Hold Anti-Viet Protest on Common,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 3
Apr 1968, p. 6; “Common Mobbed; 235 Turn in Draft Cards,” Boston Globe, 4 Apr 1968,
p. 2; Ferber and Lynd, The Resistance, p. 222 (Note: Ferber and Lynd contend that more
than 500 cards were turned in; I have not been able to corroborate that figure.
Contemporaneous Resistance statistics put the number at “more than 200.”); Ferber
speech on Common, FBI Memo, 25 Apr 1968, File Boston 25-25171, Exhibit, U.S. v.
Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, National Archives, Waltham, MA; Thome, “Resisting the Draft,”
pp. 149-150.
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was souring on the war. The antiwar movement seemed to be making headway, and draft
resistance led the charge. Louis Kampf. professor o f American Studies at MIT and a
leader of Resist, gave all the credit for Johnson’s decision and for the shifts in public
opinion to the Resistance. “These young men were the vanguards of the peace
movement.” he told the B U News. “They got people like me involved. They galvanized
the peace movement. They made this country an intolerable place.”65
What he did not know at the time, and what no one in the movement could know,
was that the draft resistance movement peaked on April 3rd. For on the very next day,
the sunny, exuberant, self-assurance that resisters and their supporters had cultivated over
the previous months began to unravel as events beyond their control pushed and pulled
the movement in new directions.

65 “Johnson’s Speech Fails to Divert Resistance Rallies,” BU News, 3 Apr 1968, p.
11 .

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VIII

SPRING 1968: A “HOTHOUSE ATMOSPHERE”

Without civil morality communities perish; without personal morality their
survival has no value.
Bertrand Russell, “Individual and Social Ethics”
Authority and the Individual, 1949
New England Resistance activists learned from previous experience that new
resisters usually yearned for direction - and an ongoing sense of solidarity - in the
aftermath o f their first act of resistance. Consequently, on April 4, 1968, the day after
their biggest draft card turn-in, Resistance leaders, as promised, held a series of
workshops and teach-ins at the Arlington Street Church. After a full day o f sessions, one
last panel convened on the stage in the basement of the church to discuss strategy and
ways of sustaining the strength of the movement. Based on the events of the last several
days and especially the previous 36 hours, the panelists and the more than 50 men and
women in the audience were upbeat. Much work remained to be done, they knew, but
momentum now appeared to be on their side. Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run for
reelection and the growing numbers of people turning out for Resistance rallies gave them
reason to be optimistic. The mood would not last.
That same night in Memphis, Tennessee, Martin Luther King, Jr. stepped out on
to the second floor balcony of the Lorraine Motel where an assassin’s bullet cut him
down. Soon after, the technician in charge of recording the Arlington Street Church
panel’s discussion for WBUR (the Boston University radio station) leaned out o f his
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makeshift booth to the right of the stage and informed the crowd that King had just been
sh o t The audience and panelists gasped as one, as though someone punched each o f
them in the stomach simultaneously. It hurt. Silence followed, then scattered weeping
and prayer. And when the WBUR man emerged a few minutes later with the news that
King was dead, the shock turned to outrage. The New England Resistance and the entire
draft resistance movement in Boston would never be the same. Almost immediately after
receiving word of King’s death, the Resistance began to fragment.1
No social movement takes place in a vacuum; it constantly seeks to engage the
broader society of which it is a part and likewise must react to other significant
developments in it. Over the next ten to twelve weeks, through April, May, and June, an
almost constant string of dramatic external events - local, national, and international followed King’s assassination. The cumulative effect of these developments created a
powerful centrifugal force that started to pull the draft resistance movement in several
new directions, away from its original mission and identity. Resistance activists
continued to target the war in Vietnam, but in what seemed an increasingly apocalyptic
climate, they started to expand their critique of the war to encompass a much broader
indictment of American society.
The impatience and urgency that characterized the movement from its inception
now served as fuel for its fragmentation. In the weeks following Johnson’s “abdication,”
it became clear that the war and the draft would go on. Casualties mounted along with
draft calls. Frustrated with the apparent failure to achieve their goals of an end to the war

1Nan Stone, interview with author, 28 Mar 1997.
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and the d raft Resistance activists began to think that the evils o f both were rooted in
more systemic problems. King’s murder and other events seemed to confirm this. Their
“analysis” grew more complicated if not more sophisticated. American society as a
whole, not just the Johnson administration or the “war machine,” was responsible for
injustices and inequities at home and abroad. Resistance rhetoric, therefore, changed
markedly from a critique based on the “immorality” and “illegality” o f this particular war
to wholesale charges of American racism and imperialism. And as they looked around
the country - and the rest o f the world - they saw other young people (students mainly)
who, upon reaching the same conclusions, were moving beyond resistance, sometimes to
revolution.
Although New England Resistance leaders did not see themselves as
revolutionaries in the Spring o f 1968. they did feel that they were part o f a worldwide
student movement, something much larger than a mere challenge to the American system
of conscription. In this climate, their agenda slowly began to diversify. They reached out
to new constituencies, especially blacks and GIs, and slowly moved away from challenges
to the draft system. Paradoxically, this change in the tenor of the movement took place
just as the Spock Trial, the most prominent manifestation of the original resistance spirit,
opened. For months, resisters and supporters had been looking forward to the big event the “political trial of the century” some called it - with great anticipation. Yet rather than
serving as a potential counterbalance - a centripetal force - to the strain pulling the
movement apart, the trial o f the Boston Five only hastened its splintering. By July 1968,
the first mass draft card tum-in of October 16, 1967 seemed a lifetime away.
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Death o f a King and a World Upside Down
Perhaps more than any other branch of the antiwar movement, draft resistance
followed closely the examples o f Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights movement.
That King had been a national public figure since 1956 meant that most in the draft
resistance community became politically and socially aware as the civil rights leader
reached the peak o f his influence.

They remembered the 1963 March on Washington

and King’s “I have a dream” speech. More important, many resisters and supporters cut
their activist teeth in civil rights and, like the earlier movement, draft resistance (in
Boston, especially) saw a convergence of religious and political activists working
together for a common goal. Not only were churches important to both movements, but
the New England Resistance modeled their strategy and tactics - always emphasizing
nonviolence - after examples from the civil rights movement. Just as King sought in
1963 to end segregation in Birmingham by filling the jails there with children, draft
resisters were prepared to bog down the court system and fill America’s prisons with the
draft age kids of the middle class. King himself all but came out in support o f draft
resistance in the last year, and when the Boston Five were indicted, he said, “If Dr. Spock
and Michael Ferber are jailed, then I should be jailed as well.” As Gandhi had been to
King, King was to the New England Resistance. According to Neil Robertson, King’s
death had a “massive impact” on the organization. To lose him so violently rocked the
New England Resistance to its foundation.2

2 “Card Turn-In Opposes Racism,” The Resistance, 8 Apr 1968, p. 1; Robertson
interview, 7 Aug 1998.
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New England Resistance leaders immediately moved to assist the AfricanAmerican community in keeping order and safety in their neighborhoods in the wake o f
King’s death. As cities across the country burned in response to the terrible news, the
New England Resistance, through its one black leader, Harold Hector, stayed in touch
with the Black United Front (BUF) in Roxbury and aided them with medical supplies,
food and water. When rumors were spread that white firefighters entering Roxbury might
be shot by snipers, members of the New England Resistance broke into the downtown
campus o f the University o f Massachusetts and '‘liberated” all the fire extinguishers for
use by members o f the BUF. Although tensions were high, widespread rioting did not
break out in Roxbury.3
At the same time, the New England Resistance took the lead in organizing a
coalition march in memory of Dr. King and called for a three day student-faculty strike to
have teach-ins on racism in America. On April 5, more than 15,000 people, mostly
white, marched from the Common past the State House through downtown streets to Post
Office Square. (As the crowd moved into the square, they noticed that the flag atop the
courthouse flapping at full staff. Chants o f "Lower it! Lower it!” rose up through the
canyon of office buildings followed, minutes later, by cheers when someone lowered the
stars and stripes to half staff.) It was one o f the biggest marches the city had ever seen.
The student-faculty strike did not come off as successfully, though there were several

3 “Roxbury Riot Prevented,” The Resistance, 1 May 1968, p. 2, RCP; Stone
interview, 28 Mar 1997; Joel Kugelmass, interview with author, 16 Jun 1997; William
Hunt, interview with author, 31 Oct 1997.
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well-attended teach-ins and workshops.4
Most striking, the draft card tum-in scheduled as the culmination of the three day
strike offered the first indications that the Resistance program would be widening. “It
took the death of Dr. King...to bring home to the New England Resistance the connection
between the war in Vietnam and racism/' a spokesman said. Resisters suggested that
attacks on the draft doubled as attacks on institutionalized racism. “The Resistance
intends to undermine the institution pampering the middle-class while it uses black
bodies for an ugly war,” they said. Therefore, on April 10, another eighteen men turned
in their draft cards at the Arlington Street Church. These were, of course, men who could
have performed this act just a week before with hundreds of others on the Common, yet
they did not; it took King’s assassination to push them over the edge. Bob Shapiro, an
antiwar activist at MIT. had considered turning in his draft card for months, but always
hesitated - until April 10. Even though he favored SNCC’s approach to civil rights over
King's, the murder o f this nonviolent man “demanded some kind of very strong
response,” he later said. “The response I decided on was to become more active in the
antiwar movement than I already was and to just basically say "no’ to the government.”5
In life, Martin Luther King, Jr. had deeply influenced the lives of many in
Boston’s draft resistance community, but in death King drove them to see what he had

4 “ 15,000 March Here - Mostly White,” Boston Globe, 5 Apr 1968, p. 10; “AntiDraft Group Calls for Student-Faculty Strike,” Boston Globe, 8 Apr 1968, p. 3.
5 “Anti-Draft Group Calls for Student-Faculty Strike,” Boston Globe, 8 Apr 1968,
p. 3; “Card Tum-In Opposes Racism,” The Resistance, 8 Apr 1968, p. 1, RCP; Robert
Shapiro, interview with author, 13 Aug 1997.
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always hoped white America would see: that racism, poverty, militarism, and materialism
were ‘‘interrelated flaws...evils rooted"deeply in the whole structure o f [American]
society.” The night of Kang’s death resident Resistance poet Jim Havelin wrote a poem
that, in retrospect, shows that draft resistance activists finally saw (if some did not
already) the connections King was making:
When I Heard the News April 4, 1968 8:35 p.m.
I was told a little while ago
Martin Luther King has been shot
in Memphis in the face
by a white in a car
I was at a Resistance meeting
A ripple of horror and anguish
Walked home
past the stone lions
by the fountains of the Prudential
I cannot maintain
any distance
I cannot separate myself
from the man who has been shot
I will not
past the stone lions
on a balmy night
ours is the age of the gun
we may die by it
ours is the age of the gun
we may try to throw it away
but it com es back to us
ours is the age of the gun
past the stone lions
on a balmy night
their jaws are hanging open
we may die by it
and blessed are the peacemakers

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

408
for theirs is the kingdom of
I cannot maintain any distance
watched little blacks
playing on the Prudential escalators
a careful eye out for the cops
I was at a meeting
w e sent a telegram
would I could send my blood, my life
ours is the age of the gun
again and again forever
the good men
faces blown off
on the streets
the jaws are hanging open
I did not want to turn on the radio
and now he is dead
police are searching
for a white assailant
he is all of us
he is all we have stood for
ours is the age of the gun
I cannot separate myself
from another corpse
We must have known
We must have expected
He must have
and he saw the bullet coming toward him
did he?
the bullet that has been coming so long
ours is the age of the gun
we may die by it

Havelin’s poem conveyed an anguish felt by almost everyone in the draft resistance
movement. That anguish, coupled with a sense o f guilt for having failed to connect
racism with the war before, contributed to a new urgency that led the New England
Resistance to completely alter its focus in the coming weeks.6
6 Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Testament of Hope,” originally published in Playboy
16 (Jan 1969), reprinted in James M. Washington, A Testament o f Hope: The Essential
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For the rest of April and into May, combating racism became the organization's
newest priority. An editorial in The Resistance laid out the rationale for this shift:
Dr. Martin Luther King's death is not the accident o f one white man with a
gun in the right place at the right time. His death is the expression of a
society for whom destruction is a tactic, racism is a poIicy...Dr. King made
the connection between racism and the war. He drew the lines between
the slaughter in the city, teaching us that it is the same mind that napalms
Hue and bivouacs in Detroit...thus we have seen that our struggle against
the draft and the war must be as well a struggle against racism in the white
community. We have all lost a leader.
Even Resist, the organization of adult advisers, soon identified their '‘job” as “push[ing]
the political offensive against the war and against racism.” It was a remarkable
transformation.7
Despite the Resistance’s visceral response to King’s death, however, the
organization’s interest in racial issues manifested itself primarily in print. For example,
although some Arlington Street Church members joined forces with black leaders in a
demonstration that became known as Tent City at the end o f April, few if any resisters
took part. Over three days, more than 40 men and women camped out in a parking lot in
Boston’s South End to protest urban renewal programs that resulted in demolition of low
cost housing and the relocation of families to other neighborhoods. The demonstration
had nothing to do with draft resistance, of course, but given the Resistance’s new focus
on racism one might have expected the New England Resistance to join the Tent City

Writings and Speeches o f Martin Luther King, Jr., (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1986),
p. 315; Jim Havelin, “When I Heard the News,” poem, The Resistance, 5 Apr 1968, p. 6,
RCP.
7 “King Dies,” The Resistance, 8 Apr 1968, p. 1, RCP; Resist Newsletter #12 (Jun
1968), p. 2, Box 28, BSP.
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demonstration.8
No sooner did Resistance leaders begin to emphasize new education programs on
racism, however, did other events beyond their control again alter the climate in which
they worked. On April 23, students at Columbia University protested against the
school’s '‘manifest destiny” policy by which the university historically purchased property
in the Iow-income neighborhood of Momingside Heights, demolished it, and built new
university buildings (in the previous ten years, more than 7,000 residents - 85 percent of
whom were black or Puerto Rican - were displaced in this manner). In particular,
Columbia’s plans to build a gymnasium in the area set off protests that began with the
occupation of the administration building. Hamilton Hall, and the holding o f a dean in his
office for more than 24 hours. Over the next week, more than 1,000 students occupied
several more buildings (declaring them “Liberated Zones”) as the protest escalated into a
rebellion against the Vietnam War and Columbia’s affiliation with the Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDA), a weapons research organization. On April 30, between 2:30
and 5:30 a.m., New York City police stormed the occupied buildings, brutally beating
many o f the unarmed demonstrators. They arrested 712 and left 148 injured. The rest of
the student body, though more moderate in their views, were outraged by the police
tactics. On May 6, when the university reopened, thousands of students took part in a
general boycott of classes that shut the school down until May 16, when President
Grayson Kirk accepted their demands that formal charges against students be dropped.

8 “23 Arrested In So. End Protest,” Boston Globe, 27 Apr 1968, p. 1; Bob Hohler,
interview with author, 11 Dec 1997.
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On May 21, students again occupied Hamilton Hall to protest the disciplining of four
SDS leaders. Again, the police came: They arrested 138, and the university later
suspended 66, taking care to notify the offenders’ draft boards that they were no longer
eligible for student deferments.9
The Columbia students’ protest of two major issues - one rooted in a racially
insensitive expansion program and another relevant to the war - mirrored the concerns of
draft resistance activists in Boston. And although no one in Boston suggested the
occupation o f university buildings as a method of protest in April and May o f 1968, the
example o f Columbia changed their sense of what was possible. “Liberated Zone" would
soon become part of the New England Resistance vocabulary.
Even more astounding than the battles at Columbia were the strikes and riots led
by students in several European countries. In Czechoslovakia, students and writers
ushered in the Prague Spring, a new culture of free and uncensored expression, and were
the most outspoken supporters o f Alexander Dubcek’s reform government. In Madrid,
students and workers joined forces in calling for democratic, economic, and educational
reforms. Extensive rioting eventually crippled the city through much o f early May, when
the fascist government of General Francisco Franco brought in the civil guard to break up
the protests. And over the same period, furious rioting occurred in Berlin and elsewhere
in West Germany following the attempted assassination o f German student leader Rudi
Dutschke.

9 Jerry L. Avom, et al, Up Against the Ivy Wall: a History o f the Columbia Crisis
(New York: Atheneum, 1969); Terry Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, p. 199.
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But none o f these uprisings stunned the world more than the general strike that
evolved from student protests in France. In early May, contemporaneous with the
Columbia uprising, students at the Sorbonne in Paris, sparked by protests at Nanterre,
began street demonstrations to demand the reform o f what one observer called the “totally
outdated and medieval structure of the university.” When police entered the Sorbonne for
the first time in its 700 year history, and beat and arrested hundreds o f students, a fullscale uprising began. Most Parisians were shocked by the police brutality and
sympathized with the students. Ten days of street demonstrations followed, culminating
in the violent Night of the Barricades on May 10. That night, in anticipation o f a police
offensive, as many as 30,000 marchers followed French revolutionary tradition and ripped
up paving stones in the Latin Quarter - the same stones used in 1848 and 1871 - and
overturned cars as they built more than 50 barricades in the winding streets surrounding
the university. In the middle of the night, the police came with incendiary grenades and
the same CS gas used by American forces in Vietnam. They clashed with the students all
night. 367 people were injured, and 460 were arrested as the police went from door to
door, taking anyone with black hands, gas spots on their clothes, or visible wounds.
A huge number of French workers and professionals joined the general strike that
resulted from the May 10 fighting. Eventually, some 9 million French citizens went on
strike not just to support the students, but to demand better wages, a roll back o f
government bureaucracy and la participation in the daily decisions affecting their lives.
On May 29, de Gaulle fled to West Germany; it appeared that his government would fall,
that students and workers had forged a revolution. But the old general came back the
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next day, and in a powerful four-minute television address all but sucked the life out o f
the rebellion. He dissolved Parliament, called for general elections and mobilized the
military under local prefects. In response, an estimated 700,000 Gaullist supporters
rushed to march on the Champs Elysees; the momentum had shifted. Ultimately, a
combination o f concessions to workers from the government - a 35 percent increase in the
minimum wage and increased participation in industry - and the strain created by a lack of

social services (e.g., no mail, no garbage collection, and inconsistent public
transportation) weakened the strike and caused the majority o f the French population to
give up on the students.10
In New England, however, the French students’ example contributed to a kind of
intersection o f radical thought that converged in the New England Resistance. On the one
hand, Resistance activists continued to despair over the state of the war and race relations
in America. Despite Lyndon Johnson's promise to seek negotiations with the North
Vietnamese, fighting raged on. Five hundred sixty two American GIs died in one week in
the middle of May - the worst week yet - and another 2,225 were wounded. The judge in
the upcoming trial of the Boston Five ruled that arguments about the immorality and
illegality of the war would not be admitted because he thought them irrelevant to the
charges. In addition, racial tensions continued to flare in Boston and in other parts o f the

10There are several good books on the tumultuous year of 1968. For descriptions
of events in Europe, I have relied especially on two: Ronald Fraser, ed., 1968: A Student
Generation in Revolt (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 203-230; David Caute, The Year
o f the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 8185, 185-210, 211-258. In addition, see Herbert Marcuse, “On the French Revolt,” Boston
Free Press, No. 5, p. 5, AJP.
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country. Three hundred black students took over the Boston University administration
building demanding more emphasis on African-American history and increased financial
aid to black students. In Roxbury, someone stabbed Jozef Mlot-Mroz in the chest when
he taunted a crowd o f people boarding buses bound for the Poor Peoples March in
Washington with a placard reading, “I am Fighting Poverty. I Work. Have You Tried It?
It Works.” He later recovered but the incident demonstrated the extent to which violence
was becoming commonplace. On the whole, the political climate appeared to be getting
worse rather than better, and tensions seemed to rise almost daily.11
At the same time, the example of so many students flexing their collective muscle
at Columbia and in Europe led some in the Resistance to see themselves as part o f a
worldwide movement for revolutionary change. Draft resistance activists found
inspiration in the student uprisings in Europe, and especially the general strike in France.
In a telegram to the students at the Sorbonne. New England Resistance leaders wrote:
The Resistance in America has been inspired by your victories and
salutes your alliance with the workers of France. We share your
determination to rid society of inequality and exploitation. Like you, we
are recalling our country to its revolutionary heritage. The movement for
human liberation is becoming international, and the future is ours.
Vive la Resistance! Vive la Revolution!12
This kind of rhetoric marked a significant shift in objectives from the early days of

11 “562 GIs Killed - Worst Week,” Boston Globe, 17 May 1968, p. 1; “One-Man
Picketer, Mlot-Mroz, Critically Stabbed in Roxbury,” Boston Globe (Evening Edition),
10 May 1968. p. 1.
12 "To the Union des Etudients Francais at the Liberated Sorbonne,” telegram to
French students from the Resistance, reprinted in Boston Free Press, first edition (c. late
May 1968), p. 7, RCP.
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October 16. At that time, Resistance leaders sought only to hamstring the draft and end
American involvement in Vietnam. No one raised the ambitious prospect o f ridding
society o f ‘'inequality and exploitation.” nor did anyone describe noncompliance with the
draft as part o f a “movement for human liberation.” But times had changed, and New
England Resistance leaders increasingly saw the roots of American racism and
imperialism embedded deep within the structure of their society. “Moral witness began
to be spoken of less as something noble than as something educational or as a tactic,”
Hilary Putnam, the Harvard philosopher and New England Resistance supporter, later
said. “One felt the need for what was called ‘an analysis.’ Originally one did not feel
that need. I thought: 'the war [is] wrong and I’m not going to be complicit in an evil
war.'” But after several months, when it became clear that draft resistance had not
moved the country materially closer to withdrawal from Vietnam, and that more and more
resisters were being called for induction - and would be prosecuted for refusing - then,
Putnam recalled, “people started producing analyses and debating these analyses.” For
the first time, Marxist interpretations o f the war and race relations began to dominate
discussion and soon the Resistance started to reflect leftist leanings more overtly than
ever before.13
Sanctuary at Arlington Street
As the Spock Trial opened in late May, the New England Resistance’s intellectual
shift became more apparent. On the very first day of the trial, Resistance leaders declared
the Arlington Street Church a “liberated zone,” and accepted two men, a convicted draft

13 Putnam interview, 18 Dec 1997.
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resister and an AWOL GI, into the first “sanctuary” there. They then issued a
“manifesto” that clearly showed their turn from a more limited focus on the institutions
responsible for both the war and the draft to a broader indictment o f American society.
First, they were critical of themselves: “We have failed to expose the social origins of
American foreign policy, to identify the economic interests responsible for exploitation at
home and abroad,” they wrote. “As a result, our analysis has remained superficial and
conciliatory.” Therefore, the leadership explained, “the time has come for the Resistance
to present a radical critique o f the nature o f our society...” The critique that followed
shaped Resistance activism for the rest o f the year:
The myth of American affluence conceals enforced want,
prosperity undercut by the anxiety of constant indebtedness, and the
emptiness of the lives o f those who have attained wealth and power.
Meanwhile, private industry poisons our atmosphere, pollutes our rivers,
and squanders our resources.
But even this pseudo-prosperity is based on a global system of
exploitation which further corrupts the fabric of American society.
Imperialism requires the maintenance o f a gigantic military establishment,
the distortion of men’s lives through conscription or the fear o f it, and the
perversion of a desire for law and order into a rationalization for and
defense of an intolerable status quo.
This focus on economic inequality, “the emptiness” of people’s lives, and on militarism
smacked of Port Huron-era SDS rhetoric more than anything else the New England
Resistance had ever produced. Even if many o f their members thought of themselves as
part of the New Left when the Resistance was bom the previous fall, the language o f the
New Left never dominated discussion as much as it did now.14

14“A Manifesto: The Resistance and the Draft,” Boston Free Press, first edition
(c. late May 1968), p. 2, RCP.
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Although the New England Resistance’s revision of its agenda derived most
directly from the intensity o f the times, and the radical examples o f their contemporaries,
a gradual change in leadership also facilitated it. O f the ten people who signed the new
manifesto, only three - Bill Hunt, Nan Stone, and Neil Robertson - had been involved
with draft resistance since the previous summer. The other original “founders” of the
New England Resistance were noticeably absent: Bill Dowling left in January because o f
disagreements over strategy: Alex Jack remained active in draft resistance but focused all
o f his energies on the biweekly newspaper. The Resistance, which merged into the Boston
Free Press at the time of the trial; and Michael Ferber had not been very active on the
local level since his indictment arrived. Like the other defendants Ferber spent most of
his time at speaking engagements around the country which he felt obligated to accept as
a way of helping other local Resistance groups. By the time of the trial then, Jack and
Ferber, the two men most responsible for injecting their Unitarian-based sense of morality
(even though both were also products of the New Left) no longer exerted much influence
on the day-to-day operations o f the New England Resistance.
Two other men, Ira Arlook and Joel Kugelmass, assumed more responsibility and,
with Bill Hunt, gradually pushed the organization further to the left. Arlook and
Kugelmass knew each other from Stanford and were friends of David Harris and some o f
the other original Resistance founders there. They came to draft resistance less from a
New England-style civil disobedience perspective than from a California New Left slant.
Connie Field, another of the manifesto’s signers, later remarked that she, Arlook, and
Kugelmass, saw their work with the New England Resistance more as “Movement work”
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than draft resistance work alone; they always felt part o f something much bigger and
interrelated, a Movement that included other forms o f antiwar work, civil rights, black
power, the student movement, and eventually women’s liberation. For them, especially,
the broadening Resistance program made sense.15
With the issuance o f the new manifesto and the simultaneous opening o f the first
sanctuary at the Arlington Street Church, the New England Resistance appeared also to be
growing more militant, particularly when compared with the well-mannered defendants in
the Spock Trial across town. The manifesto concluded by stating, “we shall resist the
enforcement of the laws we oppose” and pledged not to “allow” the government to arrest
the two men for whom they organized the sanctuary. It may or may not have been an
issue of semantics, but these sweeping statements certainly appeared to be more radical
than any earlier pronouncements. What did resisting the “enforcement of the laws we
oppose” mean? It sounded dangerously vague. Likewise, promising not to allow the
government to take the two men in sanctuary implied that arresting officers might face
physical resistance, maybe violence. To some outsiders, then, this tone seemed to add to
the apocalyptic nature of the times. As a result, Joel Kugelmass found himself defending
the organization during the sanctuary. “We're not anarchists,” he told a reporter, “because
we're not interested in destroying the social system, but in building a new order. We want
an order based on equality, such as equality between the sexes, races, economic equality,
educational equality, not to blur the individual differences, but to give every individual a
truly equal chance...” Consistent with the new Resistance line, Kugelmass mentioned

15 Connie Field, interview with author, 17 Jun 1997.
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nothing about the draft or the war, and focused on bigger issues. “We don't live in a
democratic society,” he said, “but in an oppressive shadow o f democracy in which a few
people determine the policies and programs of the country and give the majority of
Americans the false impression that they have a say.” Although the New England
Resistance hinted at some o f these themes in their publications in April and early May,
the change o f course charted by the organization only became obvious to those outside it
when the first sanctuary opened at Arlington Street.16
The possibility of sanctuary, the granting o f asylum by a church to a draft resister
or AWOL serviceman, had been in the air for months. As early as October 16, William
Sloane Coffin urged churches and temples to grant sanctuary in his Arlington Street
Church sermon. But only as the Resistance searched for new tactics beyond draft card
turn-ins did it become more likely. Once again, Robert Talmanson, 21, the CNVA
activist who burned his card outside the federal courthouse in June 1966 and who later
made the first efforts to start a Resistance chapter in Boston, found himself at the center
o f a new phase o f draft resistance in the city. In the middle of May, the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear Talmanson’s appeal o f his conviction for draft card
burning, and so the first sanctuary began with him. Army Sp 4 William Chase, 19, a high
school dropout and former garbage collector from Dennis, Massachusetts, joined
Talmanson in sanctuary. Chase had served as a clerk in Cam Ranh Bay for nine months
but on three occasions sought psychiatric discharges from the Army; all were denied.

16 Daniel P. Juda, “The Draft a Rallying Point for N.E. Resistance Group,” Boston
Sunday Globe, 2 Jun 1968.
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Later, Chase went Absent Without Leave for 20 days and when the Army did not
discharge him - instead ordering him to report to Fort Lewis, Washington - Chase again
went AWOL and soon gravitated to the Resistance looking for help.17
In some ways, Chase represented a sizeable number o f alienated servicemen. GI
desertions continued to plague the American military in 1968 after record numbers fled
the Army and Marines in 1967. According to historian Richard Moser, the rate o f Army
AWOL cases jumped from 57.2 per thousand in 1966 to 78 per thousand in 1967. Total
desertion from the Army (absence over 30 days) climbed from 14.9 per thousand in 1966
to 21.4 in 1967. The Marines fared little better, with desertion rates increasing from 16.1
per thousand to 26.8 per thousand from 1966 to 1967. Altogether, Moser reports, the
military listed 40,277 men as deserters by June 30,1967. Many o f those men wound up
in Sweden or in Canada (though Canada had an extradition agreement with the U.S. in
such cases), but none took the course Bill Chase did in seeking the assistance of a civilian
antiwar group to publicly announce his desertion as a way o f protesting the war. In
subsequent months, dozens of servicemen followed Chase's lead, possibly because they
believed that the publicity might keep the military from channeling them to either the
stockade or Vietnam. But Chase had no idea what would happen when he joined
Talmanson at the Arlington Street Church. He knew only that he did not want to go back

17“Two War Resisters Get Church Asylum,” Boston Globe (Evening Edition), 20
May 1968, p. 1; “Anti-War Pair Spend Second Day Sheltered in Church,” Boston Globe,
21 May 1968, p. 15; ‘“ I Know They Will Be Coming...I Know I Will Be Going to Jail,”
Boston Globe, 24 May 1968, p. 27.
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to Vietnam.18
The Reverend Jacle Mendelsohn learned o f his church’s distinction as the first one
in the country to offer sanctuary to a serviceman when he saw the front page of the Los
Angeles Times. Mendelsohn was in California lobbying religious leaders on behalf of
Robert Kennedy’s presidential campaign. Before going to Los Angeles, Mendelsohn
sensed that a sanctuary request might be in the offing. Fearing that such a request might
come in while he was in California and without the approval o f the church’s Prudential
Committee, he told Victor Jokel, his executive assistant, to put the man in Mendelsohn’s
office (rather than in the sanctuary of the church) until he got back. The L.A. papers
made it clear that Jokel granted sanctuary to Bill Chase and Robert Talmanson in the
actual sanctuary o f the church, and dozens of other people were supporting them there.
Mendelsohn immediately called Jokel and "cussed him out,” but Jokel was '‘pretty
defiant” and pledged to go on with the sanctuary. Mendelsohn eventually caught a flight
back to Boston, missing Kennedy’s victory in California - and his assassination, another
event that contributed to the chaotic social and political landscape of 1968 America.19
In fact, Victor Jokel made the decision to host the first sanctuary at Arlington
Street almost unilaterally. He did have the support o f Ed Harris, the associate minister,
and Bob Hohler, a "lay minister” of the church and executive director of the UnitarianUniversalist’s Laymen’s League, but he did not consult with the Prudential Committee

18 Richard Moser, The New Winter Soldiers: G l and Veteran Dissent in the
Vietnam Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), pp. 75-77; Resist
Newsletter #14 (29 Jul 1968), p. 8, BSP.
19 Mendelsohn interview, 19 Dec 1997.
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which represents the parishioners. Ralph Conant, the chairman of the Prudential
Committee learned of Jokel’s plans by chance but opted not to intervene because he
wanted to avoid “unfortunate consequences o f a confrontation with the New England
Resistance movement.” If not supportive of draft resistance, some members o f the church
- like Conant - were resigned to seeing such activities take place in their church. The
sanctuary eventually tested limits o f their patience.20
The tradition of sanctuary dated to ancient times and had been used extensively as
late as the Middle Ages. In the Book o f Kings, when King David’s son and military
commander, Joab, took refuge from King Solomon’s soldiers, he did so in a tent
containing the Ark of the Covenant, a holy place. In 693, the King o f West Saxons
(England) declared that anyone who committed a capital crime could save himself from
the penalty o f death if he took asylum in a church. This legal basis for sanctuary lasted in
England until 1623. when an act o f Parliament abolished it. Still, when Victor Jokel
opened the sanctuary at Arlington Street, he emphasized that no one expected it to have
any legal force, nor did he think it should. Instead, he noted, “this historic concept, as
renewed today, has the force of a moral imperative on the side of life and man at a time
when, through well-meaning but tragic misguidance, the leadership o f our country,
gutting its ideals, indicts its patriots and acts as executioner for thousands o f this

20 Mendelsohn interview, 19 Dec 1997; Ralph W. Conant, “Report o f the
Chairman o f the Prudential Committee to the Annual Meeting of the Corporation,” 12
Jun 1968, ASC Files.
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generation o f young men - American and Vietnamese o f both sides.”21
For the resisters and their community o f supporters, the Arlington Street event
represented a new and exciting tactic. To many, sanctuary offered a creative re-direction
for the Resistance, something new (and newsworthy) to do in place of draft card tum-ins.
Although sanctuary dated to ancient times, the first one at the Arlington Street Church
appeared rooted in values that dated to the origins o f European settlement in New
England. Over the course o f ten days, the participants treated the church more like a
meetinghouse where, as in seventeenth-century New England, a community would meet
to tend to all of its business, not just its religious instruction.
Within hours o f its start, the sanctuary began to take on a life of its own. At
times, it seemed like an ongoing teach-in. At other times, the crowd focused on preparing
for the authorities who would inevitably come. On occasion it also took on the
characteristics o f a big party. On the first night, several hundred people turned out for
dinner in the church basement. Organizers showed films of past draft card tum-ins and
musicians played the blues for the crowd. A couple o f nights later the rock band Earth
Opera (led by future bluegrass greats Peter Rowan and David Grisman) performed on the
stage in the basement o f the church. More than 70 people spent the first night in the
church awaiting the police and the crowds grew each night. Every day people could be
found sleeping, eating, cooking, giving speeches, and having “endless conversations.”
Some roamed around trying to keep everyone’s spirits up, trying to build solidarity. And

21 Joseph M. Harvey, “Talmanson Used Ancient Tradition in Seeking Sanctuary in
Church,” Boston Globe, 26 May 1968, p. 28; Victor Jokel, “The Meaning of Asylum,”
The Resistance, 15 Jun 1968, p. 4, RCP.
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reporters mingled throughout the building interviewing as many participants as they
could. Joel Kugelmass later called it “a very beautiful thing,” because of the range of
people who got involved. In addition to diehard activists, he said, some members of the
church helped, and several suburban women came in with sandwiches for everyone. Here
again, by using the church, the New England Resistance immediately attracted new
supporters. The sanctuary began to be “self propagating,” Kugelmass noted.22
No one knew exactly when the authorities would come, who they would be, or
how they would handle the crowd o f supporters vowing to prevent their removal. In the
first few days. Colonel Paul Feeney of the Selective Service told reporters that Bill Chase,
the AWOL serviceman, was “the Army’s problem,” thus implying that the Army would
have to apprehend Chase. U. S. Attorney Paul Markham said that he hoped he would not
have to use U.S. Marshals to apprehend Robert Talmanson, but “if it comes to that we
will have to do our duty.” After a couple of days, Victor Jokel promised that the
imminent showdown between the activists in the church and the authorities would be “a
moral confrontation only” and participants agreed to meet police or marshals only by
blocking their way - by standing or sitting - with the intention o f avoiding violence.
When they finally came, however, it escalated into much more than that.23

22 “Anti-War Pair Spend Second Day Sheltered in Church,” Boston Globe, 21 May
1968, p. 15; “Pair in Church ‘Sanctuary’ Say Next Move Up to U.S.,” Boston Globe. 22
May 1968, p. 15; Kugelmass interview, 16 Jun 1997.
23 “Deserter, Card Burner in Church,” Boston Globe. 21 May 1968, p. 9; “AntiWar Pair Spend Second Day Sheltered in Church,” Boston Globe, 21 May 1968, p. 15;
“Pair in Church ‘Sanctuary’ Say Next Move Up to U.S.,” Boston Globe, 22 May 1968, p.
15; “Entire 4 Hours o f Melee Detailed by 2 Reporters,” Boston Globe, 24 May 1968, p.
27.
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The confrontation came on May 22, the third day o f the sanctuary. Each day, as
supporters grew more and more exhausted, they anticipated the arrival o f the authorities.
At approximately noon on the 22nd, about 250 supporters gathered in front of the
Arlington Street Church, sensing an imminent encounter. They were right. At 3:15, as
Resistance look-outs used walkie-talkies to communicate with those inside, a police
officer began redirecting traffic off Arlington Street onto Newbury Street, thus preventing
cars from passing in front o f the church. At 3:30, just as films o f the October 16 draft
card tum-in were being shown by prosecutors across town in the Spock Trial, a
Resistance activist with a bullhorn yelled "‘here they are” as a car bearing Paul Markham
and three U.S. Marshals arrived at the church. Markham (who several resisters in later
years misidentified as Ramsey Clark) and the marshals walked up the front steps o f the
church and entered the sanctuary. There. Father Anthony Mullaney o f St. Phillips
Rectory in Roxbury met the four men and told them that they were about to “violate a
moral sanctuary.” He stressed to Markham, especially, that if they passed the crowd of
supporters and took Robert Talmanson, the U.S. Attorney and his marshals would be
cooperating with a law that Mullaney and everyone else in the church believed to be
immoral. The government men listened politely and then stepped past the priest. Robert
Talmanson observed the scene from high above the sanctuary floor. He stood at the
massive mahogany pulpit, over which someone had draped a large felt banner
emblazoned with the large black Omega symbol of the Resistance, and read a brief
statement. One could have heard a pin drop as the marshals approached Talmanson and
told him that they were placing him under arrest. Talmanson replied that he would not
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resist and fell limp into the arms o f the marshals. There had been no violence, just the
promised moral confrontation, and they carried Talmanson from the pulpit.24
Order began to unravel, however, as the marshals attempted to leave the church.
For some reason, Markham and the marshals elected not to go out the way they came in.
and instead took Talmanson outside via a side door that led to an alley that runs down the
right side o f the church, bisecting the block from Arlington to Berkeley Streets. When
the marshals emerged with Talmanson, they met the crowd of supporters who had moved
from the front of the church down the alley and now stood before them with their arms
interlocked. The path to their car was blocked. For approximately 45 minutes, the action
stalled as Markham and the marshals plotted what to do next. Talmanson sat on the
ground reading Chinese poetry with marshals standing on both sides of him. The
protesters sang “the Battle Hymn o f the Republic,” “America,” “We Shall Not Be
Moved,” and other civil rights songs. As a steady rain began to fall, shouts of “You’re
beautiful, man,” and “We love you” buoyed the spirits o f the arrested man.
At about 4:15, demonstrators could see that the marshals had a new plan. Fifteen
Boston police officers suddenly emerged from the opposite direction of the protesters. In
the late 1960s, the Ritz Carlton Hotel still operated a parking lot that guests entered from
Newbury street but which also bordered the alley in which the protesters were confronting
Talmanson’s captors. The police arrived there and moved up the alley to offer support to
their federal counterparts. They did not wear riot gear or carry tear gas guns. Eventually,

24 “Police Haul Draft Resister from Church,” Boston Globe, 23 May 1968, p. 1;
“Entire 4 Hour Melee Detailed by 2 Reporters,” Boston Globe, 24 May 1968, p. 27; Keith
Maillard, “Confrontation,” Boston Free Press, Third Edition, pp. 6-7, AJP.
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some 25 police officers arrived at the Ritz parking lot aided by another six who walked
down Newbury Street from Arlington to give them support The marshals picked up
Talmanson and once again tried to move him through the crowd, now numbering several

hundred. When that failed, they quickly turned toward the parking lot and. with police
officers forming a barrier between the marshals and the protesters, they whisked
Talmanson to a waiting squad car. Along the way, several officers pushed protesters to
the ground. Tensions quickly heightened.
The police and marshals did not get Talmanson into the car fast enough, as
supporters ran to sit down in front o f the police car. Michael “■Walrus*’ Colpitts laid
himself out across the hood o f the car while two women lay on its roof. When it became
clear that there would be another delay in the action, some protesters ran into the church
to get blankets and coats for the crowd to use in shielding themselves from the rain. Most
were soaked to the skin. During the calm, a helicopter flew over the crowd. When one
resister yelled, “Look out! Here comes the napalm!” even some of the police officers
laughed.
Finally, however, the police made it clear that they meant business and were
growing tired of the confrontation. A police wagon pulled up in front o f the parking lot
on Newbury Street. Then, all at once, the marshals pulled Talmanson from the
surrounded police car and the crowd o f police officers formed a phalanx that pushed
through the crowd to bring the arrested man to the wagon. Officers pulled the two
women from the top of the car by their hair, and as they moved through the crowd some
clubbed and punched the sitting or standing demonstrators; others sprayed them in the
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face with mace. Some demonstrators were kicked or trampled. The police later denied
using night sticks on the demonstrators, but participant and eyewitness accounts
confirmed that the 20 protesters who were hurt suffered primarily from being clubbed and
punched by police. One reporter for the Boston Free Press, an underground newspaper,
evaluated tapes, still photographs and witness accounts, and concluded that the violence
was “police-originated.” The reporter noted that “although the police were tugged at.
pushed and obstructed, at no time did any Resistance demonstrator strike or attempt to
strike a police officer.”
Not every police officer participated in the beatings. John Phillips, no stranger to
such frenzies, later recalled that he shook hands with Deputy Superintendent Joseph Saia
“in the middle of the carnage that was going on underneath us” because Saia was so
obviously trying to “control things, control his officers.” Likewise, Dan Tilton, who had
been sitting in front o f the car. recalled that after a “beefy” policeman grabbed him and
threw him (practically through the air) to the ground, another cop held Tilton down on the
ground, and said, ”1 don't want to be a part of this. Just stay where you are.” Despite
these examples of police restraint, many Resistance activists now feared that the Boston
police had reached their limit. Historically, the New England Resistance had always been
grateful that Boston police handled demonstrations and crowds better than their
counterparts in other cities. Following the melee in the Ritz parking lot, however,
activists suspected that Boston cops might start responding like Oakland or New York
City police. In any case, the physical confrontation, coupled with the arrest o f 16
demonstrators, added up to a stunning end to Robert Talmanson’s sanctuary, and set an
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example that activists hoped would not be repeated when the Army came for Bill Chase.25
From one perspective, the skirmish with police bolstered the level of attention
already being paid to draft resistance as a result o f the ongoing Spock Trial. After the
dust settled from the clash outside the church, Michael Ferber arrived in the middle o f a
meeting called by the New England Resistance to discuss how to handle the military
authorities who would undoubtedly be coming for Bill Chase; “We are all over the city,”
Ferber triumphantly told the crowd that after spending the day in court (where the
prosecution showed films o f the October 16 draft card tum-in) and walking through the
Boston Common and Public Gardens, listening to the buzz. When one reporter entitled
her mid-June article “'The Boston Happening,” it referred not just to the trial. Draft
resistance and discussion o f it seemed to dominate the city’s discourse.26
Editors at the Boston Globe, however, offered an alternative view of the sanctuary
altercation in an editorial called, “Can We Keep Out Cool?” The Globe, like some
resisters, feared that the violence hitherto seen in other parts o f the country had now
spread to Boston. “Is this result inevitable?” they asked. “Isn’t it possible for
demonstrators to make their points and police to carry out their duties without spilling

25 “Police Haul Draft Resister from Church,” Boston Globe, 23 May 1968, p. 1;
“Globe Reporter Saw Clash From Start to Finish,” Boston Globe, 23 May 1968, p. 11;
“Draft Resiste Lost in Poetry,” Boston Globe, 23 May 1968, p. 2; “Entire 4 Hour Melee
Detailed by 2 Reporters,” Boston Globe, 24 May 1968, p. 27; Keith Maillard,
“Confrontation,” Boston Free Press, Third Edition, pp. 6-7, AJP; Ed Harris, interview
with Eugene Navias, 27 Oct 1994, ASC Oral History Project; “Participant Accounts,”
Boston Free Press, Third Edition, p. 8; Phillips interview, 29 Aug 1997; Arlook
interview, 12 Aug 1998; Tilton interview, 16 Jun 1997.
26 Arlene Croce, “The Boston Happening,” National Review, 18 Jun 1968, p. 602.
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blood? Or is violence so much a part of the American heritage that real, mutual non
violence still doesn’t have a chance in our society?” It appeared, then, that the
apocalyptic mood that seemed to be sweeping the world wherever young people
congregated, might have migrated to Boston, too.27
Four days later, as Bill Chase and his supporters awaited his capture, the
Resistance suffered another blow. On May 27, just a week after agreeing to hear Jim
Oestereich’s suit against his Cheyenne, Wyoming, draft board, the United States Supreme
Court ruled seven to one against draft resister David O ’Brien. O’Brien, one o f the four
men beaten on the South Boston courthouse steps in March 1966, had had his lower court
conviction overturned by the First Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that burning
one’s draft card constituted “symbolic” speech and that the 1965 law prohibiting the
destruction o f draft cards violated the First Amendment. The appellate court ruled that
although O ’Brien could be convicted for failure to carry his card, he could not be tried for
burning it. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and overturned the appeal. Chief
Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, argued that when speech (the burning of the
card) and “non-speech” (non-possession o f the card) are combined in the same action,
and the government has a reasonable interest in limiting the non-speech element, then the
“incidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms” is reasonable. To clarify, Warren
wrote:
We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the government: if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest

27 “Can We Keep Our Cool?” editorial, Boston Globe, 24 May 1968, p. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

431
is unrelated to the suppression o f freedom of expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance o f that interest.
The Court, therefore, did not disagree with the lower court’s characterization of a draft
card burning as “symbolic” speech, but found that the Selective Service System had a
substantial interest in “an efficient and easily administered system for raising armies.”
O’Brien undermined that interest, the Court asserted, once he failed to possess his draft
card.28
For draft resisters, the only silver lining in the O’Brien ruling came from the lone
dissenter, Justice William 0. Douglas (Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in
the case), who suggested that the Court order the case to be reargued on the broader issue
o f whether the military draft is permissible at all in the absence of a declaration o f war.
He then asked several rhetorical questions from the bench that stunned the assembled
media: “Is the war in Vietnam a constitutional war? Is it constitutional to have an
‘executive’ war? Is it constitutional to have an ‘executive-declared’ war? Is it not
entirely up to Congress to declare war?” Antiwar activists, of course, wanted answers to
these questions, too.29
Still, Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion offered small solace to draft resistance
activists in Boston. After the promising start of the Talmanson-Chase sanctuary, they
found themselves bloodied by police batons and discouraged by a court system that

28 United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
29 United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968); “Draft Card Burning Upheld As
Crime in 7-1 Court Ruling,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 27 May 1968, p.l.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

432
seemed to favor the government over its citizens. David O’Brien himself suggested that
the Court’s decision in hisxase, combined with the recent conviction of Father Philip
Berrigan and three others in Baltimore (for pouring blood on draft files) and the ongoing
trial o f Dr. Spock, demonstrated that the United States and its courts were “moving
toward an authoritarian state.” Two days after the O’Brien decision came down, Bill
Chase turned himself in to authorities at the federal building in exchange for a promise of
psychiatric tests; it was an anticlimactic end for those hoping to milk the sanctuary for
more publicity. In addition, Resistance leaders put plans for future sanctuaries at the
Arlington Street Church on hold when the church lost its insurance. (It turned out that an
executive from Aetna Insurance witnessed the Talmanson arrest and ensuing commotion
from his window in the Ritz Carlton Hotel and immediately called his office to have them
drop the Arlington Street Church’s $1.4 million in fire insurance and public liability
coverage). All in all, despite frequent mention in the press, the Resistance seemed to
have gone a little flat as more and more members grew disillusioned, unable to plan for
the future existence of the organization. There would be more sanctuaries and new
attempts at anti-draft organizing, but as Ira Arlook later commented, in the swirl of events
that made 1968 such a watershed year, “no one had...a sense o f how to keep [their]
bearings with respect to the war. That was lost for a while.” As an organization, the New
England Resistance slipped almost rudderless into the murky summer waters of 1968/°

30 Arlene Croce, “The Boston Happening,” National Review, 18 Jun 1968, p. 601;
“Chase Gives Up; Promised Mental Aid,” Boston Globe, 30 May 1968, p. 17; “NER
Position Paper,” undated (c. Jan 1969), BTP; Mendelsohn interview, 19 Dec 1997;
Minutes, Special Meeting o f the Prudential Committee, 28 May 1968, ASC Files; George
Whitehouse, interview with Joan Goodwin, 16 May 1994, ASC Oral History Project, p.
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The Spock Trial
As the New England Resistance wrestled with its plans for the future in the late
spring o f 1968, the trial of Dr. Spock, William Sloane Coffin, Michael Ferber, Mitchell
Goodman, and Marcus Raskin took place in the federal courthouse downtown. The trial
put draft resistance on the front pages o f newspapers across the country for three and onehalf weeks, yet, in some ways, it could not have been more irrelevant to the local draft
resistance effort. Certainly, it provided several opportunities for demonstrations and for
sustaining press attention to draft resistance, but ultimately, it did nothing to help the
Resistance rediscover its focus regarding the war. For several reasons, the trial turned
out to be a chore for the defendants and a bore for an antiwar movement that expected
fireworks.
The most persistent criticism o f the trial centered on the strategy o f the defense.
Like almost everyone in the antiwar movement, the five defendants looked forward to the
trial as an opportunity to attack the administration’s conduct o f the war. When the
indictments came down, each man made public comments about putting the war, and thus
the administration, on trial. Ultimately, however, the “Boston Five” (as they became
known through the press) were confounded by the unwieldy conspiracy charge and the
expectation that the judge would limit their attempts to raise larger, legal and moral issues
surrounding the war.
The defendants considered three options. First, they could take a Gandhian

17; Ralph W. Conant, Report o f the Chairman of the Prudential Committee to the Annual
Meeting o f the Corporation,” 12 Jim 1968, ASC Files; Arlook interview, 12 Aug 1998.
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approach. If they were not allowed to address the larger issues o f the war and make their
own charges o f American violation o f the Geneva Accords and American war crimes, or
raise Constitutional issues regarding an undeclared war and the inequities of the draft,
then they would stand mute and take their punishment. This idea resonated most with
Coffin and Ferber. to whom further civil disobedience appealed on both a religious and
practical basis. Not only did taking one’s punishment follow more consistently the
examples o f Socrates, Thoreau, Gandhi, and King, but they believed that the sight o f Dr.
Spock entering prison - handcuffed and in overalls - would prove extremely embarrassing
to the administration. Michael Ferber later recounted that if the court would not allow the
defendants to raise the larger issues o f the war, then he thought the five defendants should
stand mute. “The jury would be instructed to convict, the judge would sentence us, and
we would march off to prison as heroes, with a huge antiwar movement making us into
martyrs. Dr. Spock with his head held high marching into Danbury Prison. I thought it
was great.”31
The second option would have seen the five defendants plead not guilty and then
act as their own lawyers. The press coverage of William Sloane Coffin, veteran and exCIA operative, interrogating government officials about the nature of the war in Vietnam
or o f Dr. Spock questioning government witnesses in his Connecticut Yankee accent
might have amounted to a stunning public relations victory. As Jessica Mitford pointed
out, however, political trials often end with guilty verdicts and the best defendants can

31 Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 76-77; Wells, The War Within, pp. 232233.
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hope for is a solid appeal; letting the defendants defend themselves could only undermine
the appeals process.
Finally, the third option - the one they chose - was to wage a full-scale defense
with a team of lawyers. Although this strategy implied their acceptance of the legitimacy
o f a system that they long ago declared illegitimate, in the end they decided to stand trial.
They embarked upon this course for several reasons. For one, if the government did
indeed plan a “decimation o f the intelligentsia,” as Marc Raskin feared, then the
mounting of a solid defense might delay further onslaughts. In addition, all five men
strongly believed that they were not part of a conspiracy, at least in the ordinary sense of
the word. They barely knew each other after all, and never stood in the same room
together until they met for the first time at the New York apartment o f Leonard Boudin,
Spock’s lawyer. The attorneys also argued that the case would give them the opportunity
to challenge the use of conspiracy law against peace groups, something that appealed to
all of the defendants. Moreover, although they admitted to giving moral and symbolic
support to draft resisters, the Boston Five denied counseling or urging young men to resist
the draft. Thus, because they could not in good conscience plead guilty to charges o f
conspiracy to counsel draft resistance, the Boston Five chose to assemble a team o f
lawyers whom they hoped would beat the government at its own game.32
When the indictments first came down in January, the American Civil Liberties
Union jumped at the chance to represent the Boston Five. Melvin Wulf, the national

32 Joseph Sax, “The Trial,” Michigan Daily, 4 Jun 1968, reprinted in Resist
Newsletter #13 (Jul 1968), p. 4, Box 28, BSP; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 76-77;
Ferber interview, 16 Jun 1998.
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legal director for the ACLU and Jim Oestereich’s lawyer in his Supreme Court case,
described the Spock indictments as “ a major escalation in the administration’s war
against dissent,” and announced that the ACLU would assemble a team of lawyers to
handle the case on a pro bono basis. The organization quickly developed cold feet,
however, and the national board quashed W ulf s plans to help the five indicted men. An
official statement claimed that the case went beyond civil liberties largely because the
organization had hitherto “assumed the draft laws were constitutional.” The Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts (CLUM), the state affiliate of the ACLU, broke ranks
and offered its services to the defendants anyway. When affiliates in New York,
California, and New Jersey also protested, the ACLU held another board meeting on
March 2 and voted to support the defense of the Boston Five with legal and financial
help. In later years, this crisis came to be seen as a critical test for the ACLU - one that it
ultimately passed - but at the time, it hardly mattered to the defense. Lawyers for each of
the defendants had been on the job for weeks and the ACLU’s final resolution of the
matter made little impact.33
The Boston Five, acting individually, chose what turned out to be an eclectic mix
of attorneys to represent them. Some were high profile, nationally-known lawyers, while
others practiced only in Boston and came to the case through the Civil Liberties Union.

33 Jessica Mitford, “The Role of the American Civil Liberties Union in the Case of
the Boston Five,” Appendix 6 in The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 272-274; remarks of Marcus
Raskin at Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union dinner in honor of the 25*h anniversary of
the Spock Trial, 2 Oct 1993, Park Plaza Hotel, Boston (see “Conspiracy! Bill o f Rights
Dinner,” 1993 videotape made of the meeting, copyright Roger Leisner, Radio Free
Maine).
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Marc Raskin, for instance, secured the services o f Telford Taylor, a law professor at
Columbia University best known as the chief American prosecutor in the Nuremberg War
Crimes tribunal. (Taylor, in turn, retained Calvin Bartlett, a 35 year veteran o f the Boston
courts, to work with him.) Dr. Spock hired Leonard Boudin o f the New York firm of
Rabinowitz, Boudin, and Standard, a firm known as much for its left-leaning politics as
for its capable representation. The firm, for example, represented the Cuban government
in all litigation with the American government. In thirty years o f work, Boudin (whom
Jessica Mitford referred to as “a sort o f Clarence Darrow of the appellate bar”)
represented many clients called to testify before the House Un-American Activities
Committee and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s committee investigating suspected
communist subversives. Not long before the Spock case, he successfully took up the case
o f Julian Bond, civil rights leader and state legislator from Georgia, who, because o f his
outspoken opposition to the war in Vietnam, found himself removed from his seat by the
House of Representatives there. The Reverend Coffin, with the help o f Yale law
professor Abe Goldstein, hired James St. Clair, a highly regarded Boston attorney who
had once assisted Joseph Welch as counsel for the Army in the Army-McCarthy hearings
and who would later gain more notoriety as one of Richard Nixon’s attorneys during the
Watergate scandal. The last two defendants. Michael Ferber and Mitchell Goodman,
availed themselves of the services o f William Homans and Edward Barshak, respectively,
both CLUM lawyers with longstanding interest in and experience with civil liberties
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cases.34
Despite the formidable array o f legal talent, the defense ceased to act in unified
fashion once the lawyers took over. Not only did some o f the attorneys lean on their
clients, urging them to refrain from the kind o f public antiwar activity that got them
indicted, but they did not work well together. Each lawyer filed his own motions for his
client and generally kept his trial strategy to himself. As the trial approached, it appeared
that the Boston Five could not even conspire to forge a united defense.35
The failure to conduct a cohesive defense put the defendants at somewhat o f a
disadvantage when confronted with an efficient prosecution. Assistant U.S. Attorney
John Wall, whom one observer described as '"a cross between a fox terrier and a young
bloodhound,” presented the case. Only one other person, Joseph Celia of the Justice
Department, sat next to Wall at the prosecution’s table. Wall grew up in a working-class
family in nearby Lynn. He put himself through Boston College while working nights at a
Lynn tannery, and later went to law school at Columbia University. He joined the
organized crime division o f the Justice Department in 1963 under Attorney General
Robert Kennedy and, while in Washington, completed a Masters degree in labor law at
Georgetown. Although he enjoyed the work in organized crime, he wanted to get more
trial experience, knowing that it could lead to a job in Boston. At the time, Kennedy
oversaw a program in which he sent some young lawyers to the US Attorney’s office in

34 Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 78-84; Ferber interview, 16 Jun 1998;
Coffin interview, 28 Aug 1997.
35 See records of U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, National Archives, Waltham, MA;
Ferber interview, 16 Jun 1998; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, p. 82.
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Washington to get trial experience, and after a year in the program, U.S. Attorney Arthur
Garrity hired Wall in Boston.
From 1964 to 1966, John Wall handled a variety o f cases, primarily focusing on
fraud. But when the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling Selective Service cases left the
office in 1966. Garrity told Wall that he wanted him to take over. Wall protested.
Although he had served as a paratrooper in Korea between college and law school, he
opposed American involvement in Vietnam and sympathized especially with religious
objectors, like Jehovah's Witnesses, to the war. Garrity responded that unless Wall could
tell him that he was morally opposed and could not in good conscience prosecute draft
cases, he would have to take the assignment. Wall could not go that far. He considered
himself a "‘Lyndon Johnson liberal Democrat” and would have preferred that the nation’s
resources be marshaled to “doing good” at home rather than “supporting dictators and
butchers all around the world [simply] because they say they’re anticommunist,” but, “in
those days,” he later recalled, "it never occurred to me that *hey. this [the draft] is morally
wrong.’” He took the appointment to handle draft cases and long before the New England
Resistance rose to prominence, Wall prosecuted John Phillips, David O’Brien, David
Benson, Gary Hicks, David Reed, and Robert Talmanson. All were convicted and sent to
prison/6
In December 1967, John Wall received a call from Attorney General Ramsey
Clark regarding the Spock case. Clark and Wall had worked together over the last several

36 Croce, “The Boston Happening,” National Review, 18 Jun 1968, p. 602; Wall
interview, 26 Jun 1998.
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months as Wall led a Justice Department probe into allegations o f financial misconduct
by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell. After conferring with Paul Markham, the U.S.
Attorney who replaced Arthur Garrity in Boston, Clark tapped Wall tc prosecute the
case.37
In April, at a hearing on pretrial motions, it became immediately clear that John
Wall would benefit from the judge selected for the case. At 85 years o f age, Judge
Francis J. W. Ford’s career spanned the entire century. Ford grew up in South Boston
and worked his way through Harvard, graduating with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in
1904. He served on the Boston City Council under James Michael Curley during and
after the First World War. In 1933, Roosevelt made Ford a federal prosecutor and five
years later appointed him to the bench. Throughout his tenure on the bench, critics
charged that Ford’s experience as U.S. Attorney “left him with at least some noticeable
sympathy for the prosecution’s point of view.” The old jurist interpreted the law with
remarkable consistency over the years. Just as he religiously followed a daily lunchtime
routine that included dining on a hard-boiled egg and an apple followed by a walk, he
never wavered in his belief in the sanctity o f the law. As the Boston Five would soon
learn, when someone broke a law, no matter what the law, motive mattered not a whit to
Judge Ford.38
Moments after taking his seat in the courtroom for the pretrial hearing, Judge Ford

37 Wall interview, 26 Jun 1968.
38 Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, p. 169; “Courthouse’s Squeaky Wheels of
Justice Recalled,” Boston Globe, 23 Aug 1998, p. B4.
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announced that he would not allow the defense to invoke the Nuremberg principles
during the trial. Moreover, he said, debates over the legality o f the war and the draft were
irrelevant to the facts o f the case and would not be permitted. Just like that, with stunning
dispatch, Ford quashed the defendant’s principal hopes for their case. Henceforth, the
entire proceeding could only fall short of the antiwar movement’s expectations. A direct
(or indirect) legal challenge to the administration’s policies in Vietnam would not
happen, at least not in this trial.39
When the first day o f the trial arrived a few weeks later, the defendants, though
they “radiated confidence in the justness of their cause” according to one writer, quickly
found themselves at an even greater disadvantage when they saw the prospective jurors.
O f the 88 people milling about in the corridors outside the courtroom, only five were
women. In a trial in which the most recognizable defendant was a world renowned baby
doctor, the almost complete absence o f women, those most likely to have read Baby and
Child Care, caused Leonard Boudin to protest vociferously. He called the clerk o f the
court to the stand to explain how he selected this unlikely mix of men and women. The
clerk informed the court that he did not follow a formula for random selection but instead
looked up in the air, and put his finger down on the voter registration list. He said he
realized that the result made him “look like a misogynist,” but stood firm that the calling
o f so many men did not occur deliberately. When Coffin’s attorney, James St. Clair
suggested that the clerk might occasionally skip over a woman’s name because the court
generally excused housewives more often than men (thus creating more paperwork),

39 Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, p. 91.
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Judge Ford finally stepped in and ended the questioning. By the time the lawyers finished
with their selections and had expended all o f their challenges, the Boston Five sat across
the courtroom from an all-male jury.40
The government presented its case first. In methodical fashion. John Wall took
the jury through the series of events that the prosecution saw as the framework for the
conspiracy. He described the early October press conference announcing the Call to
Resist Illegitimate Authority. (At one point in this discussion he mentioned Noam
Chomsky, but said that he was “not here today to my knowledge.” When Boudin
objected and pointed out that Chomsky indeed sat at that moment in the courtroom, Wall
responded ominously: “At least he is not sitting in the bar as a defendant [pause] today.)
He showed films of the October 16 draft card tum-in and burning at the Arlington Street
Church, and entered into evidence enlarged photographs o f draft cards collected there.
Wall put John McDonough of the Justice Department on the witness stand to describe the
conveyance o f the draft cards to the Attorney General. The Assistant U.S. Attorney also
presented the fabricoid briefcase, photostats o f the cards, as well as the ashes from one of
the cards (reconstructed by the FBI and secured between two pieces of glass) as
government exhibits. In total, the prosecution scrupulously presented evidence detailing
the overt acts for which the defendants were indicted. O f course, the defendants did not
deny that they committed any of these acts; indeed, they had performed them publicly
with hope o f gaining the government’s attention. Still, they thought, these events hardly
constituted a conspiracy. “The government has bitten off less than it can chew,” one

40 Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 97-99.
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court observer said.41
Indeed, the government failecTto mention the one event that might have been more
fairly characterized as evidence o f a conspiracy. On October 2, 1967, shortly after
holding the press conference that announced the Call to Resist at New York’s Town Hall,
a large group o f the signers of that statement went to the Columbia University Faculty
Club, where they had reserved a room - again, without trying to hide anything. According
to Noam Chomsky, the group held a meeting at which they “worked out the details of
what [the government] would call the conspiracy.” They planned the formation o f their
organization. Resist, and how it would operate. They lined up the key contact people for
the organization around the country and worked out networks of communication. None
of the overt acts listed in the Spock indictment provided evidence of a conspiracy in the
way that this meeting did. Yet, it never came up in the trial.42
Nevertheless, the legal standards for proving the existence of a conspiracy made it
easy to convince the jury in this case. As John Wall eventually explained in his closing
argument, members of a conspiracy do not have to know one another nor does the
conspiracy have to take place in secret. Each member o f a conspiracy merely has to
“have knowledge o f the aims and purposes” o f the conspiracy, and “agree to those aims
and purposes,” he said. At that point, each participant “becomes liable for all future and
past acts” o f the conspiracy. Furthermore, Wall argued, if the government proved that the

41 See transcripts o f U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, National Archives, Waltham,
MA; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 96-134; Daniel Lang, “The Trial of Dr. Spock,”
The New Yorker, 7 Sep 1968, p. 48.
42 Chomsky interview, 20 May 1997.
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Boston Five conspired to commit just one o f the acts with which they were charged, then
that would be sufficient for a guilty verdict; the prosecution did not have to prove that the
defendants conspired to commit all o f the acts listed in the indictment. To better illustrate
his points, Wall dissected the plot o f a popular 1956 film. In director Stanley Kubrick’s
The Killing, actor Sterling Hayden’s character. Johnny Clay, schemes to rob a racetrack.
He recruits several others individually to assist him and, for the most part, tells them only
o f their role in the plan; they do not know about the others that Clay has enlisted. He
hires someone who, posing as a disabled veteran, parks in the parking lot at the track and
shoots the favorite horse in the race as a way of creating a diversion. Likewise, Clay
employs a bartender at the track and another man to get into an argument with one
another and have it escalate into a fight as a second diversion. As the public and the
police scramble to find out what is happening. Clay goes to the window of a teller he has
hired to gain access to the money. He stuffs the cash into a duffle bag and throws it out a
window to a policeman whom he recruited to make the getaway with the loot.4j
Each o f the characters in the film knew that they were involved in a plot to rob the
racetrack and, by participating, approved of the plan. As John Wall explained to the
Spock jury, even though few o f these characters knew each other, all were part of a
conspiracy. Therefore, Wall finally stressed, the jury should regard as irrelevant the
persistent claims of the Boston Five’s lawyers that most of them barely knew each other
and, in some cases, did not meet until after they were indicted. From the government’s

43 “Closing Argument to the Jury by Mr. Wall,” U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1,
transcript of trial, vol. 18, pp. 93, 96,98-100.
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perspective, the actions o f the five defendants met the legal standards for establishing a
conspiracy. All o f them knew that they were involved in a national effort to undermine
the Selective Service System and affirmed it by taking part in the overt acts outlined in
the indictment. Case closed.
When the government rested its case, then, it had established that the defendants
did, indeed, take part in the series o f events culminating in the draft card turn-in at the
Justice Department. As the defense began to present its case, most notably by putting the
defendants on the stand, the prosecution’s objective - consciously or not - seemed to shift
from trying to prove conspiracy to trying to prove that the defendants were guilty o f
urging, convincing, inducing, even pushing draft age men into draft resistance. This
development seemed to catch the defense off-guard, for the indictment did not charge the
Boston Five with the actual acts of counseling, aiding, and abetting draft-age men to
resist the draft; rather, it charged them with conspiracy to counsel, aid, and abet. The
government’s new emphasis suited the cross-examination o f the defendants better than
focusing on the existence o f a conspiracy, which the defendants would only deny and
which the government believed it already proved. As the testimony of several of the
defendants soon demonstrated, the strategy worked.
The Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr. took the stand first and gave the first
clues that the defense would not only be forbidden to address the larger issues important
to the antiwar movement but that the kind o f defense waged would be disappointingly
lawyerly and timid. James S t Clair, Coffin’s attorney, took his client through the events
described by the prosecution as making up the conspiracy and asked Coffin why he took
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part in the October 20 Justice Department demonstration and draft card turn-in. Coffin
replied that first, he wanted to show “moral support,” for the resisters; second, he hoped it
would “force” the government to prosecute him and others for violation of the Selective
Service Act, thus bringing about a trial in which the legality of the war and the draft could
be challenged; and third, he hoped that his presence would help the draft resistance
movement to “win the hearts and minds o f the American people.” But when St. Clair
asked him if he believed the tuming-in o f draft cards would undermine the Selective
Service, he answered “Certainly n o t” “Why not?” asked St. Clair. “Because turning in
o f draft cards speeds up induction....it leads to reclassification.” Defense supporters
squirmed. Did he really believe that? First o f all, no one knew that General Hershey
would order punitive reclassifications and accelerated inductions for those who turned in
their cards until a few weeks after October 20. Second, as Jessica Mitford pointed out,
was the jury “really supposed to think that Mr. Coffin’s purpose in handing over the draft
cards was to clear the way for inducting the registrants into the armed forces,” as St.
Clair’s line of questioning seemed to suggest?44
On the stand. Coffin continued to equivocate and backtrack. He did not appear to
be the same man who earlier suggested standing mute and defiantly marching off to
prison. In the most dramatic example of this, John Wall zeroed in on the power of
Coffin’s oratory to move young men to commit crimes. Wall started by eliciting from
Coffin that he had worn his clerical robe during the October 16 service at Arlington Street

44 U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, transcript o f trial; “Coffin Outlines Protest
Goals,” Boston Globe (Evening edition), 31 May 1968, p. 6; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr.
Spock, p. 139.
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Church and that he had spoken from the pulpit there.
Wall: “Did you consider it at least a partially religious ceremony?
Coffin: Yes.
Wall: And the turning in of draft cards, did you consider that a religious act?
Coffin: In many ways, very religious.
Wall: Were there other skilled speakers?
Coffin: Yes.
Wall: It might even be said that they were moving speakers?
Coffin: That’s correct.
Wall: Did it occur to you that these moving speakers, and particularly you, might
move others with weaker spines to turn in their draft cards?”
Coffin: No.
Wall: It didn’t?
Coffin: It did not.
Wall: It never entered your mind.
Coffin: There might have been an outside chance but their decisions had already
been made.
Wall: Oh. You already knew the decisions had been made.
Coffin: That was my understanding.
Wall: You’re sure that not even one person turned in his draft card because o f the
moving speeches?
Coffin: I said there was an outside chance, but that was not my purpose.
The jury, however, had seen film of Coffin’s speech as well as his other address at the
Justice Department; and if they didn't remember it, Wall reminded them. For example,
on October 20, Coffin told the crowd that the law of the land was clear:
The National Selective Service Act declares that anyone ’who
knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration
or service in the armed forces...shall be liable to imprisonment for not
more than five years or a fine o f ten thousand dollars or both.’
We hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their
refusal to serve in the armed forces as long as the war in Vietnam
continues, and we pledge ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways we
can. This means that if they are now arrested for failing to comply with a
law that violates their consciences, we too must be arrested, for in the sight
o f that law we are now as guilty as they.
Whether or not Coffin intended it, a reasonable person could easily envision a young man
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being inspired to turn in his draft card after hearing such language from a man of his
stature. And Coffin’s response that he never considered the power of his speeches to
move people to resist the draft seemed disingenuous.45
In later years, William Sloane Coffin acknowledged that he walked a fine line
between counseling, aiding and abetting. ‘‘I felt very strongly that I personally had never
counseled,” he reflected, “because I didn’t think it was my role as chaplain at Yale
University to counsel people to turn their draft cards in...For me as a pastor, that would
have been wrong.” Instead, he sought to limit his participation to aiding and abetting
those who had already made up their minds. Still, he admitted, “aiding and abetting is an
indirect form of counseling.” When others saw someone of Coffin’s standing aiding and
abetting others, “the implication is that these guys are the really conscientious ones” and
anyone wanting to be thought o f in that way, would follow suit.46
John Wall thought Coffin made a terrible witness. “He did an awful lot to win my
case for me,” the prosecutor said. Indeed, Wall believed that Coffin could have swung
the case and at least secured a hung jury if only he had maintained his defiance and
pleaded the rightness of his cause. Wall previously witnessed Coffin at his oratorical best
and admired the “musicality and poetry o f his words.” but to his “dismay and
disappointment,” Coffin waged a “lawyer’s defense,” and that, Wall pointed out, “was
not what the movement needed at the time.” If, instead. Coffin had “preached to that jury
and acknowledged legal responsibility...he’d have been magnificent,” Wall later

45 U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, transcript o f trial.
46 Coffin interview, 28 Aug 1997.
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commented. '‘But to get up there and try to weasel...he guaranteed at least his own
conviction.”47
Coffin’s testimony showed the influence o f his lawyer, and soon the entire
defense became regarded as too lawyerly by their supporters and even by the defendants
themselves. As the government relentlessly asserted that the defendants, through their
speeches and actions, were inducing and inciting draft resistance among young men, the
defense responded that they were only stating their opinions, exercising their First
Amendment right of free speech, and offering their support to any man who already
decided to resist. In his closing arguments. Leonard Boudin told the jury that the case
raised questions of “freedom o f speech, of association, of assembly and even of the
freedom o f the press.” Thus, the defendants, all o f whom passionately opposed the war,
and all of whom a reasonable person would expect to be actively working to stop the war
(rather than just talking about it), seemed now to be saying that they were only speaking,
that they really were not doing anything of consequence. It rang hollow to most everyone
in the courtroom. During the trial, William Sloane Coffin told Daniel Lang o f The New
Yorker, “I wanted a trial o f stature. I wanted to test the legality of the war and the
constitutionality of the Selective Service Act. I wanted a trial that might be o f help to
selective conscientious objectors. But this - what is it?”48
Indeed, Mitch Goodman, in particular, gave the impression during his testimony
that the group really had not accomplished many o f its objectives because of

47 Wall interview, 26 Jun 1998.
48 Lang, “The Trial o f Dr. Spock,” p. 53.
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disorganization and miscommunication. He described how Coffin forgot to sign and
forward the letter requesting an October 20th appointment with Ramsey Clark back to
Goodman and told the amusing story about his and Ben Spock’s repeated attempts to get
arrested for civil disobedience at a chaotic demonstration in Manhattan. It became so
laughable that Michael Ferber at one point during the trial wrote a note and passed it
down the table to his fellow defendants: *‘The defendant Ferber makes a motion for
severance on the grounds of incompetence on the part of his co-conspirators who, the
testimony has shown, were unable, despite their best efforts, to conspire, combine,
confederate, or agree to do anything, and in general could not organize their way out of a
paper bag.”49
These lighter moments and a general air of support helped to sustain the
defendants through more than three weeks of testimony. Certainly, Boston’s new
reputation as the center of the draft resistance universe (thanks to the trial, the sanctuary,
the O’Brien decision, and a draft board raid at Boston's Customs House - all o f happened
in the same three week period) buoyed the defendants, too. Probably more than anyone,
Michael Ferber enjoyed going to court every day. Years later he recalled his daily routine
to an historian:
Every weekday morning during the trial I would just put on my coat and
tie, walk out my door...wind my way through Beacon Hill, come down
through the Boston Common, go by my lawyer’s house, and the two o f us
would march over to the Federal Court a few blocks away. He knew
everybody, because he was an old Boston Brahmin, and I ended up
knowing everybody because my picture was in the paper and I had all

49 U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, transcript of trial; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr.
Spock, p. 150.
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these people coming up and saying, 'Congratulations.' So I felt more like a
citizen of Boston, like someone who really belongs in the city. I felt like
this was Athens: this was a real city-state, a public, and I was...exercising
my political rights. I loved that feeling...
A considerable amount o f socializing also took place both at and away from the
courthouse during the trial. The defendants ate lunch with reporters or friends almost
every day. One afternoon, William Sloane Coffin’s mother arrived (she came to the trial
every day) with a huge picnic basket, which she laid out at the end of an empty corridor
so that the defendants could enjoy it in peace. In addition, John Kenneth Galbraith, the
Harvard economist, held a cocktail party at his home during the trial that attracted many
people associated with the antiwar movement. During the party, Jessica Mitford, then
working on a book about the trial, approached Mitch Goodman and a few other people
and, looking around the room, said, “My dears, isn’t it lovely? Just like a cruise.” So,
despite the disappointing course of the trial itself, the community of support that seemed
to grow out of it cheered the defendants’ spirits.50
Ultimately, however, the trial could only disappoint. Not only did Judge Ford
completely prohibit the defense from putting the war and the administration on trial, but
the defendants’ secondary goal of taking their message to a wider public likewise fell flat.
Although the judge allowed the defendants to testify as to their “state of mind” at the time
they took part in their draft resistance activities (as distinct from their motives), very little

50 Wells, The War Within, p. 233; Ferber interview, 16 Jun 1998; Mitchell
Goodman, remarks made at the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union dinner in honor of
the 25th anniversary o f the Spock Trial, 2 Oct 1993, Park Plaza Hotel, Boston (see
“Conspiracy! Bill o f Rights Dinner,” 1993 videotape made o f the meeting, copyright
Roger Leisner, Radio Free Maine).
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o f it filtered through the media to the general public; only those who carefully combed
their daily newspaper for such details could get beyond the government-fostered image of
older men manipulating younger ones to break the law. Finally, for much o f the antiwar
movement, a defense predicated on claiming First Amendment freedoms seemed to
minimize the importance of civil disobedience and of increasing the coefficient of friction
until the war ended. The jury seemed to sense it, too. With the exception o f Michael
Ferber and especially Dr. Spock, the defense strategy created the impression that the
defendants were putting aside their principles just to get off.
John Wall highlighted this contradiction in his closing arguments. On the one
hand, he seemed to hold Spock in high esteem, telling the jury that “the defendant Spock
on the stand was a man who appeared to be telling the truth, appeared to be hiding
nothing...I submit on the evidence that the man convicted himself on the stand - that’s for
you to decide.” Wall later added that “if Dr. Spock goes down in this case, he goes down
like a man, with dignity, worthy of respect.” At the same time, however, the prosecutor
charged that ‘‘there [were] others in this case, other defendants, who didn’t appear to be
so candid.” He reminded the jury that in December 1967, Coffin appeared on the
television news show Contact, and told the anchor that if a prosecutor asked him if he
aided and abetted these people in turning in their cards, Coffin said, “Yes, I did.” This
differed sharply from the response to a similar question during the trial.51
In closing arguments, the defense attorneys remained generally satisfied to press
the free speech line, though the two CLUM lawyers attempted to make larger points. Ed

51 U.S. v. Coffin, e ta l, CR-68-1, transcript of trial, vol. 18, pp. 108-109,113, 118.
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Barshak reminded the jury of the ongoing war in Vietnam, noting that its existence had
been present in the “atmosphere o f this courtroom” throughout the trial. And although
the judge would not allow discussion o f the legality or morality o f the war and the draft,
Barshak asked the jurors to judge the conduct o f the defendants against the context of the
war and the divisions it created in American society. Bill Homans, after attempting to
portray his client, Michael Ferber, as unacquainted with his co-defendants and absent
from many o f the events described by the prosecution, finished his closing argument by
raising the issue o f individual morality and its place in a civil society. “Few are willing to
brave the disapproval o f their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath o f their
society,” he said. “Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great
intelligence. Yet it is the one essential vital quality o f those who seek to change a world
that yields most painfully to change.” He urged the jury to find Ferber not guilty.52
On June 14,1968, the jury returned its verdict. After seven hours o f deliberation,
the 12 male jurors found William Sloane Coffin, Benjamin Spock, Mitchell Goodman
and Michael Ferber guilty of all charges except counseling draft age men to tum-in their
draft cards. At the same time, they acquitted Marcus Raskin, whom they suggested had
been only minimally involved in the events outlined in the indictment. (Certainly, the
propensity of Justice Department officials and the prosecution to confuse Raskin with
Arthur Waskow, his partner at the Institute for Policy Studies, helped Raskin’s case). On
the whole, the convictions of the other defendants surprised few in the movement. No

52 U.S. v. Coffin, et al, CR-68-1, transcript o f trial; Mitford, The Trial o f Dr.
Spock, pp. 182-184.
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one really expected them to be acquitted. Defendants in political trials rarely win;
therefore, the four convicted men pledged to forge ahead with a lengthy appeal process.
Meanwhile, Judge Ford scheduled the four convicted men for sentencing on July 10.53
Soon after the trial ended, Judge Ford called John Wall and Paul Markham to his
chambers to discuss sentencing. Ford told the two prosecutors that he wanted to be sure
that the Justice Department intended to recommend prison sentences for the convicted
men. He did not say why, but made it clear that suspended sentences would not be
acceptable in this case. Wall informed the judge that he planned to meet with Ramsey
Clark on the matter. According to Wall, Ford said, "Well, if he’s not going to
recommend time, I don’t want to hear anything from you [at the sentencing].” Wall
assured Ford that he would personally convey the judge’s view to the Attorney General.54
In general, John Wall and Paul Markham agreed that the defendants should get
some prison time. If the convicted men received no punishment for their crimes, they
thought, then what did it all mean? What was the point o f the trial? Wall and Markham
were almost certainly representative of the most Justice Department officials in holding
these views, but not everyone agreed.
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, for one, encouraged Ramsey Clark to act with
restraint. In a letter dated July 2. 1968, Griswold told Clark that he had now won all the
he could win from the Spock case. More important, he wrote, “from now on...you can

53“Spock, 3 Others Guilty; 1 Acquitted,” Boston Globe, 15 Jun 1968, p. 1;
“Mistaken Identity for Raskin?” Boston Globe, 15 Jun 1968, p. 3; Mitford, The Trial o f
Dr. Spock, pp. 196-206.
54Wall interview, 26 Jun 1968.
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only lose.”
You can lose a little by playing it too soft. You can lose a great
deal, I think, by being too severe. This is a very delicate area, and there
are large sections o f the public who are much concerned and troubled.
It is clear that the defendants have broken the law. It is equally
clear that they did it, rightly or wrongly, for reasons o f conscience, - and
that conscience has a great hold on Americans, for reasons rooted in our
history and tradition.
If the defendants are treated as common criminals, many persons
will rally to their support. More important than that, though, as I see it, is
the fact that this would be neither wise nor just. Officers of the
government must uphold the law. But they need not do it with a heavy
hand. What is called for in this situation, I think, is a firm but gentle
pressure. If the officers of the government act with restraint, there is hope
of restraint on the other side...
Advice like this coming from a legal scholar o f Griswold’s stature carried considerable
weight with an attorney general who shared his sensibilities.55
As with the original decision to bring an indictment against the Boston Five,
Ramsey Clark possessed a more complex view of the Spock Trial than anyone else in the
Justice Department. Griswold may have been one o f only a few who understood the
attorney general’s position. As the highest ranking law enforcement officer in the land.
Clark believed (in spite of his own doubts about the war and the draft) that Selective
Service laws had to be upheld. The Spock Trial did that. Punishment, though, stood as a
separate issue and Clark maintained that the government and the law “should act with
extreme sensitivity” in deciding it, “not with vengeance or harshness.” He felt strongly
about this, particularly in cases in which the defendants “acted from moral conviction.”
In a 1998 interview, Clark compared the Spock Trial to the hearings then being held by

55 Memo to Ramsey Clark from Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, 2 Jul 1968,
Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 123, LBJL.
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. “Whether right or wrong,
[the Spock defendants] acted from concern for others,” he said. “A just or decent law
doesn’t punish people for that.” Instead, Clark explained, like South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the courts should “insist on accountability” and reveal the
truth. After that, he said, “you don’t seek vindictive punishment, you seek
reconciliation.” In the Spock Trial, Clark explained, “the conviction vindicated the
law....[but] this country ought to be greater and stronger than to feel you send somebody
like that to prison. They not only weren’t a threat to us in any way, they were our hope.”56
In a 2 Zz hour meeting in Washington before the sentencing, Ramsey Clark
explained his philosophy on punishment in the Spock case to John Wall and Paul
Markham. He asked Wall to recommend suspended sentences to Judge Ford and even
offered to talk to the judge himself if Wall preferred. But Wall accepted the assignment
and when he returned to Boston he delivered the news to the judge. Before Wall could
even finish telling Ford that the Department would recommend suspended sentences, the
judge bellowed “I don’t want to hear anything from anybody!” Clark also sent a letter to
Judge Ford asking him to hand down suspended sentences, but when the sentencing date
arrived, Ford would not accept and the government did not make a formal sentencing
recommendation.57
On July 10, 1968, Judge Ford sentenced the four convicted members of the

56 Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998; Clark interview, 29 April 1998. Note: Clark
mentions the South Africa example in the 6 Jan 1998 interview.
57 Wall interview, 26 Jun 1998; Clark interview, 6 Jan 1998.
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Boston Five to two years in prison. In addition, he fined the three older men $5,000 each.
When Ford fined Michael Ferber $1,000, the youngest defendant quipped that he received
the “student discount.” Before passing sentence, Judge Ford allowed the defense lawyers
and their clients to make one last statement. Each of the attorneys recommended
suspended sentences, again inconsistent with original Resistance notions of filling the
jails. When given the opportunity to speak, both Dr. Spock and the Reverend Coffin
declined. Mitch Goodman expressed his concern for young people who not only lived
with the Vietnam War every day. but who also faced the prospect that “all life on earth
may be extinguished” by nuclear war. Then one o f those young people, Michael Ferber,
went to the lawyer's lectem and made a brief, defiant statement: “Your Honor, I have
nothing to say that might mitigate my punishment,” he said. “I only wish to point out that
I have been part o f no conspiracy, but rather I have been part of a movement, a movement
led by my generation.” The movement, Ferber explained, originated in his generation’s
“horror and disgust” at some of the things carried out by their government at home and
abroad. He further criticized those in the government who decided that the movement,
which was “created out o f love for what our country might be,” now could be
characterized as criminal. “I cannot leave the movement,” he declared as he finished. “I
will remain working in it. I have no regrets.”58
By July 1968, the movement in which Michael Ferber pledged to continue
working no longer existed in its original form. Since the April 3rd draft card tum-in on

58 “Spock, 3 Others Sentenced to 2 Years,” Boston Globe (Evening Edition), pp. 1,
3; Mitford, the Trial o f Dr. Spock, pp. 208-209.
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Boston Common, external events and conditions beyond their control overtook the draft
resistance movement. The personal risk-taking that characterized draft resistance in its
earliest stages receded as the movement turned in new directions. Over the summer a
new pattern o f activism began to develop that emphasized education over individual risk
taking. Rather than adopting a strategy o f direct action to combat racism, for instance, the
New England Resistance satisfied itself with incorporating the issue into its written and
spoken rhetoric. The Boston Five likewise chose a defense strategy aimed at educating
the public about the war in Vietnam rather than adopting a more militant approach that,
though it surely would have landed them in prison, would have done more to embarrass
the Johnson administration. Instead o f reinforcing the central tenets of draft resistance,
the defendants, thanks largely to their legal advisors, lost sight o f those tenets. Finally,
the new sanctuary movement created a sense of personal risk but only for the men taking
asylum. Police beatings notwithstanding, sanctuary supporters risked little; instead, their
presence served primarily to attract the press and, in turn, introduce the public to the sight
of GIs and antiwar activists collaborating to protest against the war. These were long
term strategies now, each with a hint of revolutionary possibility. Activists worked not
simply for a draft resistance organization in Boston, but for a worldwide student
movement.
The new directions that the New England Resistance took were not unwelcome
or seen as an admission o f failure. Certainly, there were some who disapproved o f
abandoning more radical, confrontational tactics. On July 10, shortly after the Spock
Trial sentencing, David Dellinger, and antiwar leader and himself a draft resister during
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World War II, spoke on the Boston Common. He urged Resistance supporters to stay
militant because he feared that if antiwar and antidraft sentiment grew too soft, it would
no longer be a deterrent to American policy makers. On the other hand, those who
continued to be active with the New England Resistance were excited about the new
directions o f the movement. After all, how long could one expect the press to cover
repeated draft card tum-ins? The movement needed a fresh approach. Outreach to GIs
and high school students soon became top priorities; the building of a mass movement
designed to fill the jails with America’s middle class sons, bog down the court system,
and impair the draft soon became a memory. As a result, the New England Resistance
dwindled from an organization claiming more than 500 members to one made up of no
more than 20 full-time activists. The new organizing required fewer people to carry it
out.
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CHAPTER DC

BEYOND DRAFT RESISTANCE: NEW STRATEGIES AND LOOSE ENDS

He has honor if he holds himself to an ideal o f conduct though it is
inconvenient, unprofitable, or dangerous to do so.
Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals, 1929
Twelve days after Judge Ford passed sentence on the Spock defendants and David
Dellinger voiced concern about the withering antiwar challenge to the administration,
another rally demonstrated that, in Boston at least, Dellinger’s fears were misplaced. Far
from growing complacent, leaders o f the New England Resistance and other groups with
whom they were allied made it obvious that they were only growing more militant. Many
now spoke o f “revolution.”
Ostensibly, the Monday, July 22. 1968, demonstration on the Boston Common
had been organized as a forum for Eldridge Cleaver, the Black Panther leader and
presidential candidate of the Peace and Freedom Party. But Bill Hunt, the longtime
BDRG and New England Resistance leader, used his time at the rostrum to ruminate on
the revolutionary potential of draft resistance. “The draft resistance movement,” Hunt
argued, “means the beginning o f what may become a white revolutionary left in this
country.” The convictions of Spock, Goodman, Coffin, and Ferber, he said, could be
taken as “a measure of the threat we pose to the system.” This threat and the movement
Hunt envisioned were in their embryonic stages, however. As he stood side by side with
several Black Panthers, members o f what he called “the one authentic revolutionary force
in America,” Hunt acknowledged that the “galactic” distance between the Panthers and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

461
the Resistance in terms o f “dedication and risk”:
When you hand in your draft card - to take the most radical action
performed by the white left so far - you face five years in jail. But the
members o f your local draft board don’t jump in unmarked patrol cars,
armed to the teeth with the latest in western genocidal technology, and lay
in ambush for you. The Oakland pigs do exactly that to the Black
Panthers.
True enough. White draft resisters - and they were mostly white - did not face the same
kind o f physical threat that black revolutionaries encountered. But Hunt saw in draft
resistance the potential for developing a white revolutionary movement because it
constituted an organized effort to fight a system through which draft age men were
“channeled, coerced, and brutalized.” More broadly, he said, that brutalization also came
in the form o f the “banality and mental torment” of most people's daily lives. As long as
“the System” proved successful in getting whites to focus their “aggression” on blacks,
hippies, and “commies” in Vietnam. Hunt asserted, then no one would notice that they
were “suffocating to death at home.”1
In Boston, on the other hand. Hunt pointed to “a new climate of insurgency”
growing out of three forces: the draft resistance movement, the defense of resisters in
sanctuary, and a new development, “the defense o f free speech on the Common.” In
recent weeks, Boston, like San Francisco the year before, experienced an unprecedented
influx o f young people, most o f whom spent all o f their time on the Boston Common.
The press called them “hippies,” and the name seemed to fit. Indeed, the young people
called themselves the “hip community;” they gathered on the Common, smoked pot, and

1“Resistance and the Panthers,” The Resistance, undated (c. 15 Aug 1968), p. 7,
RCP.
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listened to the music o f Jimi Hendrix, the Jefferson Airplane, and the Grateful Dead
(among others). And they did not do 'much else, except to make the residents o f nearby
Beacon Hill and the Back Bay uncomfortable.
In response to the hippie presence, the city instituted a midnight curfew on the
Common, and over the weekend o f 20 - 21 July, the Boston Police Department launched
several raids on the hip community there. They arrested 83 people, all of whom came
before Muncipal Court judge Elijah Adlow on Monday morning, 22 July. Adlow openly
scorned the hippies as menaces to the city. “To look at these people,” he sneered, “you’d
think the fence fell down around the insane asylum.” He accused them of turning the
Common into a “festering sore,” and asked rhetorically, “Is our beautiful Boston going to
become a disaster area?” Despite his contempt for them personally, the judge gave
probation to 44 of the defendants (whose cases were adjudicated in small groups) and
declared six to be not guilty o f the charges against them. He fined the remaining “hippies”
$20 each.2
Several of those arrested and sentenced by the Judge were leading figures in the
New England Resistance. When the police round-up started on Saturday, the Resistance
treated it as another manifestation o f illegitimate authority in action, and staged a sit-in.
This demonstration signaled a new willingness or propensity on the part o f the Resistance
leadership to tackle issues outside their traditional scope of protest. Thus, just as the
escalating war and the draft had created an urgency among draft resisters to challenge the

2 “Hippies Draw Fines for Defying Curfew,” Boston Globe (Evening), 22 Jul
1968, p. 3; “Judge Chastises, Penalizes Hippies,” Boston Globe, 23 Jul 1968, p. 1.
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administration nine months before, the Spock trial verdicts, the recent assassinations,
police and military attacks on student protesters around the world, and the ongoing war
drove the New England Resistance to expand their mission.
Bill Hunt’s speech about the white revolutionary left, therefore, characterized the
hippies’ challenge to the curfew as part o f the growing “climate of insurgency” started by
the draft resistance movement. More important, however, Hunt suggested that the
crackdown by Boston Police and Judge Adlow (whom he called “Pig Adlow”) amounted
to political repression. “The Man” sees the new climate o f insurgency, Hunt charged,
and he plans to put a stop to it... We ail know what it means when a
government declares a curfew. We’ve seen it used in every black
rebellion, and we’ve seen it imposed in Saigon. It means denying the
streets to the people, tightening up on the small space people have to
organize and fight for social change.
He urged his audience to resist the curfew. The Constitution, Hunt said, provides for free
assembly. “We’re going to tell Mayor [Kevin] White and Pig Adlow - tonight, tomorrow,
for as long as it takes - that if we can’t have free assembly, then there's going to be no
peaceable assembly in Boston, Massachusetts.” The targets of resistance thus widened
from a narrow focus on the Selective Service and the Johnson administration to all
authority - including local authority - deemed illegitimate.3
This rhetoric - the talk o f revolution, identification with the Black Panthers,
calling police officers and a judge “pigs” - echoed some of the points made in the
Resistance “manifesto” printed in late May, but it expressed a new militancy. Staughton

3 “Resistance and the Panthers,” The Resistance (newspaper), undated (c. 15 Aug
1968), p. 7, RCP.
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Lynd, the radical historian and one o f the leading intellectual supporters of the
Resistance, later lamented this shift. Hunt’s praise for the Black Panthers and use o f the
word “pigs” in reference to the police, signaled a “change from the thoughtworld o f
October 16. 1967, after which the New England Resistance had thanked the Boston police
for being different from Berkeley’s.” Years later, Bill Hunt characterized his
inflammatory rhetoric as a product o f a very depressing time for the antiwar movement.

The highest profile opponents of the war were either being killed (Martin Luther King,
Jr., Robert Kennedy) or given prison sentences (Spock, Coffin, Goodman, and Ferber).
Despite Eugene McCarthy’s early strength in the Democratic primaries, the party seemed
poised to give the nomination to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Indeed, rumors
circulated that Lyndon Johnson still planned to secure the nomination through a “draft
Johnson” campaign that would exploit the instability o f the party at the coming
convention in Chicago. Moreover, student protests were being defeated around the world
and, even in Boston, students had clashed with police at the first sanctuary. According to
Hunt, “We ail went through a fairly apocalyptic phase, and I remember saying things on
the Boston Common that I wish I hadn’t said (I don’t think they had any great lasting
effect), but I thought, you know, we just really need a revolution.”4
This chapter argues that the moral clarity that had for so long fueled the urgency and impatience - of the draft resistance movement now pushed it in new directions and,
ultimately, away from targeting the draft altogether. New England Resistance organizers
never wavered in their com m itm ent to end the war, but they did grow frustrated that all o f

4 Lynd and Ferber, The Resistance, pp. 224-225.
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their hard work had not had much effect. The draft card turn-in strategy o f October 16
anticipated immediate prosecutions and convictions of draft resisters, but the Justice
Department subverted that plan by pursuing only a handful o f “ringleaders” while waiting
for the rank-and-file draft resisters to refuse induction after being reclassified by their
local draft boards. Meanwhile, American troop strength in Vietnam remained at peak
levels, and thousands of Americans and Vietnamese continued to die.
The exasperation that accompanied this realization fused with the accumulating
sense of rage that Resistance leaders felt in the wake of the seemingly relentless flow of
shocking events - assassinations, riots, and crushed student rebellions - that punctuated
1968. Consequently, the New England Resistance leadership altered the organization’s
approach, and to some extent, broadened its mission. First, the group expanded its
opposition to the war and the adm inistration to a more general critique o f the fundamental
structure o f American society. The literature they produced now attacked American
“imperialism” and “capitalism” more stridently than ever before. The war, in turn,
became a symptom o f much deeper social problems. Second, to confront these larger
issues, the Resistance sought to enlarge its constituency. They began new programs, the
largest of which were aimed at helping disgruntled American servicemen find alternatives
to service in Vietnam and informing high school students about the war and the draft.
Open resistance to the draft no longer possessed much strategic value. Instead, these new
measures followed a more typical New Left example of community organizing.
As the New England Resistance turned its attention to other tactics, the
organization shrank in size. A core group o f about 20 activists worked full-time on their
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new projects. And although each new sanctuary organized by the Resistance required
hundreds of bodies to be successful, most rank-and-file resisters stopped participating in
regular work at the Resistance office. When a federal grand jury began handing down
indictments on draft resisters at the end o f the summer, the vast majority of men who
turned in their cards over the previous twelve months, for a variety o f reasons, went
unprosecuted. Those whom prosecutors did indict received little support from the New
England Resistance, and a new organization called SUPPORT stepped in to make up for
this absence. As 1969 dawned, organized draft resistance no longer existed in Boston,
and the organization most associated with it faded from public view.
So. You Sav You Want a Revolution
By the time the Spock sentences were announced, a sense o f frustration permeated
the New England Resistance office. The trial of the Boston Five had proved especially
disappointing and anticlimactic. A growing militancy hung in the air. Bob Shapiro, the
MIT student who turned in his draft card after Martin Luther King’s assassination, began
working steadily in the Resistance office just as this shift in atmosphere occurred. Years
later, he recalled that by the time he joined the organization that summer, many of his
colleagues there “termed themselves ‘revolutionaries’ and not just draft resisters.” This
change occurred, he said, because “we just felt like we were banging our heads against
the wall.” Neil Goldberg, an October 16 resister and a draft counselor at Boston
University confirmed this in a July 1968 interview. “I now consider myself to be a ftdlfledged revolutionary instead o f just a radical,” he said. “As a radical I felt that it was
possible to move the conscience o f the country... [but] nothing we can do seems capable
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o f stopping Johnson. It’s not going to stop through moral protest.” Therefore, Goldberg
asserted, “the only way change can occur is by changing the structure” o f American
society.5
The intellectual context for the New England Resistance thus changed over the
summer as the group reached a general consensus on the necessity o f revolution. Jim
Oestereich, the seminarian who had been moved to tears when he returned his draft card
on October 16 exemplified this shift in perspective. In an August 1968 article in The
Resistance, Oestereich wrote admiringly o f the Black Panthers and noted that “white
radicals” faced “the difficult job o f moving from symbolic and token protests to
organizing the revolution.” To achieve this metamorphosis, the Resistance must, he

argued somewhat vaguely, “totally organize against the oppressive institutions of this
society,” and move the country “toward a complete transformation o f the American
economy and political system.” Ten months earlier, Oestereich could scarcely have
imagined making such a statement, but now, as the prospects for peace continued to
prove illusory, wholesale change seemed the only answer.6
On the one hand, Goldberg’s and Oestereich's analyses betrayed a disappointment
with the mass of their fellow citizens who had not been moved by the example o f draft
resisters to rise up in opposition to the war. But the two resisters also did not hold the
rest of America responsible, individually or personally, for this failure. Instead of

5 Shapiro interview, 13 Aug 1997; Larry Berren, et al, “The Resistor,”
unpublished paper, undated (c. July 1968), MKFP.
6 Jim Oestereich, “The Black Panthers, P.F.P., and the Movement, The
Resistance, undated (c. 15 Aug 1968), p. 7, RCP.
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charging their fellow citizens - and especially fellow citizens opposed to the war - with

possessing inadequate moral standards, Goldberg and Oestereich blamed “the system” for
numbing the sensibilities o f most Americans. Under a more just economic and political
system, they seemed to contend, the American people would have immediately
recognized the Vietnam War as immoral and illegal, and quickly demanded its end. The
American consumer-capitalist system, however, had alienated so many that the
Resistance message got through to proportionately few ordinary people. “Everywhere we
find people,” Goldberg noted, “who find their lives meaningless, even those who work in
the middle class...this is because they have been exploited.” As a result, the Resistance
would have to go to the heart o f the problem and overthrow “the system” responsible for
this exploitation and alienation.7
As the Democratic National Convention loomed in the not-too-distant future, and
as antiwar organizers from across the country planned to descend on Chicago to protest
against the war during the convention, some in the New England Resistance saw in the
convention an opportunity to press this point. On the eve o f the convention, Joel
Kugelmass wrote an article in The Resistance in which he celebrated two popular radical
slogans: “Let the People Decide,” and “The Streets Belong to the People.” For
Kugelmass, the time to “live by those slogans” had arrived. Specifically, he wrote, “it is
time to take to the streets and start making decisions.” Chicago, he predicted, ‘Will be a

7 Berren, et al, “The Resistor”; Oestereich, “The Black Panthers, P.F.P., and the
Movement.”
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mess, but it will be a beginning.”8
Most antiwar activists who went to Chicago did not expect their confrontation
with the party in power to lead to a restructuring o f American society, much less a
revolution. Despite Abbie Hoffman’s and Jerry Rubin’s widely publicized threats to
dump LSD in the city’s water supply and carry out other stunts with their fellow Yippies
(short for Youth International Party), the overwhelming majority of protesters came
simply to demonstrate against the Democratic Party which appeared poised to nominate
Lyndon Johnson’s vice president, Hubert Humphrey, for president. Many of them
supported Eugene McCarthy’s candidacy and, thus, could in no way be considered
revolutionaries.
Although a few members o f the New England Resistance went to Chicago, most
stayed home. Regardless, the chaos of the Chicago police riots shocked everyone in the
organization. As a parallel drama unfolded in Prague, Czechoslovakia, with Soviet tanks
crushing a student-led democratic uprising, millions o f Americans witnessed the Chicago
police use what Connecticut Senator Abe Ribicoff referred to as “Gestapo tactics” on
young people in the streets outside the convention center. As Bill Hunt and Rosemary
Poole watched the beatings o f unarmed antiwar protesters on television in Boston, they
sank into a state of despair. Poole mused about catching the next plane to Chicago,
strapping dynamite to her body, and destroying the biggest building she could find.
“People were just boiling with rage,” Hunt later remembered. And that, he said, was “not

8 Joel Kugelmass, “Electoral Politics: The Art o f Retaining Power,” The
Resistance, undated (c. 15 Aug 1968, p. 5, RCP.
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the best mood” for making political decisions.9
By the fall, a year after the first draft card turn-in at the Arlington Street Church,
the frustration and anger that the Resistance leadership felt fueled a reassessment of the
organization’* goals and strategies. At an 18 October 1968 general membership meeting,

the leadership presented a statement o f theory, strategy, and organization. In some ways,
it echoed the “manifesto” produced in May, but it went further:
The Resistance should immediately and clearly state that American
society is characterized by institutions that are under the sovereign control
of a corporative ruling class; that its economic system, capitalism, is
exploitative; that the government of the U.S. is by nature oppressive and
that its policy o f containing communism and promoting foreign
investment is economically, diplomatically, and militarily imperialistic.
The Resistance should claim as its object nothing less than a total
transformation of this society that will leave every remaining institution in
the collective control of those whose lives depend on it.10
With this statement, there could be no doubt that the New England Resistance now
openly identified itself with a socialist, if not anarchist, solution to not only ending the
war but altering the fundamental economic and political structure o f American society.
As Dan Tilton, an older resister and office IWW historian, wrote around the same time:
“It is time for the Resistance to state clearly that not only is capitalism insane, but more
importantly that socialism is the only possible alternative.”" Much had changed in a
year.

9 Hunt interview, 31 Oct 1997.
10“Proposed Basic Theory, Strategy and Organization for the New England
Resistance,” paper presented at NER general membership meeting, 18 Oct 1968, BTP.
" Dan Tilton, “Socialism and Human Freedom,” The Resistance, Oct 1968, p. 8,
RCP.
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Even so. all of this talk o f revolution did not translate easily into practice. As this
intellectual shift took place over the sum m er, the New England Resistance engaged in
numerous new projects beyond draft resistance, but none could be seriously characterized
as revolutionary. On the one hand, demonstrations grew more radical and strident The
Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia in August provoked intense protests on the Common,
and the appearance of Hubert Humphrey led to a “Dump the Hump” rally at Downtown
Crossing and a clash with Boston police at the Statler Hilton. Through events such as
these, the Resistance continued to make its presence known and continued to confront the
public with the Vietnam War, but it did not materially move Boston or America closer to
revolution.
Discussion o f overthrowing the existing structure of American society,
consequently, added up to little more than what historian Terry Anderson has termed the
“rhetorical revolution.” '2 The Resistance newspaper, newly revamped over the summer,
reflected this tension between rhetoric and action. In an explanatory editorial, one
unnamed writer wrote of the organization’s realization that a “fundamental restructuring
o f American society” would be needed to overcome American imperialism and racism.
“Only through revolution can we end the manipulation and distortion of our lives,” he
wrote. “Only through revolution can we hope to realize the possibilities for human
freedom latent in the advanced state of American technology.” He then turned his
attention to more practical matters, saying one major task for revolutionaries is the
“elevation of consciousness,” presumably their own and that of others. As a result, the

12Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, p. 202.
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New England Resistance now sought to “engage in other programs as well as draft
resistance which reveal the illegitimacy o f the authority over us and build a spirit o f
unified struggle.”13
Hippies and High Schoolers
At the start, the group moved to elevate the consciousness of their own members
and supporters. In early July, they started the Resistance Free School as a way to promote
open investigation o f a variety of topics. The Free School offered an alternative to the
usual university education which, they argued, “cultivated] individuals who consider
Establishment needs over and above human needs.” Most courses were taught seminar
style, and revolved around common readings, with meetings often held at the house or
apartment o f the instructor (often a Resistance leader). Some of the courses offered
focused on lighter topics such as "Conversational French,” “Rock and Jazz Drumming,”
and “Woodwork and Cabinet Making,” but most addressed contemporary issues or
political theory; these courses included “American Labor History,” “Origins o f Radical
Thought,” “Comparative Revolutionary Development,” “Hippies and the New Left,” “the
Writings and Theories o f Herbert Marcuse,” '‘the Media and the Movement,” and “Black
Nationalism, White Racism, and Black Power,” and others. Most of these courses did not
last through the summer, and some met only once or twice before folding, but the notion
o f a free school that challenged prevailing assumptions about education exemplified the

13“Multi-Issue,” The Resistance, undated, (c. !5 Aug 1968), p. 2, RCP.
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new Resistance goal o f rebelling against the basic structure o f American society.14
Into this climate stepped the “hip community” on Boston Common. Traditionally,
most antiwar activists held hippies in contempt: rather than challenging American
society, hippies seemed to be “dropping out” of society all together. As two BDRG
activists said, they regarded hippies as “hopelessly individualistic” and as “people who
didn’t work.” Moreover, the hippie lifestyle, especially the use of drugs, made them easy
targets for government repression. Nevertheless, the Boston Common curfew issue
brought the New England Resistance into an alliance with the hip community. On one
level, they were attracted to the Common confrontation because of the free assembly
issue at stake, but on another level, the hippies appeared to be a step ahead of the draft
resistance com m unity in rebelling against the fundamental structure of American society.
To typical New Left charges that hippies were counter-revolutionary because they would
not “get off their asses,” Neil Robertson, one of the Resistance leaders arrested during the
police sweeps of the Common, offered a defense: “The hippie is, de facto, leading a
different life, a life that is resulting in increasing worry among the merchants of Charles
Street, and the residents o f Beacon Hill.” To those residents o f Boston's finest
neighborhoods, “the hippie is a threat,” Robertson argued. “He ain’t buying and he ain’t
producing.” In short, the hip community rejected everything about mainstream

14 New England Resistance letter re: the Free School, undated (c. Early Jul 1968),
MKFP; Mary Fenstermacher, “Transcendance: NER Free School,” The Resistance,
undated (c. 15 Aug 1968), p. 8, RCP; Joel Kugelmass, “Free School,” Boston Free Press,
undated (c. 11 Jul 1968), p. 12, RCP; Olene and Dan Tilton interview, 16 Jun 1997.
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America.15
The leading spokesman of the' Common’s hip community, Ben Morea, made the
Resistance-hippie alliance even easier to understand. Morea came to Boston from New
York as a member o f the Lower East Side collective. Up Against the Wall, Motherfucker.
The name came from a line in a LeRoi Jones poem (the following line is: “This is a stickup”), and the group represented an unusual hybrid o f anarchist political theory and
countercultural direct action programs. As Todd Gitlin notes, the Motherfuckers
organized as an “affinity group,” a cultural and political representation of what society
would look like after the revolution. They were hippies, but they were also
revolutionaries. In Boston, Morea told reporters, “The existence o f our community
represents both an alternative to the present system and a means for its destruction.” The
hip community, he said, “rejects old middle-class values, especially that of the consumer
life,” while simultaneously making possible “a fuller and more complete life.” This kind
o f rhetoric dovetailed well with the New England Resistance’s own arguments for
overthrowing existing society, thus facilitating an partnership between the two groups.
As Morea concluded, “we feel that the existence of the hip community itself is fighting
the Establishment.” 16
The relationship with the hip community soon became a burden to the Resistance,

15 Wright interview, Aug 1997: Hector interview, 1997; Neil Robertson, “Hippies
and the New Left,” The Resistance, undated (c. 15 Aug 1968), p. 6, RCP.
16 Todd Giltin, The Sixties: Years o f Hope, Days o f Rage, revised ed., (New York:
Bantam, 1993), pp. 238-241; “Up Against the Wall, Mother Fucker,” Boston Free Press,
8th Edition, undated (c. 1 Aug 1968), p. 7, AJP.
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however. First, the situation simply seemed unmanageable. Hundreds o f hippies wound
up sleeping in the basement o f the Arlington Street Church every night, and dozens of
others turned the Resistance office on Stanhope Street into a “crash pad.” As Neil
Robertson eventually realized, “it was a mistake to try to organize hippies” who generally
eschewed any kind of organization. Worse than that, the situation grew violent when a
group of toughs beat up several o f the Motherfuckers on the Common. During the fracas,
someone stabbed a Vietnam veteran who had joined the fight against the hippies. Police
arrested Ben Morea for the stabbing and preparations for his court case quickly
overshadowed the ongoing confrontation over the Common curfew. When the Resistance
held a press conference for Morea to refute the charges, a full contingent o f Boston
reporters covered it, but the next day, not one story on the subject appeared in the papers
or on television. Ultimately, for the Resistance, the hippies on the Common became a
distraction that lasted much o f the summer. “We just kind o f got swept up in it,” Bob
Shapiro later said, and soon found themselves wishing the situation would just go away.17
In addition to the Resistance Free School and the Resistance-hippie alliance, the
New England Resistance expanded its programs into some of Boston’s suburbs over the
summer. Small groups o f Resistance activists fanned out to nearby towns such as
Malden, Watertown, Newton and Belmont, as well as to those in outlying areas like
Lexington, Concord, Hingham and Attleboro, aiming to elevate the consciousness of
young men and women who lived there. The quality and success o f these programs

17 Ed Harris, interview with Eugene Navias, 27 Oct 1994, ASC Oral History
Project, ASC Archives; Barrie Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” p. 83, Robertson interview,
7 Aug 1998; Shapiro interview, 13 Aug 1997.
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varied from place to place, and few o f them left any record o f their work. The Concord
project is the exception to this generalization. There, in a town which boasted o f its
Revolutionary heritage and its association with Henry David Thoreau, a group o f three
activists formed the Concord Area Resistance Summer (CARS), a local organization that
quickly grew to about 50 active local members.
From the start, CARS distinguished itself from the larger, more brazen Boston
organization that spawned it. Rather than focusing on demonstrations or draft card turnins, it took a more methodical approach to educating the community of young people in
Concord about the war and the draft. On one level, organizers said, they sought to “make
people remember the war, no matter how hard they are trying to forget it.” 18 At the same
time, however, CARS hoped to achieve much more. They envisioned a three point
progression that began with raising the consciousness o f individual young people in the
community. This, they hoped, would lead to the elevation of a community consciousness
(the second point), that would provide the foundation for a “lasting and viable
organization within the community, oriented towards change through direct action” (the
third point).19
If they ultimately sought to create a community organization that practiced direct
action, CARS itself relied on other means to carry out its program. Aside from one

18 “CARS Mechanics,” newsletter #2, undated (c. 20 Jul 1968), BTP. Note:
Indeed, the issue o f complacency regarding the war faced most peace organizations as the
entered the summer of 1968; Lyndon Johnson’s announcement that he would not seek reelection created in many Americans a false sense that the war’s end would come soon.
19 “Concord-Summer, 1968,” newsletter, undated (c. Jun 1968), BTP.
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protest staged outside the Concord draft board offices toward the end of the summer, the
group avoided demonstrations. As Susan Starr, a Concord resident who became a CARS
mainstay, later remarked, “you don’t demonstrate in the suburbs; people don’t like i t ”
Instead, CARS did a lot of leafleting, and canvassing - looking for young men classified
1-A or high school men about to register for the draft. To these men, CARS offered draft
counseling services. Many o f the Concord residents who joined CARS came from the
local Quaker meeting house, and therefore from a tradition o f draft counseling. In
addition, CARS adopted the Boston Draft Resistance Group’s of taking counseling to
pre-inductees via the Early Morning Show. They also hosted a dance and several poetry
readings, staged some guerrilla theater, and held regular Monday night dinners at the
Friends’ meeting house. Finally, like the New England Resistance, CARS began its own
Free School. They offered five courses, all of which were open to anyone who wanted to
attend: The Draft - It’s Organization and Functions; The Tragedy Called Vietnam;
Aesthetic Critiques of America; The Urban Scene; and Afro-American History and White
Racism. This wider array o f programs aimed to reach as many people as possible.20
On the whole, however, CARS did not receive a warm reception in Concord or in
the surrounding towns. Local police frequently harassed them, including at least one
arrest for distributing leaflets at a supermarket. The suburbs, it seems, were places where
most people did not expect to be confronted with information about the Vietnam War,
and when they encountered CARS activists, it annoyed many of them. One woman

20 Susan Starr, interview with author, 4 Aug 1997; “Concord Area Resistance
Summer Activities,” in “Concord-Summer, 1968,” BTP; “CARS Mechanics,” vol. I, no.
4, undated (c. Jul 1968), BTP
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complained to police that a spontaneous guerrilla theater performance - in this case a play
based on the lyrics to the Fugs’ song, “Kill for Peace” - spoiled her picnic by the historic
Old North Bridge. At times, supermarket customers reacted with hostility to leafleters,
and on more than one occasion, groups of high school students threatened CARS activists
with their fists. At the end of the summer, the organization lamented that it had not
reached more than approximately 300 young people outside the group. They could take
solace in knowing that they had radicalized a core group o f local youth who had
gravitated to CARS over the summer and who would take their politics with them to
college in the fall. Furthermore, it appeared in September that a lasting community
antiwar organization would take the place o f CARS.21
CARS and the other suburban groups did set themselves apart from other similar
organisations in its reliance on an overwhelmingly female membership. Five years after

Betty Friedan articulated the grievances of millions of American women alienated within
their roles as “homemakers,” most women in affluent suburbs such as Concord continued
to fill that role or, at most, held part-time jobs. Just as nineteenth century middle-class
women participated in voluntary associations and women’s clubs then, some middle-class
women in the greater Boston area joined antiwar organizations like CARS. Although
they did most o f the “shit-work” that their female counterparts in the New England
Resistance and BDRG did, women in CARS actually took on more obvious leadership
roles as well. Susan Starr, for example, edited and wrote much of the monthly newsletter,

21 “CARS Mechanics,” vol. 1, no. 4, BTP; “CARS Mechanics,” vol. 1, no. 5,
undated (c. Sep 1968), BTP; Starr interview, 4 Aug 1997.
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CARS Mechanics, and another women, Beth Navon. came to Concord as one of the three
original organizers and exercised considerable influence within the CARS leadership.22
At the end o f the summer, despite the mixed success of the suburban programs,
the New England Resistance decided to make high school outreach and organizing one o f
its top priorities. Several factors instigated this new approach. First, over the summer,
dozens of high school students from Boston and surrounding towns had called and
stopped by the New England Resistance looking for information on the draft. In many
cases Resistance staffers sent these people to BDRG for counseling, but the numbers
made an impression. Second, the suburban programs had uncovered enough alienation
among students to warrant continued action on this front. Third, and most important,
Resistance leaders believed something had to be done to “offset the oppressive public
education system.” Here, in keeping with their revolutionary aims o f restructuring
American society, the Resistance attacked high schools as “instrument[s] o f social
channeling, devoted not to the development o f individual creativity, but to
standardization.” To challenge the “inculcation o f discipline and conformity” imposed on
students in Bay State high schools, the Resistance resolved to take its antiwar and
revolutionary messages to young people in these schools. By year's end, the New
England Resistance operated high school organizing projects in several Boston schools
and in more than 20 suburbs.23

22 Starr interview, 4 Aug 1997; “CARS Mechanics,” vol. 1, nos. 2 ,4 , & 5, BTP.
23 “The Resistance: Audacious System to Beat the System,” Boston Globe 2 Jul
1968; NER Newsletter, Jan 1969, MKFP; Arlook interview, 12 Aug 1998.
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The high school program s initiated in the fall met with more success than their
summer antecedents in large part because o f a change in tactics conceived by Ira Arlook.
Rather than raising the issues o f the war and social channeling to high school students
through multiple programs. Arlook narrowed the focus to one tactic: bringing Vietnam
veterans into the high schools to speak with students as part of an "'anti-recruitment
program.” Since the first sanctuaries o f May and June, the New England Resistance had
been steadily establishing good relations with Vietnam veterans who returned to the
United States and began working, individually and collectively, against the war.
Although historians typically treat the GI and veteran antiwar movement in isolation from
its civilian counterpart, the draft resistance movement, through its sanctuary organizing
and this high school program, effectively formed a partnership between the two groups.
Without the veterans, it is highly unlikely that school administrators would have granted
permission to Resistance organizers enter their facilities and talk with students. These
same administrators, however, generally proved eager to arrange student audiences for
veterans. Therefore, Arlook encountered little resistance in his efforts to organize
assemblies at which a veteran would speak with students about his experiences in
Vietnam. Frequently, these discussions would take place after Arlook played a U.S.
Government propaganda film such as “Why Vietnam?” or “Your Tour in Vietnam” for
the students; the veteran would then describe how his experience differed from the film
portrayals.24

24 NER Newsletter, Jan 1969, MKFP; NER Newsletter, Feb - Mar 1969, MKFP;
Arlook interview, 12 Aug 1998.
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Once the Resistance had established “a little beachhead” in a high school,
Arlook and others continued to help sympathetic students reach out to their classmates
through additional events and often by starting an “underground” newspaper in the
school. Although there is no way to measure the effectiveness of the Resistance’s high
school organizing, Arlook and others believed they were at least successful in offsetting
the work o f the armed services recruiters, and more salient, they were certain that they
were educating students about the oppressive nature o f not only their high schools and the
draft, but o f American society in general. Eventually, in the spring and summer o f 1969.
Arlook and others came to regard this kind o f work as so important that they moved into
some of these communities to do full-time school and neighborhood organizing. By then,
the New England Resistance had abandoned all draft resistance efforts, and internal
divisions had rendered the organization defunct, but the connections with veterans and
high school students had provided a solid base for organizing in new directions.25
The GI Alliance
At the same time that the New England Resistance turned its attention to high
school organizing, the group’s work with GIs and veterans blossomed into a sanctuary
movement that continued to gamer headlines for the organization and, more important,
laid the foundation for a new GI support program. It is puzzling that historians have
virtually ignored the sanctuary movement and given only cursory treatment to the alliance
formed between civilian and GI antiwar activists. Perhaps it has been too easy to accept
the stories that portray returning soldiers as mistreated by civilian opponents of the war;

25 Arlook interview, 12 Aug 1998; Robertson interview, 24 Aug 1997.
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images of long-haired protesters spitting on Vietnam veterans or calling them “baby
killers” endure in the American consciousness despite a lack o f documentation to support
their veracity.26 And certainly there is plenty o f evidence that many American
servicemen, some even opposed to the war, regarded the largely middle-class, studentled, antiwar movement with contempt.27 In any case, the GI and veteran antiwar
movement is typically treated in isolation from the civilian movement, as if the two did
not, could not, cooperate. But they did. Long before the United States Serviceman Fund
and GIs United Against the War were founded, and even longer before Vietnam Veterans
Against the War rose to prominence, the draft resistance movement established strong
relations with servicemen and veterans. The Resistance benefitted from the moral
authority that a soldier brought to the antiwar movement, and the GIs and veterans
profited from the organizational skills o f the civilians.
After the first sanctuary at the Arlington Street Church in late May 1968, enlisted
men “came out of the woodwork,” looking for help from the New England Resistance. In
June, Resistance activists organized sanctuaries in churches in Providence, Rhode Island,
and Wellesley, Massachusetts, both o f which ended with authorities dragging their quarry
over blockades of supporters. In early August, the Friends’ Meeting House in Cambridge
granted asylum to another GI who remained there more than two weeks before the

26 The image o f antiwar protesters spitting on returning veterans has recently been
challenged persuasively in Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the
Legacy o f Vietnam (New York: New York University Press, 1998). Lembcke, a Vietnam
veteran and a sociologist at Holy Cross argues that not one single instance o f an antiwar
protester spitting on a veteran has ever been convincingly documented.
27 See Appy, pp. 223-224,298-299, 301-306.
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authorities came to get him. Sanctuary soon swelled into a movement even beyond New
England. By mid-summer draft resistance groups and other antiwar organizations hosted
sanctuaries in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and California. Resistance organizers
quickly recognized the value o f sanctuary in reaching a new constituency: enlisted men.28
This new interest in the plight o f American GIs represented a significant shift in
Resistance attitudes toward military men. The draft resistance movement (and, indeed,
the antiwar movement in general) had long assumed that anyone strongly opposed to the
Vietnam War would never enter the m ilitary. As Nan Stone later noted in a speech she
gave on numerous occasions, however, it eventually became obvious to members of the
Resistance that young men enlisted or submitted to the draft for many reasons, “most of
which have nothing to do with agreement with U.S. foreign policy.” Specifically, Stone
said, the Resistance learned that servicemen usually narrowed their enlistment decision
down to one of four motives. Many men feared that being drafted would leave them with
no choice regarding the branch o f service in which they would serve; recruiters promised
“choice, not chance” if one enlisted before being drafted. Some men, especially those
from poorer families, enlisted as a step toward economic advancement. And others were
attracted by recruiting campaigns that promised opportunities to learn specific vocational
skills and to see the world. American society, finally, indoctrinated so many men,
especially working-class men, with expectations that they should join the service as a way
to leam loyalty, courage, and citizenship. Organizations such as the Boy Scouts (who

28 Resist Newsletters, 29 Jul 1968 and 27 Aug 1968, Spock Papers, Series II, Box
28; “Support Your American Way of Life,” WIN 1 Oct 1968, p. 11, AJP.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

484
taught military-like discipline), and the American Legion (a veterans organization which
gave out annual citizenship awards to'young men), Stone argued, fostered this sense of
obligation in many young men.29
It took Bill Chase, the AWOL soldier to whom the Arlington Street Church
granted sanctuary, to get the Resistance to think about soldiers differently. Chase, who
had served in Vietnam for nine months, described the war and military service in ways
that few civilians could. Resistance activists soon developed a new appreciation for GIs
and their own channeling experience, and likewise began to understand the options
available to working-class men in a new light. That draft resisters had suffered the
antagonism o f many working-class men now did not seem so unreasonable; the privileges
that came with being a middle-class college student included insulation from the kind of
physical harm that working-class soldiers in Vietnam faced every day. Even if a GI
opposed the war, he sometimes could not tolerate college students protesting against a
war about which they knew so little. Sanctuary and other outreach to GIs, therefore,
fostered a new understanding - and eventually an alliance - between civilian and military
dissenters.30
By the fall of 1968, sanctuary and GI outreach became the most prominent
antiwar work done by the New England Resistance. Sanctuary had strategic value in that

29 Nan Stone, “GI Support Speech,” undated, Nan Stone papers, copy in author’s
files.
30 Stone, “GI Support Speech;” For an interesting discussion o f the various
factors contributing to GI resentment o f antiwar protesters, see Appy, Working-Class
War, pp. 299-306.
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it continued to attract media and public attention to the war and also to American
servicemen who opposed it. In addition, Resistance activists hoped that sanctuaries
would attract some of the high school students the organization was trying to organize at
the same time. Moreover, Resistance organizers believed that the GIs who took sanctuary
would actually be helped by it once apprehended by authorities; the attention garnered
with each sanctuary; they reasoned would prevent the military from railroading the
deserters into the stockade. When they did wind up in the stockade, Resistance activists
visited them regularly and tried to arrange legal and financial assistance. Most important,
sanctuary preserved the confrontational nature o f Resistance opposition to the war. A
showdown with authorities ended each sanctuary, but Resisters hoped that the specter of
U.S. marshals, FBI agents, or military police apprehending an American serviceman amid
a crowd o f nonviolent, peaceful demonstrators would affect public opinion.
Although every sanctuary held in the Boston area and across the country over the
summer took place in a church, the New England Resistance entered the fall hoping to
extend the reach of sanctuary into more secular institutions. Three sanctuaries - at
Harvard, Boston University, and MIT - grabbed the public’s attention and brought
hundreds o f people into contact with the Resistance for the first time.
On September 22, Marine Corporal Paul Olimpieri, 21 years old and twice
wounded in Vietnam, took sanctuary in the Andover Hall Chapel at Harvard Divinity
School. It was the first time that a college or university had offered sanctuary to an
American serviceman. In comments to the media, the seminarians, several of whom were
members o f the New England Resistance, noted that although they were part o f an
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academic community, they had little to teach about their civilization “to a man who has
already experienced some of the worst our society has produced.” Instead, they
concluded, “we have a great deal to leam from him.”31
More important however, the sanctuary organizers, reflecting the Resistance’s
more recent critique of the America system, described Olimpieri’s sanctuary not simply
as an act o f protest against the war, but as a challenge to an oppressive society. “We
know that divinity schools are open to the privileged few who qualify, and closed to
others,” they wrote in a press release. “Today, in opening this chapel to a man oppressed
by a militarist society, we are looking forward to a day when privilege no longer closes its
doors to the oppressed.” Likewise, in a separate statement, the New England Resistance
described Olimpieri’s sanctuary in the context o f a new alliance between “those forces
struggling to create a society in which men can be free.” Both draft resisters and GIs like
Olimpieri were “completely opposed to subjugation and bondage.” Consequently, they
said, “we mean to seize and maintain control of our lives and the use to which they are
put.”32
For his part, Paul Olimpieri limited his criticism to the military and to the war.
The son and younger brother of Marines, he had grown up in Fairfield, Connecticut.
After graduating from Andrew Ward High School in June 1965, Olimpieri apprenticed in
a nearby machine tool factory. He also played the drums in a local rock-and-roll band

31 Harvard Divinity School Press Release, 22 Sep 1968, MKFP.
32 Harvard Divinity School Press Release, 22 Sep 1968; NER press release, 22
Sep 1968, MKFP.
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and hoped to forge a career as a professional musician. By April 1966, however, with the
threat of the draft hanging over him, Olimpieri enlisted in the Marine Corps. Six months
later he landed in Da Nang. On the first day of his sanctuary at Harvard, he told reporters
that he believed he had been “brainwashed” on the “use o f physical torture” in boot camp.
And by the rime he left for Vietnam, he “couldn’t wait to see action.” “I considered
myself a superhero,” he said, “ready to free a country that was threatened by a Communist
takeover.” When he arrived in Vietnam, however, he decided that the “South Vietnamese
Army [was] a joke” and that most South Vietnamese civilians did not want American
forces there. After suffering wounds to his chest, arm, and ear in two separate firefights.
Olimpieri found himself in a military hospital with “plenty o f time to brood.” Although

his country thanked Him for his pains with two Purple Hearts, he soon turned against the
war.33
Stationed temporarily at Quonset Naval Air Station in Rhode Island, Olimpieri
had read about the earlier sanctuaries in Boston and Providence. Sometime after going
AWOL on August 30, he decided to contact the New England Resistance who provided
preliminary legal advice before referring him to a lawyer. After consulting with the

attorney, Olimpieri persisted in choosing to make his protest publicly, and the resisters at
Harvard Divinity School soon won the privilege of granting him sanctuary. By the time
they took him in, Olimpieri had begun to adopt a new appearance, sporting a month’s
worth of new dark hair with a matching thin moustache and goatee. He wore sandals

33 “Marine Seeks Sanctuary at Harvard Divinity,” Boston Globe 23 Sep 1968, p.
1; “Harvard Silent on Sanctuary,” Boston Globe, 24 Sep 1968, p.l; “Marine Explains
Why He Dropped Out,” Boston Globe, 24 Sep 1968, p. 7.
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with an oiivd-drab Marine jacket (to which he cheerfully pinned an Omega button). On
the day he arrived in Cambridge, he figured the authorities would wait until he became
classified officially as a deserter on September 30 before arresting him.34
A decorated war hero like Olimpieri brought a certain moral authority to the draft
resistance movement that those who had not seen combat could not provide. The
seminarians publicly thanked him for seeking sanctuary with them. Harvey Cox, the
venerated theologian, told reporters that the sanctuary “thrilled” him. “I’m grateful to
Paul for giving us something to rejoice about,” he said. Olimpieri’s stories captivated his
supporters. With each conversation, they learned more about the realities o f fighting in
Vietnam and about the realities facing working-class men faced with few alternatives to
the draft. Equally important, however, Olimpieri condemned the war and the Marines.
He described a Marine Corps run by “lifers who are sadistic, sick people who couldn’t
make it on the outside.” Moreover, he criticized the American presence in Vietnam. “I
don’t think we have the right to decide which form of government the Vietnamese should
have,” he said on the first day of his sanctuary. “I feel if they don't want communism,
they can win without our help like we won our revolutionary war.” By claiming
sanctuary, Olimpieri concluded, he sought '‘to tell other military personnel and civilians
what is really going on” in the Marines and in Vietnam. “I’m not a coward (I was
awarded two Purple Hearts), but I still believe the military and the war are bad.”35

34 “Marine Explains Why He Dropped Out,” Boston Globe, 24 Sep 1968, p. 7.
35 “Marine Seeks Sanctuary at Harvard Divinity,” Boston Globe, 23 Sep 1968, p.
I; Harvard Divinity School Press Release, 22 Sep 1968, MKFP.
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Perhaps comments such as these led military authorities to grab Olimpieri before
he attained deserter status. In the quickest end to a sanctuary to date, Military Police
entered Andover Hall at 5:55 a.m. on Tuesday, September 24 (less than 48 hours after
Olimpieri arrived) and, aided by Harvard police, entered the chapel. Divinity School
Dean Krister Stendahl, also on hand, accepted the arrest warrant. The MPs found
Olimpieri in a small second floor room behind the organ. He was chained to his wife,
Lynn, and six seminarians, but the MPs came prepared. They produced a pair o f bolt
cutters, cut the chain, and carried him out. A piece o f chain dangled from his leg as he
left. Olimpieri spent the day at the Charlestown Navy Yard and anticipated a transfer
back to Quonset.36
Then a most remarkable thing happened. Olimpieri renounced the seminarians at
Harvard and the New England Resistance. On Tuesday evening, little more than twelve
hours after being arrested, Paul Olimpieri stepped out onto the freshly cut lawn in front of
the Marine barracks at the Charlestown Navy Yard, and held a press conference for print
and television reporters. Flanked by his wife, his brother, and a new attorney, Olimpieri
appeared nervous. Instead o f the moustache and goatee, his face was clean shaven. One
could practically see the starch in his pressed khaki uniform, and on his breast hung two
Purple Heart medals. The sandals and the Omega button he wore that morning were
gone. His hands trembled as he read a prepared statement. ‘"After careful consideration
o f my actions in the last few days, I consider them to be a mistake." he said. He claimed

36 “Military Seize AWOL Marine in Harvard Divinity Chapel,” Boston Globe
(Evening Edition), 24 Sep 1968, p. 1; “Police Arrest Olimpieri Who Condemns
Students,” Harvard Crimson 25 Sep 1968, p. 1.
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that he had been “used by various groups to publicize their political goals, whatever they
may be.” Upon reflection, he no longer wanted to be associated with those groups. “I am
just beginning to realize that things can be done through the proper channels,” he
concluded. “I found this out the hard way, and I hope that other servicemen will leam
from my mistake.”37
In a community which had grown used to watching resisters and supporters march
off to jail defiant and unrepentant, Olimpieri’s change o f heart came as a shock. Few
believed it conveyed his true feelings. “Paul would never say anything like this,” one
Resistance spokesman said. “The Marines obviously used some sort of coercion.” The
New England Resistance immediately issued a statement denying the charge that they had
somehow used Olimpieri for their own ends. “We presented him the offer of sanctuary at
the Harvard Divinity School and he readily accepted.” The group also noted that they had
tried to talk Olimpieri out o f sanctuary and claimed that “he was well aware of the risks.”
But Olimpieri told reporters that he - not the Marines - called the press conference and
wrote his statement. The Resistance simply could not resolve the old Paul Olimpieri with
the new one. He refused to see his Resistance attorney and any communication with the
organization. It was a terrible setback.38
The surprising end to the Harvard sanctuary exposed some shortcomings o f the
sanctuary strategy. Unlike draft card tum-ins in which a large number of people assumed

37 “Sanctuary Marine Says He’s All Wrong,” Boston Globe, 25 Sep 1968, p. 1.
38 “Police Arrest Olimpieri, Who Condemns Students,” Harvard Crimson, 25 Sep
1968, p. 1. Note: To date, I have been unable to locate Paul Olimpieri to get his side of
the story.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

491
an equal amount o f risk, sanctuaries placed most o f the risk on the man or men taking
asylum from the military. No one expected the authorities to ignore such open defiance
o f the law, and although members o f the Resistance community attempted nonviolently to
block the inevitable arrest, the man who took sanctuary faced the punishment alone. In
addition, in spite o f hopes that the public nature o f sanctuary would somehow protect the
arrested man from unfair treatment by the military, once the police took him away, he
became virtually inaccessible. Sanctuary continued to promote public confrontation with
the government but not on the same scale as draft resistance did earlier.
These failings notwithstanding, several more sanctuaries - usually prompted by an
individual serviceman seeking an alliance with the Resistance - took place in the fall o f
1968. Just one week after the Harvard sanctuary ended, a new one started across the
Charles River at Boston University. It started with the Committee of Concern for
Vietnam, a small group o f students in the BU School of Theology led by Alex Jack, Bob
Winget, and George Collis. On October 2, at the usual daily service in Marsh Chapel, the
congregation o f approximately 100 people sang “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God,” a hymn
that one commentator called “Martin Luther’s anthem o f spiritual patriotism.” The CCV
then announced that it had offered sanctuary to two servicemen: Ray Kroll, an 18 year-old
Army private, AWOL from Fort Benning, Georgia since July; and Private Thomas Pratt,
a 22 year-old Marine more recently AWOL from Quonset Naval Air Station, and a friend
o f Paul Olimpieri. Both Kroll and Pratt had sought out the New England Resistance after
seeing publicity from earlier sanctuaries. The Resistance, in turn, put them in touch with
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the CCV.39
With the Harvard sanctuary fresh in their minds, the New England Resistance did
their best to demonstrate that they were not manipulating these two soldiers. On the first
day o f the sanctuary, Ray Kroll, a soft-spoken young man o f slight build - and also
sporting a freshly cultivated moustache - told reporters that he went looking for the New
England Resistance only after he came to the decision that he “could not take part in the
armed forces without going against [his] moral convictions.” “I would like to make it
quite clear,” Kroll continued, “that the Resistance and the School o f Theology are not
using me in any way for anybody’s gain except mine.” In addition, Thomas Pratt, a
clean-cut, all-American looking Marine from Norwalk, Connecticut, said, “I chose
sanctuary so I could make a stand, so I could tell people how the servicemen feel about
the war.” He knew the risks, he said. “I am ready to face the consequences.”40
But like his friend Paul Olimpieri, Pratt soon changed his mind. At the end o f the
first day in Marsh Chapel, during which the number of students “protecting” Kroll and
Pratt had not yet reached 100, Pratt left with his parents. He claimed to be “disenchanted
with the circus setting,” and said that he had only wanted to make a protest against the
war. Two days later, in the custody of the Marines again, Pratt held a press conference
similar to Olimpieri’s. He said that he realized he had been “inexperienced and naive” in
his thoughts and actions. He also accused the Resistance of exploiting him. “I feel I was

39 “Marsh Chapel Held as Draft Sanctuary,” BUNews, 2 Oct 1968, pp. 3, 9; “20
Sympathizers Protect Awol Soldier in Sanctuary at B.U.,” Boston Globe (Evening
Edition), 2 Oct 1968, p. 5.
40 “Marsh Chapel Held as Draft Sanctuary,” BU News, 2 Oct 1968, pp. 3,9.
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used by the Resistance for their own purposes and gains,” he said. “I have been on
unauthorized absence status and expect to face the consequences o f my action,” he
concluded. “I sincerely hope the Marine Corps will give me another chance.”41
Members of the New England Resistance now began to suspect that they were
being played for fools. That two Marines - indeed two friends - both stationed at Quonset
Naval Air Station, took sanctuary separately only to attack the people who had helped
them smacked of betrayal at best and intentional sabotage at worst. Ray Kroll, who
remained at Marsh Chapel, lashed out at Pratt and Olimpieri. “I have little doubt in my
mind that both Paul Olimpieri and Thomas Pratt were plants,” he told reporters. He
suggested that the military sent the two to infiltrate the Resistance as agents
provocateurs.*1
Some still believed that the Marines had coerced the two men into recanting their
previous statements, but in the tense atmosphere of the time, few doubted that the
government might try to subvert their efforts by planting informants in the organization.
An informal game called “Who’s the fed?” developed around this time, especially among
the inner circle of long-time activists in the New England Resistance. Barrie Thome, a
Ph.D. candidate in the Brandeis sociology department and a member of both the Boston
Draft Resistance Group and the Resistance, recalls the day when she heard about the

41 “20 Sympathizers Protect AWOL soldier in Sanctuary at B.U.,” Boston Globe,
2 Oct 1968, p. 5; “Marsh Chapel Held as Draft Sanctuary,” BU News, 2 Oct 1968, pp. 3,
9; “Marine Recants Statements Made During BU Sanctuary,” Boston Globe, 5 Oct 1968,
p. 21.
42 “Marine Recants Statements Made During BU Sanctuary,” Boston Globe, 5 Oct
1968, p. 21.
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game and realized no one ever played it in front o f her. Most people knew that she was
writing her doctoral dissertation on the draft resistance movement, but in suspicious
times, some apparently viewed her graduate work as a perfect front for an informant. She
frequently conducted casual interviews with draft resisters and supporters, gathered
leaflets and other written materials, and always took field notes. Alex Jack confirmed
that he had heard people speak o f her in this way. And even Thome acknowledged that
it sometimes looked bad. At one point, she got into the habit of sneaking off to write her
notes in private. One night as she and several others finalized the production of the
Resistance newspaper, she went to the bathroom and scribbled notes as she sat on the
toilet. When someone opened the door accidentally, she later recalled, it was the
“quintessential moment o f shame and discovery.” She had been caught, she said,
“literally with my pants down!”43
Fears of government penetration of the Resistance did not, however, slow the
momentum of the BU sanctuary which was beginning to shape up as the largest to date.
The crowd of supporters steadily grew each day from fewer than 100 to more than 1,300
as expectations of Ray Kroll’s arrest heightened. Like the Arlington Street Church
sanctuary, the gathering took on a life of it’s own. Howard Zinn later characterized it as
an “ongoing free speech exercise...sort of like a 24 hour-a-day teach-in.” At an open
microphone, clergy gave sermons; resisters, academics, and anyone who wanted to, spoke
to the crowd. The Resistance showed films about the war, and several bands played
music at night. In the basement, approximately 20 doctors and residents, and six nurses

43 Thome interview, 28 Oct 1997.
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staffed a makeshift medical center. Zinn brought one o f his Government classes to the
chapel and led them in a discussion o f “making a public symbolic declaration o f
resistance to the war, and the inadequacy o f normal political procedure.” Although at
least one disturbance broke out in the balcony o f the chapel one night (several men
claiming to be Vietnam veterans tore up prayer books and showered the sleeping students
with debris and epithets), the sanctuary gathered momentum with each passing day. At
one point, an optimistic Zinn commented to a reporter that if the sanctuary continued to
be successful, and “if people continue to appear seeking sanctuary,” then the BU
sanctuary “may be permanent.”44
In the end, however, the FBI had other ideas. At 5:30 in the morning on Sunday,
October 6, sanctuary supporters sleeping on the floor and in the pews awoke to a voice
shouting, “This is the FBI. We will give you 15 seconds to clear the aisle.” The time
limit expired quickly as the students turned to see 120 federal agents streaming into the
chapel. As the first agent walked down the aisle, he turned to the others behind him and
noted that the students were not resisting their presence; the agents would not have to
move them, he suggested. A wave o f agents started down the aisle, picking up students
anyway. Sam Karp of the Resistance went to the microphone and told everyone to
remain seated and silent. “Remember our commitment to nonviolence,” he said to the
crowd. “Stay limp. This is their way.” Slowly, the agents moved through the crowd,

44 “Marsh Chapel Held as Draft Sanctuary,” BU News, 2 Oct 1968, pp. 3, 9; “20
Sympathizers Protect AWOL Soldier in Sanctuary at B.U., Boston Globe (Evening
Edition), 2 Oct 1968, p. 5; “B.U. Sanctuary Continues for Soldier,” Boston Globe, 3 Oct
1968, p. 3; “500 Keep B.U. Vigil Awaiting GI Arrest,” Boston Globe (Evening Edition), 4
Oct 1968, p. 2; Zinn interview, 6 Jul 1998.
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placing and sometimes tossing students into the pews. The sanctuary participants
remained nonviolent. “N o one in that place lifted a finger to resist them,” Joann Ruskin.
a BU junior said immediately after the raid. “It was the most beautiful thing.”
If the FBI agents were not rough with the crowd in the chapel, they were not as
kind to BU television crew or Ray Kroll. After clearing a path through the sanctuary,
several agents ran to the room where WBTU was filming the action, smashed open the
door, and destroyed the film. Another group of agents found their way to the room where
Kroll and about ten others had spent the night on cots. “Where is Ray Kroll?” they
demanded. Someone asked for a warrant. “Is Ray Kroll here?” the agents asked again.
Kroll identified himself and again asked for a warrant. “Don’t worry about that,” an
agent responded. Three agents grabbed him and tried to lift him to his feet as he went
limp. “Walk,” one o f them shouted. “Get up and walk, damn you. Walk you bastard.”
One witness said one agent yanked back on Kroll's hair as another pushed his head in the
opposite direction. Photographs on the front page of the Boston Globe and B U News the
next day show four FBI agents, all middle-aged wearing coats and ties, whisking him
down the steps o f Marsh chapel. The two agents on either side o f him held his arms
tightly; Kroll winced as one of the agents, smiling, twisted the deserter’s fingers in an
unnatural position. Two other agents squeezed his neck from behind and pushed the
entire group through a path cleared by Boston police toward a waiting car. As Kroll
attempted to go limp one last time, Ted Polunbaum, a Newsweek reporter, heard one
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agent say to Kroll, “Stand up or we’ll kill you, you bastard.”45
Although everyone involved in the sanctuary expected it to end in Ray Kroll’s
arrest, when it finally happened, it stunned many of them anyway. The FBI and the
Boston Police Department had just given a demonstration in the use of power. The
students knew that they had power, too, but Kroll’s “bust” reminded them that the state
had more and it knew how to use it. Although the BU confrontation with authorities did
not include the violence o f the Arlington Street Church sanctuary clash, in some ways, the
end of this sanctuary proved more depressing.
In an article in the BU News, Alex Jack, the veteran activist and New England
Resistance founder, expressed a new level of despair. The experience of this sanctuary
(which he had planned) led him to openly urge revolution. “The Sanctuary at Marsh
Chapel has shown, simply, that there can be no sanctuary,” he wrote.
There is no sanctuary from oppression, from racism, from militarism. The
Marsh Chapel sanctuary, as previous sanctuaries, has shown that the U.S.
government, the armed forces, the police, the University and the corporate
interests they serve will never voluntarily stop killing people in
Vietnam...They will not be deterred for conscience sake from dragging
young men o ff to make war in protection of their illicit activities.
For the American state, the BU sanctuary showed that “no place is sacred,” Jack
concluded. “No rights are inviolable. No people or humanity is sacrosanct.” If the
government felt it had to, he wrote, “they will slaughter us all.” The only solution to this
condition, he argued, was the creation o f a new society in which “exploitation is
structurally impossible, where power is returned and exercised by the people, where there

45 “Asked for a Warrant, They Just Stepped Over Me,” B U News, 9 Oct 1968, pp.
3, 8; “AWOL Soldier Seized at BU,” Boston Globe, 7 Oct 1968, p. 3.
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is no distinction between religion, politics or art, where in short there are no sanctuaries
because no on is oppressed.” Only a revolution could create the society he described,
and Jack urged others to join him. “We are the children o f the most monstrous and
destructive society in history, a society that has no conception o f or respect for human
needs, a society that will annihilate the planet before sharing its wealth, a society without
sanctuary for any o f its victims.” He concluded by calling for his generation to “rise up
and utterly destroy this universe...”46
Alex Jack’s radical stance and participation in the organization of the Marsh
Chapel sanctuary got him dismissed from the BU School of Theology. When the
sanctuary first opened, the university and School of Theology administrations expressed
surprise and made it clear that “the university...will abide by the laws of the land.” In
fact, the sanctuary constituted just one episode in a growing list o f conflicts between the
School o f Theology and its students. Debates over curricula, grades, and the students’
role (or lack thereof) in these issues had been simmering for some time, and a rift
between students and faculty was widening. In contrast to the Harvard Divinity School’s
reaction to the Andover Hall sanctuary, when the BU sanctuary took place, not one
School o f Theology professor came to the chapel to show support for it. When it ended,
the School saw Alex Jack as one of the ringleaders of all o f this disruptive behavior and
singled him out for punishment. They based his suspension on his failure to inform the
School o f the sanctuary plans and for failure to seek permission to use the chapel for that
purpose. Only Ray Kroll, who received a sentence of three months’ hard labor and who

46 Alex Jack, “The Politics of Confrontation,” B U News, 9 Oct 1968, pp. A2-A3.
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was docked two-thirds o f his pay for the three months, received a harsher punishment.47
Unlike Alex Jack, however, most rank-and-file participants did not regard the BU
sanctuary as a failure. Many believed that it had brought good publicity to the antiwar
movement and bad publicity to the war and the government. Most important, Howard
Zinn suggested, the sanctuary inspired close to 1,500 people to act on an issue of

principle. “The most we can do if we don’t liberate the world, is to liberate the spot of
ground on which we stand,” he said the day after the FBI bust. “We can find victory in
the act o f struggling for what we know is right. These five days have been days of
victory. We ought to be glad they happened.” Looking to the future, Louis Kampf of
Resist argued that, like draft card turn-ins, sanctuaries drew people together and gave
them “a sense o f responsibility to each other.” Too often, he noted, that sense of
responsibility was fleeting. But “if resistance to the war...is to be deepened,” and “if our
sense o f purpose is to be taken seriously,” rather than worrying about elections (which
few in the movement did, given the candidacies of Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon,
and George Wallace), “resistance and peace groups might better spend their time
developing strategies for building communities of resistance.” No one knew how to do
this, exactly, but continued outreach to GIs and providing symbolic sanctuary to those
who wanted it, Kampf implied, could be key ingredients. Soon, some o f Louis Kampf s

47 “Cultural Revolution at School of Theology,” Up Against the Cross, issue # I
(Nov 1968), AJP; Jack interview, Mar 1997; “Kroll, AWOL GI of BU Sanctuary, Gets
3 Months Hard Labor,” Old Mole, vol. 1, #4,5 Nov 1968, p. 3.
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own students soon responded to his call.48
To outside observers, in spite o f the ignominious ends o f the Harvard and Boston
University sanctuaries, the sanctuary “movement” no doubt appeared to be growing as it
spread from one school to another, each one larger than the last. Three weeks after Ray
Kroll’s arrest, students at the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology organized another
sanctuary, but this time it took on a secular tone. For the first time, instead o f hosting the
AWOL GI in a church or chapel, the MIT Resistance - an offshoot o f the New England
Resistance - provided asylum in the student center.
Although the draft resistance movement in Boston had attracted some students
from MIT over the past year, the university itself had seen very little antiwar protest
before the sanctuary. Compared to Harvard and BU, the campus at MIT was one of
Boston’s quietest. This relative calm could be attributed in part to MIT’s connection with
the war effort. In 1968, for instance, MIT earned the distinction o f being the only
university on a list o f 100 organizations receiving the largest dollar value contracts from
the Defense Department. In 1969, the Pentagon effectively underwrote eighty percent of
MIT’s budget.49 Two operations - the Lincoln Laboratory and the Instrumentation
Laboratory - spent most o f this money. The Lincoln Lab occupied facilities provided by
the Air Force at Hanscom Field in nearby Lexington and specialized in advanced research

48 “It had Salami and Donuts, But Spirit Sustained Chapel,” BU News, 9 Oct
1968, p. A4; “A Sense o f Responsibility,” Resist Newsletter, 28 Oct 1968, p. 2, MZP.
49 Dorothy Nelkin, The University and Military Research: Moral Politics at MIT
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 20; 1969 statistics cited in Kenneth J.
Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in the
Vietnam Era (New York: NYU Press, 1993), p. 13.
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in electronics, radar and radio physics, and information processing. Scientists used
technology developed at the Lincoln Lab to design several major early-warning air
defense systems and ballistic missile defense systems in use in the late 1960s. At the
Instrumentation Lab (or I-Lab, as it was known), researchers developed the Multiple
Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), probably the most noted (and eventually the most
controversial) program at the university. The MIRV was a high accuracy ballistic missile
that could carry multiple nuclear warheads capable o f annihilating several targets as far
apart as 100 miles. It became perhaps the most obvious symbol of the university’s ties to
the Pentagon.50
In addition to designing new technologies for modem warfare, faculty in other
departments actively supported the American war effort in Vietnam. Many within the
university community, for instance, knew that the Central Intelligence Agency openly

funded MIT’s Political Science Department in the early 1960s, and maintained a formal
relationship through the late 1960s. In fact, the department kept a villa in Saigon where
graduate students worked on pacification projects and other American political/military
programs for their dissertations.51
Finally, the apparent complacency o f most MIT students also inhibited antiwar
activism on campus. “The typical student,” Noam Chomsky later noted, “is someone

50 Michael Klare, ed., The University-Military Complex: A Directory and Related
Documents (New York: North American Congress on Latin America, 1969), p. 13, Steve
Shalom papers (copy in author’s files); Nelkin, p. 48.
51 Noam Chomsky, “The Cold War and the University,” in Chomsky, et al, The
Cold War and the University, (New York: New Press, 1997), p. 181; Shalom interview,
18 May 1997; Chomsky interview, 20 May 1997; Kampf interview, 11 Sep 1998.
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who was the only kid in Peoria who studied Quantum physics when everyone else was
playing football.„and when they come here they tend to be kind o f isolated from one
another and also from the faculty.” In short, even after all of the shocking events o f 1968,
most MIT students seemed to be sleepwalking through the war years.52
At the same time, however, a small number o f dissidents - some students and
faculty - had actively opposed the war for a long time. Most notably, Noam Chomsky
and Louis Kampf - even before writing the Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority and long
before they became key figures in the formation o f Resist - taught a course outside their
departments on their own time called ‘‘Intellectuals and Social Change.” The course
covered both contemporary foreign policy and domestic issues, and challenged students
to consider the role of intellectuals in taking sides on the important questions o f the day.
Anyone could take the course, and more and more did as the war progressed. By fall
1968, almost all of the individuals responsible for organizing the MIT sanctuary had
taken that course. In addition, a small group of students who had worked with the New
England Resistance over the summer formed the MIT Resistance. From the beginning of
the fall semester, these students plotted to hold a sanctuary on campus.
The first sanctuary attempt at MIT fell apart even before it started. An Army
friend o f Ray Kroll’s named George (the rest of his name has been lost to history)
contacted Steve Pailet at the New England Resistance during the BU sanctuary. He, too,
wanted to make his stand by seeking symbolic asylum surrounded by enthusiastic
supporters. As Pailet and Bob Shapiro of MTT Resistance worked out details for a

52 Chomsky interview, 20 May 1997.
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sanctuary at MIT, they arranged for George to stay at the Cambridge home o f two
sympathizers for a few days. But George blew it. One night, he called his girlfriend and
told her how to reach him. He did not know it, but the young woman’s father had
listened in on the conversation. Acting on the father’s tip, Military Police burst into the
sympathizers’ house and dragged George off to the nearest stockade. The homeowners
were furious, and the sanctuary plans evaporated for more than a week until a new GI
volunteered for it.53
Another Army friend o f Ray Kroll finally took sanctuary at MIT on October 29,
1968. John M. “Mike” O ’Connor, 19, came from Goldsboro, North Carolina where he
enlisted in the Army to avoid being jailed on a marijuana possession charge. In April
1968, he went AWOL from Fort Eustis, Virginia for 50 days and spent two months in the
stockade there as a result. After regaining his freedom in August, he again went AWOL
on September 14. A few days into Ray Kroll’s sanctuary began at Boston University,
O’Connor visited his friend at Marsh Chapel and approached the New England
Resistance about joining it. Sanctuary organizers anticipated Kroll’s arrest at any time,
however, and urged O’Connor to wait for another sanctuary opportunity.54
MIT Resistance organizers wanted their sanctuary to symbolize a new level of
militancy by separating the concept o f sanctuary from its longstanding religious context.
Instead of granting Mike O’Connor sanctuary in the campus chapel as students at Harvard

53 Shapiro interview, 13 Aug 1997.
54 “Students Guard GI at MIT,” Boston Globe, 30 Oct 1968, p. 47; “ 12 Days of
Sanctuary at MIT,’’Resist Newsletter, 2 Dec 1968, p. 1, RSP; Shapiro interview, 13 Aug
1997.
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and BU had done, Bob Shapiro reserved an immense space, the Sala de Puerto Rico, in
the student center for the sanctuary, hi part, this occurred simply as a practical matter; the
Sala was the only large place on campus that could be reserved without disrupting the
plans for other nonpolitical events.55 When 700 people showed up the first night (a
Tuesday), it confirmed the need for a large space. By Saturday night, November 2, more
than 1,200 supporters spent the night, most of them sleeping in sleeping bags, and waiting
for the FBI.56
The appeal o f the MIT sanctuary derived in part from the magnetism o f Mike
O’Connor himself. As the editors of MIT’s student newspaper, The Tech, noted after his
arrest, O’Connor, perhaps more than any other GI in a Boston area sanctuary, seemed to
know what he was doing. On the first day o f the sanctuary, he made it clear to his
supporters and the media that he understood the probable consequences o f his actions.
By taking sanctuary, he acknowledged, he would probably spend more time in the
stockade than if he simply turned himself in. ‘T o me it is worth it,” he asserted. “I feel
that if I can convince 100 people that the war is wrong, that it is an injustice against the
basic freedoms o f our country, then I will gladly serve the extra time.” Rather than leave
the country, O ’Connor said “If there is something wrong with [the country], we should try
to change it. Then, in an obvious reference to Paul Olimpieri and Thomas Pratt,

55 The MIT Resistance probably would not have met with much success if they
had organized the sanctuary in the beautiful but very small chapel on campus. Designed
in 1955 by the eminent architect Eero Saarinen, the Kresge Chapel is located not far from
the student center, but could have housed fewer than 100 people comfortably.
56 “ 12 Days of Sanctuary at MIT,” Resist Newsletter, 2 Dec 1968, p. 1, RSP;
Shapiro interview, 13 Aug 1997. •
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O’Connor said that he realized that he would probably be forced to retract all o f his
statements upon his arrest He told the crowd, however, that his was a “statement o f the
heart,” that they should remember it, and that with their help he would be able to
withstand any coercion. In the event that he did “weaken and make any statements
against this community,” he urged his supporters to disregard them and “remember me
for what I write and say while I am free.”57
The MIT sanctuary developed over several days in much the same fashion as the
Arlington Street Church and Marsh Chapel sanctuaries. On the second day o f the event,
some faculty brought their classes to the Sala de Puerto Rico as an expression o f
solidarity; Louis BCampf, for instance, taught his Proust class against the backdrop o f the
sanctuary. That night, several bands played and organizers showed a few short films
produced by Newsreel, the underground film collective. Abbie Hoffinan made an
appearance at one point. Through it all the numbers of people taking part ebbed and
flowed until Thursday night when more than 1,000 people claimed a space in the Sala.
That night, as participants discussed reviewed their guidelines for greeting the authorities,
a large number o f people suggested that the sanctuary abandon its nonviolent approach.
Members of the Living Theater, fresh from a performance at Kresge Auditorium,
attempted to provoke some of the students into occupying some of the administration
offices. Fearing a violent clash when the authorities arrived, O’Connor asked for a vote
on the issue of nonviolence saying that if the crowd voted for a direct confrontation, he

57 “Statement o f Jack M. O’Connor, undated (c. 29 Oct 1968), RSP; Resist
Newsletter, 20 Dec 1968, p. 8, Spock papers, box 28.
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would turn himself in to the Army; they voted for nonviolence. Still, anxiety grew
steadily over the next few days. Three technically adept students worked out seven
different telephone and walki-talkie systems to give a warning o f any raid that might take
place; meanwhile, someone armed with a ham radio patrolled the Charles River by boat
looking for federal agents or military police.58
By Friday and especially Saturday, most people were physically and emotionally
exhausted. Mike O’Connor in particular seemed to be suffering from the effects o f too
little sleep. Resistance organizers could not believe that the FBI or Army had not yet
come to arrest O’Connor, but on Sunday night, after waiting for six days, they declared
victory and sent everyone home. O ’Connor went to sleep in a small room on the fourth
floor of the student center while Resistance leaders placed the sanctuary in the best light
possible. They had been successful, they argued, in protecting O ’Connor for six days; he
had explained his position on television, radio, and in the papers; and it raised the
political consciousness o f a campus formerly considered passive. In reality, few knew
what to do when the authorities did not do what they were supposed to do. With another
group needing the Sala for a formal dance, and, more important, O’Connor exhausted,
they decided to pack it in.59 A week later, on November 10, Military Police from Fort

58 “ 12 Days o f Sanctuary at MIT,” Resist Newsletter, 2 Dec 1968, p. 1, RSP;
“Sala Sanctuary Established,” The Tech (MIT), I Nov 1968, p. 1; Bill Berry, “Am I a
Slave?” Old Mole, 5 Nov 1968, p. 5; Shapiro interview, 13 Aug 1997; Kampf interview,
10 Sep 1998.
59 “ 12 Days o f Sanctuary at MIT,” Resist Newsletter, 2 Dec 1968, p. 1, RSP;
“O’Connor’s Sanctuary Ends,” The Tech, 8 Nov 1968, p. 1; “Six-Day MIT Sanctuary
Ends Quietly Without Bust,” Harvard Crimson, 4 Nov 1968, p. I; Shapiro interview, 13
Aug 1968.
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Devens finally arrived and arrested O’Connor. Thus, as Neil Robertson wrote soon after,
the MIT sanctuary “ended in confusion after a gradual atrophy.” After a January trial, a
military court sentenced him to four months o f hard labor and forfeiture of two-thirds o f
his pay over that time; the judge then added another four months remaining from his
previous suspended sentence for going AWOL the second time.60
Mike O ’Connor’s sanctuary thoroughly transformed the activist climate at MIT.
Noam Chomsky, who initially thought the sanctuary would fall flat and attract little
student support, later remarked that to his “amazement” the sanctuary “just galvanized the
whole campus.” It “completely changed the mood of the whole university,” he recalled.
“It’s never changed since, or never gone back.” Indeed, in the wake of the sanctuary’s
end, many students commented on the new consciousness o f students. Bill Berry, an MIT
Resistance organizer, argued that MTT students were now suddenly questioning their role
in society. He gave an example of a student who would now be more likely to turn down
a lucrative job at General Dynamics and do scientific work that would help society in
stead of creating new and more efficient destructive technology. Previously isolated
students now felt exhilarated by the sense o f community that they experienced with
faculty and their fellow students. Nevertheless, a handful of critics also began to criticize
the tactic of sanctuary.61

60 “Sanctuary Terminated by Arrest,” The Tech, 12 Nov 1968, p. 1; Neil
Robertson, “The Politics o f Sanctuary,” Nov 1968, p. 8, RCP; O’Connor sentence
described in “Up Against the Wall Street Journal,” 16 Apr 1969, p. 15, RSP; Shapiro
interview, 13 Aug 1997.
61 Chomsky interview, 20 May 1997; Bill Berry, “Am I a Slave?” Old Mole, 5
Nov 1968, p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

508
The MIT sanctuary turned out to be the last significant sanctuary in the Boston
area. Although students a t Brandeis University offered sanctuary to another soldier in
early December, the authorities’ willingness to all but ignore it and let it sputter out on its
own, again undermined the protest value of the event By January, the Resistance started
to shift its focus on GIs away from sanctuary to lower-profile outreach. Organizers
admitted that beyond the publicity that sanctuaries garnered, and the growing numbers of
students on Boston campuses who turned out for such events, these events actually played
into the hands o f the military. The public nature o f the GI’s protest had no mitigating
effect on his punishment; indeed, it may have made matters worse.62
Consequently, the New England Resistance decided to intensify its GI outreach
program. On Friday nights, Resistance members walked a few blocks from their
Stanhope Street office to the Greyhound bus terminal on St. James Street. There they
sought out soldiers traveling for the weekend and gave them copies o f Vietnam GI, the
antiwar newspaper aimed at GIs (published in Chicago); a few people also spent their
Friday nights at Logan Airport for the same reason. In addition, Resistance activists tried
to make contact with disgruntled soldiers to offer counseling on how to get discharges or
apply for conscientious objector status. They handed out flyers to parties and invited GIs

62 NER Newsletter, Jan 1969, MKFP; NER Newsletter, Feb-Mar 1969, MKFP.
Note: The Brandeis sanctuary for Sp/4 John Rollins, AWOL from Ft. Clayton, Panama
began on 4 December and lasted two weeks. On 19 December, Rollins and the sanctuary
com m unity dissolved the sanctuary and went to F t Devens to distribute leaflets to GIs.
There Military Police arrested him.
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to visit the Resistance office.63 In one o f the most ambitious strands o f the outreach
program, Nan Stone and Joel Kugelmass made several visits to bars and clubs in the
Combat Zone (Boston’s red light district), where they could usually expect to encounter
plenty o f alienated servicemen and frequently someone who had gone AWOL. Stone and
Kugelmass then offered help in the form o f lawyers and counselors. Since their antiwar
experience had taught them something about the reach o f the federal government, Stone
and Kugelmass usually encouraged AWOLs to turn themselves in with the help of
movement lawyers. In a few rare instances, however, Stone and others in the Resistance
participated in a sort of underground railroad with other antiwar organizations as a way of
getting deserters out o f the country.64
Resistance members who had been part of the movement since its beginning
regarded this shift to GI outreach as an indication of the organization’s maturity. “As we
all became a litde more astute about what we were doing,” Nan Stone later recalled, “we
did get much more o f a sense o f how guys could end up in the military and even in
Vietnam without believing in the war.” Many servicemen, they learned, felt they had no
choices. Gradually, in the second half of 1968 and into 1969, Resistance activists
stopped looking at servicemen as potential enemies. And so the organization continued

63 NER Newsletter, Jem 1969, MKFP; NER Newsletter, Feb-Mar 1969, MKFP;
Stone interview, 8 Oct 1997; Kugelmass interview, 16 Jun 1997; Shapiro interview, 13
Aug 1997. Note: In some ways, the Resistance began duplicating the Boston Draft
Resistance Group’s GI Outreach program; BDRG, for example, had been distributing
Vietnam G I at bus stations since the summer of 1968.
64 Kugelmass interview, 16 Jun 1997; Stone interview, 8 Oct 1997; Tiltons
interview, 16 Jun 1997; Robertson interview, 7 Aug 1998.
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to direct its attention toward expanding the circumference o f its circle of supporters to
men serving in America’s armed forces.63
This change in constituency, however, resulted in two unintended consequences:
the virtual abandonment o f the hundreds of men who returned their draft cards in late
1967 and the first half o f 1968, and the ultimate decline o f the New England Resistance.
When the Resistance turned away from draft card turn-ins to devote more and more time
and resources to high school organizing and the sanctuary movement, it made no formal
announcement. Newsletters and The Resistance newspaper no longer carried information
on draft card tum-ins and instead included articles laced with revolutionary rhetoric and
critiques of imperialism and capitalism. For the rank and file draft resister, the future
seemed less clear, and the group to whom one might ordinarily look for guidance had
moved in a new direction. As a result, several draft resisters created a new organization
to meet that demand.
SUPPORT and Forgotten Draft Resisters
The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston, consistent with Ramsey Clark’s wishes,
waited until after the Spock Trial ended to indict ordinary draft resisters. Between
August and December 1968, a grand jury handed down 48 indictments of men who had
refused induction when called. As Michael Zigmond, who had turned in his card at the
Old West Church on November 16, 1967 and was among the 48 indicted, later recalled,
“Now that people had refused induction, the movement...wasn’t all that interested in
them. Their political act had happened and what happened to them afterwards was o f no

65 Stone interview, 8 Oct 1997; Kugelmass interview, 16 Jun 1997.
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particular political interest, I think.” Zigmond approached the New England Resistance
and Resist about providing some kind o f support for the indicted men but got little in the
way of a response. “My attitude was, maybe it isn’t political, but it’s sort o f the other
side of the Veterans Administration System,” Zigmond reflected. “You know, we’ve
served our time in the front lines, we refused induction, people ought to care about us
now. Whether it’s political or not doesn’t matter.” Frustrated by the indifference of
movement leaders, Zigmond and his wife Naomi, along with a few other indictees formed
an organization called SUPPORT (which was always spelled in capital letters) to raise
money for legal expenses and travel expenses incurred by family members visiting a
resister in prison.66
Michael Zigmond was somewhat older than most Resistance organizers. Two
months before turning in his draft card, Zigmond turned 26, making it very unlikely that
he would ever be drafted. Moreover, he had earned his Ph.D. from Carnegie Tech and at
the time of his resistance held a postdoctoral fellowship at MIT. The war and his
immunity from it weighed heavily on him, however, (see Chapter 4) and he decided to
risk his safe status by returning his draft card to the Justice Department. His Arlington,
Massachusetts, draft board quickly reclassified him and called him for induction. On the
Friday of Memorial Day Weekend 1968, Zigmond, accompanied by his wife and parents,
arrived at the Boston Army Base and found that he was the only person scheduled for
induction that day (a tactic often used on troublemakers so they would not have the

66 “A Year o f Support,” SUPPORT Newsletter, Aug 1969, p. 1, MZP; Zigmond
interview, 29 Dec 1997.
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opportunity to proselytize to other draftees). Although he had allergies, flat feet, and
terrible vision, he passed the physical! He did better on the IQ test. When a psychiatrist
asked him questions during the psychological examination, Zigmond reported feeling a
little depressed and anxious. When the doctor asked why, Zigmond responded, “Because
at the end of this day I’m going to commit a felony.” And so he did. As his wife, Naomi,
and his parents watched through a glass picture window, Zigmond refused to step forward
on three separate occasions. Two FBI agents interviewed him after the ceremony and
released him. The affair took all day.67
As the Zigmond family walked the long walk from the induction center to the
Boston Army Base exit, they heard a trumpet begin to play the familiar refrain of “Taps.”
Nearby, an old soldier slowly started to lower the American flag. But when he saw the
Zigmonds walking - instead of stopping to observe the sacred ceremony - he began
shouting at them. They walked on. The man yelled. The trumpeter played until the
end.68
In the fall of 1968, Michael and Naomi Zigmond assumed more prominent roles
in the Boston antiwar movement by starting SUPPORT, which drew its membership from
several other organizations such as the American Friends’ Service Committee, Resist,
BDRG. Mass Pax, the New England Resistance, and the Prisoners Information and
Support Service. The impulse to form SUPPORT came in part from attending the late
summer trials of a few men who had refused induction. “Some o f those who had been

67 Zigmond interview, 29 Dec 1997.
68 Zigmond interview, 29 Dec 1997.
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surrounded by 5,000 supporters on the Boston Common were left standing alone,” a
SUPPORT newsletter charged. “Court rooms (which hold about 35 people) were filled
only with difficulty...” Those who did attend trials realized that many o f the men on trial
were very young, often poor, frequently did not understand the judicial process, and rarely
had more than one supporter attending the trial. Thus, SUPPORT got started by
coordinating groups o f people to go to each draft resistance trial. “The resistance
movement must now decide whether the government will be allowed to continue to carry
off non-cooperators quietly,” they said as the number o f indictments climbed through the
fall. The objective, since the media did not cover the trials at all, would be to make each
one a focus for political action and, consequently, a story worth covering.69
In contrast to the growing activist program of the Resistance, SUPPORT offered a
fairly narrow array of services which, for the indicted men, were very important. Each
week, the Zigmonds and their one paid staff person, Carol Neville, combed the
newspaper for announcements o f indicted men. Then, in most cases, SUPPORT lined up
someone from the indictee’s own community to contact the young man and offer
information on legal and financial assistance. Often resisters could enlist the aid o f an
attorney through the Committee for Legal Research on the Draft, an organization started
by Harvard Law School students. Supporters assigned to each case also were responsible
for coordinating support for the indictee in his own community, by circulating petitions,

69 “A Guide for Indictees and Counselors,” SUPPORT leaflet, Mar 1969, p. 2,
MZP; “Draft Refusal Indictments Coming,” Old Mole, 1 2 - 2 2 Sep 1969, p. 17; “ThirtySix Men Indicted Since August,” SUPPORT Newsletter, 25 Nov 1968, p. I, MZP; “A
Year o f Support,” SUPPORT Newsletter, Aug 1969, pp. 1-2, MZP.
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organizing rallies, and encouraging others to attend the man’s trial. SUPPORT’S work
did not stop with a conviction, however; resisters found guilty could expect frequent
letters and postcards from supporters while in prison and, maybe most important,
SUPPORT supplied travel money to families who wanted to visit their sons in prison.70
The irony is that most o f the men who benefitted from SUPPORT’S assistance had
not taken part in the draft resistance movement at any time over the previous year. By
December 1968, Zigmond realized that all but four or five o f the men indicted since
August were men whose draft boards had denied their conscientious objector requests
and, in turn, decided to refuse induction rather than violate their consciences. That said,
this distinction did not distract SUPPORT from its work in any way. It seemed clear that
indictments would eventually be issued for men who had openly defied the draft as part
of the resistance movement and subsequently refused induction. Moreover, SUPPORT
activists knew just how important their work was to the families they had already helped.
One couple who had received money to travel to Allenwood, Pennsylvania to visit their
imprisoned son wrote a letter to Michael and Naomi Zigmond that conveyed their
gratitude: “[We’re] certain that just knowing that there are people like yourself on the
outside that have not forgotten about him is enough to give him the courage and
reassurance that he so needs right now.” Letters like that inspired continued activism

70 “Draft Refusal Indictments Coming,” Old Mole, 12-22 Sep 1969, p. 17; “A
Year o f Support,” SUPPORT Newsletter, Aug 1969, p. 2, MZP; Zigmond interview, 29
Dec 1997.
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regardless o f the resister’s movement credentials or lack thereof.71
In the end, however, ittum edout that the U. S. Attorney in Boston secured
proportionately few indictments - and even fewer convictions - o f draft resisters who
turned in their draft cards at one o f the gatherings organized by the New England
Resistance in 1967-68. Thirty years later, the reasons for this are not altogether clear.
After the flurry o f indictments at the end of 1968, no Boston area draft resister was
indicted in all o f 1969. Assistant U.S. Attorney and Spock Trial prosecutor John Wall
recalls “an avalanche o f [draft] cases” overwhelming his office, and suggests that many
cases simply “fell through the cracks.” The department just did not have the resources to
pursue every draft resister. That may have been the case, but the evidence shows that
several variables probably factored into the ultimate resolution o f each draft resister’s
case. The final determination of each resister’s future usually derived from decisions
made by either the resister himself, his draft board, or a judge.
Until now, many in the draft resistance community have believed that once the
New England Resistance abandoned draft card turn-ins as its primary tactic for
confronting the government, most resisters who had lost their deferments as a result of
their protest sought to have them renewed. When sociologist Barrie Thome completed
her dissertation in 1971, she reported that although “there were no certain figures, only
cumulative hearsay and general impression,” most in the movement guessed that at least
half - and as many as three-fourths - o f Boston’s draft resisters “had gone back on their

71 “Local Support Efforts,” SUPPORT Newsletter, 2 Dec 1968, p. 2, MZP; Mr. &
Mrs. William F. Curry letter to Michael Zigmond, 20 Jan 1970, MZP; see also Elizabeth
Powers letter to Michael Zigmond, 26 Jan 1970, MZP.
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pledge o f non-cooperation.” These figures seem inflated when one considers, as Michael
Ferber and Staughton Lynd did, that between the fall o f 1968 and the spring o f 1970 some
four hundred men had refused induction in Boston; as o f March 1970, none o f those men
had been indicted, “a fact,” Ferber and Lynd noted, '‘for which no one has offered a good
explanation.” These men no doubt included some o f those who had begun their draft
resistance odyssey by turning in their draft cards at a New England Resistance organized
ceremony, but most of them probably refused induction on their own.
Draft resisters who completed the 1997 survey conducted for this dissertation
provide the first clear indication of how the cases o f Boston’s draft resistance community
turned out. Table 9.1 shows what happened to draft resisters after they tumed-in their
draft cards. Most local draft boards followed General Lewis Hershey’s instructions and
reclassified draft resisters once they received their draft cards. Out of 102 survey
respondents, 77 (75.5%) report being reclassified to 1-A; 56 (54.9%) of these men later
received orders to report for induction into the armed services. Nine men (six of whom
were 26 or older and one of whom was a veteran) heard absolutely nothing from their
draft boards. Only 15 (14.7%) avoided reclassification by seeking or accepting a
duplicate draft card or a new deferment, but another 11 o f the men who were reclassified
1-A also secured new deferments before they could be called for induction (see Table
9.2).
Since the government chose not to prosecute men for turning in their draft cards,
they generally waited until a draft resister refused induction before pursuing an
indictment. Table 9.3 presents data on the Boston draft resisters who received induction
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notices after having their classifications changed to I-A. Thirty o f 53 respondents went
through with their original plan and refused induction, while another 14 who might have
refused induction failed their pre-induction physicals. Only nine of the men called for
induction avoided their own personal showdowns at the Boston Army Base by seeking
and receiving a new deferment before their induction date. Therefore, when these nine
men are added to the 26 men who escaped reclassification and/or an induction call by
accepting a duplicate draft card or new deferment, it totals approximately one-third
(34.3%) o f the draft resisters in the sample.
Resisters compromised on their original commitment to refuse induction for a
variety o f reasons, but generally it came down to two considerations. First, many realized
that even if every man who turned in his draft card in late 1967 and early 1968 refused
induction, it would not stop the war. As one resister commented on his survey: “I had
hoped, naively, that I would be on of hundreds o f thousands, on October 16 or later, who
refused to serve, and that my act would, with others, lead to a quick end to the war. Eight
months later, I reluctantly concluded it wasn't going to happen.” David Clennon. the
Yale graduate student, likewise recalls the doubt that many resisters had about their
original strategy by the middle of 1968. When he was called for induction in June 1969,
he took advantage o f his fragile psychological state to secure a note from his psychiatrist
that effectively won him a new deferment. At the same time, Clennon acknowledges that
he “began to doubt whether I could handle 32 months in prison.” This is the second most
common reason for seeking a new deferment: self-interest. In Clennon’s case, more than

a year o f anxiety had accumulated in the wake of his draft card tum-in (which led him to
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the psychiatrist in the first place) and he doubted he could cope with prison. As another
resister wrote, “People were no longer doing this (turning in cards) and there seemed to
be a general feeling that it was pointless to go to jail over it..Fear o f going to prison was
also a major factor.”72
Today, many o f the draft resisters who chose not to refuse induction still have
mixed feelings about their decision and some regret it altogether. David Clennon has
called his new deferment “a real copout.” Although he had “taken this big step
and...stood my ground for about a year, year and a half,” he said, he then “copped out and
took the middle class road to get out of the draft.” Similarly, Larry Etscovitz, the Boston
University student who spontaneously turned in his draft card at the Arlington Street
Church on October 16, admits giving in to his fear when he accepted a 1-Y deferment at
his pre-induction physical. He now regards his initial act o f resistance as “an inviolate
moment in an otherwise very gray scenario o f self-preservation in moving from one
extreme to another.” When he turned in his card, he says, “I felt I was committed to an
irrevocable course of protest.” But the government kept “dangling carrots” in front of
him to make it easy to back out. These offerings - of duplicate cards, new deferments,
etc. - “became more and more enticing as my tolerance for being in a state of chaos got
less. I got scared,” he says. “Let’s just be straight about it. I got scared...and I regret it to
this day. I really do.”73

72 Written comment, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey, respondent #42,
author’s files; Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Written comment, 1997 BDRS,
respondent #31, author’s files.
73 Clennon interview, 12 Jun 1997; Etscovitz interview, 12 Aug 1997.
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What the men who avoided an induction-ceremony confrontation did not know
was that with each passing year, prosecutors found it increasingly difficult to bring draft
resistance cases to trial and to win them when they did. Table 9.4 shows that in 1966, the
U.S. Attorney in Boston won 16 convictions or guilty pleas from a total of 26 indicted
draft resisters. That amounts to a 62% success rate. But by 1968, the situation had
changed dramatically. The department won only 8 convictions or guilty pleas out o f 50
indictments, or a 16% success rate. This drop can be attributed in part to an increase in
the number of indicted men who left the country (17)- again, almost all of the indicted
men refused induction individually, not as part of a draft resistance movement that
strongly discouraged immigration - but it also resulted from mistakes made by draft
boards. Sometimes, bureaucratic errors were sufficient to keep a case from being
prosecuted (or to get it dismissed), but it seems reasonable to attribute the dearth o f
prosecutions (only 12 o f the 30 men surveyed who refused induction were prosecuted) to
an understanding that several draft resistance cases had attracted the attention of the
Supreme Court which was expected to rule on several issues germane to such cases.
Indeed, several major judicial decisions, three of which stemmed from Boston draft
resistance cases, were handed down in late 1968 and 1969.
Not long after a Cheyenne, Wyoming draft board reclassified Jim Oestereich, the
Andover Newton seminarian, to I-A, Oestereich engaged the services of the American
Civil Liberties Union who filed suit against the Selective Service in federal court to
prevent Oestereich’s induction on the grounds that his local board had punished him
through a punitive reclassification without due process. The District Court dismissed the
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complaint and the Court o f Appeals affirmed it, in part because the Selective Service Act
of 1967 stated that there should be nopre-induction judicial review of the classification
record o f any registrant. In May, however, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. In
October, Oestereich’s attorney, Melvin Wulf, o f the ACLU, argued the case before the
Court. General Hershey used the draft to punish dissenters of national policy, Wulf
argued, and consequently deterred many unknown persons from expressing any view at
all. In addition, W ulf reiterated his original charge that punitive reclassification was
unconstitutional.74
On December 16, 1968, in what was hailed as a landmark decision, the Court
ruled in favor o f Jim Oestereich. The Court focused on Oestereich’s status as a
ministerial student and the draft exemption that his draft board had granted him. As
distinct from the II-S student deferment which theoretically postponed a registrant’s
obligation to serve in the armed forces., the 4-D classification exempted the registrant
from military service for as long as he was a divinity student or minister. “Once a person
registers and qualifies for a statutory exemption,” Justice William O. Douglas wrote for
the Court, “we find no legislative authority to deprive him of that exemption because o f
conduct or activities unrelated to the merits o f granting or continuing that exemption.”
Douglas described the conduct of the Cheyenne draft board as “basically lawless,” and
asserted that Oestereich’s reclassification and induction order were no different in
constitutional implications than if the board called a minister or another “clearly exempt

74 A good summary o f the chronology o f the Oestereich case is given in Morgan
David Arant, Jr., “Government Use of the Draft to Silence Dissent to War,” Peace &
Change 17:2 (April 1992), pp. 147-171.
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person” for induction “(a) to retaliate against the person because o f his political views or
(b) to bear down on him because o f his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get
him out o f town so that the amorous interests o f a Board member might be better
served.”75 A few weeks later, Douglas commented, “There is no suggestion in the current
draft law that the Selective Service has free-wheeling authority to ride herd on registrants,
using immediate induction as a disciplinary or vindictive measure.”76 The draft resisters,
it seemed, had won this one.
In fact, however, the Court did not rule that punitive reclassifications were
inherently unconstitutional (as Melvin Wulf had argued). The decision applied only to
the reclassification o f registrants with ministerial exemptions. The Court’s judgement
said nothing about reclassification o f other registrants resulting from protest activity. In
Boston, Jim Oestereich learned of the decision on the morning o f the 16th when a UPI
reporter called him at the American Friends Service Committee office. Oestereich, who
had been filled with so much emotion when he turned in his draft card, and who had been
basically run out of Lunenburg where he had been a youth minister, now had something
to cheer about. Others cautioned against getting too optimistic. Michael Zigmond
reminded readers of the SUPPORT newsletter that the Oestereich decision amounted to
“victory on the narrowest possible grounds.” He feared that piecemeal victories such as
this might undermine some o f the outrage that fueled the movement. “Any victory is

75 Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, et a i, 393 U.S. at 237.
76 Flynn, Louis B. Hershey, p. 267.
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important,” he wrote. “Yet we must be careful. Too many o f us are still uncomfortable
in our new anti-establishment roles, all too ready to return to our old lives at the slightest
hint o f a bombing halt or a favorable court decision”77
Still, the Oestereich decision offered a glimmer o f hope that the Court might yet
clamp down on the Selective Service’s use o f the draft as punishment for protesters. A
year later, two decisions effectively expanded the Oestereich ruling to all draft resisters.
In Gutknecht v. United States the Court ruled in the petitioner’s favor in a case in which
Gutknecht’s draft board accelerated his induction schedule, effectively trying to take him
out o f order (he was already classified I-A) after he left his draft card on the steps of the
Federal Building in Minneapolis on October 16, 1967.78 And in the decision for Breen v.
Selective Service Board No. 16, issued the same day as the Gutknecht decision, the Court
decided that the draft board had acted unconstitutionally when it reclassified Timothy
Breen, a student at Boston’s Berklee College o f Music for failure to possess the draft card
he had returned at the Arlington Street Church on October 16. “We fail to see any
relevant practical or legal differences between exemptions and deferments,” Justice Hugo
Black wrote, thus extending the Court’s judgement in Oestereich to cover all registration
classifications.79 Collectively, the three decisions held that punitive reclassification by
local draft boards was unconstitutional.

77 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; “Oestereich Decision,” SUPPORT
Newsletter, 16 Jan 1969, MZP.
78 Gutknecht v. United States, 393 U.S. 295.
79 Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, Bridgeport, Connecticut, et al,
396 U.S. 460.
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A third court ruling in a Boston case further undermined the Selective Service’s
channeling system. In the case o f United States v. Sisson, U.S. District Court Judge
Charles Wyzanski, who had presided over many draft resistance cases in the previous
four years, issued a ruling that said the Selective Service law’s identification o f certain
religions as the only ones acceptable for the granting o f conscientious objector status
discriminated against non-religious objectors. John Sisson, a resident of Lincoln,
Massachusetts held a II-S student deferment until he graduated from Harvard in 1967.
His West Concord draft board reclassified him I-A in November and called him for
induction in April 1968. At the time, Sisson worked for the Southern Courier, a civil
rights movement newspaper associated with Harvard in Montgomery, Alabama. In
February 1968, while still in Alabama, Sisson had written to his draft board requesting an
application form for conscientious objector status, but decided not to complete it because
he did not fit the religious profiles required for that classification. At his trial he said he
refused induction because he believed that 'The United States military involvement in
Vietnam is illegal under international law as well as under the Constitution and treaties of
the United States” and that his “participation in that war would violate the spirit and letter
of the Nuremberg Charter.” On the basis o f his knowledge o f the Vietnam War, Sisson
concluded, “I could not participate in it without doing violence to the dictates o f my
conscience.” It was the most common o f arguments among draft resisters. So many
resisters came to their stand in the fall o f 1967 or spring o f 1968 after having their CO
applications denied because they were not Quakers. The Sisson decision at last
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acknowledged their stand.”
Judge Wyzanski, who many court observers believed had long been seeking a case
such as this, issued an arrest o f judgement in the guilty verdict against Sisson in deciding
that the defendant could not be criminally convicted in the case because he was a
legitimate conscientious objector. In a lengthy opinion, Wyzanski raised the question of
selective objection to war, an issue long important to the draft resistance community,
repeatedly pointed to Sisson’s sincerity. “On the stand, Sisson was diffident, perhaps
beyond the requirements of modesty,” the judge wrote. “He was entirely without
eloquence. No line he spoke remains etched in memory. But he fearlessly used his own
words, not mouthing formulae from court cases or manuals for draft avoidance.”
Wyzanski highlighted Sisson’s sense of social obligation in working for the Courier and
applying to the Peace Corps, and in prose that heartened all draft resisters, outlined in
detail Sisson’s moral development.
Sisson’s table o f ultimate values is moral and ethical. It reflects quite as
real, pervasive, durable, and commendable a marshaling o f priorities as a
formal religion. It is just as much a residue of culture, early training, and
beliefs shared by companions and family. What another derives from the
discipline of a church, Sisson derives from the discipline of
conscience...He was as genuinely and profoundly governed by his
conscience as would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion.
In short, Wyzanski said, the 1967 draft law discriminated against “atheists, agnostics, and
men like Sisson,” who were motivated in their objection to conscription “by profound

” John Sisson, interview with author, 13 Jul 1998; United States v. John Heffron
Sisson, Jr., 294 F. Supp. 511.
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moral beliefs which constitute the central convictions o f their beings.”81 The United
States appealed to the Supreme Courts but the Court let the decision stand without hearing
it.
With these important cases working their way through the federal court system, it
is not surprising that prosecutors in Boston relaxed the pace of draft resistance
indictments after December 1968. Even before the Breen and Gutknecht decisions, a
reasonable person could have deduced that the Oestereich ruling would make winning
any o f these cases more difficult. Ultimately, o f the thirty men in this study’s sample who
refused induction, only twelve were prosecuted and only five o f them were convicted.82
Therefore, for a variety o f reasons - from illegal behavior on the part o f local draft boards
and self-preservation on the part of resisters - only five (roughly 4%) of the 121 draft
resisters who responded to the survey issued as part of this study went to prison. This
record is virtually identical to the the national average which convicted 8,750 (4.2%) out
of 209,517 accused draft offenders.83
Ironically, the court victories and the Justice Department’s general lack of success

81 U.S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511. Note: in some ways, Wyzanski’s decision
echoed an earlier Supreme Court decision in the case o f U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965), in which the court held that Seeger, an atheist, could not be denied conscientious
objector status because he did not belong to one of the religious groups outlined in the
Selective Service law. Wyzanski’s decision differed from the Seeger decision in that it
allowed for selective conscientious objection; that is, a registrant could decide which wars
to fight in and which not to.
82 Of the thirty men who refused induction who completed the 1997 survey, 18
were not prosecuted. O f the twelve men who were prosecuted, five were convicted, three
acquitted, and four others saw their cases dismissed
83 Statistics cited in Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 69.
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came as the draft resistance movement in Boston came to an end. The source of the
Resistance’s disintegration could be attributed to finances as well as internal divisions
that could not be bridged. First, by moving away from draft card tum-ins and their
natural following of middle-class men, the Resistance gave up its main source of funding:
suburban liberals. Even if they were inclined to donate money to the Resistance, the
working-class families o f GIs had fewer resources to share with the antiwar movement
than middle-class supporters o f draft resistance initially did. In August 1968, the
Resistance needed to send out a special letter soliciting more funds. “At a time when we
must expand our operations, we are in danger of bankruptcy,” the letter said, noting that
the organization was $2,000 in debt and operated on a $3,500 monthly budget. By
January, the monthly budget had dropped to $2,000, but debts now tallied close to $3,000.
One year before, the Resistance enjoyed the prominence accorded Boston’s leading
antiwar organization, but now, as they acknowledged in their January 1969 newsletter,
few knew what had happened to them. The “desperate financial straits” they found
themselves in would not improve.84
In the spring, the New England Resistance finally folded. The end came after
Penney Kurland (who had been active with the Resistance since the BU sanctuary)
returned from the national Resistance conference in Bloomington, Indiana. There she had
met many other women from other Resistance groups across the country. They shared
their experiences and realized that they were all being marginalized within their

84 Michael Ferber letter to supporters, Aug 1968, MKFP; NER Newsletter, Jan
1969, MKFP.
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organizations in the same ways. When they left Bloomington, they pledged to one
another that they would confront the men in their organizations on the gender inequities
in the movement. In Boston, this confrontation between the men and women o f the New
England Resistance led to the collapse of the organization. Although some men
expressed contrition over the way the group had treated women, the women decided that
the formation o f their own resistance was more important than continuing with their
present course. The remaining six or eight women left the organization and went on to
form Boston’s first consciousness-raising groups. The New England Resistance soon
voted to become a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society. By summer, they were
forced to move out of the Stanhope Street office. Neil Robertson, Steve Pailet, and Ira
Arlook started driving taxi cabs to raise money to pay off the remaining Resistance debts.
On August 2, 1969, in the saddest footnote to the history of the New England Resistance,
a passenger shot and killed Pailet in a robbery that the police never solved.85

Even before the New England Resistance dissolved, most o f the remaining
activists felt burned out. The organization’s revolutionary rhetoric from the previous
summer had given way to cautious approval for positive court decisions. The intensity of
1968 had taken its toll on the movement. Now, in 1969, Richard Nixon took over a war
that showed few signs of ending.
But it would be too easy to dismiss the last half of 1968 and the early months of

85 Barrie Thome, “Resisting the Draft,” p. XX; Kurland interview, 21 Feb 1999;
Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997; Robertson interview, 7 Aug 1998.
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1969 as a period o f fitful searching for new strategies to end the war. In fact, Boston’s
draft resistance community, though diminished in size, made several important advances
over that period. First, the alliance with servicemen and their emphasis on GI dissenters
ushered in a new phase o f antiwar protest in which GIs and veterans - with whom the
public associated a moral authority that they never granted civilian protesters - eventually
came to dominate the movement against the war. The sanctuaries organized by the
Resistance attracted considerable publicity to antiwar servicemen, and GI outreach helped
sustain soldiers who opposed the war. Second, the network o f supporters pulled together
by SUPPORT kept alive dreams o f a real resistance community in which the whole group
supported individuals and their families in time of need, especially during trials and once
resisters were sent to prison. Finally, the Resistance could take some credit for protecting
the civil liberties o f draft-age men when federal courts and the Supreme Court ruled
against the government’s misuse o f the draft. In his memoirs, Richard Nixon wrote that
he regarded draft resisters as cowards, but he also admitted that they affected the way he
approached the war. When he instituted a lottery system for the draft and reassigned the
aging General Hershey, he did so in part to undermine the antiwar movement. As
Resistance activists moved on to other forms o f protest, or drifted away from the
movement, most (even if they felt emotionally spent) took some satisfaction in knowing
that, try as it might, the government had not been able to ignore them.
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EPILOGUE

In the battle for freedom...it is the struggle for, not so much the
attainment of, liberty, that develops all that is strongest, sturdiest, and
finest in human character.
Emma Goldman
“What I Believe,” 1908
On Saturday, October 18, 1997, about three dozen alumni o f Boston’s draft
resistance community assembled at the Arlington Street Church for a reunion marking the
thirtieth anniversary o f the first draft card turn-in. Most of those in attendance still lived
in the Boston area or elsewhere in New England, but some drove many hours to get there;
and two - Dan Tilton and David Clennon (with his wife Perry) - flew in from California.
Most o f those in attendance were at least a little grayer, a little heavier, or a little balder,
and maybe looked more like their parents now than they did during the sixties, but, for
the most part, they recognized one another immediately. There were plenty of hugs to go
around.
In typical Resistance fashion, the day-long event was characterized by an
intentional lack of structure. Save for dinner plans - catered by one o f the best
Vietnamese restaurants in town - the afternoon was set aside for catching up. After a
period o f mingling and informal discussion, the group formed a massive circle so that
each person could present a brief update on what he or she had been doing for the last
thirty years. And that’s how it went - at first. Each person talked about their careers and
their families. Slowly, however, each successive presentation went longer, as more and
more individuals began to reflect on their days in the Resistance. Many o f them had
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clearly been giving some thought to their history as the reunion approached, and they now
ruminated on how their experience with draft resistance affected their lives. The original
five minute limit on testimonials soon stretched to fifteen or twenty minutes.
Several of the resisters openly regretted that they had not either followed through
with their resistance all the way to prison, and/or that they had not really stayed active in
political issues since the late 1960s. The way they made these confessions - sheepishly,
conveying a genuine sense o f shame - elicited an immediate response from the others
who, like a big brother offering reassurance to a younger sibling, made it clear that the
community did not judge them harshly. Going to prison, someone mentioned, did not
stop the war. And, although few of those in attendance still committed civil disobedience
with any regularity, it did not mean that they did not still lead political lives. No one, for
example, confessed to working for a defense contractor or to “selling out” to Wall Street.
Moreover, as Rosanne Aversa, a former BDRG counselor, said that day, one might think
that one has not lived a “political life,” but personal decisions about how to raise children
- and, in her case as a public school librarian, referring students to books on Emma
Goldman instead of Woodrow Wilson - are political acts.
The purpose of this epilogue is to extend the thirtieth anniversary discussion at the
Arlington Street Church to a wider population o f the draft resistance community. Relying
primarily on data gleaned from the 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey and oral history
interviews, it is clear that most former resisters and their supporters have defied the
stereotype o f a sixties activist who in the 1980s became yuppies concerned only about the
accumulation of personal wealth. They may not be marching in the streets, but their view
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o f the world remains largely consistent with that o f their youth.
Life After the Resistance
In 1969, a new president took office promising to end the war in Vietnam. During
the election campaign he promised “Peace with Honor.”

But despite initiating a gradual

troop withdrawal program and altering the draft selection process to a lottery system (both
in 1969), Richard Nixon actually began expanding the war during his first year in office.
Within weeks o f taking up residence in the White House, Nixon widened the air war to
include thousands of secret sorties over Cambodia. A year later, he sent ground forces
into Cambodia, thus triggering protests more widespread and intense than any of his
predecessors had experienced. There would be no peace with honor. By the time the
United States signed the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Richard Nixon’s
administration had seen another 20,553 American soldiers die along with 107,000 South
Vietnamese troops and more than half a million enemy soldiers; civilian casualties from
1969 to the end of 1972 may have reached one million.
For the men and women who made up Boston’s draft resistance community from
1966 to 1969 the passing o f their movement did not signal an end to their activism.
Although Nixon initiated the draft lottery and troop withdrawals in part to “lessen the
steam behind student protest,”1 and although the larger antiwar movement certainly
experienced some lulls, most former draft resistance activists found plenty of
opportunities to register their opposition to the war long after the Resistance disbanded.
Campus protest continued to grow throughout the greater Boston area, and the October

1 Flynn, The Draft, p. 243.
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15,1969 Moratorium - a national day o f protest in which citizens all across the country
stayed home from work and school to register their opposition to the war - attracted
100,000 people to a rally on the Boston Common, ft was the largest demonstration in the
city’s history. On the same day, doctors in white lab coats collected signatures for
antiwar petitions outside the historic Old South Church; 400 lawyers gathered at Faneuil
Hall to protest against the war. As several historians later wrote: for one day, at least, it
became patriotic to demonstrate.2
Ultimately, the 1997 survey found that at least two-thirds o f the Boston draft
resistance community stayed active in the antiwar movement as draft resistance tapered
off.3 Some former draft resisters and their supporters joined other antiwar organizations
such as the Indochina Peace Campaign, the Coalition for Peace and Justice, the Fifth
Avenue Peace Parade Committee, the U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, and many others. John
Phillips and Suzy Williams, both o f whom had been beaten on the South Boston
Courthouse steps in 1966, joined what became known as the “Ultra-Resistance,” raiding
draft boards, often in broad daylight, and destroying thousands of I-A files.4 Others, less

2 Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, pp. 269, 271-272; see also DeBenedetti,
An American Ordeal, pp. 255, 257, for a similar assessment.
3 When asked what they did immediately after the draft resistance movement, 120
o f 185 (64.9%) respondents said they “remained active in antiwar movement.” In
addition, however, Table E.l shows that 142 of 184 (77.2%) activists said that they were
at least “somewhat involved” in “other Vietnam antiwar movement activities.” It seems
reasonable, therefore, to say at least two-thirds of the former draft resistance community
remained active in protesting against the war.
4 Note: Williams actually carried out her first draft board raid at Boston’s
Customs House with Frank Femia, another CNVA member, aided by John Phillips, in
June 1968, during the Spock Trial. Phillips later achieved further renown as a member of
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bold, worked for town referendum against the war. Eventually, the Massachusetts
legislature passed a bill in April I970"that would allow Massachusetts men to refuse
combat if Congress did not first declare war as required by the Constitution. The new law
empowered the state attorney general to bring any such case directly to the United States
Supreme Court for a ruling. The sponsors hoped, therefore, to get the Court to rule on the
constitutionality o f the Vietnam War. But in November, 1970 the Court refused to hear
the first Massachusetts case based on this law. As Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan
noted, “thus failed one more attempt to end the war through the system.”5 And so, some
people continued to work outside the system. One respondent to the 1997 survey wrote
that even though he felt “completely exhausted, physically, emotionally and financially,
after the movement,” he continued to withhold payment o f his income taxes until fall
1972.6
In addition to continuing their commitment to antiwar activism, some members of
the draft resistance community went on to other social and political activism that did not
pertain to the war. Almost all of the women who participated in the 1997 survey (21 of
25 or 84%) went on to join the women’s movement. They formed the city’s first
consciousness raising groups and eventually founded the influential Bread and Roses

the so-called Chicago 15, when he joined Philip Berrigan in a massive nighttime raid of
Chicago’s Selective Service offices. Williams served a year and a half in prison
(bracketed around an escape) and Phillips spent two and a half years in prison for their
actions.
5 Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, p. 315.
6 Respondent #71, Boston Draft Resistance Survey, 1997.
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collective.7 A handful followed Ira Arlook into the working-class communities of
Lowell, Lynn, Lawrence, New Bedford, Fall River and Boston’s Mission Hill
neighborhood to do community organizing.® Very few gravitated to the Progressive
Labor Party, a Maoist offshoot o f SDS largely credited with the demise of BDRG and
Harvard SDS.9 And not one respondent to the 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
aligned himself or herself with Weatherman, the most extreme SDS splinter group.
Critics o f the 1960s generation generally inflate the importance o f Weatherman, an
organization which, thanks to several successful bombings, attracted considerable media
attention from 1969 to 1971, and likewise overstate the extent to which many radicals
dropped out of society to live together in communes. Here again, the survey upsets these
misconceptions. Of 185 respondents, only 20 (10.8%) stated that they moved into a
commune after their draft resistance days. Few, it turned out, were prepared to drop out
altogether.
Although some draft resistance activists have certainly mellowed in their political
and ideological stands over the last thirty years, very few hung on to the American
political pendulum through much of its sweep from left to right. Table E. 1 (see Appendix
A) shows that the draft resistance community which counted not a single Republican

7 DuBois interview, 11 Jun 1997; Field interview, 17 Jun 1997; Katz interview, 2
Mar 1999; Kurland Lagos interview, 21 Feb 1999; Stone interview, 28 Mar 1997; Thome
interview, 28 Oct 1997.
* Arlook interview, 12 Aug 1998; Robertson interview, 24 Aug 1997.
9 8 (4.3%) out o f 185 respondents said they joined PL after their resistance days,
1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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among its adherents (as represented by the survey’s respondents) when the movement
waned now counts eight (4.8%). More significant is that the large number of men and
women who identified themselves as anarchists, socialists, or communists has decreased,
though nearly one-third continue to use these labels. An attendant increase in the
proportion o f “liberal Democrats” in the survey population has resulted from this
development.10
Over the years, the overwhelming majority of Boston’s draft resistance
community have chosen to participate at one time or another in other social causes and
protest activism. Table E.2 shows the extensive variety o f this work. Although no single
issue has galvanized this group o f people to protest as fervently as the Vietnam War once
did, a significant number of them have taken part in the environmental movement, the
anti-nuclear movement, and in protests against American involvement in El Salvador and
Nicaragua in the 1980s. Only 16 o f 185 (8.6%) survey respondents have not participated
in any type of social or political activism since the Vietnam War. Thus, it would appear
that a certain faith in the power of social movements and grassroots organizing persists
among those former draft resisters and their supporters.
That said, there are some indications of ambivalence about social movements, too.
Though it is no doubt unfair to judge other forms of activism against the antiwar
movement, the survey results clearly demonstrate that to the extent that most respondents
have participated in other movements, the level of involvement has generally been lower

10 32 (31%) o f 103 anarchists, socialists, and communists among the population
now list themselves as liberal Democrats.
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than during the war (see Table E.2). The average number o f individuals from this sample
who characterize their activism as “somewhat involved,” for example, is more than three
times the number who described themselves as “very involved,” and twice the number of
those “moderately involved.”11 Of course the reasons for this could be numerous. As one
person wrote on their questionnaire, his paucity o f involvement today derives “not from
[lack of] conviction, but lack of time.”12 It is a common sentiment.
Maybe more important is a slight undercurrent o f cynicism regarding social
movements. One survey respondent wrote that while she believes activism could affect
real change in America one day, she also thinks that the “collective will necessary to
mobilize people now” is absent. “Apathy, self-centeredness, runs too deep,” she said.
Mike Jupin, the associate rector who caused such a stir at his Winchester church in 1967
says now that his experience opposing the war in Vietnam led him to develop “a certain
amount of cynicism about political processes and the difficulty of bringing about change.”
For one, arguments made on both sides of issues “are much less intellectual than they are
emotional,” which makes it difficult to move others. More important, he says now,
however, is that he learned how “incredibly resistant to change” is any system. “It’s just
very difficult,” he laments. “I’m not nearly the activist that I once was.”
This skepticism notwithstanding, most resisters and those who joined them in the

11 The mean for each level o f involvement was calculated only for the causes and
social movements listed in Table E.l, save the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition
(which, between them, attracted only one person from this group). The mean for “very
involved,” is 9.67; for “moderately involved,” 15.86; and for “somewhat involved,”
33.24.
12 Respondent #56, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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draft resistance movement still possess a strong faith in the ability of ordinary people to
effect change in American society. Table E.3 shows that an overwhelming majority o f
this group agrees that social movements can be potentially effective vehicles for social
change in contemporary America. One former resister commented that, although the
United States is currently experiencing a period of “moral and political crisis,” and
although “the potential for social movements now seems low,” he firmly believes that
“nothing else will bring us toward being a country of justice and peace.”13 This sentiment

is echoed by another former resister, now a minister, who sees social movements as the
most obvious manifestation o f what he calls “the struggle.” The objectives o f the struggle
- which engages “people o f good will from all communities” - are “human liberation
and acting against that which oppresses people.”14 Naturally, some among the old draft

resistance community are not as sanguine. One former draft counselor wryly remarked.
“Chomsky says movements da have an effect [in shaping society], but TV and the mall
seem to have more effect.”15 Moreover, another Resistance supporter argues, 'The media
does not like movements today.” He believes that the social movements of the 1960s
benefitted from a positive media coverage - an assumption that some of his former
colleagues would challenge - that cannot be expected today. “Social change is boosted by
the marriage o f movement and media, and I just don’t see that happening any time soon,”

13 Respondent #126, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
14 Respondent #33, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
15 Respondent #79, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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he concluded.16 Overall, however, the survey indicates that a vast majority o f respondents
still believe in the power o f social movements, and many no doubt agree with the former
resister who said they are “the only hope.”17
Finally, whether social movements are the only hope or not, the career choices of
former draft resistance advocates in many ways seem to reflect their concerns with social
issues or facilitate their examination and discussion o f them (see Table E.4). Far and
away the most popular current occupation o f this group is in academia and teaching.
More than thirty percent o f respondents to the 1997 survey indicated that they currently
teach at the colleges and universities or in a local school system. Professions in which the
welfare of others is a primary concern also dominate the list of occupations. For instance,
in addition to the noticeable number o f physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists (9%)
in the group, a number o f respondents work and often run non-profit or charitable
organizations: Nan Stone is the director of a regional AIDS relief organization; Ray
Mungo is a social worker; Gary Hicks is a tenant organizer; and others list their
occupations as patient advocate, child welfare worker, community arts program director,
and cooperative housing organizer. Likewise, another ten percent are involved in artistic
endeavors, whether as actors (David Clennon, Dick Huges, and Harold Hector), film
makers (Connie Field, and Tim Wright) or artists and writers. There is therefore, an
apparent leaning away from mainstream work in the business world, and although there
are a significant number o f doctors and lawyers in this group, most o f the professional

16 Respondent #83, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
17 Respondent #99, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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categories lean toward the liberal arts. As many o f those who attended the 1997 reunion
remarked, their work has turned out to be a natural extension of the activism o f their
youth. They remain engaged with major issues of the day and are concerned about the
young, the poor, and the alienated.
Looking Back
The positive view of social movements that most former resisters and supporters
maintain today no doubt stems in part from a sense that they waged a struggle that was at
least partially successful thirty years ago. Not only do they disagree overwhelmingly with
conservative critics who charge that the 1960s generation was primarily “destructive,” or
that the antiwar movement was ineffective and actually prolonged the war (thus causing
more deaths), but the vast majority believe that the draft resistance movement ended the
draft and helped to end the Vietnam War (see Table E. 5).
The validity of these claims is still the subject of debate in some circles. In his
historical survey of American draft law violators from 1658 to 1985, Stephen FCohn
describes the Vietnam War era draft resistance movement at the one that “finally
succeeded.” He credits draft resisters with causing the “collapse” o f the nation’s draft
system. Likewise, Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss conclude in their landmark
study of the Vietnam War generation that if the Resistance did not bring the war to an end
or bog down the court system with draft cases, it at least jammed prosecutors’ offices.18
The present study, as indicated especially in Chapter Nine, did not reach the same

18 Kohn, Jailed fo r Peace, p. 142; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance,
p. 67.
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conclusion: in Boston at least, proportionately few draft resisters faced the threat of
prosecution. Nevertheless, George Q7 Flynn, the leading historian on the modem draft
and Louis Hershey’s biographer - and certainly not an antiwar movement partisan acknowledges that the Nixon administration’s decision to reform and ultimately end the
draft came in reaction to the draft resistance movement and its success in publicizing the
unfairness o f a system of conscription that called the poor and underprivileged in
disproportionate numbers.19 At a time when most Americans believed the draft should
continue after the war ended (and fewer than one third favored an all volunteer force),20
Nixon moved to institute the lottery and later terminated the draft altogether. In his
memoirs, Nixon admits that although he regarded draft resisters as cowards, they did
influence his decisions in these matters, if only because he wanted so badly to subvert
their efforts and those of the larger antiwar movement.21
In later years, the elimination o f the draft has been criticized by those who regard
military service as one of the few duties of citizenship in America that fosters a sense of
civic responsibility in those who participate. Historian John Chambers, for instance,

19 Flynn, The Draft, pp. 181, 236.
20 A January 1969 Gallup Poll found that 62% o f Americans thought the draft
should continue after the Vietnam W ar ended, and that only 32% favored the idea of an
all volunteer force. Flynn, The Draft, p. 237.
21 Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985), pp. 102,
125. In addition to reforming and ending the draft, the Nixon administration used the
CIA illegally and the FBI unethically in infiltrating the antiwar movement with the aim of
destroying it. See Flynn, The Draft, p. 237; Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent
(Boston: South End Press, 1990).
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argues that Nixon unintentionally “further reduced the symbolic importance o f American
citizenship.” Elimination o f the draft, he notes, “diluted a preeminent feature o f political
membership - the sense o f shared sacrifice and patriotic commitment to a common goal.”
Although the vast majority o f respondents to the draft resistance survey do not agree that
compulsory military service would help to create a greater sense of civic responsibility in
America today,22 the question produced a bounty o f qualifying statements. Most o f those
who commented acknowledge a dilution in social responsibility over the last generation
and would favor a system o f compulsory service for young Americans that, like the plan
proposed by Robert McNamara in 1967, included non-military options. In addition,
several resisters commented that the All Volunteer Force that evolved out o f the end of
the draft is no more equitable than the deferment-riddled system of conscription they
fought to abolish. Wealthy and better educated men and women do not enter the military
on the same scale as (and, therefore, do not bear the same burdens for their country as)
poorer and less educated men and women who are drawn to serve by promises o f
educational and employment opportunities otherwise unavailable to them. Thus, whether
the draft resistance movement caused the collapse o f the draft or not, its elimination has
had consequences that some former resisters find troubling.23
The claim that draft resistance helped shorten the war is another matter o f some

22 When asked if they agree or disagree that “compulsory military service would
help to bring a greater sense of civic responsibility in contemporary America,” 150
(87.7%) o f 171 respondents disagreed. Only four agreed strongly. 1997 Boston Draft
Resistance Survey.
23 Respondents #1, 19,40, 53, 61, 73, 82, 93, 121, 132, 144, 146, 151, 155, 157,
160, 169, 178, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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contention. Claims that a draft resistance movement that essentially folded in 1969
helped to stop a war that continued until January 1973 seem at first a bit overstated. The
war did grind on for another four years after all, and as Thomas Powers wrote in the years
immediately following the war, opponents o f the war had to come to grips with the reality
that the American government abandoned its policy in Vietnam not because the antiwar
movement had persuaded most Americans to oppose the war - or because the war was
simply wrong - but because the Vietnamese would not yield after more than a decade o f
fighting. Indeed, this issue is at the heart of Adam Garfinkle’s argument that the antiwar
movement failed totally in its efforts to move public opinion against the war and that it
succeeded only in dragging the war out longer. But Garfinkle does not address draft
resistance within the antiwar movement or issues of manpower allocation at all in his
analysis, and, more important, he does not consider the issue o f conscience in a civil
society.24
In 1967 and 1968, draft resistance raised the stakes o f fighting the Vietnam War.
Draft resisters and everyone who supported them waged their protest at a new level of
intensity that not only incurred significant risks for participants, but also forced the
Johnson administration to finally take notice of - and respond to - a growing community
o f opposition. Maybe most important, as the Selective Service made matters worse by
punitively reclassifying resisters, and as the Justice Department prepared to prosecute
these men, key officials in the Pentagon and the State Department pointed to an expected
surge in draft resistance if the president granted General Westmoreland’s request for

24 Powers, The War at Home, p. xv; Garfinkle, Telltale Hearts,
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206,000 additional troops. That is the most obvious evidence that the draft resistance
movement helped to rein in the war effort.
And here Garfinkle may yet be right: by preventing the fulfilment o f that troop
request and, more significant, by causing foreign policy officials to worry about the
antiwar movement, perhaps the antiwar movement was guilty o f contributing to a longer
war. We can never know, o f course, but at the end of the day, it is not a particularly
meaningful question. The more important question revolves around the moral issue o f a
citizen’s responsibility to his country when the government is engaged in behavior that he
deems “illegal,” “immoral,” or “obscene.” Should he remain passive, as Garfinkle’s
argument seems to imply, in hopes that the war will end sooner than if he took to the
streets in protest? As one resister asked rhetorically, “what would have happened without
the movement? Would we have nuked Vietnam? Destroyed half the world in our anti
communist obsession? Despite rampant revisionism, history has bom us out.
Communism self-destructed without us having to bomb Russia, China, etc. Governments
evolve without war.” It is significant that he emphasizes the draft resistance movement’s
role in deterring an even wider war in Vietnam or elsewhere, for even among those who
believe their efforts in the Resistance did not help end the war, most agree that, as another
resister wrote on his survey, the Resistance “served only as a counterbalance to keep the
war from being wider...from being more vigorously fought.”25
Noam Chomsky argues that one of the greatest legacies o f the Vietnam era

25 Respondent #19, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey; Respondent #59, 1997
Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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antiwar movement is that it set an example for others to follow. When Ronald Reagan
began to build a “■counterinsurgency” program in El Salvador just as John F. Kennedy had
done in South Vietnam, his administration eventually had to back off, Chomsky says,
because ‘‘there was just an uprising all over the country - nobody was going to tolerate it.”
Soon, the Reagan administration moved to a program o f “clandestine terror,” that
Kennedy and Johnson, operating at a time when most Americans did not generally
question their government’s foreign policy, never had to consider. That, Chomsky
concludes, is a major change.26
Beyond a general sense that the draft resistance movement helped to end the war
(as indicated in Table E.4), when asked to reflect on the significance o f the movement,
most former resisters and supporters speak about its personal impact rather than its
political one. Chris Venn, who ultimately went to prison following an accumulation of
run-ins with the law over draft resistance and fighting police in Berkeley’s battle for
People’s Park, says now that turning in his draft card “defined who I am ever since.”
Although his mother criticized him for his draft resistance saying he would never get the
GI Bill or the kinds of house loans afforded veterans, Venn always regarded the “standing
up for principles, [and] understanding the consequences o f it,” as the most valuable
lesson o f draft resistance. Ray Mungo likewise wrote in 1970 that regardless o f what
happened with his battles with the draft he hoped “never to regret having handled it as I
did - uncompromisingly but kind of cavalierly.” “It’s something I’m doing,” he
concluded, “maybe the only thing, for my self-respect.” Others, like David Stoppelman,

26 Chomsky interview, 20 May 1997.
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who also did prison time, now regret the effect his draft resistance had on his family, and
is not so sure that resisting'the draft was the right thing to do.
Most activists, however, regard their draft resistance work as invaluable in that it
taught them how make difficult choices based on principle, and that doing so did not
signal “the end of the world.” They could survive it. “Although I’m older now and...we
pay our taxes and we have this average sort o f urban lifestyle,” Jim Oestereich says now,
“I know that tomorrow, if I had to hit a barricade, I know how to do it. And I’d know
how to make the decision, and I’d know how to live with it. Those are things I didn’t
know before [resisting the draft].” Jack Bishop, the rector at Winchester’s Parish o f the
Epiphany when Mike Jupin’s draft resistance caused controversy, regards that crisis as
“the turning point” in his life. “It’s awfully hard to move forward without constant
reference to 1967 and what it meant to me as a priest,” he said. “It certainly pointed out
that if one is going to take a personal stand, that that’s going to require an awful lot o f
energy: spiritual, mental, emotional, and physical - the whole works.” Perhaps the survey
comments of one other resister come closest to conveying how most feel today about their
draft resistance experience: “Would I do it again? Depends on the circumstances. I did
not like being illegal, but I still thought the war and the draft were wrong, wrong enough
to demand civil disobedience. I like to think that I would still be willing to break a bad
law. But I don’t know...you get awfully comfortable. Like E.M. Forster, I hope I would
have the guts to betray my country.”27

27 Oestereich interview, 20 Dec 1997; Bishop interview, 11 Dec 1997;
Respondent #60, 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey.
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Finally, a common sentiment among members of the Boston draft resistance
community is that the movement introduced them to some of the finest people they have
ever met and taught them something about the essential qualities of a good human being
and a decent society. Their interpretations o f their participation in the movement to end
the war in Vietnam echo the characterization o f struggle made by Emma Goldman in the
epigraph at the top o f this epilogue. “The emphasis on values, feelings, human rights,
justice, the collective spirit,” Penney Kurland says, “have formed how I view the world,
how I raise my children, and hopefully, how I treat others in both my personal and
professional life.” Bill Bischoff, the then-Harvard graduate student, veteran, and resister
remembers it the same way. He gets the last word: “It was gratifying to be associated
with as many people of high moral caliber and intellectual caliber as I was involved with.
I really, in later years, I’ve missed that.”28

28 Penney Kurland Lagos, e-mail to author, 25 Feb 1999; Bischoff interview, 5
Jan 1998.
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APPENDIX A

TABLES

Table 4.1: Selective Service Classifications of Resisters in New England, Fall 1967
Classification

N

%
35

17.5

1-D (Reserve or ROTC)

1

.5

1-0 (Conscientious Objector)

4

2.0

1-S (Student)

1

.5

l-W (Conscientious Objector)

1

.5

23

11.5

2

1.0

2-S (Student)

85

42.5

3-A (Hardship or dependent)

6

3.0

4-A (Prior active service)

13

6.5

4-D (Minister or divinity student)

13

6.5

4-F (Not qualified for military service)

11

5.5

5-A (Overage)

3

1.5

Refused to register

2

1.0

1-A (Available for service)

l-Y (Physical or mental)
2-A (Occupational)

200
Totals
Source: New England Resistance “Master File,” 3apers o f Alex Jack.
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Table 4.2: Resisters’ Parents’ Level o f Education
#
Fathers

Some grade school

%

#
Mothers

%

6

5.1

3

2.6

Completed grade school

4

3.4

3

2.6

Some high school

6

5.1

9

7.7

Completed high school

18

15.4

26

22.2

Some post high school training

10

8.5

9

7.7

Some college

16

13.7

19

16.2

Completed college

13

11.1

27

23.0

Some graduate school

7

6.0

4

3.4

M.A. or M.S

7

6.0

11

9.4

Professional degree

16

13.7

5

4.3

Master’s plus additional grad work

3

2.6

0

0.0

Doctorate

11

9.4

1

0.9

100%

117

100%

Highest Level o f Education
Achieved

'

117
Total
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey.
Table 4.3: Resisters * Parents’ Occupations
# Fathers

%

# Mothers

%

Semiskilled or unskilled

5

4.3

2

1.7

Skilled

13

11.3

1

0.9

Farmer

2

1.7

0

0.0

Clerical or Sales

15

13.0

20

17.2

Proprietor

13

11.3

2

1.7

Professional

67

58.3

31

26.7

Homemaker

0

0.0

60

51.7

115
99.9
Total
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey.

116

99.9

Occupational Code
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Table 4.4: Resisters’ Class Status
Class Description

.# Resisters

%

Working-class

12

10.0

Lower middle-class

13

10.8

Middle-class

53

44.2

Upper middle-class

40

33.3

Upper class

2

1.7

Total
120
Source: 1997 Boston <raft resistance survey.

100

Table 4.5: Religious Affiliation o f Resisters and Their Parents
#
Fathers

%
Fathers

#
Mothers

%
Mothers

#
Resisters

%
Resisters

Roman Catholic

11

9.7

14

12.1

5

4.2

Baptist

0

0.0

1

0.9

0

0.0

Congregational

6

5.3

5

4.3

->

2.5

Episcopal

16

14.2

17

14.7

7

5.9

Lutheran

1

0.9

1

0.9

1

0.8

Methodist

8

7.1

10

8.6

4

3.4

Presbyterian

11

9.7

10

8.6

J

2.5

Unitarian-Universalist

10

8.8

12

10.3

15

12.7

Quaker

0

0.0

0

0.0

4

3.4

Mennonite

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Jehovah’s Witness

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Jewish

27

23.9

29

25.0

18

15.3

Agnostic

8

7.1

5

4.3

30

25.4

Atheist

10

8.8

6

5.2

20

16.9

Other

5

4.4

6

5.2

8

6.8

Denomination
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113
99.9
Total
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

116

100.1

118

99.8

Table 4.6: Veteran Status o f Resisters and Their Parents
Veteran Status

#
Fathers

%
Fathers

#
Mothers

%
Mothers

#
Resisters

%
Resisters

Veteran

48

39.7

3

2.5

8

6.6

Non-Veteran

73

60.3

118

97.5

113

93.4

100

121

100

121
Total
100
121
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

Table 4.7: Political Leanings o f Resisters and Their Parents
#
Fathers

%
Fathers

#
Mothers

%
Mothers

#
Resisters

%
Resisters

Conservative
Republican

15

13.0

6

5.2

1

0.9

Moderate Republican

27

23.5

28

24.1

1

0.9

Moderate Democrat

21

18.3

28

24.1

6

5.1

Liberal Democrat

41

35.7

46

39.7

48

41.0

Socialist/Communist

4

3.5

4

3.4

29

24.8

Anarchist

1

0.9

1

0.9

17

14.5

No preference

3

2.6

J

2.6

7

6.0

Other

3

2.6

0

0.0

8

6.8

100

117

100

Political Identity

100.1
116
115
Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
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Table 4.8: Parents with Shared Political Leanings
Political Identity

Number of Couples

Percent of Couples-

Both Republican

29

32.2

Both Democrat

56

62.2

Both Socialist/C om m unist

4

4.4

Both Anarchist

1

1.1

90
Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

99.9

Table 6.1: Parents’ Views o f Their Sons’ Draft Card Tum-In
Parent

N/A

Strongly
Disapprove

Disapprove

NonCommittal

Approve

Strongly
Approve

Total

Father

35

24

23

16

13

10

116

Mother

22

19

27

22

21

11

116

232
21
50
34
57
38
43
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey. Is[ote: Althoug 1 121 draft resisters
responded to the questionnaire, only 86 answered questions regarding their fathers; 99
answered questions about their mothers. Therefore, the percentages that appear in the
text are based on iV=86 and V=99.
Table 6.2: Parish of the Epiphany (Winchester, Massachusetts) Reaction to the Rev.
Vlichael Jupin’s Draft Card Tum-in
Reaction

# o f Parishioners

% of Parishioners

Approval

73

55.7

Disapproval in favor of
disciplinary action

25

19.1

Disapproval but not in
favor o f punishing Jupin

22

16.8

Other

11

8.4

100
i
131
Totals
Source: Written Responses, Parish o f the Epiphany, 29 Oct 967, Papers o f the Reverend
Jack Bishop
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Table 6.3: Supporters' Occupations
Occupation N

%

Students

33

48.5

Academics

10

14.7

Other

25

36.8

Total
68 100
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey

# Fathers

Occupational Code

%

# Mothers

%

Semiskilled or unskilled

1

1.7

2

3.1

Skilled

4

6.8

0

0.0

Farmer

I

1.7

0

0.0

Clerical or Sales

5

8.5

9

14.1

Proprietor

15

25.4

4

6.3

Professional

33

55.9

23

35.9

Homemaker

0

0.0

26

40.6

59
Total
100
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey.

64

100

Table 6.5: Supporters’ Class Status
Class Description

# Supporters

%

Working-class

6

9.1

Lower-Middle-C lass

4

6.1

Middle-Class

31

46.9

Upper-Middle-Class

24

36.4

1

1.5

Upper-Class

66
Total
100
Source: 1997 Boston draft resistance survey
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Table 6.6: Parents o f Supporters, Religious Affiliation
#
Fathers

%:
Fathers

#
Mothers

%
Mothers

Supporters

%
Supporters

Agnostic

6

10

5

7.8

16

24.6

Atheist

5

8.3

3

4.7

22

33.8

Baptist

1

1.7

2

3.1

0

0.0

Roman Catholic

8

13.3

7

10.9

4

6.2

Christian Scientist

1

1.7

0

0.0

0

0.0

Congregational

2

3.3

2

3.1

0

0.0

Episcopalian

4

6.7

5

7.8

1

1.5

18

30

19

29.7

10

15.4

Lutheran

0

0.0

1

1.6

0

0.0

Methodist

1

1.7

4

6.3

0

0.0

Mormon

I

1.7

1

1.6

1

1.5

Presbyterian

6

10

5

7.8

1

1.5

Unitarian

5

8.3

6

9.4

7

10.8

Quaker

0

0.0

I

1.6

1

1.5

Other

2

3.3

3

4.7

2

3.1

Denomination

Jewish

64
65
99.9
60
100.1
100
Total
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
Note: O f the 60 fathers, 49 or 81.7% identified themselves with a religious domination.
Similarly, 56 o f 64 mothers (87.5%) identified themselves with a religious domination.
In contrast, of 65 supporters, 27 or 41.5% identified themselves with a religious
domination.
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Table 6.7: Veteran Status o f Supporters and Their Parents
Veterans

N

%

Supporters

11

25.0%*

Fathers

29

42.6%**

Mothers

1

1.5%

-

Both Mother and Father 1 N/A
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
Note: *Out o f 44 male supporters. 11 were veterans.
** Out of 68 fathers, 29 were veterans.
Table 6.8: Supporters’ Self-IdentiJication
Label
Hippie

%

N

7.4

5

Politico

23

33.8

Activist

51

75

Revolutionary

23

33.8

Member of Counterculture

27

39.7

47 69.1
Part of New Left
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
Table 6.9: Parents of Supporters, Political Affiliation
Political Affiliation

N

%

Mother and Father Both Republican

18

35.3

Mother and Father Both Democrat

29

56.9

Mother and Father Both Communist/Socialist/Anarchist

4

7.8

51* 100
Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
* Of 68 supporters, the parents o f 51 (75%) both belonged to the same political
affiliation.
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Table 6.10: Supporters, Political Affiliation
Political Affiliation

N.

%

Conservative Republican

0

0

Moderate Republican

0

0

Moderate Democrat

I

1.8

Liberal Democrat

28

49.1

Communist/Socialist

22

38.6

Anarchist

6

10.5

57 100
Total
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
Table 6.11: Supporters’ Prior Activism______
Type o f Activism

N

%*

SDS

23

33.8

Campus or Community Peace Activism

38

55.9

Campus or Community Vietnam Summer

14

20.6

Campus or Community Civil Rights Activism

42

61.8

No Activist Experience
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
* Note: Based on population of 68 respondents

7

10.3
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Table 9.1: In the Wake o f Draft Card Turn-Ins
Number

Percentage

Reclassified to 1-A, but no Induction Notice

21

20.6

Reclassified to 1-A and Sent Induction Notice

56

54.9

Resister Retrieved Original Draft Card Before Sent to DOJ

2

2.0

Resister Asked Draft Board for New Draft Card

3

2.9

Draft Board Sends Duplicate Card Unsolicited

4

3.9

Resister Applied for and Received New Deferment

6

5.9

Resister Left the Country

1

1.0

Resister Heard Nothing from SSS or DOJ

9

8.8

102

100

Action

Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

Table 9.2: Resisters Reclassified to I-A But Who Did Not Receive an Induction Notice
Number

Percentage

Applied for and/or Accepted a New Deferment

11

52.4

Joined Oestereich Lawsuit

2

9.5

Left the Country

1

4.8

Heard Nothing Further from SSS or DOJ

7

33.3

21

100

Action

Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

Table 9.3: Resisters Reclassified to I-A and Who Die Receive an Induction Notice
Number

Percentage

Refused Induction

30

56.6

Failed Physical or Other Induction Test

14

26.4

Applied for New Deferment After Reclassification

9

17.0

53

100

Action

Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
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Table 9.4: Draft Resistance Indictments and Prosecutions in Boston. 1966-1968
-1966

1967

1968

Indictments

26

25

50

Fugitives

3

4

17

Convictions or Guilty Pleas

16

12

8

Acquittals and Dismissals

2

3

18

Dismissals for Compliance

5

6

2

Pending
Source: SUPPORT Newsletter, Jan 1970, p. 4, Papers o f Michael Zigmond.

5

Table E. 1: Political Affiliation o f Draft Resistance Community Then and Now
Immediately
After Draft
Resistance

%

Today

%

Conservative Republican

0

0

2

1.2

Moderate Republican

0

0

6

3.6

Moderate Democrat

5

3.0

9

5.4

Liberal Democrat

46

27.5

72

43.1

Socialist/Communist

71

42.5

39

23.4

Anarchist

32

19.2

14

8.4

No Preference

10

6.0

13

7.8

Other

3

1.8

12*

7.2

Political Affiliation

167
100.1
167
100
Total
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey. * Note: The labels used to identify their
politics today include: “Progressive populist,” “social democrat” (2), “propeople/community,” “revolutionary,” “autonomist,” “Green” (2), and “maverick
humanist.”
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Table E.2: Level o f Activism in Other Causes and Movements After Draft Resistance
(includes draft resisters and supporters)__________________ __________ ________
Cause or Movement

Moderately
Very
Involved
Involved

Somewhat
Involved

Not
Involved

Other Vietnam Antiwar Activities

67

42

33

42

Student Movement

22

23

24

118

Women’s Movement

17

25

43

103

Gay & Lesbian Rights Movement

8

16

23

138

Farm Workers Movement

2

11

49

123

Labor Organizing

14

10

26

135

Pro-Choice Movement

9

16

41

119

Pro-Life Movement

1

5

6

173

Environmental Movement

14

34

45

92

Common Cause

0

6

20

159

Anti-Nuclear Movement

16

15

53

101

Nuclear Freeze

7

7

36

135

Contemporary Draft Resistance

0

3

17

165

Contemporary Peace Movement

9

17

44

115

1980s Central American Antiwar
Movement

23

22

40

100

Anti-Apartheid Movement

11

19

47

108

Moral Majority

0

1

0

184

Christian Coalition

0

0

0

185

Socialist Movement

9

14

23

139

Democratic Party

9

24

42

110

Republican Party

0

1

1

183

Libertarian Party

0

1

2

182

Local Electoral Campaigns

12

27

46

100
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State Electoral Campaigns

37

19

8

121

18
36
National Electoral Campaigns
12
109
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey
Note: In addition to the causes listed in this table, respondents listed a total of 24 other
causes with the following receiving multiple mentions: Race relations (4); Native
American rights (2); Anti-poverty/welfare rights (6); children’s rights (2); community
organizing (4); health care (2); Palestine liberation (2); prison rights (3); and Green Party
(2).
Table E.3: Resisters’ and Supporters’ Current Views on the Effectiveness of Social
Movements
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

90

81.

11

0

80

98

64

92

17

3

Social Movements Based on Non72
Violence are Potentially Effective
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

98

6

2

Subject
Social Movements Were Very Effective
Vehicles for Social Change in 1960s
Social Movements Are Potentially
Effective Vehicles for Social Change in
Contemporary America
Social Movements Based on Moral
Witness are Potentially Effective

1

Table E.4 Resisters’ and Supporters’ Current Occupations
Number

Percent

Professor or other academic job

47

25.8

Teacher or librarian

12

6.7

Physician/Psychiatrist/Psychologist

16

8.8

Non-profit/charity/activist

13

7.1

Artist/Actor/Author/Film

19

10.4

Attorney or Judge (1)

10

5.5

Ministers or Priests

9

4.9

Occupation
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High Tech

8

4.4

Skilled Labor

5

2.7

Clerical or sales

5

2.7

Self-employed

6

3.3

Fanner

1

0.6

State/local government

3

1.7

Professional - other

17

9.3

Retired

5

2.7

Unemployed

6

3.3

182

99.9

Totals
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

Table E.5: Resisters’ and Supporters’ Current Views on the 1960s and the Success and
Failure of the Draft Resistance Movement.
_________
_________
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

The 1960s Generation Was a
Destructive Generation

5

I

53

120

The Antiwar Movement was Ineffective
and Actually Prolonged the War

1

3

53

124

30

79

55

4

The Draft Resistance Movement
80
Helped to End the Vietnam War
Source: 1997 Boston Draft Resistance Survey

93

4

3

Subject

The Draft Resistance Movement
Brought About the End o f the Draft
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APPENDIX B

STATEMENT ON METHODOLOGY

The primary goal o f this dissertation is to recover the history o f a social movement
that to date has been largely overlooked by historians. More narrowly, the dissertation
seeks to capture the experiences of draft resisters and their supporters in a way that
preserves individual stories while also making generalizations possible. Consequently,
two o f the most important sources used in this study are a questionnaire and dozens of
oral history interviews. The purpose of this appendix is to describe the ways in which
these sources were created and used in gathering data for this dissertation.
Questionnaire
The sheer number of participants in Boston’s draft resistance movement made a
questionnaire necessary. Hundreds o f (indeed, probably more than a thousand) people
made up this grassroots movement, and in an attempt to understand their collective
experience - as opposed to focusing on experiences of a small number of “representative”
participants - a blending o f sociology and history became necessary.
The first step in this process required the gathering o f as many names o f draft
resisters and other movement participants as possible. After combing through the
newsletters and internal memoranda of several key organizations (e.g., the New England
Resistance, the Boston Draft Resistance Group, Resist, SUPPORT, etc.), a “Master File”
o f draft resisters dating to circa January 1968, underground newspapers, mainstream
newspapers, and other sources, I compiled a list o f close to 600 names.
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Locating all o f these people thirty years later proved to be one of the biggest
challenges o f the project. I put together a database that listed all o f the names that I had
found and any other information that I knew about each person, such as what
organization(s) he or she worked with, university, hometown, etc. Beginning with
Michael Ferber and many of the other former leaders of the New England Resistance, I
circulated copies o f the database to dozens of movement participants looking for leads.
At the same time, an article by James Carroll in the Boston Globe elicited calls from
many other activists who also helped to provide leads - and added more names to the list.
Meanwhile, using an internet site called Switchboard.com, which carries the nation's
telephone listings, I began to systematically move through the list of names, using all the
information at my disposal, to get solid addresses for as many people in the database as
possible. This proved to be tremendously successful, especially in cases in which the
activist I was seeking had an unusual name; it was much more difficult to find someone
with a common name using this resource. Frequently, I mailed a letter to five or six
people with the same name, hoping I would catch the right one. Sometimes it worked
and other times it did not (see Appendix C). Finally, after almost a year of this kind o f
detective work, I turned to the alumni offices at approximately 40 colleges and
universities, who confirmed that they had addresses for some of the people whom I still
had not found.
In the end, I decided to proceed with the administration of the questionnaire when
I had a list o f 310 people for whom I or their alumni office had a solid address. O f the
310 who received the questionnaire, 185 completed and returned it (59.7%), a very
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respectable response rate.
The questionnaire aimed to capture the experience not just of draft resisters but
also o f those who worked in the movement in various capacities to support their efforts.
Consequently, certain portions of the questionnaire (see below) were tailored for certain
types of individuals. Rare was the person who was able to answer every question on the
survey. Everyone was asked to complete the sections pertaining to their backgrounds and
personal history, as well as questions about what they have done since the end o f the draft
resistance movement.
The diverse nature o f the population made it necessary to tabulate the data gleaned
from the questionnaire in several different ways. As the tables in Appendix A show, data
tabulated for Chapters 4 and 9 dealt only with resisters, and data tabulated for Chapter 6
pertained only to supporters. For the Epilogue, I tabulated data for the entire population.
It is important to note here that of the 185 respondents, 121 were draft resisters. That is,
these respondents had either turned in a draft card, burned a draft card, or refused
induction. The rem ain in g 64 respondents, therefore, participated in the draft resistance
movement in a variety o f what can be called, for lack o f a better term, support roles. This
include members o f BDRG, other draft counselors, ministers, sanctuary participants,
older advisers (such as those in Resist), etc. At the same time, however, I made the
decision to include four o f the 121 resisters in the supporter population as well. Three o f
the four individuals were older men (in their early to mid-thirties) who primarily acted in
roles that I defined as support roles, but who turned in their draft cards as well. The
fourth person is a woman who was extremely active in the movement, and who also
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burned a colleague’s draft card at the Arlington Street Church. In these few unusual
cases, it seemed appropriate to include their data in analyses o f both resisters and
supporters.
A copy o f the questionnaire and a sample cover letter are included at the end of
this appendix.
Oral Histories
To supplement the data mined from the questionnaire responses and numerous
manuscript sources, interviews with a wide range of participants was also necessary.
Most of those interviewed completed the questionnaire (usually before the interview,
though a few interviews were conducted as exploratory discussions for the purpose of
conceptualizing the questionnaire), but some did not - either because they chose not to or
because they were located long after the questionnaire was administered.
All o f the interviews have been recorded on audio tape and at some future date
will be deposited at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection in Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania, where they will eventually be available to other researchers. At the start of
each interview, every interviewee was asked to complete an informed consent form and a
deed of gift form agreeing to the eventual transfer of the tape to Swarthmore.
In conducting these interviews, I sought to touch on many o f the issues raised in
the questionnaire, but I also tried, to the extent possible, to elicit spontaneous story telling
from each interviewee. As any oral historian can testify, some interviews go brilliantly
and others do not. Memories can be crystal clear and they can be very hazy. And
recollections that seem crystal clear can be quite inaccurate. In all cases, I have tried to
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corroborate stories told in interviews with other sources, print or oral. At times, however,
I have used material gleaned from only one interview, but only in rare cases in which the
verisimilitude o f the account seemed reasonably unassailable. To my regret, there are at
least a few remarkable stories that I have elected to leave out o f the present narrative for
lack o f corroboration. If and when I find other supporting evidence for these stories, they
will be added to a later draft.
In the end, I have sought to fuse the historian’s traditional archival research with
the sociologist’s approach to examining large demographic groups. And although I am
satisfied that this was the most useful and fruitful course to take, I must acknowledge its
inherent limitations. In questionnaires, for instance, there are always questions that
should have been asked but were not, and the issue of those who did not return the
questionnaire always lingers. One hopes that even if every person to whom the
questionnaire was sent had completed and returned it, the results would not be materially
different than those presented here, but it is worth pondering. For example, when I assert
in the Epilogue that most former draft resistance activists have continued to be active and
have not “sold out,” it is possible that some persons did not return the survey exactly
because they did “sell out.” It is impossible to know. The best one can do is to try to
avoid overstating conclusions based on such data and to seek supporting evidence
elsewhere. The variety o f sources used in this dissertation has made that process
relatively easy.
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Department of History
College of Liberal Arts
Horton Social Science Center
20 College Road
Durham . N ew H am pshire 03824-3586
(603) 862-1764
F ax : (603) 862-0178

10 June 1997

Mr. John Doe
P.O. Box XXXX
Boston, MA 02134

Dear Mr. Doe,
My name is Michael Foley. I am a Ph.D. candidate here at the University o f New Hampshire and
am currently writing a dissertation on the history o f draft resistance in Boston during the Vietnam
War. I found your name among the records o f the New England Resistance which indicate that you
turned in your draft card at the Old West Church on November 16,1967. I am contacting you
through your alumni office in hopes that you will be w illing to take part in my study.
It is my belief that the draft resistance movement has not received sufficient attention in our
histories o f the antiwar movement. Yet it was a vital part o f the larger movement. My goal is to use
Boston as a case study for the draft resistance movement and to focus on the participants more than
on a traditional description o f events. To that end, I have been working with records from different
organizations associated with draft resistance in Boston; but to get a better understanding, I will be
interviewing some participants and sending questionnaires to as many participants as I can locate.
As you will see from the questions on the survey, I am interested in understanding all varieties o f
experience. It is important that historians explore how different people from different backgrounds
came to the same movement, how they experienced that movement, and how it ultimately affected
their lives. I realize that, for some people, participation in the draft resistance movement was a
deeply personal, sometimes painful, experience. If this was the case for you, I hope that you will
still consider at least completing this questionnaire. One o f the problems with many studies o f
social movements is that they rely too heavily on the experience o f leaders and others who have
predominantly positive feelings for the movemenL I want to understand the whole draft resistance
story (the good and the bad), so I hope to have a high response rate to this survey.
Finally, let me add that your responses to questions on this survey will remain absolutely
confidential. I will not, under any circumstances, use any survey respondent’s name in my oral or
written interpretations o f the survey results. Furthermore, I will not respond to any requests from
the media or the government for information that I collect.
I hope that you will enjoy participating in this study, and would appreciate it if you would return the
completed questionnaire within five days, if that is possible (otherwise, please return it as soon as
you can). I have included a postage paid envelope for that purpose.
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The success or failure o f this project is heavily dependent upon the cooperation o f people like you.
It is my sincere hope that you w ill take a few minutes (generally no more than 30 minutes) to
participate in a study that I hope w ill help recover an important part o f our history, one that can
teach us lessons important to our future. Please call m e with any questions or com m ents you have
regarding this questionnaire or the dissertation research as a whole. My number is 603.437.0S13.
Thanks very much.
Sincerely,

Michael S. Foley

Note: This questionnaire and dissertation have been approved by the University o f New Hampshire
Institutional Review Board for the Protection o f Human Subjects in Research.
ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:
Michael Ferber, Professor o f English, University o f N ew Hampshire
I have been working closely with Michael Foley for over a year, and I am confident he
w ill do a serious, thoughtful, responsible job o f his research into draft resistance. He is entirely
sympathetic with what we trial to do in 1967-70—1 think he would have been one o f us—but he
has die scholarly detachment to pose certain questions o f our movement and to place it in certain
contexts that I, at least, would not have been able to do. Y ou'll like him if you meet him.
He’ll write a good book. Please give him what help you can.

Michael Ferber
June 1997

Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Boston University
May 10,

1997

Michael S. Foley
113 Bayberry Lane
Londonderry, NH 0305
Dear Mr. Foley:
I am happy to endorse your project in researching the draft
resistance movement in Boston during the Vietnam war. I
think it will be a valuable addition to our knowledge of the
anti-war movement in that period of American history.
Sine
Howard Zinn
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Boston Draft Resistance During the Vietnam W ar A Questionnaire
Please respond to all questions that apply to your experience. You may include comments at any point.
Draft Resistance Activity
I.

With which draft resistance organizations'did you work? (Circle as many as apply)
1. None (resisted as an individual)
2. Boston Draft Resistance Group
3. New England Resistance
4. RESIST
5. SUPPORT
6. Prison Information and Support Service
7. Committee for Non-Violent Action
8. American Friends’ Service Committee
9. A campus-based draft counseling group
10. East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives
11. O th e r_______________________

2.

O f these groups, was there one with which you worked more than the others? Which one?
1. None (resisted as an individual)
2. Boston Draft Resistance Group
3. New England Resistance
4. RESIST
5. SUPPORT
6. Prison Information and Support Service
7. Committee for Non-Violent Action
8. American Friends’ Service Committee
9. A campus-based draft counseling group
10. East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives
11. O th e r_______________________

3.

In what kinds of draft resistance activities did you participate?
1. Draft counseling (e.g., out o f an office such as BDRG or AFSC, or on a college campus)
2. Turned-in draft card
3. Burned draft card
4. Refused induction
5. “Early Morning Shows”
6. “Horror Shows”
7. Community outreach (e.g., door-to-door canvassing of potential draftees)
8. GI outreach
9. Sanctuaries
10. Draft board raids (to steal or destroy files)
11.Other
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Yes
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Please answer the following questions only if you turned-in your draft card, burned your draft card, and/or
refused induction. Otherwise, please proceed to question # 20.
4.

What was your draft status at the time you tumed-in or burned your draft card?
I. Did not turn-in or bum my draft card
2 . 1-A.
Draft eligible
3 . 1-A-O.
Conscientious objector available for noncombatant duty only
4 .1 -0 .
Conscientious objector available for civilian work only
S. 1-S.
Deferred to end o f school year
6 . 1-Y.
Physical or mental deferment
7 .2-A.
Occupational deferment
8 .2-C.
Agricultural deferment
9 .2-S.
Student deferment
10.3-A.
Deferred because o f dependants
II.4-B .
Officials deferred by law
12.4-C.
Alien deferment
13.4-D.
Minister or ministerial student
14.4-F.
Not qualified for any service
15.5-A.
Overage

S.

When and where did you tum-in or bum your draft card? Please circle.
1. Did not tum-in or bum my card
2. October 16, 1967 at the Arlington Street Church
3. November 16,1967 at the Old West Church
4. December 4,1967 at Banell Chapel, Yale University
5. January 29, 1968 at the Arlington Street Church (day o f the Spock arraignments)
6. April 3,1968 on the Boston Common
7. November 14,1968 on the Boston Common
8. (ndependendy mailed my card to the Justice Dept., Selective Service, or draft board
9. Other (specify)_________________________________________________
10. Other________________________________________________________

6.

How did you first hear about this event?
1. Did not tum-in or bum my card
2. Friend or acquaintance told me about it
3. Family member told me about it.
4. Heard about it through news reports (television, radio, newspaper)
5. Saw a poster or leaflet
6. Happened upon it as I was walking by
7. Other (specify)_______________________________________
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7.

What happened to you after you turned-in or burned your draft card? (Please circle all that apply)
Yes

No

1. The FBI interviewed me.
2. The FBI interviewed one or both o£tny parents about me
3. The FBI interviewed other members o f my family about me
4. The FBI interviewed friends about me
5. The FBI interviewed my employer about me
6. Draft board changed my draft status to 1-A (draftable), but
I never received an induction notice
7. Draft board changed my draft status to l-A (draftable), and
I later received an induction notice
8 .1 retrieved my draft card from the people to whom I had given it.
9 .1 asked my draft board to issue another draft card to me.
10.1 applied for and received a deferment.
11.1 left the country
12.1 accepted induction
13.1 refused induction
14. Other_____________________________________________
8.

If you later applied for or accepted a deferment, which deferment did you receive?
1. Did not later apply for a deferment
2. l-A-O. Conscientious objector available for noncombatant duty only
3.1 -O.
Conscientious objector available for civilian work only
4 . 1-S.
Deferred to end o f school year
S. 1-Y.
Physical or mental deferment
€. 2-A.
Occupational deferment
7 .2-C.
Agricultural deferment
8 .2-S.
Student deferment
9. 3-A.
Deferred because o f dependants
10.4-B.
Officials deferred by law
11.4-C.
Alien deferment
12.4-D.
Minister or ministerial student
13.4-F.
Not qualified for any service
14.5-A.
Overage

9. If you later left the country, please name the country to which you moved.
1.

Did not leave the country

2. Canada

3. Mexico

4. Sweden

5. Other_______________

10. If you later accepted induction, please name the branch o f service into which you were inducted.
1.

Did not accept induction 2. Army

7.

National Guard

3. Navy

4. Air Force

5. Marine Corps
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11. Based on the following scale o f 1 to 5, please rate your father’s reaction to events listed.

I. When I turned in/buroed my
draft card
2. When I retrieved my draft card
or asked my draft board for a new one
3. When I applied anew for a deferment
4. When I left the country
5. When I accepted induction
6. When I refused induction

Not
Strongly
Applicable Disapprove
.1
2

Disapprove
3

NonCommittal
4

Approve
5

Strongly
Approve
6

I

2

3

4

5

6

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6

Approve
5

Strongly
Approve
6

Comments:

12.

Based on the following scale o f 1 to 5, please rate your mother’s reaction to events listed.

1. When I turned in/burned my
draft card
2. When I retrieved my draft card
or asked my draft board for a new one
3. When I applied anew for a deferment
4. When I left the country
5. When 1accepted induction
6. When I refused induction

Not
Strongly
Applicable Disapprove
1
2
I

2

I
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

Disapprove
3

NonCommittal
4

Comments:

13. Which o f the following descriptions best characterizes the moment at which you turaed-in or burned your draft
card?
1. It was not spontaneous; 1 had planned to turn in my card that day.
2. It was somewhat spontaneous; I had been thinking about turning in my card, but was not committed
to it until the moment I did it.
3. It was completely spontaneous; I had not been considering turning in or burning my card until the moment I
did it.
Please comment (further description of your decision):
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14. If you later asked for your card back, or accepted a new one from your draft board, or sought a deferment, please
rank the following factors that may have contributed to this decision.
Somewhat
Not
Very
Important
Important
Important
Important
1. Disapproval o f parents) regarding open 2
4
3
confrontation with the government
2. Disapproval o f significant other regarding
open confrontation with the government
3. Knew people who had been drafted or
enlisted; didn’t want to “betray” them
4. Turned in/burned my card impulsively;
thought better o f it soon after
5. Possibility o f prosecudon
2
4
6. Possibility o f being drafted
2
4
7. Concern for how it might affect career
2
4
2
4
8. Concerned about being perceived as unpatriotic
or cowardly
9. No longer viewed resistance as a useful antiwar
strategy
4
10. Other_________________________________
2
2
4
11. Other_________________________________
Please comment (further description o f your decision):

15.

If you later left the country, please rank the following factors that may have contributed to this decision.
Not
Somewhat
Very
Important
Important
Important
Important

1. Disapproval ofparent(s) regarding open
confrontation with the government
2. Disapproval o f significant other regarding
open confrontation with the government
3. Possibility o f prosecution
4. Possibility o f being drafted
5. Concern for how it might affect career
6. No longer viewed resistance as a useful antiwar
strategy
7. Other________________________________
8. Other________________________________

1

2

3

4

I

2

3

4

I
I
I
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

2
2

3
3

4
4

I
I

Please comment:
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16.

If you later accepted induction, please tank the following factors that may have contributed to this decision.
Somewhat
Not
Very
Important
Important
Important
Important
4
2
1. Disapproval o f parents) regarding open ;
confrontation with the' government
2. Disapproval o f significant other regarding
open confrontation with the government
3. Knew people who had been drafted or
enlisted; didn’t want to “betray" them
4
2
4. Possibility o f prosecution
4
2
5. Just seemed like the right thing to do
4
2
6. Concern for how it might affect career
2
4
7. Concerned about being perceived as unpatriotic
or cowardly
8. Hoped to organize antiwar activity within the
military
9. No longer viewed resistance as a useful antiwar
strategy
2
4
10. Other_________________________________
2
4
11. Other_________________________________
Please comment:

17. If you later refused induction, please indicate which o f the following actions applied to your case (by circling) and
the approximate date o f each:
Approximate Date
1. Refused induction_________________________ _______________
2. Prosecuted
_______________
3. Acquitted
_______________
4. Convicted
_______________

18.

If you were convicted of charges o f violating draft laws, please describe your sentence.

19.

If you were sentenced to prison time, please indicate in which prison(s) you served and approximate dates.
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Please answer the following questions only if you worked as a draft counselor. Otherwise please proceed to
question 25.
20.

For which draft counseling organization did you work?
1. Boston Draft Resistance Group
2. American Friends’ Service Committee
3. Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors
4. A campus draft counseling organizations (please specify)___________________________
5. A church counseling center (please specify)______________________________________
6. Other (please specify)_______________________________________________________

21. Using the following descriptions of demographic groups, please rate from 0 to 100% the approximate proportion of
men whom you counseled.
1. White college students_____________________ ______
2. Minority college students
______
3. Middle-class white men not in college
______
4. Middle-class minority men not in college
______
5. Working class white men not in college
______
6. Working class minority men not in college
______
7. Other_____________________________
______

22. What did your parents think o f your participation in the movement as a draft counselor?
Mother

Not
Applicable

Strongly
Disapprove

Disapprove

Non-committal

1
Father

Not
Applicable

Approve

Strongly
Approve

5
Strongly
Disapprove

Disapprove

Non-committal

1

Approve

Strongly
Approve

5

23. If reaching draft-age men who were not college students was part o f your organization's goal, please note the extent
to which you believe the draft counseling efforts o f your organization were successful on that count.
Not a
Goal

Unsuccessful

1

2

Somewhat
Successful

Successful
4
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24. If you participated in Early Morning Shows or Honor Shows with BDRG, were you ever arrested? If so, please
inrfimty how many times you were arrested and the result o f these arrests (i.e., were you fined , prosecuted, etc.)
Number o f times arrested ______
1.

Charges dropped

2. Fined

6.

Sentenced to jail time

3. Prosecuted

4. Acquitted 5.Convicted

7. Sentenced to community service

8. Did not participate in such events

Background Information: T he following questions apply to ALL survey participants.
25. Date o f B i r t h : ____________________________
26. Sex: Male

Female

27. Race/Ethnicity:
1. White
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Asian-American
5. Other_____________
28. The following is a list o f levels o f education. Please indicate the highest level o f education attained by your parents
and yourself at the time o f your involvement with draft resistance.

1. Some grade school
2. Completed grade school
3. Some high school
4. Completed high school
5. Some post high school training, but not college
(e.g., technical school)
6. Some college
7. Completed college
8. Some graduate work
9. M.A. or M.S.
10. Professional degree (J.D., M.D., etc)
11. Masters degree plus work for higher degree
12. Doctorate (Ph.D., Ed.D, etc.)

Father
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Mother
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Self
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

29. What kind of job did your father have at the time you became involved with draft resistance? First, give a brief
name or title for his work such as electrician, engineer, accountant, etc.
F a t h e r : ____________________________________________________ _
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30.

In addition, please circle the answer category which best Sts your father's occupation at that time:
1. Semiskilled or unskilled worker (truck driver, factory worker, etc.)
2. Skilled worker (foreman, cook, machinist, carpenter, etc.)
3. Farmer (owner-operator of renter) "
4. Clerical or sales position
5. Proprietor, except farm (i.e., owner o f a business)
6. Professional (teacher, chemist, doctor, etc.) or managerial position (department head, postmaster.
police chief etc.)
7. Don't know

31. What kind o f job did your mother have at the time you became involved with draft resistance? First, give a brief
name or title for his work such as electrician, engineer, accountant, etc.
Mother_________________________________________________________

32.

In addition, please circle the answer category which best fits her occupation at that time:
1. Semiskilled or unskilled worker (truck driver, factory worker, etc.)
2. Skilled worker (foreman, cook, machinist, carpenter, etc.)
3. Farmer (owner-operator or renter)
4. Clerical or sales position
5. Proprietor, except farm (i.e., owner o f a business)
6. Professional (teacher, chemist, doctor, etc.) or managerial position (department head, postmaster,
police chief, etc.)
7. Don’t know

33. Which description would best characterize your family at the time you became involved with draft resistance?
1. Working class
2. Lower middle class
3. Middle class
4. Upper middle class
5. Upper class
34. Below is a list of political preferences. Please indicate which most closely describes the position of your parents
and yourself prior to your involvement with draft resistance.

1. Conservative Republican
2. Moderate Republican
3. Moderate Democrat
4. Liberal Democrat
5. Socialist/Communist
6. Anarchist
7. No political preference
8. Other

Father
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Mother
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Self
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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35. Did either o f your parents belong to a trade union?
No
Yes
Father

2

I

Name o f Union:__________________________________

Mother

2

1

Name o f Union:__________________________________

36. Did either o f your parents participate in any kind o f social activism before your participation in draft resistance?
Please describe:

37. At the time you became involved in draft resistance were you a veteran of the armed services? Were either o f your
parents veterans ax that time?
You

I. Yes

2. No

Mother

I. Yes

2. No

Father

1. Yes

2. No

38.

If you or either parent was a veteran, please indicate o f which branch?

You:

M other

Father

Coast
Guard

National
Guard

Marine
Corps

Coast
Guard

National
Guard

Air Force

Marine
Corps

Coast
Guard

National
Guard

4

5

Not a
Veteran

Army

Navy

Air Force

Marine
Corps

1

2

3

4

5

Not a
Veteran

Army

Navy

Air Force

2

3

4

Not a
Veteran

Army

Navy

1

2

3
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39. If you or either parent was a veteran, please indicate in which American wars any o f you saw active combat duty in
any o f this country’s wars (up to and including Vietnam)?
You:

Not a
Veteran
1

Mother

Not a
Veteran
1

Father

Not a
Veteran
1

No Combat World
Duty
War!
2

3

No Combat World
Duty
War!
2

3

No Combat World
Duty
War I
2

3

'

World
W arII
4

World
War H
4

World
War II
4

Korea
5

Korea
5

Korea
5

Dominican
Lebanon(1957) Republic(1965)
6

7

Dominican
Lebanon (1957) Republic (1965)
6

7

Dominican
Lebanon (1957) Republic (1965)
6

7

Vietnam
8

Vietnam
8

Vietnam
8

40. At the time you became involved in draft resistance, were you or either of your parents members o f any veteran's
organizations? If yes, which ones?
You:
2.

No

I. Yes

3. American Legion

4. VFW

5. Other_________________________

Mother
2.

No

1. Yes

3. American Legion

4. VFW

5. Other_

No

I. Yes

3. American Legion

4. VFW

5. Other_

Father
2.

41. What was your occupation at the time you became involved with draft resistance? First, give a brief name or title
for your work such as electrician, engineer, accountant, etc.

42.

In addition, please circle the answer category which best fit your occupation at that time:
1. Semiskilled or unskilled worker (truck driver, factor worker, etc.)
2. Skilled worker (foreman, cook, machinist, carpenter, etc.)
3. Fanner (owner-operator or renter)
4. Clerical or sales position
5. Proprietor, except farm, (i.e., owner o f a business)
6. Professional (teacher, chemist, doctor, etc.) or managerial position (department head, postmaster,
police chief, etc.)
7. Student
8. Don’t know

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

579
43. If you were a student, please indicate where you were studying at the time you became involved with draft
resistance.

In which year o f school were you at the time you became involved with draft resistance?
1. High School
2. College Freshman
3. College Sophomore
4. College Junior
5. College Senior
5. Graduate Student (Master’s program)
6. Graduate Student (Doctoral program)
7. NOT a student at the time
Please circle your major or field o f expertise at that time
1.

English

7.

Psychology

2. Philosophy

3. Sociology

8. Business

9. Biology

13.

Linguistics

14. Foreign Language

15.

O ther___________________________

4. History

5. Anthropology

10. Physics

6. Political Science

11. Chemistry

IS. Religion/Theology

16. Law

12. Engineering
17. Medicine

44. Below is a list o f religious preferences. Please circle the ones which most closely describe the preference of your
parents and yourself at the time you became involved with draft resistance. Circle all that apply.
Father
Mother Self
I
1. Roman Catholic or Orthodox Catholic
1
1
2
2
2. Baptist
2
3
3
3
3. Episcopal
4
4
4
4. Lutheran
5
5
5. Methodist
5
6
6
6. Presbyterian
6
7
7
7
7. Unitarian
8
8
8
8. Quaker
9
9
9. Mennonite
9
10
10
10
10. Jehovah’s Witness
11
11
11
11. Jewish
12
12
12
12. Agnostic
13
13
13
13. Atheist
14
14
14
14. Other fsoecify)
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45.

Please circle those activities in which you were involved prior to draft resistance:

On Campus:

9.SDS

1. Performing arts
2. National Student Association
3. Student government
4. Fraternity/sorority
5. Academic clubs or honor societies
6. Religious groups or activities
7. School newspaper
8. Athletics

11. Peace organizations or activities
12. Vietnam Summer
13. Civil rights organizations or activities
14. Other political organizations (e.g., Young Democrats, Young
Republicans. Friends o f SNCC, etc.)
15. Others (please describe)______________________________

In the Community:
1. Religious groups or activities
2. Civil rights organizations or activities
3. Peace organizations or activities
4. Vietnam Summer

5. Volunteer work
6. Others (please describe).

46. Please rank the following factors in terms o f how important each one was to your decision to get involved with draft
resistance.
Not
Somewhat
Important Important
1. Religious beliefs
1
2
2. Friends or acquaintances
1
2
3. Past social activism
1
2
4. News reports of draft resistance
1
2
5. Parents
1
2
6. Organizations o f which you were a member
1
2
(please name)
1
2
1
2
1
2

Important

Very
Important

47. Did any of your close friends become involved with draft resistance at the same time or after you did?
l.Y es

2. No

48. During the time that you were involved in draft resistance only, would you have identified yourself as:
I. A hippie
2. A politico
3. An activist
4. A revolutionary
5. Part o f the counterculture
6. Part of the New Left

l.Yes
l.Yes
l.Yes
l.Yes
l.Yes
l.Yes

2. No
2. No
2. No
2. No
2. No
2. No
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49. Please circle the number for the response that most accurately reflects your view o f the following statement
regarding women in the draft resistance movement.
Don’t
Strongly
Strongly
Know
Agree
Agree
Disagree Disagree
1. Although women were not draft eligible they played
an important role in the draft resistance movement
2. Women often attained positions o f leadership in
draft resistance organizations
3. Women sometimes attained positions o f leadership
in draft resistance organizations
4. Women often participated in determining important
policy and procedure issues in draft resistance
organizations.
5. Women were marginalized in the draft resistance
movement and mostly limited to clerical work
6. Women were encouraged to participate in draft
resistance organizations primarily as a way o f
attracting more men to the movement

2

4

5

2

4

5

2

4

5

2

4

5

4

5

4

5

50. What did you do immediately following your experience with draft resistance? If you went in the service or served
time in prison, please indicate what you did immediately after you left the service or got out o f prison. Please circle all
that apply.
1. Went to/finished graduate school
2. Remained active in antiwar movement
3. Became active in women’s liberation movement
4. Joined a commune
5. Joined Progressive Labor
6. Joined Weatherman
7. Employed a s ______________________ ______
8. Other (please specify)_______________ ______

51. Please list all the political or “movement” organizations, including local groups, to which you belonged from the
end o f your draft resistance work until the end o f the war in 1975.
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52. Please check the appropriate space to indicate your level o f involvement in the following movements or political
activities since your participation in draft resistance.
Very
Moderately Somewhat
Not
involved
involved
involved
involved
1. Other Vietnam Antiwar Movement activities
1
2
3
4
2. Student Movement
1
2
3
4
3. Women’s Movement
1
2
3
4
4. Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement
1
2
3
4
5. Farm Workers Movement
1
2
3
4
6. Labor Organizing
1
2
3
4
7. Pro-Choice Movement
1
2
3
4
8. Pro-Life Movement
1
2
3
4
9. Environmental Movement
1
2
3
4
10. Common Cause
1
2
3
4
11. Anti-Nuclear Movement
1
2
3
4
12. Nuclear Freeze
1
2
3
4
13. Contemporary Draft Resistance
1
2
3
4
14. Contemporary Peace Movement
1
2
3
4
15.1980s Central American Antiwar Movement
1
2
3
4
16. Anti-Apartheid Movement
1
2
3
4
17. Moral Majority
1
2
3
4
18. Christian Coalition
1
2
3
4
19. Socialist Movement
1
2
3
4
20. Democratic Party
1
2
3
4
21. Republican Party
1
2
3
4
22. Libertarian Party
1
2
3
4
23. Local Electoral Campaigns
1
2
3
4
24. State Electoral Campaigns
1
2
3
4
25. National Electoral Campaigns
1
2
3
4
26. Others (please describe)
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

53.

Are you presently employed? No_______

54.

Please list all major jobs you have had from the present back to 1969.
Years o f Employment
Job______________________________ from _____ To

Yes________ (if yes, p lease list your job below).
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55. Please circle the number which best characterizes your political stance:
You
Immediately After
Draft Resistance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1. Conservative Republican
2. Moderate Republican
3. Moderate Democrat
4. Liberal Democrat
5. Socialist/Communist
6. Anarchist
7. No political preference
8. Other

You
Today
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

56. Please list all political or movement organizations, including local groups, to which you currently belong. (Please
include any ostensibly nonpolitical organizations through which you participate in political activities, e.g., churches.)

57. Are your currently involved in any social movements?
1.

Yes

2. No

If yes, which ones?

58. How did your experience in the draft resistance movement affect decisions that you made later in life? Please circle
the number for the response that most accurately reflects your view o f the following statements.

1. My participation in draft resistance and/or related social
movements affected my choice o f mate(s).
2. My participation in draft resistance and/or related social
movements affected my choices about work.
3. My participation in draft resistance and/or related social
movements affected my choices about having children.
4. My participation in draft resistance and/or related social
movements affected my choices about religion.
(If your religious affiliation has changed from the
denomination marked in question 44, please indicate your
current religious affiliation)

No
Effect
3

Not
Applicable
4

Strong
Effect
1

Some
Effect
2

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4
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59.

Please circle the number for the response that most accurately reflects your view of the following statements.
Strongly
Strongly
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

1. In the 1960s, social movements were very effective
vehicles o f social change.
2. Social movements are potentially effective vehicles o f
social change in contemporary America.
3. The 1960s generation was a destructive generation
4. Social movements based on moral witness are potentially
effective vehicles for social change in contemporary America
5. Social movements rooted in non-violence are potentially
effective vehicles for social change in contemporary America
6. The draft resistance movement brought about the end o f the
Vietnam era draft
7. The draft resistance movement contributed to bringing the
Vietnam War to an end.
8. The antiwar movement was ineffective and actually
prolonged the war
9. Compulsory military service would help to create a greater
sense o f civic responsibility in contemporary America

2

3

2

3

2
2

3
3

2

3

2

3

2

3

2

3

2

3

Please comment in more detail:
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Current Information (optional)
In contacting many survey participants, I have been aided by numerous college alumni relations departments. A sa
result, I do not have current addresses for many respondents. My hope is that you will be willing to complete this
section, particularly if you are open to being interviewed, but let me again assure you that information from individual
surveys will be completely confidential. I plan to use only the aggregate results o f this survey; I will not, under any
circumstances, connect names to individual survey responses, nor will I share such information with anyone else.
Interviews generally take no more than 2 hours. In most cases, interviewees will be identified on tape and in
transcripts, however, anonymity can be arranged if desired.
60. Are you willing to be interviewed?
I. la m willing to be interviewed

2 .1am not willing to be interviewed

61. Name:___________________________________
62. Address:_______________________________________

63. Phone:
64. E-mail:

THANKS VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE!

Again, any help you could provide in locating other individuals who participated in draft resistance in Boston would be
greatly appreciated. Please list any addresses you can provide.

Also, do you have any draft resistance related archives (including, pamphlets, leaflets, newsletters, photographs, diaries,
correspondence) that you would be willing to share with me?

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX C

MEDITATIONS ON DRAFT RESISTANCE RESEARCH

AND PUBLIC MEMORY

For the past two years. I have frequently been reminded o f the controversial and
misunderstood nature o f the historical events that I write about in this dissertation. When
people ask about the subject o f my research, almost inevitably they interpret it as a study
o f draft “dodgers,” make comments about Bill Clinton and Dan Quayle, and sometimes
wonder aloud why I would even be interested in such people. Others understand quite
well the difference between draft resistance and draft dodging but still can barely contain
their contempt. For example, in the course o f explaining the process for calling up
certain papers in a collection at the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, one archivist
only partially in jest used the name “Idiots Against the Draft” as an example o f an
organization that might have some letters in President Johnson’s correspondence files.
The most hostile responses, however, have come from people I have never met.
In the course o f trying to locate hundreds o f former draft resistance movement
participants, I unexpectedly irritated, angered, and frustrated about a dozen people who
felt compelled to call me or write to me to complain. This Appendix is included here
because I think some o f those responses shed a little light on how draft resistance and the
antiwar movement o f the 1960s still is perceived by some segments o f the American
population today.
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In the course o f trying to locate hundreds o f former draft resisters and other
participants in Boston’s draft resistance movement, I had to master some o f the skills o f
the private detective. Using an internet site called Switchboard.com (which lists the
entire nations phone listings and addresses) I successfully located dozens of people whose
names I had found in a variety o f manuscript and published sources. Frequently,
however, I could not determine if a person who had the same name as a former activist
was the person I sought. Often I could not narrow it down to fewer than seven or eight
people all o f whom had the same name. Consequently, on a case by case basis, I
sometimes decided to send an introductory letter to, say, all seven people named John
Doe to inquire if any of them were the John Doe who had participated in the draft
resistance movement in Boston. If I sent seven letters, of course, it meant that at least six
were going to the wrong person - maybe all seven - and so I tried to make it clear in the
opening paragraph o f each letter that I was not sure if I had sent the letter to the right
person. Not knowing there would ever be any need to do so, I did not keep track of the
number of duplicate letters that I sent out, or even how many names in my database
received this treatment. I did, however, begin to track the responses fairly soon after I
began receiving them.
In most cases, I received very courteous (what I would call “neutral”) responses to
my inquiries either by phone call, e-mail, or letter. Out of a total o f 51 responses, 36 were
neutral, written simply to inform me that I had not found the correct person. One of those
was a man who called me directly because he feared he might not receive an expected
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government security clearance if his name could be found out there, even erroneously, on
a document identifying him as a draftfesister. I told him that I doubted it would be a
problem, but he could have the FBI call me if there was any confusion on the issue. In
addition to the neutral responses, another five responses were positive, expressing interest
in the project and wishing me well with the work.
At the same time, however, another 10 individuals called or wrote to express their
disapproval of draft resistance and, sometimes, their disapproval o f my project. In spite
my attempts to make it clear that I did not know if I was writing to the correct person,
some recipients interpreted my letter as some kind o f accusation that they were draft
resisters or were somehow on an official list of American draft resisters. “Please insure
that my name and address is not on your list. I would hate to be in any way associated
with this group,” wrote one man. Another scribbled, “I have never participated in any
draft card turn-in ceremony. I [sic] never been to Boston. How my name got in your file,
I don't know. Please remove it! I have serviced [sic] my country. And proud of it and I
was not drafted. I enlisted.” Several, it turned out, were veterans o f World War H, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and each made sure to express their pride in having
served their country and their “disdain” for those who did not. One former Marine wrote
to the president o f the university demanding that his name be removed from the records I
cited, and urged the president to caution her faculty “to be more thorough in their efforts
to c o mmunicate with ‘possible participants’ especially with such a controversial subject
as ‘draff resistance.’”
Some phone calls and letters were particularly vituperative. One man called to

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

589
tell me that his middle initial was different from the man I sought. He concluded the
conversation by saying his namesake “ought to be shot, that’s what I say.” Another wrote
“I was shocked to receive your letter wondering if I was one of the contemptible scum
you are trying to locate. I served twenty-two years in the Army, and you are free to do
your research due to the efforts o f people like me. I find it hard to imagine that someone
would attempt to develop a history o f a group o f self-centered 'useful fools,' to quote
Lenin.” Another veteran wrote that he believed civil disobedience to be a “synonym for
anarchy” and that he regarded draft resisters as cowards, including, he said, “our draftdoging [sic] president.” He went on to criticize the “army of second-guessers who simply
can’t comprehend the magnitude o f the Soviet Menace to our way o f life,” and especially
to the United States. “It is so easy for the cloistered PhD,” he wrote, "to ruminate over
the way it should have been with present knowledge. It is quite another thing to have
been there, and been fully informed on what the Reds would have done to all of us, had
they been able to do the job.”
This is, obviously, a pretty unscientific sampling o f public opinion, but it does
offer some food for thought. Maybe most important is that the overwhelming number of
people who took the time to contact me did so considerately and expressed no value
judgements about draft resisters or historians who study them. This fact alone leaves me
hopeful that a history of the draft resistance movement will at least be considered by
open-minded people. The more angry responses point to the issues o f loyalty, patriotism,
and freedom that I first raised in the introduction. For these individuals, there can be no
compromise on the question o f one’s obligation to one’s country, and as one man
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implied, to the American “way o f life.” It is at least an understandable position to take.
My hope, however, is that this history”o f draft resistance will complicate the definitions
o f loyalty, patriotism, and the American way of life. Those who opposed the war, and
were willing to commit civil disobedience as a way o f confronting the government
officials responsible for the war, did so out of a belief that dissent can be patriotic, and
their actions would help to preserve some o f the finest qualities o f that American way of
life.
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